US Forces in Yemen

Mabkhout Ali al Ameri with his 18-month old son Mohammed, shortly after a botched US raid on al Ghayil in January 2017 had killed at least 20 villagers, including Mohammed's mother Fatim Saleh Mohsen. © Iona Craig

Belligerent
US Forces
Country
Yemen
start date
end date
Civilian Harm Status
Belligerent Assessment
Declassified Documents
Strike Status
Strike Type
Infrastructure

Incident Code

USYEMTr006-C

Incident date

January 29, 2017

Location

الغيل, al Ghayil, Yakla, Bayda, Yemen

Geolocation

14.592945, 45.038975 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Village level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

At least 15 civilians, including at least 10 children and four women, were reportedly killed in a US Navy special forces operation in al-Ghayil village, Yakla region of Bayda province – though the reported civilian toll varied considerably. The US military has to date conceded 12 deaths.

A force of US Navy SEALs engaged in a firefight with alleged militants in the village at around 1:30am, before sustaining injuries and one death, and then calling in air support to facilitate their withdrawal.  Though the raid was publicly announced as a “site exploitation mission”, intended to recover sensitive information on AQAP militants, later reporting by NBC revealed that the mission had been to “kill-or-capture” AQAP leadership, possibly including AQAP leader Qassim al-Raymi.

Assessments of civilian casualties varied considerably.  While NBC News reported that Nasser al-Awlaki, the grandfather of Nawar al-Awlaki who was killed during the raid, alleged that some initial total fatality counts were as high as 59, local medics and tribal sources reported around 30 deaths including 10 women and children, according to Reuters.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism worked with a journalist who visited al-Ghayil five days after the raid and spoke with nine survivors, collecting the names of 25 civilians killed as reported by those who lived there.   According to the Bureau, these names were later corroborated in an investigation by Human Rights Watch.

Ten of those civilian names collected by the Bureau were under the age of 18, nine of whom were under the age of 13.  However, of the child casualties reported by the Bureau, Abdallah Ahmed Abad al-Zouba was also listed as an AQAP militant in a statement by the militant group, and is not therefore counted in Airwars’ minimum civilian child casualty figure.  Two further child casualties, not included in the Bureau’s list, were reported in international media.  Osama, the child of AQAP member Arwa al-Baghdadi, was killed during the raid, according to The Intercept and a statement by AQAP.  Multiple reports suggested that a newborn child, born 48 hours later by emergency caesarean section, subsequently died due to injuries sustained by the mother, Arwa al-Baghdadi’s sister-in-law, during the raid.

In its own list of casualties, as reported by Al Araby, AQAP stated that three unnamed children of Abu Abdelileh al-Hadrami were killed in the raid, though no other sources mentioned these children, and it was unclear whether they were the same as others already named by others.  The minimum number of civilian child casualties given by Airwars is therefore eleven, ten of whom are named.  The maximum is given as fifteen, including Abdallah Ahmed Abad al-Zouba and the three unnamed children of Abu Abdelileh al-Hadrami.  The Bureau also reported that five children were injured in the raid.

In the Bureau’s original report it was stated that, of the 25 reported civilian deaths, eight were women, including one who was heavily pregnant, and that two additional women were injured. In the Bureau’s list as published by Al Araby, however, only seven adult female casualties were named. In addition, one of the women listed, Arwa al Baghdadi, was reported to be an AQAP member by multiple sources; some AQAP propaganda channels indicated that she may have been directly involved in combat during the raid, though this was denied by local residents.

Some reports variously suggested that Arwa al-Baghdadi’s unnamed pregnant sister-in-law – the wife of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – either died of injuries sustained during the raid after giving birth, or survived.  It could not be confirmed whether she was among those casualties named by the Bureau or other sources.  AQAP additionally stated that the “wife of Abi Walid al-Hadrami” had been killed in the raid, but this was not confirmed by any other sources, and it was unclear whether she was among those casualties named by other sources.  Airwars’ minimum number of adult female civilian casualties is therefore presently set at six, all of whom are named, with a maximum of ten, including the eight mentioned by the Bureau and the wives of Al-Hadrami and al-Baghdadi.

Eight of the civilian names collected by the Bureau were adult men, of which five were also claimed by AQAP or other sources to be AQAP militants; Airwars’ minimum number of adult male civilian casualties is therefore set at three, all of whom are named.  Cumulatively, twenty minimum civilian fatalities of the raid are given by Airwars, of which nineteen are named.

On February 1st 2017, CENTCOM reported that civilian non-combatants were likely killed “in the midst of” the firefight, and that this “may include children”.  According to this report, “the known possible civilian casualties appear to have been potentially caught up in aerial gunfire that was called in to assist U.S. forces in contact against a determined enemy that included armed women firing from prepared fighting positions, and U.S. special operations members receiving fire from all sides to include houses and other buildings”.

On February 28th, a Pentagon official told NBC News that the Pentagon did not dispute the numbers reported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. However, in March, General Votel told the Senate Armed Services Committee that US forces killed between four and twelve civilians casualties in the raid. A later investigation by NBC included US intelligence sources saying sixteen civilians in total died as a result of the operation, contradicting Votel’s March comments. NBC determined from official documents verified by US intelligence that ten children under 13 had been killed.   A later internal Joint Special Operations Command report, obtained by The Intercept in December 2018, described the raid as resulting in “minimal civilian casualties”.

Numbers of reported combatant casualties also exhibited considerable variance.  One US soldier, Navy SEAL William ‘Ryan’ Owens, was killed by fire from alleged militants, while at least three further US personnel were injured, some during the “hard landing” of an Osprey helicopter during the raid.

US Central Command initially reported that fourteen AQAP militants were killed during the raid, including “two longstanding AQAP operational planners and weapons experts”, Sultan al-Dhahab and Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab.  Some local sources, as well as an AQAP statement, further suggested that Saif al-Jawqfi, an 80 year-old killed during the raid, had connections to AQAP.  According to “local sources”, reported by Al Jazeera, an AQAP leader, Abu Abu Barzan, was also killed, though other sources did not mention his name, and he did not appear in casualty lists given by either AQAP or the Bureau of Investigative Journalism.  According to AFP, one local Yemeni source initially stated that as many as 41 total “presumed militants” had been killed.  The internal Pentagon report obtained by The Intercept in December 2018 gave an overall number of 35 enemy combatants killed.

Several reports indicated that at least three of those killed during the raid were AQAP members.  Multiple sources suggested that the son of a local tribesman, Mohammed al-Ameri, Arwa al-Baghdadi and her brother Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were “low-level” AQAP militants; all three were killed during the raid. Arwa and Abu Bakr were being sheltered in Mohammed al-Ameri’s house at the time of the raid, and one source indicated that this house was also used by passing AQAP militants.

Further, some witnesses suggested that additional AQAP militants may have joined the firefight from the surrounding area during the raid.  To reflect these issues, Airwars’ minimum estimate of militants killed in the raid is set at three.  Correspondingly, the maximum number of civilian casualties is set at 56, reflecting the highest alleged death toll of 59, less the three minimum militant casualties recorded by Airwars.  The maximum number of combatant casualties is set at 42, to reflect the highest alleged number of militant casualties, in addition to the single US death.

However, local sources and on-the-ground reporting cast significant doubt upon the more substantial militant casualty figures given by the US military and some other sources.  Both local residents and Yemeni state sources, as well as an investigation by the Associated Press, disputed that Sultan al-Dhahab or Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab were AQAP militants.  Instead, multiple sources, including Yemeni government army moral guidance director Major General Mohsen Kosroof, claimed that Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab was instead a leader of US-backed pro-Hadi militia forces, and that he had returned to Yakla to distribute payment to fighters.  Both are listed as civilians in the Bureau of Investigative Journalism’s report on the raid.

In an interview with PBS Frontline, Abdulilah al-Dhahab, brother of Sultan and Abd-al-Ra’uf, said that neither were AQAP militants, and also stated that Abd-al-Ra’uf was a leader in the US-backed anti-Houthi forces.  The Yemeni government confirmed to PBS Frontline that Abd-al-Ra’uf held this position.  Abdulilah al-Dhahab went into hiding in the aftermath of the raid, according to Frontline, and has since been the target of several reported US raids.

In an investigation for The Intercept, journalist Iona Craig suggested that many of the combatants encountered by US forces in the al-Ghayil were likely scared civilians acting in self-defence, rather than AQAP militants, having previously been attacked by Houthi forces. “If you want to hunt al-Qaida, you can find them in the surrounding mountains not in this small village… The Americans’ information was wrong,” said Aziz Mabkhout, the village chief, according to Associated Press.  PBS Frontline later published witness testimony, suggesting that the village had been attacked by Houthis hours before the raid, and that the villagers initially believed US forces to also be Houthis.

In an initial statement, AQAP indicated that the raid had killed “only women and children… with some tribal leaders who have no connections” to the group, while a statement by AQAP leader al-Raymi listed fourteen men as dead, but did not clearly state that they were AQAP members.  Eight of those names given were listed with a nom de guerre, indicating likely membership.  According to Iona Craig of The Intercept, eight names given by AQAP were not included in the list of the dead that villagers provided to her, and were not known to local residents.  They were also not given in the Bureau’s list of casualties.  Family members disputed that the remaining six men were AQAP militants.  These six names included Mohammed al-Ameri, Sultan al-Dhahab, Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab, Saif al-Jawqfi, and seventeen year-old Abdallah Ahmed Abad al-Zouba, as well as Abdallah Mabkhout al-Ameri.

Similarly, both local residents and commentators disputed the reports by US Central Command that female fighters had been involved in the firefight.  Pentagon spokesperson Jeff Davis stated that “female fighters ran to pre-established positions as though they had trained to be ready” to fight during the raid.  Some AQAP propaganda channels reported that women had been involved in combat during the raid.  However, all of those local residents spoken to by Iona Craig for The Intercept “strongly challenged this accusation, citing a culture that views the prospect of women fighting, as Nesma al Ameri put it, as ‘eib’ — shameful and dishonorable — and pointing out the practical implausibility of women clutching babies while also firing rifles”.  It is unclear what proportion of US-reported enemy casualties, if any, female fighters constituted.

