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REQUEST #4

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND –
OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
APO AE 09348

IRIZ-JA-OPL

6 February 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) for CJOC-B Strike Cell Strike (b)(1)1.4a (CJFLCC-OIR J34 Target No. (b)(1)1.4a) – CIVCAS Ref 06/17)

1. **BLUF:** The allegation is not credible. The evidence available is sufficient to associate the alleged CIVCAS with the only CJFLCC-OIR strike conducted in the area, however, there is insufficient evidence to establish that any civilians were killed or injured as a result of this strike.

2. **CIVCAS Allegation:**

a. *Source.* The source is a Department of State (DoS) human rights report for 25 January 2017 emailed to the CJFLCC-OIR DCME which includes a CIVCAS allegation based on a UNAMI report.

b. *Time and Location.* The report alleges that the CIVCAS occurred on 14 January 2017 in western Mosul but does not indicate a time.

c. *Description.* The DoS report includes the caption "Airstrikes Targeting Da'esh Militants in Mosul are Killing Civilians (UNAMI)" under which appears the supporting allegation that "[i]n one case, airstrikes targeted a local Da'esh leader in western Mosul on Jan. 14, but the attack caused the collapse of both the targeted house and the adjacent house, reportedly killing 19 people and wounding 11 UNAMI reported".

3. **Associated Strike:** The CJOC-B Air Advisor assesses with reasonable confidence that there were no ISF strikes conducted in West Mosul on 14 January 2017. The only strike conducted by the CJFLCC-OIR in West Mosul on 14 January 2017 was the prosecution of a CJFLCC-OIR J34 deliberate target—two, two-story buildings assessed to function as an ISIL headquarters—at (b)(1)1.4a (ISIL HQ Strike). The similarities between the ISIL HQ Strike and the strike described in the allegation, and the absence of any other strikes in the area, are sufficient to associate the CIVCAS allegation with the ISIL HQ Strike.

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4. **Analysis:** The following is a chronological breakdown of the ISIL HQ Strike based on analysis of relevant targeting documents, mlRC logs, and FMV footage:

a. *Target Information and Approval.* The target was developed by the CJFLCC-OIR J2T and presented for (b)(1)1.4a removal and approval at the CJFLCC-OIR Commanding General's (b)(1)1.4a Removal Board briefing on 14 January 2017. The target structures were assessed to function as an ISIL headquarters and to have been under ISIL control since February 2016. The target structures were not assessed to be (b)(1)1.4a. The weaponizing solution proposed for the target was (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(1)1.4a aim points on the north target structure and (b)(1)1.4a aim point on the south target structure, and this weaponizing resulted in a (b)(1)1.4a call. The Commanding General's Staff recommended "removal of the area from (b)(1)1.4a to permit a dynamic strike under Supplemental ROE (b)(1)1.4a based on present Intelligence, current Weaponizing, and provided Facility Outline." The Commanding General approved the recommendations without further guidance and the target packet was forwarded to the CJOC-B strike cell for prosecution. The target packet is included as *Enclosure 1* and the target approval sheet is included as *Enclosure 2*.

b. *Engagement Summary.* The CJOC-B Strike Cell received the target for prosecution and revised the weaponizing solution, based on assets available at the time, to (b)(1)1.4a with (b)(1)1.4a aim points in each target structure resulting in a (b)(1)1.4a. On 14 January 2017, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) arrived over the Target at (b)(1)1.4a to conduct (b)(1)1.4a scans and observe the strike. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed no CIVPOL in the approximately 45 minutes of pre-strike FMV collected on the Target. A snap from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) pre-strike FMV capture is included as *Enclosure 3*. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) engaged the target with (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a. The FMV of the strike from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) pod is included as *Enclosure 4* and the relevant portion of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) mlRC room log is included as *Enclosure 5*. The BDA resulting from the strike was "Mosul Al Kuwayt ISIL Headquarters Destroyed (2x Buildings)" and the nearest collateral structure—a building 15m west—was assessed not to have sustained significant effects from the strike. A snap from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) post-strike FMV is included as *Enclosure 6*.

c. *Post-Strike Analysis.* (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed the target area for approximately 23 minutes after the strike. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) screener's analysis of this post-strike observation is included in *Enclosure 4*. Only the first four minutes of the post-strike observation were recorded. At (b)(1)1.4a (at 3:04 in the video), one ADM can be seen walking southwest on the road to the north of the target structures and, shortly after, the ADM meets another ADM and they proceed back towards the impact site. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) pre-strike and post-strike FMV can be found at the IP address listed in *Reference 1*. At (b)(1)1.4a, the screener indicates that he sees movement to the west of the target and then observes up to 5 ADMs and one child walking near the non-targeted structure to the west. At (b)(1)1.4a, the screener called out one injured ADM and indicated that the injured ADM "possible came from the rubble" but that it was "hard to say." There is insufficient

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evidence to establish with any certainty from where the injured ADM had come or whether he was injured in the strike. However, since no transients were observed in the pre-strike soak and the nearest collateral concern—the structure 15m west of the Target—was effected only with debris, the ADM most likely came from one of the target structures and, if this is the case, the ADM would more likely be a combatant than a noncombatant ADM since the target structures were assessed to be used exclusively by ISIL.

5. **Credibility Assessment:** This CIVCAS allegation is deemed not credible because there is insufficient evidence to determine whether any civilians were injured or killed in the strike.

6. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6) at (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

6 Encl

1. Target Packet
2. Target Approval Sheet
3. Pre-strike Image
4. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) Pod FMV
5. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) Main mlRC Log
6. Post-strike Image

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I have conducted a legal review of the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

 The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

 The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

 9 The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.


JOSEPH M. MARTIN
Major General, U.S. Army
CG/CFJLCC-OIR

FEB 09 2017

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Pages 44 through 60 redacted for the following reasons:

Exhibits removed per agreement - Bates 3102-3118

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