The US has declared that its military actions in 2022 resulted in no civilians killed or injured, the first such release since a landmark policy intended to overhaul American practices and approaches to civilian harm across the globe.
On the night of October 26, 2019 the US military carried out an operation against ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi in Syria. Local journalists reported the deaths of at least five civilians in the raid. Alongside Baghdadi’s family members and ISIS operatives within the compound, three civilians were reported harmed while passing by the Baghdadi residence at the time.
Following a freedom of information lawsuit by NPR, the US military released the partially redacted 14-page civilian harm assessment it conducted into the incident. The document highlights fresh concerns about both the pattern of US targeting which has consistently resulted in the death and injury of civilians, and the approach to assessing and responding to civilian harm claims.
Цей огляд методології супроводжує нашу аналітичну записку “Характер шкоди, завданої цивільному населенню внаслідок дій Росії в Харківській області, згідно з повідомленнями місцевих джерел”, нашу сторінку з інформацією про війну в Україні та архів з детальним описом кожного із закументованих інцидентів з завдання шкоди цивільному населенню.
Цей підхід було розроблено під час документування конфліктів у Лівії, Сирії, Іраку, Ємені, Сомалі та Секторі Газа, і він відповідає світовим стандартам у реєстрації жертв серед цивільного населення.
Що таке “інцидент”?
“Airwars” здійснює документування шкоди, завданої цивільному населенню, на основі документування окремих інцидентів. Кожен інцидент визначається як момент у часі і просторі, коли джерела повідомляють про загибель або поранення цивільних осіб. Більш детальний опис джерел міститься нижче.
Якщо точний час і місце інциденту невідомі, випадки загибелі і поранення цивільного населення можуть бути об’єднані в одну подію до отримання додаткової інформації. Для кожного інциденту встановлюються координати, з максимально можливим ступенем точності нашими досвіченими командами з геолокації. Коли точне визначення місця події є неможливим, інциденти, що спричинили шкоду цивільному населенню, об’єднуються до надходження додаткової інформації.
Зображення для підвердження геолокації, інцидент RUK192
Наш мінімальний поріг точності геолокації для включення інциденту до архіву відповідає району області.
Всі інциденти в нашому архіві є “живими”, тобто їх може бути оновлено, переглянуто або змінено з надходженням додаткової інформації.
Наші джерела
Задля документування завданої шкоди цивільному населенню ми проаналізували всі наявні повідомлення з відкритих джерел про загибель або поранення цивільних осіб Харківській області внаслідок застосування вибухової зброї усіма сторонами конфлікту.
Наші джерела інформації було встановлено висококваліфікованою командою українських дослідників, що використовувала метод, заснований на документуванні окремих інцидентів. Командою було сформовано постійно оновлюваний перелік джерел для моніторингу та розслідування заяв про загибель або поранення цивільних осіб. Ці джерела включають Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, а також місцеві та міжнародні ЗМІ та організації українською, російською та англійською мовами.
Ми регулярно проводимо cпіввставлення даних, щоб забезпечити координацію з іншими організаціями громадянського суспільства, які теж працюють над документуванням завданої шкоди цивільному населенню.
На сьогоднішній день подібні агреговані бази даних, що містять дані про жертви серед цивільного населення в Харкові та області, створено наступними організаціями: Bellingcat, Eyes on Russia – Center for Information Resilience, проект “Атаки на охорону здоров’я в Україні”, Hala systems, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), Платформа пам’яті “Меморіал”, Архів війни, Харківська правозахисна група та Українська Гельсінська спілка з прав людини/ініціатива “Трибунал для Путіна” (T4P).
Ми посилаємося на ці бази даних у наших детальних описах інцидентів задля полегшення обміну інформацією та узгодження відомостей, які містяться у різних наявних базах даних з документування жертв серед цивільного населення.
Зверніть увагу, що згадка “Airwars” про інцидент, що міститься у іншій базі даних з відкритих джерел, не означає, що результати дослідження “Airwars” точно збігаються з тим, що було зафіксовано цією організацією. У деяких випадках висновки можуть відрізнятися через використання інших джерел або через відмінності в методології.
Поводження з дезінформацією/недостовірною інформацією
Як і в усіх інших конфліктах, які ми відстежуємо, ми документуємо всю наявну інформацію, що стосується окремого інциденту завдання шкоди цивільному населенню, незалежно від приналежності джерела. Іншими словами, якщо джерело містить посилання на цивільних осіб, які загинули або були поранені в результаті окремого інциденту, воно буде включене в наше оцінювання інцидента. Якщо джерело містить лише загальну інформацію без прив’язки до конкретного інциденту, воно не буде включене.
Уся інформація оцінюється, записується та архівується в рамках кожного оцінювання задля того, щоб користувач нашої бази даних міг за потреби провести подальше розслідування.