According to both global media and local sources, the raid began in the early hours of the morning of January 29th.  Around thirty US SEALs and Emirati special forces entered the village, accompanied by military dogs. After taking wounded and one fatality – Navy SEAL William ‘Ryan’ Owens, US forces called in air support, including two Marine Corps CV-22 Osprey tilt rotor vertical take-off and landing aircraft, along with AV-8B Harrier jump jets and attack helicopters.  During attempts to evacuate the US-Emirati forces, one Osprey helicopter experienced a “hard landing”, and was then intentionally destroyed by US aircraft.  Multiple sources suggested that the overall firefight lasted for around an hour.

Local sources alleged that US forces began firing on the village and killing indiscriminately, causing civilians to take up arms in self-defence.  One anonymous local resident told Reuters that the “operation began at dawn when a drone bombed the home of Abdulraoof al-Dhahab and then helicopters flew up and unloaded paratroopers at his house and killed everyone inside”, and, subsequently, “the gunmen opened fire at the U.S. soldiers who left the area, and the helicopters bombed the gunmen and a number of homes and led to a large number of casualties”.

According to an investigation by Human Rights Watch, “men in al-Dahab’s house heard people approaching and called out. When they got no response, they began shooting”. Another witness said that “the men in [al-Dahab’s] house fired warning shots into the air and that the forces outside then opened fire on the home”.  Some sources reported that this advance was accompanied, or shortly preceded, by aerial strikes against the village. According to Alwaght, these targeted “a number of locations where al-Qaeda elements are believed to be entrenched in the area, including a school and an al-Qaeda prison”.  Others told Human Rights watch that “[Mohammed] al-Ameri’s house was destroyed by an aerial bomb soon after fighting began, killing at least nine people, including him, four women, and four children”.

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that eleven-year-old Ahmed al-Dhahab was one of the first killed in the raid.  His father, Abdelilah Ahmed al-Dhahab, told the Bureau that “when my son Ahmed saw them, he couldn’t tell that they were soldiers because it was dark… He asked them ‘Who are you?’ but the men shot him. He was the first killed. No one thought that marines would descend on our homes to kill us, kill our children and kill our women”.  Abdelilah al-Dhahab later told PBS Frontline that his son was shot through the heart by US forces when he saw them, prompting the family to return fire.

Abdullah al-Dhahab, whose son, Nasser, was killed in the raid told the Bureau “that his son had gone to visit family members in the Yakla area during the midterm school holiday… ‘Nasser was very smart, and he was special to me. He was my friend, despite being young, and I trusted his decisions. … The American raid killed my son, a student in the eighth grade. … There needs to be accountability for those who carried out this crime before American courts'”.

According to witness Sadiq al Jawfi, both Abd-al-Ra’uf al-Dhahab and Sultan al-Dhahab were shot as they exited their home, as well as 80-year-old Saif al Jawfi.  Witnesses, including Abdelilah al-Dhahab, told the Bureau that US forces fired indiscriminately on the home of 65-year-old Abdallah Mabkhout al-Ameri, attacking everyone who left their home.  Abdallah was a survivor of a previous US drone strike in the area, in 2013, which had hit his wedding.  Saleh Mohsen al-Ameri said that US forces “attacked the mosque, school, medical unit and a prison in the area…  Anybody leaving the house was hit and killed… people in here have nothing but Kalashnikovs” to defend themselves.  According to The Intercept, the firefight escalated as others from the area came to support the al-Ghayil villagers.  Some sources claimed that AQAP militants from the area joined the battle, but others mentioned only villagers.

Further reported civilian casualties came as the result of US close air support.  Aziz al-Ameri reported that “[attack helicopters] were shooting at anything moving, anything that moved they shot, human or animal, even donkeys”.  Several reports suggested that multiple houses and buildings were destroyed by air support.  Speaking with Iona Craig of The Intercept, Nesma al Ameri, “an elderly village matriarch who lost four family members in the raid, described how the attack helicopters began firing down on anything that moved”.  Various sources alleged that 30-year-old Fatim Saleh Mohsen al-Ameri was shot in the back of the head and killed while fleeing fire with her 18-month-old son and her other children.  Her son, Mohammed, survived, but was injured.   “We pulled him out from his mother’s lap. He was covered in her blood,” said 11-year-old Basil Ahmed Abad al­ Zouba.  Fahad Ali al-Ameri said that his three-month-old daughter was killed in her crib when a missile hit his home.  The Intercept reported that three children of Mohammed al-Ameri were killed when an airstrike hit his home.

Nawar al-Awlaki, an eight year-old girl visiting her uncle in the village, was reportedly killed while hiding in a house, after fire from a gunship hit her in her neck.  According to her uncle, Abdelilah al-Dahab, she bled to death over the course of two hours. Her grandfather, Nasser al-Awlaki, who was not present at the time of the raid, told NBC News that “when the attack came, they were sitting in the house, and a bullet struck her in her neck at 2:30 past midnight. Other children in the same house were killed.”  According to Nasser, US forces “entered another house and killed everybody in it, including all the women. They burned the house”.  Nawar al-Awlaki’s father, the American preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by a US drone strike in 2011.  Her sixteen-year-old American-born brother was also killed by a 2011 US drone strike.

Reporting by Human Rights Watch further suggested that those injured during the raid struggled to get medical care.  “Dr. Ameen Mabrook, director of the “26th September” hospital in al-Joubah district in Marib, a five-hour drive from the Yakla area and the nearest hospital that provides neonatal care, said that the hospital received three people wounded in the raid – a young man shot in the leg, a pregnant woman, and a small girl”.  The pregnant woman, the sister-in-law of Arwa al-Baghdadi, had been shot in the stomach, and gave birth to a child who later died on January 31st due to these injuries.

This picture of events strongly contradicts reports from US officials and US Central Command.  In a CENTCOM press release, it was stated that the US force came under attack from a “determined enemy that included armed women firing from prepared fighting positions, and U.S. special operations members receiving fire from all sides to include houses and other buildings”.  Speaking with Reuters, three US officials said that “the attacking SEAL team found itself dropping onto a reinforced al Qaeda base defended by landmines, snipers, and a larger than expected contingent of heavily armed Islamist extremists”.  “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has a horrifying history of hiding women and children within militant operating areas and terrorist camps, and continuously shows a callous disregard for innocent lives”, said CENTCOM spokesperson Col. John J. Thomas.

In its May 2018 annual civilian casualty report, the US Department of Defense stated that “there were credible reports of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military actions in Yemen against AQAP and ISIS during 2017”, but did not specify which specific actions these credible reports referred to.  Overall, the Department of Defense assessed that there were credible reports of “approximately 499 civilians killed and approximately 169 civilians injured during 2017”, as a result of US military actions in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen.

In late 2020, following the publication of its report into Trump-era drone strikes in Yemen, Airwars had to remind CENTCOM of its previous confirmation to the Senate of up to 12 civilians killed at Yakla, after a press statement was issued asserting only that “there may have been civilian casualties”. CENTCOM’s official spokesman blamed the mistake on an “administrative error.”

A major report into Trump actions in Yemen, issued in March 2021 by the Yemeni human rights group Mwatana, lowered the minimum likely civilian toll at Yakla to at least fifteen killed – which it said was “likely a conservative estimate.” The study, Death Falling From The Sky, contained multiple eyewitness statements on the Yakla raid from survivors, many of whom had witnessed the killing of close relatives in the US attack.

Ten year old Barzan Mohammad Abdallah Mabkhout Al Amir, whose family lived in the village, for example recalled: “We were all asleep when we suddenly heard the shooting. Our mother gathered us in one room to protect us. My grandfather was immediately killed after he left the house. The house collapsed and my mother, father, and siblings were all killed.”

The report also noted that “Residents told Mwatana that US forces used helicopters to attack inhabited houses, and that US soldiers stormed the village and opened fire, including on villagers fleeing from their homes. Some of those interviewed by Mwatana said that some men in the village tried to fire back when they realized their village was under attack.”

More than three years after the US raid, residents described to Mwatana the extreme trauma they still experienced: “The strike left people in the village, particularly children, paralyzed with fear, residents said. Traumatized, people in the village told Mwatana in May 2020 that they were still struggling to carry out regular activities, such as farming. One man, whose daughter was killed in the raid, said his wife was traumatized and that her health had gravely deteriorated after the raid and their daughter’s death.”

The report concluded: “Mwatana found no credible information suggesting that these 20 civilians killed or wounded were directly participating in hostilities with AQAP or IS-Y. Of the 15 civilians killed, only one was an adult man, who residents said was old—about 65—who was unable to fight and had lost his hearing before the raid. All the rest were children—most very young—or women.”

Responding to the Mwatana report in April 2021, CENTCOM raised its estimate of civilians killed at Yakla to twelve. The following month, DoD’s annual civilian harm report to Congress noted that ” USCENTCOM assessed that between 4 and 12 civilians
were killed during this incident, however the assessment was not able to determine a more precise number. Twelve civilians killed is reported here.”

The incident occured at approximately 1:30 am local time.

The victims were named as:

Family members (16)

3 months years old female killed
4 years years old female killed
5 years years old female killed
5 years years old male killed
6 years years old male killed
7 years years old female killed
38 years years old female killed
25 years old female killed
24 or 30 years old female killed
40 years old female killed
Adult female killed
Adult female killed
37 years old male killed
38 years old male Alleged by multiple sources to be an AQAP militant killed
65 years old male Alleged by multiple sources to be an AQAP militant killed
2 years old male injured

Family members (4)

11 years old male killed
12 years old male killed
32 years old male Alleged by multiple sources to be an AQAP militant killed
37 years old male Alleged by multiple sources to either have been an AQAP militant or a pro-government militant killed

Family members (2)

35 years old male killed
55 years old male killed

Family members (3)

Adult female Alleged by multiple sources to be an AQAP militant killed
Age unknown female pregnant Alleged in some sources to have been killed killed

Family members (4)

Adult female Reported only in AQAP statement killed
Child Reported only in AQAP statement killed
Child Reported only in AQAP statement killed
Child Reported only in AQAP statement killed

The victims were named as:

8 years years old female killed
17 years old male Alleged to have been an AQAP militant in a statement by the group killed
80 years old male Alleged by multiple sources to be an AQAP militant killed

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Counter-Terrorism Action (Ground)
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    15 – 56
  • (10–15 children4–10 women1–8 men)
  • Civilians reported injured
    5–7
  • Causes of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions, Small arms and light weapons
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Confirmed
    A specific belligerent has accepted responsibility for civilian harm.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    4–42
  • Belligerents reported injured
    3–6

Sources (92) [ collapse]

Media
from sources (52) [ collapse]

  • The Pentagon said that an Osprey helicopter had experienced a "hard landing" during the raid, allegedly shown here (Al Jazeera, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    Eight-year-old Nawar al-Awlaki was reportedly fatally wounded after US forces fired upon the house she was hiding in during the raid. Photos of her body, shown here, circulated online after the raid. (Alshahed News, January 29th 2017)
  • Interior view of a building allegedly destroyed during the raid (Alahd, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@amerAlhamiqaniu, January 29th 2017)
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    Abd al-Raoud al-Dahab was reportedly killed during the January 29th 2017 raid. The US claimed that he was an AQAP militant, but other sources disputed this, instead suggesting that he was pro-Hadi government fighter (@shahd201062, January 29th 2017)
  • Abd al-Raoud al-Dahab was reportedly killed during the January 29th 2017 raid. The US claimed that he was an AQAP militant, but other sources disputed this, instead suggesting that he was pro-Hadi government fighter (@shahd201062, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    A compilation of alleged child victims of the raid (@ahmadnaser4444, January 29th 2017)
  • A car allegedly destroyed during the January 29th 2017 raid (@almisbarr, January 29th 2017)
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    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@m_alsallaly, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@mazenyemen, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@mazenyemen, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@abu_japheth, January 29th 2017)
  • This media contains graphic content. Click to unblur.

