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REQUEST #2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
CAMP ARIFJAN, KUWAIT
APO AE 09306

IRHH-OCO

12 January 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR CIVCAS Team, Combined Joint Task Force- Operation Inherent Resolve,
APO, AE 09306

SUBJECT: CIVCAS Credibility Assessment Report (CCAR) for strike number (b)(1)1.4a

1. BLUF: The CIVCAS allegation is determined to be non-Credible due to the lack of information provided by the source of the CIVCAS allegation and the lack of evidence to show that seven (7) or more people were killed or injured in the strike.

2. CIVCAS Allegation:

a. Source: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights

b. Time and Location: 19 November 2016, Buaas Village (northern countryside of Ar-Raqqah)

c. Description: The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reports that at least seven (7) people were killed and others were injured, in airstrikes by warplanes believed to belong to the international coalition, which targeted Buaas Village in the northern countryside of Ar-Raqqah, and the death toll is expected to rise because there are some people in critical situation.

3. Analysis:

a. Coalition Strike Activity: Strike (b)(1)1.4a occurred during the alleged allegation's time period and within the alleged area. Strike (b)(1)1.4a target was an ISIL Training Camp located at grid (b)(1)1.4a. Designated a deliberate strike, it was prosecuted on 19 (b)(1)1.4a NOV16 by a pair of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6). The desired effect was to harass operations in the ISIL training camp by cratering the entrance and functionally destroying the camps electrical power station. Munitions used on the target included (b)(1)1.4a. Strike restrictions included a night strike and a (b)(1)1.4a scan was required.

b. Review of WSV/FMV: The available FMV of the strike consisted of two videos. The first shows a strike on the camp's electrical power station (1 x JDPI), which is the smallest building in camp compound. The second video shows strikes on the compound's entry roadway (7 x JDPI). No other videos were discovered, including video of the (b)(1)1.4a scan.

c. Target Information: The target was an ISIL Training Camp located at grid (b)(1)1.4a. It was deemed significant to ISIL's logistic network because it was one of two known training camps in Ar Raqqah and was the only active training site in Ar Raqqah. The facility provided ISIL with the capability to train and beddown ~ 600 ISIL foreign fighters. 7 JDPIs were assigned to the target. The target was assessed as (b)(1)1.4a and the CDE was determined to be low.

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4. Credibility Assessment:

a. Based on a thorough assessment of all reasonably available evidence, this CIVCAS allegation is deemed not credible. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident did not occur. The initial report from Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) stated that the strike targeted Buaas Village in the northern countryside of Ar-Raqqa, however, the target of strike (b)(1)1.4a a military training camp, was just on the outer edge of Raqqa itself. Also, a search for the Village of Buaas using both English and Arabic search terms was unsuccessful. Thus there is no confidence that the targets for strike (b)(1)1.4a and the alleged target on the SOHR report are the same.

b. An examination of the JDPIs show that six (6) of them were designated roadway and one (1) was designated as a power station. The roadway was sufficiently away from occupied buildings as was the power station. Video of the strike shows no individuals on the road or around the power station during the strike. Also, no individuals are seen running towards or away from the target area. Thus, there is no visible or direct evidence indicating that any civilians were killed or injured.

c. Further, although the blasts were sufficient to destroy the roadway, they were not sufficient but not the adjacent buildings. Likewise the blast was sufficient to disable whatever was in the power station, but not enough to destroy the structure itself or the adjacent buildings. Thus, unless there were individuals in the power station structure, there is no visible or direct evidence indicating that any civilians were killed. Likewise, unless some civilians were injured due to the pressure wave breaking window glass there is no visible or direct evidence indicating that any civilians were injured.

d. Finally, after reading the initial Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) report, it is too vague and does not provide enough information, much less credible information to tie strike (b)(1)1.4a to the strike which caused the alleged CIVCAS. For that reason and the reasons above I assess the CIVCAS allegation to be not credible.

5. (U) The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3) 10 USC 130b; (b)(6)

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[To be completed by GCMCA at the assessing command.]

I have reviewed the information contained in this CCAR and the supporting evidence. Based upon all reasonably available information at this time, I find that:

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. I direct an investigation be conducted by this command.

___ The evidence supports a finding of CREDIBLE. That is, it is more likely than not that the CIVCAS incident occurred. However, at this time I direct no investigation be conducted by this command, as no additional information could be discovered by further investigation.

___ The evidence supports a finding of NOT CREDIBLE. Without additional evidence, I direct that no further action be taken by this command.

NAME
Signature Block
Position

Approved for Release