Категорії інцидентів завдання шкоди цивільному населенню
“Airwars” розробив унікальну методологію класифікації інцидентів завдання шкоди цивільному населенню відповідно до характеру інформації, виявленої у зв’язку з інцидентом. Такий підхід дозволяє користувачам архіву швидко зрозуміти інформаційне середовище, пов’язане з кожним звинуваченням.
Додаткові категорії та примітки
Особиста інформація постраждалих цивільних осіб
Імена та особиста інформація цивільних осіб, які постраждали і чиї особиcті дані було встановлено, не було включено до нашого публічного архіву через постійні побоювання щодо їхньої безпеки та безпеки їхніх близьких, а також відповідно до Закону України “Про захист персональних даних” та інших нормативно-правових актів. “Airwars” зберігає захищений приватний архів інформації щодо цих осіб на випадок, якщо ситуація зміниться.
Пошкодження інфраструктури
Ми задокументовували пошкодження цивільної інфраструктури у тих випадках, коли також повідомлялося про загибель або поранення цивільних осіб. Наше визначення поняття “інфраструктура” може ще змінюватися, але на сьогоднішній день воно враховує будь-яку згадку в джерелах наступних термінів: медичні заклади, школа, сільське господарство, надання гуманітарної допомоги, гуманітарна евакуація, релігійна установа, ринок, газовий об’єкт, електростанція та водопровідна станція.
Виклики та обмеження
Щодо обліку жертв серед цивільного населення в Україні та Харківській області
Український уряд припинив публікувати загальнонаціональну оцінку втрат через чотири дні після початку війни. Організація Об’єднаних Націй, яка наразі є єдиним офіційним джерелом цих даних, не надає детальної інформації про втрати за регіонами. На початку травня 2023 року, за оцінками ООН, за 15 місяців на всій території України загинуло лише 8 800 українських цивільних осіб, переважно внаслідок застосування вибухової зброї. ООН неодноразово визнавала, що це занижена оцінка, тоді як українські військові прокурори вважають, що реальна кількість жертв може бути в 10 разів вищою.
Команда “Airwars”, що працює над дослідженням війни в Україні, з’ясувала, що місцеві джерела часто посилались на органи влади відносно інформації про втрати і кількість жертв, і рідше, ніж в інших конфліктах, за якими стежить “Airwars”, надавали оцінки кількості жертв серед цивільного населення з боку громадськості. Це можна пояснити тим, що ще до повномасштабного вторгнення в Україні функціонували офіційні структури безпеки, судово-медичні та судово-медичні установи, яким цивільні особи довіряли здійснення внутрішньої реєстрації шкоди, завданої цивільному населенню. Побоювання щодо можливої окупації та помсти в Харківській області під час проведення дослідження також можуть пояснити меншу готовність джерел публікувати інформацію про інциденти у відкритих джерелах.
Наша команда зафіксувала обмежену кількість повідомлень про поранення цивільних осіб у місцевих ЗМІ, натомість джерела часто згадують про цивільних осіб, яких “витягли з-під завалів”. За відсутності чіткої згадки про поранення ми не включали врятованих з-під завалів до числа постраждалих цивільних осіб. Однак ми долучали цю інформацію до нашого оцінювання інцидентів. Ми використовуємо її як альтернативний спосіб відстеження шкоди, завданої цивільним.
Щодо ідентифікації жертв та зниклих безвісти
У низці інцидентів наші дослідники зіткнулися з однією серйозною прогалиною в оприлюдненій інформації, а саме з ідентифікацією жертв. В україномовних повідомленнях було мало згадок про імена жертв, а також обмежена інформація про їхню стать, вік або рід занять. Існує низка потенційних причин цієї прогалини, але ключовим фактором є Закон України “Про захист персональних даних”, а також інші нормативно-правові акти, які застосовуються органами влади для захисту особистих даних цивільних осіб. Це дозволяє розголошувати особисту інформацію лише тоді, коли на це є згода жертви або її сім’ї. Іншими причинами можуть бути ризики безпеки, пов’язані з документуванням шкоди, завданої цивільному населенню в районах активних бойових дій, таких як Харків, а також ускладнений або заборонений доступ цивільних осіб до зруйнованих або обвалених будівель у міських районах, коли вони шукають своїх близьких.
Ідентифікація цивільних осіб, загиблих під час конфлікту, також була особливо складною в Харківській області, зважаючи на те, що багато районів регіону були окуповані російськими військами протягом кількох місяців. У жовтні 2022 року українська влада повідомила, що знайшла сотні тіл на нещодавно відвойованих територіях. У випадках, коли причини смерті не були відомі і багато сімей все ще чекають на результати ДНК-тестів і додаткових розслідувань, щоб дізнатися про долю своїх близьких, ці жертви не були включені до нашої загальної кількості жертв. Деякі експерти стверджують, що на пошук та ідентифікацію жертв серед цивільного населення можуть піти роки. За оцінками Харківської правозахисної групи, лише в Харківській області зниклими безвісти вважаються майже 2 000 осіб.