    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@abu_japheth, January 29th 2017)
  • Alleged remnants of US medical supplies from the site of the raid (Elyamnelaraby, January 29th 2017)
  • Alleged remnants of US medical supplies from the site of the raid (Elyamnelaraby, January 29th 2017)
  • Abd al-Raoud al-Dahab was reportedly killed during the January 29th 2017 raid. The US claimed that he was an AQAP militant, but other sources disputed this, instead suggesting that he was pro-Hadi government fighter (Tehama Press, January 29th 2017)
  • "William Owens holds a photo of his son, Navy SEAL William "Ryan" Owens, in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Florida." (NBC, October 1st 2017) William "Ryan" Owens was killed during the raid.
  • "William Owens stands with his son, William "Ryan" Owens, in front of a helicopter in a family photo." (NBC, February 27th 2017) US Navy SEAL William "Ryan" Owens was killed during the raid.
  • Eight-year-old Nawar al-Awlaki was reportedly fatally wounded after US forces fired upon the house she was hiding in during the raid. (@nationalyemen, February 3rd 2017)
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    A newborn child allegedly died, 48 hours after the raid, due to wounds sustained by the mother during the raid. Some sources alleged that the mother was the nine-months pregnant sister-in-law of Arwa al-Baghdadi, and had been shot in the stomach. (@karot2525, January 31st 2017)
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    Pro-AQAP media channels used images from the raid in propaganda efforts (@ludowizze, January 30th 2017)
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    An alleged casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@doamuslims, January 29th 2017)
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    An alleged child casualty of the January 29th 2017 raid (@doamuslims, January 29th 2017)
  • The Pentagon said that an Osprey helicopter had experienced a "hard landing" during the raid, allegedly shown here (@defence_blog, January 29th 2017)
  • The Pentagon said that an Osprey helicopter, of the type shown here, had experienced a "hard landing" during the raid (@defence_blog, January 29th 2017)
  • "Ryan Owens, left, with his father Bill Owens." (NBC, October 1st 2017)
  • "CPO Ryan Owens, a Navy SEAL who died in a raid on al Qaeda in Yemen in January 2017" (NBC, October 1st 2017)
  • A map of Yemen, produced by NBC News, showing the location of Yakla, where the January 29th raid took place (NBC, October 1st 2017)
  • The interior of a building damaged during the January 29th 2017 raid (NBC, October 1st 2017)
  • A building damaged during the January 29th 2017 raid (NBC, October 1st 2017)
  • "Relatives of those who died, including the seven children of Fatim Saleh Mohsen al-Ameri" (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Febuary 9th 2017)
  • Abdallah Mabkhout al-Ameri was killed during the raid. He had survived a previous US strike on his wedding in 2013. (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, February 9th 2017)
  • Eight-year-old Nawar al-Awlaki was reportedly fatally wounded after US forces fired upon the house she was hiding in during the raid. (Bureau of Investigative Journalism, February 9th 2017)
  • Interior view of a building allegedly destroyed during the raid (Alahd, January 29th)
  • A map of al-Ghayil, published by The Intercept (March 9th 2017), detailing the locations of the raid
  • A girl in the remains of a building, reportedly destroyed during the January 29th 2017 raid (The Intercept, March 9th 2017)
  • Children in the ruins of a house, destroyed during the January 29th 2017 raid (The Intercept, March 9th 2017)
  • The village of al-Ghayil, in which the raid took place (The Intercept, March 9th 2017)
  • "Mabkhout Ali al Ameri stands with his 18-month-old son, Mohammed, in the village of al Ghayil in Yemen’s al Bayda province. Mabkhout’s wife, Fatim Saleh Mohsen, was shot in the back of the head by helicopter gunship fire as she fled with Mohammed in her arms during a U.S. raid on January 29, 2017. The vehicle in the background was also destroyed during the assault." (The Intercept, March 9th 2017)
  • Buildings damaged during the raid (Reprieve, February 2nd 2017)
  • The interior of a building damaged during the raid (@doamuslims, January 29th 2017)
  • Eight-year-old Nawar al-Awlaki was reportedly fatally wounded after US forces fired upon the house she was hiding in during the raid. (Yemenpress, January 29th 2017)
  • Eight-year-old Nawar al-Awlaki was reportedly fatally wounded by US fire during the raid (CNN, January 31st 2017)
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    Video footage of a child allegedly killed during the raid
  • Alleged video footage of al-Ghayil village, showing damage caused in the raid.
  • PBS Frontline visited the site of the Yakla raid, recording interviews with eyewitnesses of the raid
  • Barzan Mohammed Abdullah Mabkhout Al Ameri, 10, the sole surviving member of his family after the January 29, 2017 raid in Al Bayda governorate, Yemen. Photo taken by a Mwatana researcher.
  • The place where Mursil Abedraboh Masad Al Ameri, 6 years old, was shot and killed during the raid. Photo taken by a Mwatana researcher.
  • Location where witnesses reported US forces landed during the January 2017 raid. Photo taken by a Mwatana researcher.
  • Damage to the reception room of a Yakla home from the January 2017 raid. Photo taken by a Mwatana researcher.
  • A home in Yakla that was attacked and significantly damaged during the January 2017 raid. Photo taken by a Mwatana researcher.
  • Text of CENTCOM letter to Mwatana, April 2021, confirming 12 civilian deaths at Yakla.

Geolocation notes (1) [ collapse]

Reports of the incident mention a firefight and several strikes in the village of Al Ghayil (الغيل‎), for which the coordinates are: 14.592945, 45.038975. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further.

  • Tagged satellite imagery of the event from The Intercept.

    Imagery:
    The Intercept, 2017

US Forces Assessment:

  • Known belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Credible / Substantiated
    The investigation assessed that although all feasible precautions were taken and the decision to strike complied with the law of armed conflict, unintended civilian casualties regrettably occurred.
  • Given reason for civilian harm
    Killed by strike blast, Unseen at time of engagement, Inside target building, Killed in adjacent structure
    Airwars’ assessment of belligerent’s civilian casualty statement
  • Initial Airwars grading
    Confirmed
  • Civilian deaths conceded
    12
  • Civilian injuries conceded
    None

Civilian casualty statements

US Forces
  • May 28, 2021
  • Apr 20, 2021
  • Mar 9, 2017
  • Feb 1, 2017
  • A team designated by the operational task force commander has concluded regrettably that civilian non-combatants were likely killed in the midst of a firefight during a raid in Yemen Jan. 29. Casualties may include children. The ongoing credibility assessment seeks to determine if there were any still-undetected civilian casualties in the ferocious firefight that also claimed the life of Navy Seal Team Chief Special Warfare Operator William “Ryan” Owens and wounded three other U.S. service members. The known possible civilian casualties appear to have been potentially caught up in aerial gunfire that was called in to assist U.S. forces in contact against a determined enemy that included armed women firing from prepared fighting positions, and U.S. special operations members receiving fire from all sides to include houses and other buildings. This complex situation included small arms fire, hand grenades and close air support fire. Analysts are carefully assessing whether additional non-combatant civilians that were not visible to the assault force at the time were mixed in with combatants. The raid resulted in the seizure of materials and information that is yielding valuable intelligence to help partner nations deter and prevent future terror attacks in Yemen and across the world. “Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula has a horrifying history of hiding women and children within militant operating areas and terrorist camps, and continuously shows a callous disregard for innocent lives,” said Col. John J. Thomas, U.S. Central Command spokesman. “That’s what makes cases like these so especially tragic.”

