(Previous Incident Code: B6 )

In a failed attempt to target al-Qaida’s “number two”, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an alleged US drone strike killed up to 82 civilians, hereof up to 74 below the age of 18, as a Madrasa, a religious school in Chenegai, Bajaur Agency, was struck, international and local media reported.

An attack on a madrassa – allegedly a Taliban training camp according to some Pakistan army officials – resulted in one of the highest recorded death tallies of the drones campaign. Initially, the Pakistani military claimed “confirmed intelligence reports that 70 to 80 militants were hiding in a madrassa used as a terrorist training facility”, thus denying that the victims were civilians, as reported by Inter Press Service. However, eyewitnesses identified U.S. drones as carrying out the strikes, and that all the victims were local students of the madrassa.

The school, run by Maulvi Liaqat (killed, possibly along with his three sons), was destroyed, resulting in more than 80 deaths. Ayman al-Zawahiri was reported by some to be the intended target, though he appears not to have been present. However, according to CNN and other media outlets, Mauli Liaqat was an al-Qaida affiliated. The News reported that while he ran the school, he  was a leader of the banned pro-Taliban organisation, Tanzim Nifaz Shariat-i-Mohammadi (TNSM).

The death toll spanned from 70, as reported by BBC to as many as 82, as reported by several media.

A report prepared by the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) administration found that 81 died, stating: ’80 children 01 men all civilian’.

Meanwhile, Pakistani newspaper The News published the names and ages of 69 children, under the UN definition of a child as being under 18 years old. The discrepancy between the figures appears to be because the FATA Secretariat has also classified older students killed as ‘children’.

Moreover, three tribal elders may also have died.

The total number of named fatalities, listed below, amount to 81 – hereof 74 below the age of 18.

There were just three survivors, two named as Usman aged 15 or 16, and 22-year old Abu Bakr, reportedly all left seriously wounded. Additionally a local farmer, Jan Mohammad, was reported murdered shortly after the attack, with a note on his body claiming he had been killed for spying for the US and Pakistan.

The attack led to uproar in Bajaur and across Pakistan, on a day that local militants were expected to sign a peace agreement with Islamabad. Although the Pakistan Army initially claimed it was responsible, blame was soon laid at the CIA’s door. A senior aide to Pakistan’s then-leader General Musharraf said:

“We thought it would be less damaging if we said we did it rather than the US. But there was a lot of collateral damage and we’ve requested the Americans not to do it again.”

In August 2011 former ISI director General Asad Durrani confirmed to IPS that the attack was the work of the US, stating that the drone attack ‘effectively sabotaged the chances for an agreement‘ in Bajaur and that it was ‘a very clear message‘ from the CIA not to enter into any more such peace agreements. However, Pervez Musharraf in June 2012 denied that a large number of children died, telling the New Statesman’s Jemima Khan that ‘It’s all bullshit – sorry for the word – that it was a madrassa and seminary and children were studying Quran. They used this as cover.’ He added confusingly when asked about reports of children killed:

“I don’t remember. In the media, they said it was all children. They were absolutely wrong. There may have been some collateral damage of some children but they were not children at all, they were all militants doing training inside.”

According to The Long War Journal, between two and five “senior al-Qaida leaders” were killed in the strike.

In March 2012, the Washington Post ran a profile of the long-serving head of the CIA’s Counter Terrorism Center [CTC], ‘Roger’, noting that the CIA had planned for months an expansion of its Pakistan drones campaign:

“When Michael V. Hayden became CIA director in May 2006, Roger began laying the groundwork for an escalation of the drone campaign. Over a period of months, the CTC chief used regular meetings with the director to make the case that intermittent strikes were allowing al-Qaeda to recover and would never destroy the threat. “He was relentless,” said a participant in the meetings. Roger argued that the CIA needed to mount an air campaign against al-Qaeda “at a pace they could not absorb” and warned that “after the next attack, there would be no explaining our inaction.”

Finally, as reported by the Long War Journal, an American intelligence source said that the Pakistani Army “does not possess the capabilities to conduct precision night strikes such as this attack,” why it is more likely to have been carried out by a Predator drone, or by U.S. C-130 gunships or helicopters.