(Translated to Ukrainian by Iryna Chupryna and Igor Corcevoi)
Основною мовою “Airwars” є англійська. У разі виникнення питань, пов’язаних з цим документом, будь ласка, перегляньте нашу англомовну версію тут або зв’яжіться з нами за адресою info@airwars.org
В період з 24 лютого по 13 травня 2022 року, під час вторгнення російських військ в Харківську область, від 275 до 438 цивільних осіб загинули внаслідок застосування вибухової зброї.
Дослідники “Airwars” задокументували всі повідомлення з відкритих джерел про завдану цивільному населенню шкоду і протягом короткого періоду, відомого як “Битва за Харків”, виявили 200 інцидентів заподіяної шкоди. Поміж щоденних повідомлень про загибель цивільних осіб, також повідомлялося про поранення більше 800 (за оцінками організації, до 829) цивільних осіб. У випадках, коли місцеві джерела надавали більше детальну інформацію про жертв, “Airwars” встановив, що щонайменше 30 дітей, 52 жінки і 61 чоловік були ймовірно вбиті російськими військами.
Це дослідження є, мабуть, найбільш грунтовною базою даних у відкритому доступі про шкоду, завдану цивільному населенню у густонаселеній Харківській області, що межує з Росією.
Спираючись на розповіді місцевих мешканців, журналістів та організацій громадянського суспільства, цей звіт проливає світло на повсякденне життя харків’ян під обстрілами. Нижче ми представляємо результати дослідження повідомлень місцевих джерел про шкоду, завдану мешканцям Харкова, пошкодженя критично важливої інфраструктури та перешкоджання наданню життєво важливих послуг. Ми також пропонуємо до вашої уваги наш аналіз інформаційного середовища та непересічних викликів щодо точного документування людських жертв у складних обставинах війни.
Битва за Харків
Наша робота з документування жертв серед цивільного населення враховувала всі повідомлення з місцевих джерел про шкоду, завдану цивільному населенню вибуховою зброєю, на території всієї Харківській області за період, коли місто Харків та його околиці були об’єктом інтенсивних бойових дій, інакше відомих як “Битва за Харків”.
Друге за розміром місто України, Харків, є одним з найбільш постраждалих міст під час війни. Розташоване приблизно за 40 км від російського кордону, з великою кількістю російськомовного населення і тісними зв’язками з російською економікою, місто було ключовою ціллю агресора з початку російського вторгнення 24 лютого 2022 року.
Коли російські війська вторглися в Україну з різних напрямків, тисячі військових увійшли до Харківської області. Міста і села зазнали сильних обстрілів. За кілька тижнів ключові міста області, зокрема, Ізюм, Куп’янськ та Балаклія, було окуповано російськими військами.
Сам Харків ніколи не був окупований, але, натомість, став ареною інтенсивних боїв. Багато мешканців покинули місто у перший місяць війни. За довоєнними оцінками, населення Харкова становило 1,4 мільйона осіб, але у березні 2022 року, за повідомленнями місцевої влади, кількість населення зкоротилась до лише 300 000. Проте успіх Збройних сил України в обороні Харкова відіграв значну роль у зміцненні морального духу в перші дні російського вторгнення.
Наприкінці квітня 2022 року українські війська почали контрнаступ на Харків. 13 травня російські війська були витіснені з околиць міста. Остаточний відступ росіян був описаний як один з найбільших успіхів української армії з часу, коли війська РФ відмовилися від наступу на Київ. У червні 2022 року, за оцінками міського голови Ігоря Терехова, населення Харкова повернулося до рівня близько одного мільйона осіб.
Тим не менш, більшість окупованих територій Харківської області було відвойовано лише в ході успішного українського контрнаступу у вересні 2022 року.
Сьогодні ситуація в Харкові в цілому спокійна, хоча періодичні російські обстріли міста та області тривають. Інфраструктура міста залишається зруйнованою, а спустошливий вплив російської агресії виявляється як у втрачених життях цивільного населення, так і у великій кількості місцевих мешканців, які досі не повернулися до своїх домівок.
Процес архівування
Наш новий архів містить важливі подробиці про те, де і за яких умов постраждало цивільне населення. Ці подробиці було встановлено на основі повідомлень місцевих українських джерел під час війни в Харкові.
Наше дослідження, здійснене на основі відкритих джерел, має стати відправною точкою для слідчих, журналістів, правозахисних груп, а також сімей та окремих осіб, які постраждали внаслідок цього конфлікту. Ми збираємо та зберігаємо всі місцеві свідчення заради утворення постійної бази даних про заподіяну шкоду. Дослідження ставить на меті також зберігти память про постраждалих внаслідок війни і дати зрозуміти потужним військовим формуванням у всьому світі, що завдана цивільному населенню шкода навіть в умовах інтенсивних міських боїв може і повинна бути зафіксована.
Наші оцінки завданої цивільному населенню шкоди не є остаточними, оскільки, враховуючи великі масштаби втрат серед цивільного населення, цілком імовірно, що не всі інциденти було охоплено джерелами, які ми відстежували.