  • Senator Kaine: If I might, one last question with respect to Yemen. We have had hearings in this committee about the ground operation in Yemen, which to my knowledge was the first ground operation by DOD forces in Yemen. There were a number of questions raised by that. I do not want to go into the classified briefing we had, but questions about was the mission compromised in some way in the advance. What intel was gained? There was some after the-fact justification of the mission using video that actually had been taken in another mission. Is the DOD conducting an ongoing investigation of that mission to determine all lessons learned, what worked, what did not, and what we can do better? General Votel: Senator, thank you, and let me answer this a little more comprehensively. First and foremost, I am responsible for this mission. I am the CENTCOM Commander and I am responsible for what is done in my region and what is not done in my region. So I accept the responsibility for this. We lost a lot on this operation. We lost a valued operator. We had people wounded. We caused civilian casualties. We lost an expensive aircraft. We did gain some valuable information that will be helpful for us. Our intention here was to improve our knowledge against this threat, a threat that poses a direct threat to us here in the homeland. And that was what we were focused on. There have been a number of investigations that have been initiated. Most of these are regulatory or statutory in terms of things that we normally do. When we lose an aircraft, there is both a safety investigation to ensure that we disseminate lessons learned for the broader fleet, and there is also a collateral investigation that tries to determine the specific reason why that happened and establishes accountability over that. We have done an investigation into the civilian casualties. That has been completed. The helicopter investigations are ongoing. The civilian casualty aspect has been completed, and we have made a determination based on our best information available that we did cause casualties, somewhere between 4 and 12 casualties that we accept -- I accept responsibility for. We have done a line of duty investigation, again a statutory investigation, on the death of Senior Chief Owens that determined that he was in the line of investigation. The key mechanism that I have, Senator, is the after action review, and this is something we do with every operation we do. And the intention here is to review the operation in great detail to understand exactly what happened. And it is done with the chain of command in place. And we have done that and I have presided over that. Based on my experience, nearly 37 years of service, I have certainly appointed a lot of investigations and I have been through a lot of these after-action reviews. When I go through these things, there are some specific things that I am looking for. I am looking for information gaps where we cannot explain what happened in a particular situation or we have conflicting information between members of the organization. I am looking for indicators of incompetence or poor decision-making or bad judgment throughout all of this. So what I can tell you is that we did an exhaustive after-action review on this. I presided over that. It went down to a level that included people who were on the specific objective. As a result of that, I was satisfied that none of those indicators that I identified to you were present. I think we had a good understanding of exactly what happened on this objective, and we have been able to pull lessons learned out of that that we will apply in future operations. And as a result, I made the determination that there was no need for an additional investigation into this particular operation. Senator Kaine: So the only investigation that continues is the investigation -- or the loss of the helicopters is still not complete. General Votel: That is correct, Senator. Senator Kaine: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Chairman McCain: Just to follow up, General, there has been a lot of conversation about this particular mission and the point that some of us are trying to make that the heroism and sacrifice of those who served has nothing to do with the mission itself. In other words, we honor their sacrifice no matter what happened in the mission. And when you have women and children killed, as you pointed out, the loss of a $70 million aircraft, you did not capture anyone as was part of the mission, that mission is not a success. But that happens in war. There is a thing called the fog of war. They did the best they could under very difficult circumstances. And I hope in the process of your investigation, when heavy fire was encountered why the decision was made to continue the mission -- I still do not think this committee has an answer to that question. But it does not question the loyalty and sacrifice and bravery when we question the mission. And unless we tell the American people the truth, the absolute truth, then we are going to revisit another war a long time ago where we did tell the American people the truth and we paid a very heavy price for it. There are 55,000 names engraved in black granite not far from here, and the American people were not told the truth about whether we were succeeding or failing in that war. And then because of that, it all collapsed. So I hope that we will not forget that lesson, and in no way does it detract from the heroism and professionalism and sacrifice of the brave men and women who serve under your command.

  • CENTCOM letter to Mwatana (see image above)

  • The following table contains additional details about the one instance during 2017 assessed to have resulted in civilian casualties. USCENTCOM assessed that between 4 and 12 civilians were killed during this incident, however the assessment was not able to determine a more precise number. Twelve civilians killed is reported here.

Original strike reports

US Forces

An estimated 14 al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula terrorists were killed yesterday during a raid by U.S. forces in Yemen, according to a U.S. Central Command news release issued today.
One U.S. service member died of wounds suffered in the raid, and three others were wounded, the release said.
The names of the deceased and wounded service members are being withheld pending notification of next-of-kin, the release said.
“In a successful raid against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula headquarters, brave U.S. forces were instrumental in killing an estimated 14 AQAP members and capturing important intelligence that will assist the U.S. in preventing terrorism against its citizens and people around the world,” President Donald J. Trump said in a statement issued today.
Trump added, “Americans are saddened this morning with news that a life of a heroic service member has been taken in our fight against the evil of radical Islamic terrorism. The sacrifices made by the men and women of our armed forces, and the families they leave behind, are the backbone of the liberty we hold so dear as Americans, united in our pursuit of a safer nation and a freer world. My deepest thoughts and humblest prayers are with the family of this fallen service member. I also pray for a quick and complete recovery for the brave service members who sustained injuries.”
“We are deeply saddened by the loss of one of our elite service members,” Army Gen. Joseph L. Votel, Centcom’s commander, said in the Centcom release. “The sacrifices are very profound in our fight against terrorists who threaten innocent peoples across the globe.”
A U.S. military aircraft assisting in the operation experienced a hard landing at a nearby location, resulting in an additional U.S. injury, according to the Centcom release. That aircraft was unable to fly after the landing. The aircraft was then intentionally destroyed in place.
The raid is one in a series of aggressive moves against terrorist planners in Yemen and worldwide, according to the Centcom release. Similar operations have produced intelligence on al-Qaida logistics, recruiting and financing efforts.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Counter-Terrorism Action (Ground)
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    15 – 56
  • (10–15 children4–10 women1–8 men)
  • Civilians reported injured
    5–7
  • Causes of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions, Small arms and light weapons
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Confirmed
    A specific belligerent has accepted responsibility for civilian harm.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    4–42
  • Belligerents reported injured
    3–6

Sources (92) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEMTr186-C

Incident date

January 21, 2019

Location

جعار, Ja'ar, Al Bayda, Yemen

Geolocation

14.25, 45.83333 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Neighbourhood/area level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

One civilian, named as the elderly man Saleh Ahmed Mohammed al-Qaisi, was killed by a US drone strike in the vicinity of Ja’ar, in the Al Qayseen subdistrict, Sama’a district of Bayda governorate, at 10am on January 21st 2019.

In April 2021, CENTCOM confirmed to the Yemen human rights group Mwatana that it had killed a civilian in this action.

Mr Al-Qaisi was killed by the strike as he drove near a health centre in the area, according to reporting by Al-Masdar Online and Mwatana for Human Rights. Local sources told news outlets, including Hunaa Al-Bayda, Al-Masdar Online, and Yemen Shabab, that Al-Qaisi had no affiliation with any militant or extremist groups. No known sources indicated that he was a belligerent.

Several local-language sources, such as Yemen Monitor, described Al-Qaisi as a construction worker. Mwatana reported that he was employed in Saudi Arabia as a wall painter, and had returned to Bayda to visit his family. Reports gave differing accounts of Al-Qaisi’s age at the time of the strike.  Several local-language news and social-media sources indicated that he was 65. Both Mwatana and analyst Nadwa Dawsari (@NDawsari), stated that he was 67.

According to Mwatana, Saleh was targeted after taking his wife and three children to a relative’s house. Another relative, who spoke with him prior to the strike, told Mwatana “I had been on my bike when I met Uncle Saleh… he reminded me of some funny anecdotes while we were working in Saudi Arabia. Then he continued on his way… Suddenly, I heard an aircraft hitting his car”.

Another witness told Mwatana that the drone remained in the sky after the first strike, preventing others from helping Saleh. When he attempted to leave his car, another strike killed him. Locals described Saleh as “beloved, with good manners, and known as a person who did not involve himself in political or military affairs”.

A local source told Al-Masdar that the strike took place at 10am, and that drones had been flying over the area for the two previous days.

The day after the attack, Yemen Shabab, Huna Al-Bayda, and others reported that the Al-Qaisi tribe held a vigil for Saleh, holding banners condemning the government and the Saudi-led coalition for the killing of innocent civilians by US drones.

In its annual civilian casualty report for Congress issued in May 2020, the US Department of Defense stated that, as of March 1st 2020, it had assessed “no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting from US military actions in Yemen during 2019”. The report also asserted that US Central Command had not received “any reports from IOs or NGOs regarding potential civilian casualties caused by U.S. military action in Yemen in 2019”.

Responding to Airwars’ publication of its Yemen dataset and accompanying report in October 2020, CENTCOM dismissed all but two civilian harm claims under President Trump, asserting that “USCENTCOM conducted a thorough review of the information AirWars provided regarding allegations of potential civilian harm caused by USCENTCOM strikes in Yemen from 2017-2020… The bulk of the information asserted by AirWars, however, did not correspond with dates and locations of U.S. military strikes or raids in Yemen.   Other AirWars allegations either did not allege civilian harm or were not assessed as credible upon our review.”

However, in April 2021 in response to a major civilian harm review by Mwatana, the US military noted: “USCENTCOM acknowledges one civilian casualty in a strike on January 22nd 2019 [sic] in al Bayda, Yemen… The command determined that condolence payments were not appropriate.”

The event was also confirmed in DoD’s annual civilian harm report to Congress, in which it noted: “As of April 2021, one report about one incident in 2019 and
one report about one incident in 2017 were found to be credible.”

The incident occured at 10:00:00 local time.

The victims were named as:

67 years old male killed

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    1
  • (1 man)
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Confirmed
    A specific belligerent has accepted responsibility for civilian harm.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Sources (28) [ collapse]

Media
from sources (12) [ collapse]

  • Members of the Al-Qaysi tribe held a vigil for Saleh, condemning US drone strikes against civilians.
  • Members of the Al-Qaysi tribe held a vigil for Saleh, condemning US drone strikes against civilians.
  • Members of the Al-Qaysi tribe held a vigil for Saleh, condemning US drone strikes against civilians.
  • The strike reportedly took place in Bayda governorate; the US later reported that an undated January strike had taken place in Bayda (Almarsd Post, January 21st 2019)
  • Weapon remnants found after the attack, which a weapons expert identified as being from an AGM-114 Hellfire missile. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Weapon remnants found after the attack, which a weapons expert identified as being from an AGM-114 Hellfire missile. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Weapon remnants found after the attack, which a weapons expert identified as being from an AGM-114 Hellfire missile. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Protest organized by the community in the village after the attack. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Protest organized by the community in the village after the attack. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Saleh’s car after the strike. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana
  • Saleh’s car after the strike. Photo received from a relative. Via Mwatana

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention a vehicle being struck in the vicinity of Ja’ar (جعار) village, within the Al Qayseen (القيسين) subdistrict. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further. The generic coordinates for Ja’ar are: 14.25, 45.83333.

