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REQUEST #91

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09306

CJ33

03 November 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) for Allegation 1574, Al Qaim, Iraq, 14 OCT 17

1. (U) References:

a. (U) CJTF-OIR Policy for Reporting and Responding to CIVCAS Incidents, 27 SEPTEMBER 2017, UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

b. (U) CJTF-OIR Security Classification Guide, 20 OCTOBER 2016, UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

c. (U) CJCSI 3160.01B, 2 Apr 2016, UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

d. (U) Advanced GEOINT Support to the Warfighter - ACES-Hy, AUGUST 2015, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~

2 (U//~~FOUO~~) **BLUF:** I assess that the allegation of Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) on 14 OCT 17 in Al Qaim is NOT CREDIBLE. This assessment is based upon a thorough review of all reasonably available information, including information provided by Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) and open source material.

3. (U) **CIVCAS Allegation:**

a. (U) **Source:** Self Report, AFCENT CAOC Battle Director, CJTF-OIR CJ34 CUOPS FIRES

b. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Time and Location:** (b)(1)1.4Z 14 OCT 17, Al Qaim, Iraq

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Allegation:** Two FIRs were provided by the CAOC and CJTF-OIR respectively.

1. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **AFCENT CAOC Battle Director:** Potential CIVCAS involving (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) strike on IED Factory in AL QAIM, [Iraq]. WHO: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) WHAT:

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Multiple Vehicles/Pax in blast inside CDE (b)(1) ring at impact; WHEN: (b)(1)1.4a Z 14 OCT 17; WHERE: Al Qaim, [Iraq]; WHY: CJTF/OIR Commander approved strike under ROE (b)(1)1.4a due to target value despite (b)(1)1.4a concerns. Details: Following DCA vul (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) was re-tasked to work with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) from (b)(1)1.4a for strike on IED factory. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) contacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and completed 9-line for (b)(1)1.4a on IED factory within Al QAIM. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) entered ROZ with (b)(1)1.4a minutes of playtime and observed (b)(1)1.4a concerns along a road immediately south of the target and within CDA (b)(1)1.4a ring. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) informed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) who was already in contact with CJTF/OIR CC about how to proceed. Additionally, at least one (b)(1)1.4a callsign (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and one (b)(1)1.4a callsign (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) were overhead the target area and feeding rover footage to provide SA to the TEA. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) that the strike was approved regardless of heavy traffic on the road to the south. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) questioned this decision and was told that the proportionality decision of the strike outweighed the collateral estimate and the strike should proceed. Finally, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) flight queried who the approval authority was for the strike and the response was CJTF-OIR Commander. With this information and direction to proceed without (b)(1)1.4a the attack was executed without incident. Upon tape review, multiple vehicles and PAX were observed inside the (b)(1)1.4a GDE ring at impact. At least one vehicle appeared to be disabled post-strike and a large group of PAX began moving toward the area in the moments after the impact. After the strike (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) confirmed with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) that they would file a CIVCAS incident through the appropriate channels. 336 DOI has been briefed on the event and this narrative is included in the MISREP (Encl 1).

2. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) CJTF-OIR CJ34 CUOPS FIRES: CJTF-OIR conducted a strike on a suspected ISIS VBIED Factory in vicinity of Al Qaim, Iraq on (b)(1)1.4a Z 14 OCT 17. The target is located in a manufacturing area in Al Qaim, Al Anbar, Iraq. The target consisted of two parallel target compounds oriented North to South. To the South of both compounds running East to West was a main supply route. This supply route had a heavy volume of traffic. Prior to the Strike, Full Motion Video (FMV) had the target area in view and there was an assessed ISIS presence inside the facility. The call on ISIS personnel was 18 present in the targeted compounds. Outside the target area vehicles and personnel transited East to West along the MSR. The strike was timed in an attempt to mitigate civilian casualties by coordinating the impact of the munitions at a time in between traffic intervals. After weapons release, two vehicles were observed traveling along the MSR adjacent to the target. The munitions impact appeared to have blown debris into the road affecting the vehicles. Due to dust, debris, and ejecta, the ability to discern the actual effects on the vehicles at the time of impact were reduced. After the strike, there were about 10-15 personnel that had gathered and were assessing the personnel from vehicles. Additionally, enemy casualties were assessed as being brought out of the targeted facilities and brought into the street. At this time there was no known civilian casualties or media reflections. The only known confirmed casualties were to be assessed by the Target Engagement Authority as ISIS. When: (b)(1)1.4a Z 14 OCT 17; Where: Al Anbar, Iraq (b)(1)1.4a; Casualty Estimate:

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UNK Civilian, Estimated 13 ISIS Casualties; Additional Information: No known media reflection at this time. **Recommendation:** Recommend CCAR (Encl 14).

d. (U) **Discussion:** During the strike conducted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) multiple vehicles and transients were visible inside the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) (b)(1)1.4a ring, as calculated by CJTF-OIR CDE analysts, during weapons impact. The predominate hazard to personnel inside the CDE (b)(1)1.4a ring is (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (Ref c, Encl 13).

4. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Summary of Coalition Strike Activity:** On 14 OCT 17, 1 X Strike was conducted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) against two targets (Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010/011) simultaneously in Al Qaim, Iraq. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) was on station to provide observation of the strike, and post-strike analysis (Encls 2, 3).

5. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Strike (b)(1)1.4a Overview:** Strike number (b)(1)1.4a was a Dynamic strike that occurred at (b)(1)1.4a Z on Air Tasking Order (ATO) day (b)(1)1.4a under Rule of Engagement (ROE) (b)(1)1.4a targeting the VBIED Factories IVO (b)(1)1.4a (Encl 3). A US (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) struck 2 X Targets in a single engagement with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (Encl 4). The strike resulted in 2 X ISIS VBIED Factory destroyed, 13 X ISIS casualties, and 3 X DUD munitions (Encl 5).

a. (U) **Review of Supporting Intelligence:**

1. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010,** (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Z: Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010 was a garage located at (b)(1)1.4a. CJTF-OIR CJ34 assessed the target facility as an ISIS VBIED Factory, with a former function as a vehicle maintenance shop. This assessment was made with Moderate confidence, supported by (b)(1)1.4c reports as recent as 20 SEP 17, and 1 hour and 3 minutes of Full Motion Video (FMV) as recent as 10 OCT 17, producing a slant of 0/0/0. The facility was assessed to have been under the use and control of ISIS since at least SEP 17, was assessed with Low confidence to be (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (Encl 3, Ref d).

2. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 011,** (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Z: Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 011 was a garage located at (b)(1)1.4a. CJTF-OIR CJ34 assessed the target facility as an ISIS VBIED Factory, with a former function as a vehicle maintenance yard. This assessment was

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made with Moderate to High confidence, supported by (b)(1)1.4c reports as recent as 2 OCT 17 and 3 hours and 50 minutes of FMV as recent as 11 OCT 17, producing a high slant of 18/0/1 on 3 OCT 17. The facility was assessed to have been under the use and control of ISIS since at least JUN 16, was assessed with Moderate confidence to be (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a (Encl 3, Ref d).

b. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE):** The CDE call for this strike was (b)(1)1.4a. There were 5 X Collateral Concerns (CC) (1 X Shed, 4 X Garage) within the weapons effects radii of the weaponing solution. All 5 X CC were within (b)(1)1.4a of an aimpoint, the nearest CC was (b)(1)1.4a west-northwest of Aimpoint 1 (Encl 3).

c. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Battle Damage Assessment (BDA):** The BDA call for this strike was passed in the CJTF_OIR_CJOC chat room as: 2 X ISIS VBIED Factory [Destroyed], 13 X ISIS Casualties, and (b)(1)1.4a DUD Munitions (Encl 5). (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

"The W and S side of the W target compound and the N side of the E target compound were assessed to be destroyed. The SE side of the W target compound and the S side of the E target compound were assessed to still be intact. (b)(1)1.4a probable dud holes were observed on the SE building of the W target compound and on the S building of the E target compound" (Encls 6, 7).

d. (U//FOUO) **Review of Chat Logs:** A single chat room contained all chat applicable to this strike.

1. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) Between (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES passed that the strike should be observed around (b)(1)1.4a Z, the name and MGRS of the targets, the requirement for near (b)(1)1.4a scans by (b)(1)1.4a and far scans by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and that the primary concern will be any (b)(1)1.4a within (b)(1)1.4a of the target facilities. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, (b)(1)1.4a began making assessments of the targeted facilities, and (b)(1)1.4a personnel and vehicles, SLANT 6/0/0. Between (b)(1)1.4a Z, there was significant activity in the vicinity of (IVO) the targeted facilities, and (b)(1)1.4a continued to make assessments, SLANT 11/0/0. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES amended the strike time to (b)(1)1.4a asks if CJTF_FIRES would like 10 minute rollups rather than continued callouts, CJTF_FIRES accepted the proposal. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES confirmed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) will be ready at (b)(1)1.4a passed the (b)(1)1.4a Z- (b)(1)1.4a Z rollup, SLANT 18/0/0. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES announced their intent to change

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FOV once (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) are in strike posture and re-emphasized (b)(1)1.4a scans. (b)(1)1.4a acknowledged the intentions and passed that there is moderate vehicle and (b)(1)1.4a on the road south of the target facilities. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES requested another (b)(1)1.4a scan. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES requested the FOV remain the same, and (b)(1)1.4a then passed the (b)(1)1.4a Z rollup, SLANT 18/0/0, with moderate vehicle traffic. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, CJTF_FIRES requested callout of (b)(1)1.4a and stated that the TEA was present, and observing the ISR feed and chat. From (b)(1)1.4a Z, (b)(1)1.4a called out approximately (b)(1)1.4a on the streets IVO the targeted facilities. At (b)(1)1.4a passed that they are unable to callout (b)(1)1.4a from the current zoom level (this matches with the FMV provided by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a that is discussed later in this CCAR). CJTF_FIRES replied that "[I]t's ok. [T]hey're weapons away, (b)(1)1.4a" At (b)(1)1.4a Z, (b)(1)1.4a announced observation of two kinetic strikes on the target facilities, and a secondary explosion. At (b)(1)1.4a observed approximately 5 X Squirters south of the target facility. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, (b)(1)1.4a provided initial BDA of the strike. At (b)(1)1.4a Z, (b)(1)1.4a observed 4 X Adult Males (Adms) walking IVO the target facilities. From (b)(1)1.4a assessed (b)(1)1.4a potential DUD munitions. At (b)(1)1.4a observed multiple Adms investigating the rubble and 4 X Adms were observed carrying an injured person out of the target facilities (later assessed as a potential EKIA). Between (b)(1)1.4a Z, the 1 X potential EKIA was moved to a pickup truck by approximately 20 X Adms, the pickup then departed. The remaining chat does not add further to this assessment, and at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) switched ISR to the next target (Encl 8).

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) Review of FMV/Weapon Sight Video (WSV): FMV and WSV were available for this strike.

1. (S//~~REL USA, IRKS~~) Review of FMV: Approximately 4 minutes and 50 seconds of FMV was provided by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a for review. The video starts at 00:05 (b)(1)1.4g with the Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 011 in the center of the FOV while a vehicle pulls into the facility. Throughout the footage, vehicles can be seen transiting the east-west running road immediately to the south of the target facilities, and multiple (b)(1)1.4a can be seen (b)(1)1.4a along on the far side of the road. At 00:20, (b)(1)1.4a can be seen (b)(1)1.4a east along the near side of the road, adjacent Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010, and there appears to be another (b)(1)1.4a along the road just to the west of the same facility. At 00:30, the vehicle parks in Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 011, and there appears to be multiple (b)(1)1.4a in the yard; a truck pulls up to the front of Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010, and then reverses to the front of Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 011. At 00:50, the (b)(1)1.4a east along the road has passed beyond both facilities. At 01:16 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a zooms on the target facility and changes (b)(1)1.4g Just prior to zooming out at 01:20, (b)(1)1.4a can be

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seen exiting an awning of Al Makarim ISIS VBIED Factory 010, once zoomed out, the vehicle traffic continues, but (b)(1)1.4a cannot be seen. At 01:34, splash occurs as approximately 3 X vehicles are passing the facilities; both facilities and the road are obstructed by smoke and dust, remaining vehicle traffic appears to stop or turn away from the target facility. At 01:49, there appears to be a secondary explosion in the target facilities. At 02:00, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a zooms on the target facilities, there is smoke and dust obstructing most of the FOV, but there are multiple vehicles and (b)(1)1.4a observable. At 03:00, the smoke and dust dissipated enough that the facilities and road are visible. During the remainder of the video, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a continues to scan the targets and street, showing significant (b)(1)1.4a activity and vehicle movements (Encl 9).

2. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Re-Processing, Estimation, and Dissemination (PED)

Results: Due to the high volume of activity IVO the target facilities, a re-PED was requested and fulfilled by Distributed Ground System (DGS); "The other crew headed out, but they assessed that there was not a CIVCAS of any kind. They said at the time of the strike, there were no civilians in the area. The crew said that the zoom-out level was such that it was very hard to see anything other than the target being struck; however, when the aircrew zoomed back in, there was no evidence of a CIVCAS-- meaning there were no bodies shown that were previously unaccounted for, nor was there any evidence of any vehicles struck that weren't called out before. The crew was extremely confident in their assessment. If you have any questions, just let me know" (Encl 10).

3. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) Review of WSV: Approximately 56 seconds of WSV was provided by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a for this strike. The video begins at 00:06 with the target facilities in the center of the FOV. Multiple vehicles can be seen both transiting and parked on the road, but none are currently passing the target facilities. At 00:16, splash occurs as 3 X Vehicles, and what appears to be 1 X Motorcycle are adjacent the target facilities. The blast obscures the roadway and the target facilities, preventing observation. Other traffic can be seen stopping or turning away. At 00:32, there appears to be a secondary explosion, however the footage cuts to BDA. At 00:34, the target facilities can be seen in the center of the FOV and appear partially destroyed. There is a large number of vehicles and personnel in the roadway adjacent the target facilities. At 00:36, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a zooms on the target facilities and multiple trucks are driving near the facilities and people can be seen interacting with the rubble. At 00:46, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a zooms out and scans the target facilities for assessment for the remainder of the footage (Encl 11).

f. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) CJTF-OIR Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Legal Notes: (b)(5)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

g. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **CIVCAS Assessment:** Based on reasonably available evidence, it is more likely than not that no CIVCAS occurred as a result of this strike.

6. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Additional Information:** The CDE Graphic lists the use of a (b)(1)1.4a which has a Collateral Estimation Range (CER) of (b)(1)1.4a. The munition that was used for the strike was a (b)(1)1.4a which has a CER of (b)(1)1.4a was used to establish the area of concern for the (b)(1)1.4a scans that were conducted by (b)(1)1.4a (Encl 13).

7. (~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~) **Credibility Assessment:** Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation is deemed NOT CREDIBLE. That is, there is insufficient evidence to corroborate this allegation.

8. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at:

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

14 Encls

1. (U) 5Ws on Potential CIVCAS involving (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
2. (U) OIR Strike Log, 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
3. (U) CJTF Strike Engagement Script, 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
4. (U) MISREP (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
5. (U) mIRC CJTF_OIR_CJOC, 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
6. (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) PED, 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
7. (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) Stills, 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~
8. (U) mIRC (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) 14 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~
9. (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) FMV, 14 OCT 17,

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~~S//REL USA, IRKS~~

10. (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) Re-PED, 29 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~

11. (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) WSV, 14 OCT 17,

~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~

12. (U) (b)(1)1.4a SJA Notes, 14 OCT 17,

~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~

13. (U) CDE CER (b)(1)1.4 01 OCT 17, ~~S//REL USA, KOR, ACGU, NATO~~

14. (U) CJTF CIVCAS FIR, 14 OCT 17,

~~S//REL USA, FVEY~~

Classified By: (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

Derived From: Multiple Sources

Declassify On: 03 November 2042

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

IRJA

SUBJECT: Legal Review of CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) –
Allegation #1574, Al Qaim, Iraq, 14 October 2017

I have conducted a legal review of the information in this CCAR. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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IRCS

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1. I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

a. ___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted.

b. ___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no further investigation, as no additional information could reasonably be discovered. Accordingly, CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell shall close this allegation and CJTF-OIR PAO shall publish the results of this assessment in a press release as soon as practicable.

c. X The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command. Accordingly, CJTF-OIR CIVCAS Cell shall close this allegation and CJTF-OIR PAO shall publish the results of this assessment in a press release as soon as practicable.

 24 OCT 2017

KENNETH L. KAMPER
BG, US ARMY
Chief of Staff

Approved for Release