Стислий опис нашої методології більш детально пояснює, як ми застосовували методологію реєстрації цивільних жертв в цьому густонаселеному і складному середовищі.
Частота та інтенсивність інцидентів завданої цивільному населенню шкоди
Протягом перших двох місяців російського вторгнення інциденти, пов’язані з нанесенням шкоди цивільному населенню, фіксувалися майже щодня. Цей інтенсивний період боїв за Харків був найбільш смертоносним для цивільного населення: лише за перші п’ять днів боїв було вбито від 18 до 38 цивільних осіб, а ще 119 отримали поранення.
В одному з інцидентів, відстежених “Airwars” 10 квітня, представник громади міста Золочів повідомив “Суспільному” телебаченню, що “з самого ранку Золочів обстрілювали майже весь день, а останні дві з половиною години – безперервно”. У квітні 2022 року мер Харкова Ігор Терехов описав місто як таке, що бомбардують “вдень і вночі“.
Навіть коли наприкінці квітня Збройні сили України витісняли російські війська з Харкова та його околиць, випадки завдання шкоди цивільному населенню було зафіксовано на решті території області: за день до того, як аналітики встановили перемогу України у битві за Харків, повідомлялося про загибель щонайменше двох цивільних осіб у результаті інцидентів за межами лінії фронту ЗСУ в Шебелинці, Дергачах та Балаклії.
Зазвичай цивільні особи були єдиними жертвами, про яких повідомлялося
Ключовою дискусією протягом війни було питання про те, якою мірою російські війська завдавали ударів по легітимних військових цілях. Російські офіційні особи звинувачують Україну в тому, що вона розміщує військові об’єкти поблизу цивільних населених пунктів, тоді як Україна стверджує, що ці удари є навмисно невибірковими.
Наші дані свідчать про те, що в 95% випадків, коли цивільні особи були вбиті або поранені (189 інцидентів), місцеві джерела повідомляли, що цивільні були єдиними жертвами російських дій і не згадували про інші військові об’єкти або українських військовослужбовців, яким було завдано шкоди.
Хоча оприлюдення інформації про втрати серед українських військових заборонено згідно з українським законодавством, що, можливо, пояснює відносно низькі показники військових втрат, цей висновок перегукується з іншими повідомленнями правозахисних організацій, таких як Human Rights Watch.
У трьох інцидентах повідомлення з місцевих джерел були суперечливими або неясними щодо того, чи були серед постраждалих також українські військовослужбовці, чи лише цивільні особи.
У одному з інцидентів, що стався 26 березня, російські війська обстріляли місто Барвінкове в Ізюмському районі, внаслідок чого загинуло щонайменше четверо українських солдатів і одна цивільна особа. Численні українські джерела, в тому числі в соціальних мережах, зазначали, що обстріл спричинив пожежу в загальноосвітній школі. Згідно з повідомленнями одного з джерел, що повязано з проросійським акаунтом у соцмережах, школа використовувалася українськими силами для створення “живого щита” для українських солдатів. Джерело наполягало на тому, що жертвами російської ракети стали військові. Наша методологічна записка більше детально розяснює те, як ми оцінюємо та враховуємо суперечливу інформацію.
Життя під обстрілами
Документуючи шкоду, завдану цивільному населенню, місцеві джерела надають унікальні свідчення повсякденного життя під час війни та висвітлюють далекосяжні наслідки агресії для цивільних.
Цивільні, які постраждалі від обстрілів під час перебування вдома
У щонайменше 60 інцидентах (що складає майже третину всіх повідомлень) цивільні особи були вбиті або поранені вдома внаслідок влучання російських артилерійських обстрілів або ударів у житлові будинки або споруди. В одному з інцидентів, що стався 17 березня 2022 року, мати та її чотирирічна донька спали у своєму будинку, коли почався обстріл. Джерела стверджують, що жінка накрила доньку своїм тілом, щоб захистити її. В результаті інциденту вона загинула, а донька отримала поранення.
Джерела повідомляли про цивільних, що загинули на своїх кухнях та у спальнях. Подробиці, надані місцевими ЗМІ, дають уявлення про втрачені життя: росіянки, яка жила в Харкові протягом десяти років; дев’яностошестирічного чоловіка, який пережив Голокост; двох сусідів, які збиралися разом пообідати – всі вони загинули в своїх будинках під час ймовірного російського бомбардування.
Місцеві джерела також зафіксували історії загибелі цивільних осіб, які намагалися врятуватися втечею. 6 квітня 2022 року повідомлялося про загибель 33-річного цивільного чоловіка після ймовірного російського обстрілу Золочева, Харківська область. Місцевий чиновник Віктор Коваленко заявив, що молодий чоловік біг “від свого будинку до підвалу сусідів” у пошуках притулку, “бо не мав власного. Він не пробіг і півтора метра – йому відірвало ноги вибухом”.