US Forces Assessment:

  • Known belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Credible / Substantiated
    The investigation assessed that although all feasible precautions were taken and the decision to strike complied with the law of armed conflict, unintended civilian casualties regrettably occurred.
  • Given reason for civilian harm
    No reason given
    Airwars’ assessment of belligerent’s civilian casualty statement
  • Initial Airwars grading
    Confirmed
  • Civilian deaths conceded
    1
  • Civilian injuries conceded
    None
  • Stated location
    Bayda, Yemen
    Nearest population center

Civilian casualty statements

US Forces
  • May 28, 2021
  • Apr 20, 2021
  • Nov 5, 2020
  • Via email to Airwars: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to focus on ways to minimize civilian casualties during its military operations. We assess or review all reports of civilian casualties because such assessments or reviews help us identify ways to improve our operations and counter misinformation and propaganda. We routinely share the results of every one of our assessments in Department of Defense (DoD) reports to Congress, including annual reports, many of which are publicly available. We also share the results of our assessments or reviews with the public via the USCENTCOM website and our statements to the media. Individuals wishing to understand U.S. military operations in Yemen more fully should consult these official sources of information. USCENTCOM conducted a thorough review of the information AirWars provided regarding allegations of potential civilian harm caused by USCENTCOM strikes in Yemen from 2017-2020. Of the information AirWars provided, one strike on September 14, 2017, was assessed to have caused injuries to two civilians. Also, as previously released by USCENTCOM to the public in February 2017, USCENTCOM acknowledged there may have been civilian casualties during a raid on January 29, 2017. The bulk of the information asserted by AirWars, however, did not correspond with dates and locations of U.S. military strikes or raids in Yemen. Other AirWars allegations either did not allege civilian harm or were not assessed as credible upon our review. Consistent with our mission, our authorities, and our obligations under the law of war, USCENTCOM will continue to conduct military actions in Yemen when required to protect the Nation and our allies and partners from al Qa’ida and ISIS terror cells that are committed to inflicting terror. In every strike and raid, we take careful measures to minimize civilian harm and take responsibility for our actions. When our military operations result in reports of civilian harm, we will continue to assess the credibility of such reports to help us identify ways to improve our operations and respond as appropriate.

  • CENTCOM letter to Mwatana: "USCENTCOM acknowledges one civilian casualty in a strike on January 22nd 2019 [sic] in al Bayda, Yemen... The command determined that condolence payments were not appropriate."

  • C. U.S. military actions in Yemen USCENTCOM received 11 new reports of civilian casualties related to U.S. military operations in Yemen from years prior to 2020. As of April 2021, one report about one incident in 2019 and one report about one incident in 2017 were found to be credible.

Original strike reports

US Forces

Our Yemen strikes data has been updated for individualized dates after CENTCOM responded to an inquiry on the eight strikes in 2019. Strikes were as follows: 1/1, 1/21, 3/25, 3/25, 3/26, 3/28, 3/29, and 3/29. All but 1/1 in al Bayda'

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    1
  • (1 man)
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Confirmed
    A specific belligerent has accepted responsibility for civilian harm.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Sources (28) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEM039-B

Incident date

September 30, 2011

Location

الجوف, Jawf, Yemen

Geolocation

16.612171, 45.670558 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Province/governorate level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

Four AQAP militants were killed in a confirmed CIA drone strike on Jawf, reports said. There are currently no reports of civilian harm from this strike.

Anwar al Awlaki, the US-born cleric, apparently became the first US citizen to be deliberately killed by the CIA in a drone strike, part of Operation Troy. The attack – assisted by JSOC – also killed US citizen Samir Khan, editor of AQAP’s Inspire magazine, Abu Muhsen al Maribi (or Mohammed bin Muhsen) and Salem al Marwani (aka Salem bin Arfaj). Bomb maker Ibrahim Hassan al Asiri was also initially reported killed in the blast but Associated Press reported he survived.

Al Asiri reportedly made the bomb for the December 2009 “underwear bomber” plot to bring down a jet over Detroit. He is also said to have been behind the devices sent to targets in the US aboard a cargo plane in October 2010. Following this strike al Asiri went to ground, resurfacing more than six months later.

In a May 2013 letter Attorney-General Eric Holder revealed the US deliberately targeted al Awlaki. However Khan was “not specifically targeted by the United States”, Holder added. The letter was a response to requests for information on drone strikes from Patrick Leahy, chair of the US Senate Judiciary Committee.

NBC News journalist Richard Engel tweeted that two cars were struck by “missiles from US aircraft” that killed Anwar al-Awlaki and Bin Arfaj, another al Qaeda operative. Al-Awlaki, the New Mexico-born operative was “the leading English-speaking member of Al Qaeda”, according to Time magazine. These English skills made him particularly dangerous and aided him in appealing to disaffected young men. Nidal Hassan, who killed thirteen people at Fort Hood military base was among those who listened to the teachings of al-Awlaki.

According to the Washington Post, after locating al-Awlaki the CIA assembled a fleet of armed drones to target him: “The choreography of the strike, which involved four drones, was intricate. Two Predators pointed lasers at Awlaki’s vehicle, and a third circled to make sure that no civilians wandered into the cross hairs.” Moved from Pakistani to Yemeni territory, two US Predator drones and two larger Reaper drones encircled and then destroyed the car carrying Al-Awlaki.

The Nation reported that even more military hardware was involved: As the vehicles made their way over the dusty, unpaved roads, US drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, were dispatched to hunt them down. The drones were technically under the command of the CIA, though JSOC aircraft and ground forces were poised to assist. A team of commandos stood at the ready to board V-22 helicopters. As an added measure, Marine Harrier jets scrambled in a backup maneuver.

According to the New York Times, the CIA had just finished building a secret drone base in Saudi Arabia and President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor John Brennan directed the Agency take full responsibility for killing Awlaki.

David Petraeus, then director of the CIA, ordered several drones be relocated from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Newsweek later reported that the US had been observing Awlaki at the location for two weeks but did not attack because of the presence of children. On the morning of September 30th, however, Awlaki and several of his companions left the safe house and walked about 700 yards to their parked cars. As they were getting into the vehicles, they were blown apart by two Hellfire missiles fired by Reaper drones.

The killing of Khan and Awlaki – and Awlaki’s 16-year old son a week later – led for calls for the US to publish the legal basis on which it had “extrajudicially executed US citizens”, as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) put it.

On December 20th 2011, the New York Times filed a lawsuit against the Obama administration, seeking the release of the Justice Department legal opinion in the Awlaki case, which the department would not disclose. The New York Times had previously reported that the secret memo which authorised the killing stated that it would be lawful “only if it were not feasible to take him alive”.

The memo was “narrowly drawn to the specifics of Mr Alwaki’s case” and circumvented “an executive order banning assassinations, a federal law against murder, protections in the Bill of Rights and various strictures of the international laws of war,” said the New York Times.

In November 2012, it emerged that the US had tried to strip Awlaki of his US passport six months before his death. On the first anniversary of his death, Anwar al Awlaki’s father alleged that Yemen’s government was complicit in his death, saying that ‘there was an agreement between the Yemeni intelligence and the CIA, under which the former abided to submit daily reports on the activities of Anwar al-Awlaki and his movements.’ Dr Nasser al-Awlaki also said that he last met his son in April 2009 after former President Ali Abdullah Saleh had asked him to convince Anwar to return to Sana’a.

But Anwar refused, because the then Interior Minister ordered Shabwah governor and security director to arrest Anwar for no reason.

In April 2014 a US court said that Washington officials could not be held accountable for the death of Anwar al Awlaki, Samir Khan or Abdel Rahman al Awlaki. The court dismissed a suit brought against several officials including then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and then-CIA Director David Petraeus on behalf of Awlaki’s parents by the ACLU and Center for Constitutional Rights.

Circuit Court justice Rosemary Collyer said allowing the suit to continue against individual officials “would impermissibly draw the court into “the heart of executive and military planning and deliberation”. She added: ‘“In this delicate area of war-making, national security, and foreign relations, the judiciary has an exceedingly limited role.”

Due to the actions of a federal judge in December of 2010, the Obama administration was cleared to continue to pursue Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen living in Yemen and alleged member of Al Qaeda. Despite the radicalization of Mr. Al-Awlaki, Jameer Jaffer, a lawyer for the ACLU believed that this court decision would allow the American government to potential kill any American citizen deemed a potential threat to the national security.

An ABC News report quoted President Barack Obama as noting that the death of al-Awlaki dealt a “major blow” to al-Qaeda, and Reuters reported that Obama described the strike as a “significant milestone” in the fight against terrorism, but the killing of an American citizen by American military planes raises difficult questions about the significance of personal liberties when weighed against national security. The same Reuters report noted that American officials believed that Al-Awlaki was planning to use ricin and cyanide in attacks upon Westerners.  While earlier reports noted American planes conducted the fatal attack, the BBC reported that American drones killed al-Awlaki.  The American born cleric, who graduated from Colorado State and later San Diego State with a master’s degree in education, had gained increasing popularity with fiery sermons that called for violence, and American officials believed that he was the leader of Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He is credited with recruiting Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the infamous “underwear bomber” caught on Christmas day, 2009.  However, the exact role Al-Awlaki played within AQAP is uncertain. Jeremy Binnie, a London-based terrorism analyst said the Al-Awlaki will be “difficult to replace”, while the Reuters article also stated that Al-Awlaki was neither a “commander of AQAP” nor a “senior Islamic cleric”.  The importance of Al-Awlaki remained insignificant to Yemeni citizen Fayza al-Suleimani who said, “Nobody cared about his [al-Awlaki] death. We have bigger problems than Anwar Al-Awlaki.”

The incident occured at 09:55:00 local time.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    4

Sources (98) [ collapse]

Media
from sources (11) [ collapse]

  • Anwar al Awlaki (via AQAP's Inspire 6)
  • "American-Born Qaeda Leader Is Killed by U S Missile in Yemen" 9( via Getty/AP)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by BBC)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Islamist Movements)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Islamist Movements)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Islamist Movements)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Islamist Movements)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by New York Times)
  • Samir Khan, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Long War Journal)
  • Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical American Muslim cleric of Yemeni descent, killed by US drones on September 30, 2011. (Image posted by Long War Journal)

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention the governorate of Jawf (الجوف), for which the generic coordinates are: 16.612171, 45.670558. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further.

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US Forces Assessment:

  • Known belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Original strike reports

US Forces

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since entering office, the President has made clear his commitment to providing
Congress and the American people with as much information as possible about our
sensitive counterterrorism operations, consistent with our national security and the proper
functioning of the Executive Branch. Doing so is necessary, the President stated in his
May 21, 2009 National Archives speech, because it enables the citizens of our democracy
to "make informed judgments and hold [their Government] accountable."

In furtherance of this commitment, the Administration has provided an
unprecedented level of transparency into how sensitive counterterrorism operations are
conducted. Several senior Administration officials, including myself, have taken
numerous steps to explain publicly the legal basis for the United States' actions to the
American people and the Congress. For example, in March 2012, I delivered an address
at Northwestern University Law School discussing certain aspects of the
Administration's counterterrorism legal framework. And the Department of Justice and
other departments and agencies have continually worked with the appropriate oversight
committees in the Congress to ensure that those committees are fully informed of the
legal basis for our actions.

