



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND  
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND - OIR  
ERBIL, IRAQ  
APO AE 09316

IRIZ-JA-OPL

3 December 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) - Strike (b)(1)1.4a  
(b)(1)1.4a (8x Armed Males in Building), 24 (b)(1)1.4a November 2016

1. BLUF. This allegation is NOT CREDIBLE. A thorough review of all reasonably available evidence indicates that the child allegedly injured was not in the same location as the strike location. Likewise, the post-strike review did not indicate that the child was injured.

2. CIVCAS Allegation.

a. Source. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) self-reported the allegation during mission; CJTF-OIR reported to CJFLCC-OIR.

b. Time and Location. 24 (b)(1)1.4a November 2016, IVO Al Karāmah, Mosul, Sector E.20, MGS (b)(1)1.4a

c. Description. The CJTF CIVCAS Team asserted that:

"This possible CIVCAS was self-reported during-mission. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) was tasked by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) JTAG to slew to grids IVO (b)(1)1.4a to look for 8 armed adult males with weapons carrying large weapon system. While at the target location, two armed adult males with tactical vests in addition to 8 other adult males in western wear. Civilians, including children were observed loitering in the area. After firing (b)(1)1.4a women and children were observed fleeing the site, including one possibly injured child (assessed possibly injured due to a small limp). Initial assessment is 1x CIV POSS WIA.

Closest strike (b)(1)1.4a (Grid Location differs from closest strike; there may be a discrepancy with the strike log)."

3. Analysis.

a. Target Information. The strike information for CJTF Strike # (b)(1)1.4a does not align with the factual circumstances outlined, nor the location of the allegation; however, CJTF Strike # (b)(1)1.4a does align with the location of the plotted strike, the reporting assets and the circumstances of the allegation. Accordingly, CJTF Strike # (b)(1)1.4a

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has been assessed to correlate to the reported potential CIVCAS incident. This is locally recorded as CJFLCC-I Strike (b)(1)1.4a

(1) The intended target of ten armed adult males, including a large weapons system, were within effective fires range of friendly forces in Sector E.20, eastern Mosul. Eight armed adult males moved from the streets into a building IVO (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. While conducting scans for (b)(1)1.4a in the area and building, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) observed two armed adult males also enter the same building.

(2) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) was tasked by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to slew to the grid coordinate (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a in order to track 8x armed males, who were also carrying a large weapons system. While observing the target location to maintain PID, 2x armed adult males with a tactical vest entered the same compound of interest. According to the allegation, multiple civilians, including children, were observed in the vicinity of the target location; post-strike, several women and children were observed fleeing the target site. This observation included 1x child with a limp, leading the allegation to conclude "one child WIA".

b. *Coalition Strike Activity.* This strike was an engagement under U.S. Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a Collective Self-defense of Partner Nation forces (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) initially observed the eight armed adult males engaging friendly forces; on request from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) slew to the area to maintain positive identification of the compound the combatants entered, and to scan for (b)(1)1.4a in the area. Although not required, a hasty CDE analysis on the compound was conducted by the CJOC-E CDE Analyst to ensure no other buildings were adversely affected by the munitions. While this was developing, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed two armed adult males on the SW corner of the street moving towards and entering the compound. The TEA authorized the engagement under ROE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) engaged the target compound at (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(1)1.4a.

c. *Review of WSV/FMV.* Three videos were reviewed for this strike: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) recording the strike, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) scanning post-strike.

(1) *Strike:* The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) strike videos, both approximately 45 seconds in length, do not portray any CIVPOL in the target area during the strike itself (though one civilian is visible over a block away). See *Enclosure 1*.

(2) *Post strike:* Approximately 3:00 minutes after the strike, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed one child running down a road, and meeting two adults. This recording is only 0:24 seconds in length, and does not depict where the one child and two adults originated. The grid coordinates visible in the frame are IVO (b)(1)1.4a. This is approximately one block South of the target location. See *Enclosure 3*, where blue indicates the child's path and orange is the one child with the two adults.