Порушення звичного ритму життя
За повідомленнями з місцевих джерел, деякі цивільні особи також були вбиті або поранені під час купівлі продуктів та інших необхідних речей.
28 лютого четверо місцевих мешканців, у тому числі дитина, були вбиті під час збору питної води після того, як вони полишили бомбосховище. 6 березня жінка отримала важкі поранення, стоячи в черзі перед магазином. А 24 березня під час одного смертельного інциденту, ймовірно, загинули шестеро цивільних осіб і ще до 17 отримали поранення внаслідок ймовірного російського обстрілу супермаркету.
Місцеві джерела зафіксували багато прикладів того, як трагедія обірвала або назавжди змінила звичне життя. В одному з інцидентів мати гуляла з донькою вулицею, коли, за повідомленнями, неподалік впав російський снаряд, вбивши її і серйозно поранивши доньку. В іншому випадку літня жінка, яка годувала котів у парку, була вбита в результаті ймовірного російського артилерійського обстрілу. Джерела також повідомляють, що матір двох дітей було вбито перед її будинком, коли вона розмовляла по телефону, повертаючись з магазину. Її сусідка розповіла “Суспільному”, що “якби вона прийшла на хвилину раніше, то, можливо, встигла б… Двоє дітей залишилися без матері”.
Повідомлялося також про постраждалих цивільних осіб, які чекали на громадський транспорт, їхали у своїх автомобілях або перебували на робочому місці.
У березні і травні, під час двох окремих інцидентів, кілька волонтерів і працівників зоопарку “Фельдман Екопарк”, розташованого на північ від Харкова, були вбиті або серйозно поранені в результаті російських обстрілів. Серед жертв був п’ятнадцятирічний хлопчик, який загинув під час спроби евакуювати тварин парку.
Руйнування міста
У Харкові найбільша кількість інцидентів, пов’язаних з завданням шкоди цивільному населенню, була зафіксована в Салтівському, Київському та Шевченківському районах та північній та східній частинах міста. У вересні 2022 року міський голова Харкова Ігор Терехов заявив в інтерв’ю, що “є житлові райони, де нічого не залишилося”.
За оцінками української влади, в Ізюмі, розташованому приблизно за 100 км на південь від Харкова і окупованому російськими військами понад шість місяців, було зруйновано від 70 до 80% житлових будинків.
“Airwars” встановив 56 інцидентів, в яких, окрім загибелі і поранень мешканців Харкова, також повідомлялось про пошкодження цивільної інфраструктури. В рамках цього звіту поняття “інфраструктура” визначається як будь-яка згадка наступних ключових термінів у джерелах: лікарні, школи, сільське господарство, служби доставки гуманітарної допомоги, шляхи гуманітарної евакуації, релігійні установи, ринки, системи енергопостачання (газо-, електро- та водопостачання).
Ми також відстежували пошкодження адміністративних будівель, магазинів, гуртожитків, парків, – включно з зоопарком, залізничних станцій, в’язниці та кладовища.
Відстежені “Airwars” інциденти, пов’язані з пошкодженням інфраструктури, відображають лише ті випадки, в яких також були зафіксовані смерті і поранення цивільних, і тому надають лише невеликий зріз більш масштабної картини пошкодження інфраструктури Харкова.
16 березня, за повідомленнями джерел, від двох до трьох цивільних осіб загинули і щонайменше п’ятеро, включно з трьома рятувальниками, отримали поранення внаслідок ймовірного російського обстрілу Новосалтівського будівельного ринку в Харкові. Джерела, які вдалося відстежити, не згадують про поранення військових або військові об’єкти, які було вражено.
Пошкодження і руйнування інфраструктури мали також опосередкований руйнівний вплив на життя цивільного населення. В одному з інцидентів, відстежених “Airwars”, після ймовірного російського удару було пошкоджено газопровід, що призвело до того, що понад 500 сімей тимчасово залишилися без газопостачання. В іншому інциденті, у травні 2022 року, 46-річну жінку було вбито на власному подвір’ї, коли вона готувала їжу на вогнищі через відсутність електрики.
Доступ до охорони здоров’я
Руйнування Центральної міської лікарні в Ізюмі після російського обстрілу 8 березня 2022 року, опубліковане у Facebook користувачем, чиє ім’я було відредаговано з міркувань безпеки
Серед “відстежених” Airwars інцидентів, пов’язаних з пошкодженням інфраструктури, найбільша кількість згадок стосувалася закладів охорони здоров’я, що безпосередньо впливало на доступ цивільного населення до медичної допомоги.
“Airwars” задокументував пошкодження 16 медичних закладів під час інцидентів, в яких також загинули або були поранені цивільні особи. Серед них – лікарні, центр донорства крові, аптека і машина швидкої допомоги. 3 березня сирійський лікар, гінеколог родом з Дейр-Ез-Зора, був убитий, коли, як стверджується, російський міномет влучив у Харківську обласну лікарню.