The Administration is determined to continue these extensive outreach efforts to
communicate with the American people. Indeed, the President reiterated in his State of
the Union address earlier this year that he would continue to engage with the Congress
about our counterterrorism efforts to ensure that they remain consistent with our laws and
values, and become more transparent to the American people and to the world.

To this end, the President has directed me to disclose certain information that until
now has been properly classified. You and other Members of your Committee have on
numerous occasions expressed a particular interest in the Administration's use of lethal
force against U.S. citizens. In light of this fact, I am writing to disclose to you certain
information about the number of U.S. citizens who have been killed by U.S.
counterterrorism operations outside of areas of active hostilities. Since 2009, the United
States, in the conduct of U.S. counterterrorism operations against al-Qa'ida and its

associated forces outside of areas of active hostilities, has specifically targeted and killed
one U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi. The United States is further aware of three other U.S.
citizens who have been killed in such U.S. counterterrorism operations over that same
time period: Samir Khan, 'Abd al-Rahman Anwar al-Aulaqi, and Jude Kenan
Mohammed. These individuals were not specifically targeted by the United States.

As I noted in my speech at Northwestern, "it is an unfortunate but undeniable
fact" that a "small number" of U.S. citizens "have decided to commit violent attacks
against their own country from abroad." Based on generations-old legal principles and
Supreme Court decisions handed down during World War II, as well as during the
current conflict, it is clear and logical that United States citizenship alone does not make
such individuals immune from being targeted. Rather, it means that the government must
take special care and take into account all relevant constitutional considerations, the laws
of war, and other law with respect to U.S. citizens -- even those who are leading efforts to
kill their fellow, innocent Americans. Such considerations allow for the use of lethal
force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-
Qa'ida or its associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill
Americans, in the following circumstances: (1) the U.S. government has determined,
after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is not feasible; and (3) the operation
would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.

These conditions should not come as a surprise: the Administration's legal views
on this weighty issue have been clear and consistent over time. The analysis in my
speech at Northwestern University Law School is entirely consistent with not only the
analysis found in the unclassified white paper the Department of Justice provided to your
Committee soon after my speech, but also with the classified analysis the Department
shared with other congressional committees in May 2011 -- months before the operation
that resulted in the death of Anwar al-Aulaqi. The analysis in my speech is also entirely
consistent with the classified legal advice on this issue the Department of Justice has
shared with your Committee more recently. In short, the Administration has
demonstrated its commitment to discussing with the Congress and the American people
the circumstances in which it could lawfully use lethal force in a foreign country against
a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces, and
who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans.

Anwar al-Aulaqi plainly satisfied all of the conditions I outlined in my speech at
Northwestern. Let me be more specific. Al-Aulaqi was a senior operational leader of al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most dangerous regional affiliate of al-
Qa'ida and a group that has committed numerous terrorist attacks overseas and attempted
multiple times to conduct terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland. And al-Aulaqi was
not just a senior leader of AQAP -- he was the group's chief of external operations,
intimately involved in detailed planning and putting in place plots against U.S. persons.

In this role, al-Aulaqi repeatedly made clear his intent to attack U.S. persons and
his hope that these attacks would take American lives. For example. in a message to

Muslims living in the United States, he noted that he had come "to the conclusion that
jihad against America is binding upon myself just as it is binding upon every other able
Muslim." But it was not al-Aulaqi's words that led the United States to act against him:
they only served to demonstrate his intentions and state of mind, that he "pray[ed] that
Allah [would] destro America and all its allies." Rather, it was al-Aulaqi's actions --
and, in particular, his direct personal involvement in the continued planning and
execution of terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland -- that made him a lawful target
and led the United States to take action.

For example, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab -- the individual who attempted
to blow up an airplane bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 -- went to Yemen in
2009, al--Aulaqi arranged an introduction via text message. Abdulmutallab told U.S.
officials that he stayed at al-Aulaqi's house for three days, and then spent two weeks at
an AQAP training camp. Al-Aulaqi planned a suicide operation for Abdulmutallab,
helped Abdulmutallab draft a statement for a video to be shown after the
attack, and directed him to take down a U.S. airliner. Al-Aulaqi's last instructions were
to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil. Al-Aulaqi also played a key role
in the October 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes:
he not only helped plan and oversee the plot, but was also directly involved in the details
of its execution to the point that he took part in the development and testing of the
explosive devices that were placed on the planes. Moreover, information that remains
classified to protect sensitive sources and methods evidences al-Aulaqi's involvement in
the planning of numerous plots against U.S. and Western interests and makes clear
he was continuing to plot attacks when he was killed.

Based on this information, high-level U.S. government officials appropriately
concluded that al-Aulaqi posed a continuing and imminent threat of violent attack against
the United States. Before carrying out the operation that killed al-Aulaqi, senior officials
also determined, based on a careful evaluation of the circumstances at the time, that it
was not feasible to capture al-Aulaqi. In addition, senior officials determined that the
operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war principles, including
the cardinal principles of (1) necessity -- the requirement that the target have definite
military value; (2) distinction -- the idea that only military objectives may be intentionally
targeted and that civilians are protected from being intentionally targeted; (3)
proportionality -- the notion that the anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be
excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage; and (4)
humanity -- a principle that requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary
suffering. The operation was also undertaken consistent with Yemeni sovereignty.

While a substantial amount of information indicated that Anwar al-Aulaqi was a
senior AQAP leader actively plotting to kill Americans, the decision that he was a lawful
target was not taken The decision to use lethal force is one of the gravest that our
government, at every level, can face. The operation to target Anwar a1--Aulaqi was thus
subjected to an exceptionally rigorous interagency legal review: not only did I and other
Department of Justice lawyers conclude after a thorough and searching review that the

operation was lawful, but so too did other departments and agencies within the U.S.
government.

The decision to target Anwar al-Aulaqi was additionally subjected to extensive
policy review at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, and senior U.S. officials also
briefed the appropriate committees of Congress on the possibility of using lethal force
against al--Aulaq i. Indeed, the Administration informed the relevant congressional
oversight committees that it had approved the use of lethal force against al-Aulaqi in
February 2010 -- well over a year before the operation in question -- and the legal
justification was subsequently explained in detail to those committees, well before action
was taken against Aulaqi. This extensive outreach is consistent with the Administration's
strong and continuing commitment to congressional oversight of our counterterrorism
operations -- oversight which ensures, as the President stated during his State of the
Union address, that our actions are "consistent with our laws and system of checks and
balances."

The Supreme Court has long "made clear that a state of war is not a blank check
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004); Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
578, 5 87 (1952). But the Court's case law and longstanding practice and principle also
make clear that the Constitution does not prohibit the Government it establishes from
taking action to protect the American people from the threats posed by terrorists who hide
in faraway countries and continually plan and launch plots against the U.S. homeland.
The decision to target Anwar al-Aulaqi was lawful, it was considered, and it was just.



This letter is only one of a number of steps the Administration will be taking to
fulfill the President's State of the Union commitment to engage with Congress and the
American people on our counterterrorism efforts. This week the President approved and
relevant congressional committees will be notified and briefed on a document that
institutionalizes the Administration's exacting standards and processes for reviewing and
approving operations to capture or use lethal force against terrorist targets outside the
United States and areas of active hostilities; these standards and processes are either
already in place or are to be transitioned into place. While that document remains
classified, it makes clear that a cornerstone of the Administration's policy is one of the
principles I noted in my speech at Northwestern: that lethal force should not be used
when it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect. For circumstances in which capture is
feasible, the policy outlines standards and procedures to ensure that operations to take
into custody a terrorist suspect are conducted in accordance with all applicable law,
including the laws of war. When capture is not feasible, the policy provides that lethal
force may be used only when a terrorist target poses a continuing, imminent threat to
Americans, and when certain other preconditions, including a requirement that no other
reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat, are satisfied. And in all
circumstances there must be a legal basis for using force against the target. Significantly,

the President will soon be speaking publicly in greater detail about our counterterrorism
operations and the legal and policy framework that governs those actions.

I recognize that even after the Administration makes unprecedented disclosures
like those contained in this letter, some unanswered questions will remain. I assure you
that the President and his national security team are mindful of this Administration's
pledge to public accountability for our counterterrorism efforts, and we will continue to
give careful consideration to whether and how additional information may be declassified
and disclosed to the American people without harming our national security.

Sincerely,



Eric H. Holder, Jr.
Attorney General

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    4

Sources (98) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEM077-B

Incident date

May 12, 2012

Location

حريب, Desert road in Harib district, Ma'rib, Yemen

Geolocation

14.901509, 45.379398 Note: The accuracy of this location is to District level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

Six to seven militants were killed in an alleged US drone strike which destroyed one vehicle as it travelled as part of a three vehicle convoy along a desert road from Shabwa to Marib on the 12th of May, 2012.

Al-Masdar Online reported that local residents had claimed that “the airstrike took place in the Al-Maqsara area in the Hareeb district, south of Ma’rib, killing at least seven, the car was set ablaze and some of the dead bodies were charred.” Al-Masdar Online further stated that those killed in the strike included “four belonging to the Aqeel family in the Hareeb area, two from Al- Damasceneh and the Gharib family in Wadi Ubaidah, the last was an Egyptian, a leader of al-Qaeda.”

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that the specific names of those killed in the strike were subsequently released by the Yemen Ministry of Information and were listed as “Ali Hassan Ali Gharib al Shabwani from the Shabwan family; Hassan Saud Hassan Bin Mouaily, from the Obayda clan; Hamid Nasir Al-Aqraa, from the Jadaan clan; Mohsen Saeed Kharassan, from the Jadaan clan; Ahmed Saleh Mohammed Al-Faqeer, from the Murad clan; Abdullah Ali Muhammad Miqan aka Al-Quti, from the Obeida clan; and Mohammed Saleh Bakeer Al-Faqeer, from the Murad clan (all from Marib province).”

