



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION AND
 COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND - OIR
 ERBIL, IRAQ
 APO AE 09316

IRIZ-JA-OPL

8 September 2017

(U//~~FOUO~~) MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force -
 Operation Inherent Resolve, Camp Arifjan, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: (~~S//REL~~) CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) - CJFLCC-OIR
 151/17 CJTF-OIR #790

1. BLUF. (~~S//REL~~) Based on the reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS (civilian casualty) allegation is presently found NOT CREDIBLE.

2. CIVCAS Allegation.

a. (~~S//REL~~) *Source*. Reported by AIRWARS based on numerous social media reports (see Enclosure 6).

b. (~~S//REL~~) *Time and Location*. 27-28 December 2016, Mosul (Al Faisaliah, Alqosjat, and/or Aldndan areas) (IVO MGRS: (b)(1)1.4a).

c. (~~S//REL~~) *Description*. CJOC-Erbil (CJOC-E) conducted various strikes throughout Mosul between 27-28 December 2016. Below describes the possible strikes where CIVCAS may have occurred based on an assessment of the strikes on those days in the areas provided by AIRWARS.

3. (~~S//REL~~) Strike Narrative and Analysis. The following is a chronological breakdown of the potential strikes based on analysis of relevant reports, Full Motion Video (FMV) footage, and post-strike assessments.

a. (~~S//REL~~) An AIRWARS report alleged that on 27 December 2016, "[u]p to 20 civilians were reported killed in heavy Coalition strikes on Mosul according to local sources." The stated locations were in the Al Faisaliah, Alqosjat, and/or Aldndan areas in Mosul, Iraq. The report claims the strikes led to around 20 civilians being killed.

b. (~~S//REL~~) A First Impression Report (FIR) was drafted by CJOC-E based on an initial assessment by the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) CIVCAS team. Strikes between 27-28 December 2016 were then correlated with these areas.

c. (~~S//REL~~) Two potential strikes on 27 December seemed like potential strikes

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where a CIVCAS could have occurred: [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a (targeted a UAV facility) and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a (both targeted the same VBIED facility).

d. (~~S//REL~~) For strike [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a FMV from both the aircraft [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (see Enclosures 1 and 2) and the Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) asset [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) (see Enclosures 3 and 4) show a strike on what was an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) facility. No civilians are seen outside or inside the target location before or after the strike.

e. (~~S//REL~~) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on 27 December 2016 targeted a VBIED facility. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was the ISR asset that observed the strikes. However, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a does not record strikes that occur, and if CJOC-E recorded these strikes, the FMV is no longer available. Engagement [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was shot by [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6). After first contacting the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a squadron office via SVOIP, the point of contact searched for FMV of that strike but did not find any FMV. No FMV was found on the MISREP Analysis Tool website either (see Enclosure 7). Engagement [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was shot with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and therefore no FMV exists. Thus, no FMV exists from the VBIED facility struck on 27 December [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a either from ISR or the aircraft.

f. (~~S//REL~~) The other strikes on the Google Earth KMZ below (see Enclosure 5) do not appear likely to be the result of the CIVCAS here. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a (planned target [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a targeted two different bridges at [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a respectively on 27 December 16. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed both of these strikes. Another target, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a occurred on [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a on 27 December 2016 and targeted another bridge. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) observed this strike.

g. (~~S//REL~~) According to the ISR Technical Controller (ITC) in CJOC-E, when a CIVCAS is observed by a screener watching FMV, the screener will call out the potential CIVCAS. According to the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), if an aircraft observes a CIVCAS, the aircraft will call out the potential CIVCAS. For [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a it is reasonable to assume that no CIVCAS occurred as any CIVCAS, especially of this magnitude, would have almost certainly been observed by the ISR asset and/or the aircraft who would have called out the potential CIVCAS.

h. (~~S//REL~~) A final strike that appears on the Google Earth KMZ is [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. However, according to CJOC-E SJA strike cell records, there is no record of this strike. The Collateral Damage Estimation analyst checked with CJTF who do not have any record of an [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a. There is no explanation as to why this appears on the Google Earth KMZ since no record of this strike exists if it did occur.

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4. (~~S//REL~~) Credibility Assessment. Based on the reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation is presently found NOT CREDIBLE, as a thorough review of available strike records does not include sufficient information to establish the alleged civilian casualties occurred as a result of a Coalition strike. This allegation should be reassessed if further information becomes available.

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) The point of contact for this CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report is the undersigned at [redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

6 Encls

1. Pre-strike snap by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
2. Post-strike snap by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
3. Pre-strike snap of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
4. Post-strike snap of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)
5. Google Earth Strike KMZ
6. CIVCAS Cell Initial Assessment
7. Email correspondence with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) POC

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I have conducted a legal review of the information in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

W The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.



ROBERT P. WHITE
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

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