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d. *mIRC Logs*. The mIRC Logs for this strike are enclosed. See *Enclosure 2*.

(1) A review of the mIRC Logs from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) indicate that at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) asked (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to slew to (b)(1)1.4a in order to maintain positive identification of the eight armed adult males with a heavy weapons system that (b)(1)1.4a observed crossing RTE SANTA FE (south). The nearest friendly forces to their location was 320m away. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) identified several family groups and civilian population in the area of the compound, but stated they would continue to monitor the compound. Additionally, the MGS was correctly given to the CDE analysts from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and a refined (b)(1)1.4a grid was produced (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) confirmed positive identification of a weapon in a group of adult males on the West corner of the nearest intersection. Two armed adult males then traversed across the street into the building. The positive identification by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) of the original eight armed adult males was maintained, thus making 10x armed adult males within the compound. Additionally, there was CIVPOL noted in the area of the target, but not within the target site itself.

(2) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) *Assessment*. There are no more written records for this strike on the ChatSurfer database. According to the mIRC Log of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) stated that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) lost connection to the system. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) forwarded their internal mIRC Logs for the missing period of time from the ChatSurfer database. The Logs indicate that post-strike, the observer saw one child and one woman running from the direction of the strike ("splash area"), however, it does not confirm that the individuals originated from the target site. Moreover, a review of the videos indicates that the origin of the individuals is not observable. Lastly, the mIRC Log indicates the child ran across the road and met up with two other individuals, mirroring what is visible on the recording of the strike. This child, according to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) appears to be wounded. Based on these statements, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) submitted a 5W Report reflecting one child WIA.

(3) At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) regained connection to the servers. The Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Liaison Officer (ISRLO) screener, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) who was responsible for recording the ISR feed for the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) asset observing the strike, stated that the strike in question, namely the (b)(1)1.4a engagement for a possible CIVCAS allegation, had been reviewed and they had subsequently assessed the child was not wounded. Asking (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) to review it, the aircraft pilot responded that they would review it when the mission was complete. See *supra. at para. 3.d.(2) for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) assessment.*

(4) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) *Screener Assessment*. Speaking with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) screener, he stated that he had reviewed the video following the strike, based upon the possible CIVCAS report from the pilot, and had assessed the one child to not be wounded. This was on the basis that there were no observable injuries, and it is believed the 1x child did not originate from the target area. Further, from his recollection, the one child came from a building away from the strike and ran to meet the two adults in the street.

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(5) At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) screener identified that they were attempting to regain positive identification on a pick-up truck and group of adult males; however, the CJOC-E ISRLO confirms that this call-out was in relation to another scan of the area and unrelated to this allegation.

4. Credibility Assessment. Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation is deemed NOT CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident for the one child WIA did not occur based on the following:

a. The origin of the one child is not able to be determined from the three videos (although there are several individuals who did originate from the splash area);

b. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) screener (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) did not believe there to be a CIVCAS incident from a real-time and subsequent review of the FMVWSV. After speaking with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) screener, the supplemental information provided indicates the one child does not appear wounded from the strike;

c. From my review of the three recordings for the engagement, the one child does not appear to be injured as a result the strike; and,

d. The CJOC-E G2 NCOIC Imagery Analyst has reviewed the video and concurs in this assessment.

5. The point of contact for this CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report is the undersigned at (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

// ORIGINAL SIGNED //

3 Encls.

- 1. Strike Recordings
- 2. mIRC Logs, ref: (b)(1)1.4a
- 3. 1x Child Diagram

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have conducted a legal review of the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

\_\_\_ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

\_\_\_ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

9 The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.

  
JOSEPH M. MARTIN  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

Pages 91 through 100 redacted for the following reasons:

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Exhibits removed per agreement - Bates 2871-2877