Local sources reported that this incident was the first of two strikes that occured on the same day, possibly targeting the same convoy of vehicles (USYEM076-B). On the 13th of May, CNN reported that, according to local officials, the drone strike had “hit one of three vehicles carrying the suspected militants in the district of Huraib, the other two vehicles fled the area unharmed and continued toward the southern Abyan province.” Al-Masdar Online reported that ‘local sources’ had said that a second airstrike later “apparently [hit] the other two cars in the Al-Hosoun area in Marib, killing three others.” According to Mareb Press, the vehicles in the convoy were “two Vitara and Shas”, with the initial strike hitting the “Vitara” car. Overall, sources reported that up to 13 militants were killed between the two incidents (USYEM076-B and USYEM077-B).

The incident occured in the evening.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Likely strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    Unknown
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Suspected attacker
    US Forces
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    6–7

Sources (21) [ collapse]

Geolocation notes (1) [ collapse]

Reports of the incident mention that two cars were struck on a desert road in the Harib district (حريب) of Ma’rib (مَأْرِب) province. Due to limited information and satellite imagery available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the precise location of the strike. The generic coordinates for the district Harib (حريب) are: 14.901509, 45.379398.

  • Harib district (حريب) of Ma’rib (مَأْرِب) province

    Imagery:
    Google Earth

US Forces Assessment:

  • Suspected belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Summary

  • Strike status
    Likely strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    Unknown
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Suspected attacker
    US Forces
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    6–7

Sources (21) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEM128-B

Incident date

September 10, 2012

Location

وادي العين, Wadi Al Ain, Hadhramout, Yemen

Geolocation

15.489268, 48.425239 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Subdistrict level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

Between six and seven militants including AQAP’s second-in-command Said al Shehri (aka al Shihri) were reportedly killed in an alleged US or Yemeni strike on a car and house in Hadramout, eastern Yemen on September 12, 2012, according to US and Yemeni officials. However, it is unclear at what point Shehri was killed as his death was not announced by AQAP until July 2013.

Residents in the Wadi al Ain village believe the missile struck a home in which numerous men were meeting while CNN reported that the strikes were against a car. Nasser Arrabyee @Narrabyee tweeted that six individuals were killed and Reuters reported that among the dead were a Saudi and an Iraqi.

Al Shehri “was prisoner number 327 at Guantanamo Bay, captured as he tried to cross the border into Pakistan from Afghanistan late in 2001.” In 2007 he was released, returning to Riyadh in Saudi Arabia, where he was put through a rehabilitation program. However within months he reportedly absconded, becoming a founding member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. He was suspected of involvement in a 2008 car bomb attack on the US embassy in Sanaa. Sixteen died, including the six attackers.

A diplomat told the FT al Shehri was “the senior leadership figure in AQAP who was involved in external attack planning.” Katherine Zimmerman said al Shehri’s death would have a medium-term impact on AQAP but it “still has room to maneuver in Yemen” and “its operational network is largely intact.”

The Press Association initially reported Yemeni military officials as saying that “a local forensics team had identified al Shehri’s body with the help of US forensics experts on the ground.” The agency added: “Yemeni military officials said they had believed the United States was behind the operation because its own army does not have the capacity to carry out precise aerial attacks and because Yemeni intelligence-gathering capabilities on al Shehri’s movements were limited.”

However an anonymous Yemeni official subsequently told Asharq al Awsat: “Saeed Ali al Shehri was not killed in the raid that targeted a number of Al-Qaeda’s fighters in Dadramawt a few weeks ago.”

The source told the London-based paper DNA tests had shown a corpse was not that of al Shehri. He said authorities “were confused because of a wound on the leg of the deceased that matched a wound that al Shehri has that requires him to use a walking stick.”

The paper reported that DNA samples were taken but it was subsequently claimed that DNA tests had not yet been carried out. An “American-German” team was said to have been coming to Yemen to carry out the tests.

Sources in Abyan also told the Yemen Observer al Shehri was still alive, 10 days after the strike. One said al Shehri was not at the scene of the strike. A second said “I am one hundred percent sure he [al Shehri] is alive. So close sources from al Shehri have also affirmed he is still alive.”

The following month, October 2012, a recording purporting to be al Shehri emerged, in which he claimed the false rumours of his death were “to cover up the killing of innocent Muslim civilians” and in April 2013, AQAP released a statement from al Shihri, and referred to him as if he was alive. AQAP announced the death of al Shihri in a video that was released on July 16, 2013 according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained the video. However, the statement does not specify when he was killed, only that it was by US drones.

The incident occured in the morning.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Contested strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Suspected attackers
    US Forces, Yemeni Air Force
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    6–7

Sources (43) [ collapse]

Media
from sources (2) [ collapse]

  • Deputy leader of al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula, Said al-Shehri, a Saudi national identified as Guantanamo prisoner number 372, speaks in a video posted on Islamist websites, in this 2009 file image. (NBC News)

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention the Al Ain river valley (وادي العين) in Hadhramout governorate, for which the coordinates are: 15.489268, 48.425239. Due to limited information and satellite imagery available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further.

US Forces Assessment:

  • Suspected belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Yemeni Air Force Assessment:

  • Suspected belligerent
    Yemeni Air Force
  • Yemeni Air Force position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Summary

  • Strike status
    Contested strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Suspected attackers
    US Forces, Yemeni Air Force
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    6–7

Sources (43) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEMTr180-C

Incident date

September 18, 2018

Location

العشار, Al Ashar, Al Bayda, Yemen

Geolocation

14.499999936, 45.09999993 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Neighbourhood/area level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

Two Yemeni National Army soldiers, including a Colonel, were reportedly killed by a US drone strike in Al Ashar, Yakla area of Bayda governorate, on the evening of September 18th 2018, according to multiple sources. Some however instead variously indicated that the strike killed two AQAP members, or two civilians.

In a later press release, US Central Command confirmed that a strike had targeted AQAP in Bayda on September 18th. Since there were no other known reported strikes at that time, this event is treated as confirmed.

Military sources told SMA News that Colonel Salem Abdullah Ahmad Al-Taysi, the commander of the second battalion of the local Radaa Brigade, and Ahmed Abbad Al-Taysi, variously described as a “companion” or “companion soldier”, were killed while travelling through the area in a car. According to several sources, including @BelqeesTV, Salmashad, and Yemeni News, the pair were reportedly on their way to meet the Chief of the General Staff in Marib governorate.

Others suggested that those killed were either civilians or AQAP members. Following the strike, a local source told Al-Masdar Online that the airstrike had killed two civilians from the Al-Taysi family as they drove in a car, reportedly on their way to Marib [note that this is the same family name as the Colonel, leaving open the possibility that his companion in the vehicle was a non combatant relative]. According to Hunaa Radaa, a local source also reported the deaths of civilians to Yemen Shabab. The original Yemen Shabab article could not however be found by Airwars.

Reprieve shared their findings on this strike with Airwars, which indicated that two members of the Al-Taysi family, also related to the Al-Ameri family previously targeted by multiple alleged US strikes, were killed while travelling to Marib. An on-the-ground investigator spoke with members of the same tribe as the victims, and saw pictures of those killed taken prior to the strike.

Two local-langage social-media sources, @akhbar and @alteef_news, instead claimed that those killed were AQAP members. AQAP forces have previously been reported to have fought alongside, and integrated into, pro-Hadi government forces.

While most suggested that the strike took place on September 18th, a few later reports suggested that it instead occurred on September 30th; this appears to reflect erroneous reporting of other sources.

It is worth noting that no US airstrikes were reported in Yemen between September 18th and November 2nd – perhaps indicative of a local partner backlash against the apparent killing of a senior commander.

In its annual civilian casualty report to Congress issued in April 2019, the US Department of Defense stated that it had assessed “no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting from US military actions in Yemen during 2018″.

Responding to Airwars’ publication of its Yemen dataset and accompanying report in October 2020, CENTCOM dismissed all but two civilian harm claims under President Trump, asserting that “USCENTCOM conducted a thorough review of the information AirWars provided regarding allegations of potential civilian harm caused by USCENTCOM strikes in Yemen from 2017-2020… The bulk of the information asserted by AirWars, however, did not correspond with dates and locations of U.S. military strikes or raids in Yemen.   Other AirWars allegations either did not allege civilian harm or were not assessed as credible upon our review.”

The incident occured in the evening.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    1 – 2
  • (1–2 men)
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Fair
    Reported by two or more credible sources, with likely or confirmed near actions by a belligerent.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    2

Sources (23) [ collapse]

Media
from sources (7) [ collapse]

  • The strike reportedly targeted two men of the Al-Taysi family as they travelled to Marib (Yemeni News, September 30th 2018)
  • Multiple sources suggested that those killed in the strike were members of the Yemeni National Army, including Colonel Salem Abdullah Ahmad Al-Taysi (Salmashad, September 30th 2018)
  • The strike reportedly took place in Al-Ashar area of Yakla, Bayda governorate (@belqeesTV, September 30th 2018)

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention a vehicle being struck in the Al Ashar (العشار) area, allegedly in or around the village of Yakla (يكلاء), within the Wald Rabi (ولدربيع) district. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further. The generic coordinates for Yakla are: 14.499999936, 45.09999993.

US Forces Assessment:

  • Known belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Non credible / Unsubstantiated
    Insufficient information to assess that, more likely than not, a Coalition strike resulted in civilian casualties.
  • Reason for non-credible assessment
    No reason given
  • Civilian deaths conceded
    None
  • Civilian injuries conceded
    None

Civilian casualty statements

US Forces
  • Nov 5, 2020
  • Apr 29, 2019
  • C. U.S. military action in Yemen against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS During 2018, U.S. forces deployed to Yemen continued to work towards disrupting and degrading the terrorist threat posed by AQAP and ISIS. U.S. forces conducted 36 airstrikes against AQAP and ISIS operatives and facilities in Yemen and supported United Arab Emirates and Yemen-led efforts to clear AQAP from Shabwah Governorate. DoD has no credible reports of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military actions in Yemen during 2018.