За схемою, подібною до тієї, про яку часто повідомляють у Сирії, “Airwars” також відстежила три випадки так званих “подвійних ударів”, коли за одним ударом слідує наступний в той час, коли аварійні служби або цивільне населення реагують на інцидент. Ці інциденти також були зафіксовані проектом “Напади на охорону здоров’я”, який задокументував випадки багаторазових ударів по одним і тим же лікарням у Харкові: “В одну лікарню влучили п’ять разів, а в іншу – чотири рази”. Представники проекту додали, що в період з лютого 2022 року по грудень 2022 року в Харківській області було зафіксовано найбільшу кількість пошкоджених або зруйнованих лікарень в Україні.
Документуючи шкоду, завдану цивільному населенню, місцеві джерела також часто повідомляли про те, що російські бомбардування ускладнюють здатність рятувальників реагувати на інциденти.
В рамках інциденту з завданням шкоди цивільному населенню, про який повідомлялося в березні, видання “Харків сьогодні” повідомило, що рятувальники “не змогли навіть під’їхати” до Харкова “через постійні залпи ворожої артилерії”. Місяцем пізніше, під час іншого інциденту в Ізюмі, російські війська, за повідомленнями, атакували евакуаційні автобуси, що призвело до жертв серед цивільного населення. Одне з місцевих джерел стверджувало, що через зруйновані дороги і мости, “а також через те, що російські окупанти забороняють пересування між селами в громаді”, було неможливо доставляти медикаменти та іншу життєво необхідну допомогу.
Зброя та боєприпаси, які використовувались
Бойові дії в Харківській області переважно відбувалися із застосуванням вибухової зброї.
Згідно з повідомленнями, більшість цивільних осіб загинули або отримали поранення від артилерійського вогню (77% зафіксованих інцидентів), тоді як у решті інцидентів шкоду було заподіяно авіаударами (вісім інцидентів) або боєприпасами, що не розірвалися (шість інцидентів).
Від 12 до 14 цивільних осіб загинули і від 4 до 11 отримали поранення від закладених вибухових пристроїв і боєприпасів, що не розірвалися. В одному з таких випадків джерела повідомили, що двоє чоловіків у віці 30 років загинули, коли їхній автомобіль наїхав на протитанкову міну по дорозі до села Чорноглазівка. Один з них збирався відвідати свою матір. За словами місцевого чиновника, вони “загинули на місці, машину розірвало на шматки. Окупанти нещодавно відійшли з цього села і могли залишити вибуховий пристрій”
Невелика кількість відстежених “Airwars” інцидентів, пов’язаних з мінами або іншими вибухонебезпечними предметами, не відображає масштабу забруднення землі в Харківській області. Шкода, пов’язана із забрудненням земель, вірогідно не обмежиться початковим періодом війни, і про неї ще буде відомо у майбутньому.
Головний прокурор Харкова Олександр Фільчаков пояснив виданню “AP News”, що “ніхто не може зараз сказати, який відсоток території Харкова заміновано, ми знаходимо міни скрізь”.
У 14 інцидентах місцеві джерела звинувачували російські війська у застосуванні касетних боєприпасів. Використання Москвою такої зброї в Україні широко задокументовано. У квітні 2022 року “Airwars” показав наслідки влучання одного російського касетного боєприпасу у лікарню та центр донорства крові в Харкові на другий день вторгнення. Повідомлялося про пошкодження в радіусі 350 метрів. Того ж місяця троє саперів загинули і ще четверо отримали поранення під час спроби знешкодити ймовірно російські міни. Міністр внутрішніх справ України Денис Монастирський заявив, що серед боєприпасів, які вибухнули під час операції, були касетні боєприпаси.
В одному з інцидентів місцеві джерела згадували про використання російськими військами снаряда, який впав на фабрику з парашутом, також відомого як “парашутна бомба“. Внаслідок цього інциденту, який, як стверджується, був здійснений Росією, загинула одна цивільна особа і ще шість отримали поранення. У квітні про застосування такої зброї в Харкові вже повідомляв мер міста.
Інформаційний простір
Відповідно до стандартної методології “Airwars”, всі інциденти класифікуються відповідно до характеру інформації, отриманої щодо інциденту: інциденти, де всі джерела згодні щодо причини і випадку шкоди, позначені як “підтверджені”, інциденти, де джерела не згодні щодо того, хто несе відповідальність або чи були жертви серед цивільного населення, позначені як “спірні”, а інциденти, де є дуже мало джерел або повідомляється лише загальна інформація, позначені як “слабкі”. Більше подробиць у нашій методологічній записці.
У Харкові “підтверджені” інциденти, в яких джерела звинувачували російські війська у завданні шкоди цивільному населенню, становлять 138 інцидентів, і відповідають за жертви серед цивільного населення у кількості від 275 до 387.
