



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION AND
COMBINED JOINT FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND - OIR
Baghdad, IRAQ
APO AE 09316

IRIZ-JA-OPL

23 February 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve, APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) - Strike (b)(1)1.4a Dynamic Target of ISIL UAS Launch Site, 04 (b)(1)1.4a February 2017 (CJFLCC-OIR 17/17)

1. BLUE. The CIVCAS allegation is NOT CREDIBLE. A thorough review of all available evidence does not provide enough evidence to conclude that it is more likely than not that a CIVCAS occurred.

2. CIVCAS Allegation.

a. Source. Distributed Ground Station for the ISR platform (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)

b. Time and Location. (b)(1)1.4a on 4 Feb 2017, Southwest Mosul MGRS (c)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a

c. Description. ISIS UAS Launch Site and ISIS Operators.

3. Strike Narrative and Analysis. The following is a chronological breakdown of the strike based on analysis of relevant mlRC logs, FMV footage, and post-strike assessments.

a. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) an armed ISR asset, observed several ISIS fighters retrieving a UAS they were using to observe partner forces on the east side of the river. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) fired (b)(1)1.4a

b. The launch site and ISIS Fighters were observed for roughly three hours after the strike, 1.5 hours by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) and 1.5 hours by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) during which time they interacted with the target structure and a dilapidated structure to the southwest of the target structure that the TEA determined was (b)(1)1.4a

c. The ISIS fighters were observed lighting obscuration fires to the northeast of their position, and they continued to move from the target structure into the courtyard and to the dilapidated structure to the southwest.

d. The TEA assessed that the adult males interacting with the target structure and dilapidated structure to the southwest of the wall were ISIS Fighters based on the interaction with the UAS earlier in the afternoon, the obscuration fires, recent intelligence reports on the area, and their behavior. This assessment was not passed to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) operators via mlRC, but all observations were made by strike cell personnel and the TEA. The video also show the obscuration fires burning.

e. At around 1350z, The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) operators called the ISR Tactical Controller in the Baghdad Strike Cell to confirm the areas where they should be making callouts. They were told

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to observe the courtyard and areas south of the wall, but they were not told the TEA assessed the adult males were ISIS fighters and were considered targetable at that point.

f. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) operators called out an adult male in the southwest dilapidated structure the ISIS fighters had interacted with leading up to the strike, and based on the TEA's earlier assessment, CJOC-B considered him as targetable so the strike proceeded, though effects were not expected to extend to the dilapidated structure.

f. The transient concern in the strike cell was the women and children pedestrian activity in the streets West and North of the target compound, and ensuring they were not approaching the courtyard of the target compound prior to weapons release. Weapon release was held until the strike cell was confident that (b)(1)1.4a would be effected by the strike.

g. At (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) engaged the target structure with (b)(1)1.4a destroying the target compound completely. The ISIS fighter in the southwest structure was not assessed at the time as part of EKIA inflicted by the attack because he was not accounted for in the slant of the target structure at the time of the strike.

h. After the strike and prior to the submission of this CCAR, the ISR tactical controllers were reminded to pass all assessments the TEA makes concerning (b)(1)1.4a protections and positively identified ISIS fighters when working with ISR operators in preparation for a strike.

4. Credibility Assessment. Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation is deemed NOT CREDIBLE. The adult male called out after the strike by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) had been assessed by the TEA as an ISIS fighter prior to the strike, and so was likely EKIA not CIVCAS. This assessment is based on the following:

a. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) operators were unaware of the TEA's assessment that the adult males in the area were ISIS Fighters and were engaged in the operation of an ISIL UAS node. This lack of awareness led to their report of potential CIVCAS.

b. There is no independent report of CIVCAS.

5. The point of contact for this CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report is the undersigned at

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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- 3 Encis
- 1. mIRC Chat Log
- 2. (b)(1)1.4a Removal Storyboard
- 3. CDE Graphic
- 4. Strike video available on request

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I have conducted a legal review of the information in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

(b)(5)

(b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

 The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

 The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

 The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.



JOSEPH M. MARTIN
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

FEB 28 2017

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Pages 51 through 57 redacted for the following reasons:

Exhibits removed per agreement - Bates 3004-3010

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