  • Via email to Airwars: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) continues to focus on ways to minimize civilian casualties during its military operations. We assess or review all reports of civilian casualties because such assessments or reviews help us identify ways to improve our operations and counter misinformation and propaganda. We routinely share the results of every one of our assessments in Department of Defense (DoD) reports to Congress, including annual reports, many of which are publicly available. We also share the results of our assessments or reviews with the public via the USCENTCOM website and our statements to the media. Individuals wishing to understand U.S. military operations in Yemen more fully should consult these official sources of information. USCENTCOM conducted a thorough review of the information AirWars provided regarding allegations of potential civilian harm caused by USCENTCOM strikes in Yemen from 2017-2020. Of the information AirWars provided, one strike on September 14, 2017, was assessed to have caused injuries to two civilians. Also, as previously released by USCENTCOM to the public in February 2017, USCENTCOM acknowledged there may have been civilian casualties during a raid on January 29, 2017. The bulk of the information asserted by AirWars, however, did not correspond with dates and locations of U.S. military strikes or raids in Yemen. Other AirWars allegations either did not allege civilian harm or were not assessed as credible upon our review. Consistent with our mission, our authorities, and our obligations under the law of war, USCENTCOM will continue to conduct military actions in Yemen when required to protect the Nation and our allies and partners from al Qa’ida and ISIS terror cells that are committed to inflicting terror. In every strike and raid, we take careful measures to minimize civilian harm and take responsibility for our actions. When our military operations result in reports of civilian harm, we will continue to assess the credibility of such reports to help us identify ways to improve our operations and respond as appropriate.

Original strike reports

US Forces

TAMPA, Fla. – U.S. Central Command conducted two counterterrorism air strikes targeting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen in September, bringing the total number of air strikes to 36. In October, there were zero air strikes.

September strikes include Sept. 9 in Abyan and Sept. 18 in Al-Bayda governorates.

"Despite a decline in counterterrorism air strikes against AQAP, they continue to pose a significant threat," said Lt. Col. Earl Brown, a USCENTCOM spokesman. "We remain vigilant and will continue to work by, with and through our regional partners to disrupt, deter and destroy AQAP."

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Drone Strike
  • Civilian harm reported
    Yes
  • Civilians reported killed
    1 – 2
  • (1–2 men)
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Fair
    Reported by two or more credible sources, with likely or confirmed near actions by a belligerent.
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    2

Sources (23) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEMTr209

Incident date

August 31, 2019

Location

عرقوب, Arqoub, Abyan, Yemen

Geolocation

13.468889, 45.763889 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Nearby landmark level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

A few local language social-media sources suggested that US strikes, reportedly including a naval bombardment and at least one air strike, had targeted “terrorist groups”, possibly AQAP, in Arqoub in Abyan governorate, on August 31st 2019, killing “dozens”. Some suggested that the “terrorists” were amongst or affiliated with pro-government forces. There were no known associated reports of civilian harm.

Though a number of Twitter sources, such as @AAlzabli and @kamal_ALNumani, reported a naval bombardment, similarities in wording appeared to suggest that they were re-posts of a single source. Similarly, both sources that alleged a US airstrike, @nasseralgda and @maherhasan17, shared very similar wording. Since a number of differing sources suggested a US strike of some kind in the area, however, this event is presently assessed as likely.

The alleged strike came a few days after an Emirati air campaign in southern Yemen from August 28th-29th 2019, apparently in support of secessionist militias, which reportedly focused on Aden and the Abyan governorate. Late on August 29th, sources suggested that Emirati strikes were being conducted in the Arqoub area.

In a statement at the time, the Emirati foreign ministry said that its strikes had targeted “terrorist militias”, though others indicated that the actions were targeting the pro-government Yemeni military. AQAP militants have been previously reported to have fought alongside, and sometimes integrated into, Yemeni government forces. Given this, it is possible that the event reflects a late Emirati strike.

On October 4th 2019, a US Central Command spokesperson told New America that no US military strikes had been conducted in Yemen since June 24th 2019. It is, however, possible that an undeclared strike was conducted by the CIA, or was part of a clandestine US military action.

Given the description of “dozens” killed, minimum alleged militant deaths has been set at twenty-four.

The local time of the incident is unknown.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Likely strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Naval bombardment
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    Unknown
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Contested
    Competing claims of responsibility e.g. multiple belligerents, or casualties also attributed to ground forces.
  • Suspected attackers
    US Forces, United Arab Emirates Military
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    24

Sources (25) [ collapse]

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention the vicinity of the Arqoub (زنجبار‎) area, for which the generic coordinates are:13.468889, 45.763889. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further.

US Forces Assessment:

  • Suspected belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Original strike reports

US Forces

On October 4, 2019, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) replied to an email inquiry from New America confirming that “the last strike conducted by CENTCOM in Yemen was 24 June.” Per that statement, there were no CENTCOM strikes in Yemen in September 2019.

The lack of strikes in September makes it more than three months since the last U.S. military counterterrorism strike in Yemen, according to New America’s research. However, it is possible that the United States has conducted covert non-military strikes, and in recent years there have been a small number of strikes attributed by media reports to the United States that CENTCOM has denied conducting

United Arab Emirates Military Assessment:

  • Suspected belligerent
    United Arab Emirates Military
  • United Arab Emirates Military position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Summary

  • Strike status
    Likely strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Naval bombardment
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    Unknown
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Airwars civilian harm grading
    Contested
    Competing claims of responsibility e.g. multiple belligerents, or casualties also attributed to ground forces.
  • Suspected attackers
    US Forces, United Arab Emirates Military
  • Suspected target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    24

Sources (25) [ collapse]

Incident Code

USYEM004-B

Incident date

December 24, 2009

Location

وادي رفض, Wadi Rafadh, Shabwa, Yemen

Geolocation

14.185053, 46.948228 Note: The accuracy of this location is to Village level. Continue to map

Airwars assessment

In the dawn hours of Dec. 24, 2009, a cruise missile launched by the United States struck a farmhouse in the Rafdh Valley, located in Yemen’s Shabwa province, killing between 5-34 militants associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, colloquially known as AQAP. While there are no known reports of civilians being killed or injured in the strike, the number of militants, as well as their rank and significance, is contested.

On the day the strike took place, the Yemeni embassy in Washington D.C. issued a press release taking credit for the strike. The Yemeni government claimed that several high-profile AQAP militants, such as AQAP’s commander of operations in Yemen, Nasser al-Wuhayshi, and his deputy, Said al-Shihri, had been killed. The Yemeni military, officials claimed, had successfully carried out a “decapitating strike” against Al Qaeda’s network in Yemen. A Reprieve report titled “You Never Die Twice” added that Fahd al-Qasaa was also targeted in this strike.

Another name was listed that immediately caught the attention of western media: Anwar al-Awlaki, a US-born cleric who had exchanged emails with the Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan. Several outlets, such as the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, and Reuters, writing in the days following the strike, claimed that Awlaki could be among the dead.

It did not take long for the government’s narrative to change. While most reporting from the week following the Dec. 24 strike put the number of militants killed at 30-34, some publications, such as The Guardian and the Washington Post, cited reports that only five AQAP militants had been buried.

This number was the one later cited by the New York Times in more in-depth reporting on the raid published in July and August 2010, and that reporting states that the five militants killed were low-level fighters, some of them even lodging with AQAP for the first time the night they were killed.

In the days following the strike, other details soon emerged that cast doubt on the Saleh government’s narrative, already viewed skeptically by the Yemeni public. On Dec. 25, 2009, CBS News stated that Awlaki was probably still alive. On Dec. 26, the Associated Press reported that Awlaki was “​​alive and well.”

Jeremy Scahill, reporting for The Nation on March 30, 2011, noted that “​​In the coming months clear evidence that Awlaki, Wuhayshi and Shihri were not killed in the attack would emerge, as each of them appeared in video or audio messages.” Later documentation shows that Awlaki was killed in September of 2011.

It soon became clear that the Yemeni government wasn’t honest about who conducted the Dec. 24 strike, as well as a strike one week earlier on Dec. 17 in the province of Abyan. Confirming the suspicions of many in the Yemeni public, evidence emerged that the Dec. 17 strike had been conducted not by the Yemeni government as was originally claimed, but by the United States.

A Reuters article published on 3rd December 2010, nearly a year later, reported that the President Saleh admitted lying to the Yemeni public about the cruise missile strikes on Al-Qaeda in December 2009 saying they were the work of Yemeni forces, with support from US intelligence. This article draws on a diplomatic cable dated 4 January 2010, which refers to a meeting between CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus and President Saleh on 2 January 2010 during which it reports that Petraeus congratulated Saleh on recent operations against Al Qaeda and told him of an increase in security assistance to Yemen. The cable also says that President Saleh praised the 17th and 24th December strikes, but that “mistakes were made” in the killing of civilians in the Abyan strike, which occurred on 17th. The cable further says that “Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are ‘not very accurate’ and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed precision-guided bombs instead. ‘We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,’ Saleh said, prompting Deputy Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just ‘lied’ by telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.”

Taken together, the Dec. 17 and Dec. 24 strikes represented an escalation of American military involvement in Yemen, the early stages of a quiet and opaque war that the Obama administration would fight against AQAP in which Yemeni civilians often paid a high price for botched strikes.

In Shabwa, the New York Times reported in July 2010 that in the days following the Dec. 24 strike, locals decided that the presence of AQAP militants had become a liability, and asked them to leave the area.

The US strikes in Yemen also ignited fierce debate in the United States over the limitations, or lack thereof, applied to the conduct of the war on terror in regions such as Yemen, outside of officially delineated battle spaces such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Due to the nature of both CIA and US military involvement in Yemen, and the lack of official acknowledgement by the CIA for their involvement, Airwars grades this event as “declared” following the revelations of US role contained in the released US diplomatic cables, in lieu of public reporting on CIA actions. It is unclear if US involvement in the operation was limited to providing intelligence and munitions, or also included more extensive operational actions

The incident occured around dawn.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Counter-Terrorism Action (Ground)
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    5–34

Sources (24) [ collapse]

Geolocation notes

Reports of the incident mention Wadi Rafd (وادي رفض), for which the generic coordinates are: 14.185053, 46.948228. Due to limited satellite imagery and information available to Airwars, we were unable to verify the location further.

US Forces Assessment:

  • Known belligerent
    US Forces
  • US Forces position on incident
    Not yet assessed

Original strike reports

US Forces

(S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes
against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the
killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that
the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of
an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into
a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister
Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of
terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment:
Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he
has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in
Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to
determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage.
End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but
the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives
to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in
affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the
issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal
sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported
through other channels.

Summary

  • Strike status
    Declared strike
  • Strike type
    Airstrike, Counter-Terrorism Action (Ground)
  • Civilian harm reported
    No
  • Civilians reported killed
    0
  • Cause of injury / death
    Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
  • Known attacker
    US Forces
  • Known target
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
  • Belligerents reported killed
    5–34

Sources (24) [ collapse]