Наша команда також зафіксувала ще два “підтверджені” інциденти, в яких усі джерела приписували відповідальність за шкоду, заподіяну цивільному населенню, Збройним силам України. На ці інциденти припадає від двох до п’яти жертв серед цивільного населення. Оскільки ця доповідь зосереджена на ймовірних діях Росії, ці два інциденти не були включені до загальної кількості жертв, хоча вони продовжують розслідуватися нашою дослідницькою групою.
“Слабкі” інциденти охоплюють 60 інцидентів, в яких загинуло від 41 до 42 осіб. У всіх цих “слабких” випадках відповідальність за шкоду, заподіяну цивільному населенню, покладалася на російські війська. У двох інцидентах деякі місцеві джерела стверджували, що шкода була завдана Збройними силами України, які відтісняли російські війська, і “Airwars” виявила жертви серед цивільного населення.
Хоча занепокоєння щодо дезінформації широко розповсюджені, “Airwars” виявила, що окремі звинувачення у завданні шкоди цивільному населенню рідко оскаржувалися предметно зі сторони Росії. У тих випадках, коли звинувачення в завданні шкоди відкидалися або оголошувалися хибними (фейковими), ці заяви в основному зосереджувалися на загальних тенденціях.
В ході дослідження було виявлено, що джерела, які дискредитують заяви про шкоду, завдану цивільному населенню Харкова та області, зазвичай поширюють два основних наративи: або джерело стверджує, що шкоду було нанесено Збройними силами України, або що українські військові навмисно встановлюють військову техніку в житлових районах або на об’єктах цивільної інфраструктури.
У цьому контексті можна згадати й заяви Росії на найвищому рівні про те, що Збройні сили України використовували цивільних як “живі щити”. У березні 2022 року, після загибелі індійського студента у Харкові внаслідок російського обстрілу, президент Володимир Путін заявив, що українські силовики використовували індійських студентів у Харкові як “живий щит”.
Інші заяви, виголошені Міністерством оборони Росії, містять звинувачення в тому, що українські сили навмисно знищують цивільну інфраструктуру, щоб захистити секретну інформацію – наприклад, Фізико-технічний інститут у Харкові, в якому начебто розроблялися ядерні технології. 1 березня будівлю Харківської обласної державної адміністрації та площу Свободи в Харкові було обстріляно ракетою, що призвело до загибелі від шести до одинадцяти осіб, включно з дитиною. До 35 цивільних осіб, за повідомленнями, отримали поранення. Російські офіційні особи стверджували, що удар був навмисно нанесено українськими силами проти українських цивільних осіб, нібито “незадоволених міською адміністрацією”; тоді як президент України Володимир Зеленський заявив, що бомбардування здійснила Росія і що “на площі не було жодних військових цілей”.
Росія досі не визнала жодних жертв серед цивільного населення України, спричинених власними атаками, а в офіційних заявах, опублікованих Міністерством оборони Росії, неодноразово наголошувалось, що під російські обстріли та удари потрапляли лише військові об’єкти і так звані “бойовики”.
Критичні прогалини в обліку жертв
Основні відомості про зниклих безвісти осіб
У низці інцидентів наші дослідники зіткнулися з серйозною прогалиною в інформації, що є у відкритому доступі, – а саме, мало інформації щодо осіб жертв. В україномовних звітах було мало згадок про імена жертв, а також лише обмежена інформація про їхню стать, вік або рід занять.
Це кардинально відрізняється від інших конфліктів, за якими стежить “Airwars”, включаючи повітряні удари США в Ємені та Іраку, російські бомбардування в Сирії та ізраїльські бомбардування в Газі та Сирії.
Наприклад, за один інтенсивний місяць бомбардувань сирійського міста Алеппо російськими та сирійськими урядовими військами в липні 2016 року наша команда відстежила 76 різних інцидентів, в яких постраждало цивільне населення, і там ми встановили ідентичність 187 жертв. У березні 2022 року в Харківській області ми відстежили 70 окремих інцидентів, пов’язаних із завданням шкоди цивільному населенню внаслідок російських ударів, але загалом встановили ідентичність лише 37 жертв.
Існує декілька потенційних причин цього браку інформації. Ключовим фактором є політика України щодо захисту приватності, яку влада застосовує для захисту особистих даних цивільних осіб. Вона дозволяє оприлюднювати імена лише за згодою жертви або її/його сім’ї.
Україна є також державою з функціонуючими безпековими, розслідувальними, судово-медичними структурами та службами, які працювали над фіксацією завданої цивільному населенню шкоди ще з часів попередньої агресії Росії в Україні. В Іраку, Лівії, Сомалі та Сирії такі офіційні структури або відсутні, або викликають недовіру з боку цивільного населення. Таким чином, цивільні особи були змушені заповнювати прогалини – розміщувати інформацію про загиблих у соціальних мережах, зокрема, у Facebook.
Іншими причинами можуть бути безпекові ризики, пов’язані з документуванням завданої цивільному населенню шкоди в районах активних бойових дій, таких як Харків. Серед них, зокрема, ускладнений або заборонений доступ цивільного населення до зруйнованих будівель в пошуках своїх близьких через загрозу від нерозірваних боєприпасів, а також перебої в роботі Інтернету та/або електрики, які не дають місцевому населенню можливості передавати інформацію зовнішньому світу.
Зниклі безвісти
Місцеві джерела, які документують завдану цивільному населенню в Україні шкоду, вказують на ключові виклики зі збором точних даних про жертви серед цивільного населення через складнощі з пошуком та ідентифікацією жертв. В одному з інцидентів, відстежених “Airwars”, місцеві джерела повідомили, що минуло 20 днів, перш ніж жінку та її 11-річного сина знайшли похованими під уламками свого будинку.
Деякі експерти стверджують, що на пошук та ідентифікацію жертв серед цивільного населення можуть піти роки, а Харківська правозахисна група підрахувала, що лише в Харківській області зниклими безвісти вважаються майже 2 000 осіб.
Інформація щодо окупованих територій
Ідентифікація цивільних осіб, загиблих під час конфлікту, була особливо складною в Харківській області, оскільки багато районів були окуповані російськими військами протягом декількох місяців. Деякі інциденти, ідентифіковані “Airwars”, стали відомими громадськості лише після того, як українські війська відновили контроль над певними районами. Наприклад, в Ізюмі “Airwars” знайшла відкриті джерела, які описували загибель цілої родини в травні 2022 року, коли їхній автомобіль наїхав на ймовірну російську міну під час спроби евакуюватися з Харкова. Лише в жовтні 2022 року поліція змогла вперше повідомити про цей інцидент, відвідавши місце трагедії та опитавши місцевих.
Губернатор Харківської області Олег Синєгубов стверджує, що “перше, що вони [російські війська] зробили на окупованих територіях , – це відрізали людей від будь-якої інформації”.
В іншому інциденті, що також відбувся в Ізюмі 9 березня 2022 року, російські військові завдали авіаударів, а потім обстріляли п’ятиповерховий житловий будинок, що призвело до його обвалення. Внаслідок інциденту загинуло від 47 до 54 осіб, у тому числі багато сімей, які опинилися під уламками. Широкого розголосу трагедія набула лише у вересні, коли українські війська відновили контроль над цим районом.
У жовтні 2022 року українська влада повідомила, що знайшла понад 500 тіл на нещодавно відвойованих територіях. Причини смерті досі невідомі, а багато сімей все ще чекають на результати ДНК-тестів і додаткових розслідувань, щоб дізнатися про долю своїх близьких.
У багатьох інцидентах, зафіксованих “Airwars”, джерела згадували про розпочаті Харківською прокуратурою розслідування ще під час активної фази конфлікту. Результати цих розслідувань, ймовірно, розкриють нові подробиці про характер і масштаби шкоди, завданої цивільному населенню.
“Airwars” продовжуватиме оновлювати наш архів по мірі надходження нової інформації.
Висновок
Хоча масштаб жертв російської агресії ще досі не відомий у повному обсязі, інциденти завдання шкоди цивільному населенню, які були задокументовані в Харкові, вкотре демонструють руйнівний вплив конфлікту на цивільне населення.
Тяжкість людських втрат під час війни спонукає до посилення заходів із захисту цивільного населення під час конфліктів у всьому світі, особливо в густонаселених районах. Спираючись на місцеві джерела, можна припустити, що з огляду на масшаб і тяжкість завданої цивільному населенню шкоди, війна в Україні матиме далекосяжні та довготривалі наслідки.
(Translated to Ukrainian by Iryna Chupryna and Igor Corcevoi)
Основною мовою “Airwars” є англійська. У разі виникнення питань, пов’язаних з цим документом, будь ласка, перегляньте нашу англомовну версію тут або зв’яжіться з нами за адресою info@airwars.org
From February 24th to May 13th 2022, between 275 and 438 civilians were alleged to have been killed by explosive weapons when Russian forces invaded the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv.
Airwars researchers documented all open source accounts of civilian harm, identifying 200 harm incidents during the short period known as the ‘Battle of Kharkiv’. Alongside the almost daily reported civilian deaths, up to 829 civilians were reported injured. In cases where the identity of the victims were reported by local sources, Airwars identified at least 30 children, 52 women and 61 men likely killed by Russian forces.
This research represents perhaps the most granular openly available database on civilian harm in the densely populated oblast that borders Russia.
In bringing together the stories shared by local residents, journalists and civil society organisations, the following research brief offers an insight into life under bombardment. We present our findings below on where and how local sources reported harm to the residents of Kharkiv, how critical infrastructure has been damaged and how essential services have been disrupted. We also present our analysis of the information environment, and the unique challenges of accurate casualty recording in this complex battleground.
Battle of Kharkiv
Our casualty recording efforts cover all local allegations of civilian harm from explosive weapons throughout Kharkiv oblast, for the period when the Kharkiv city and its surroundings were subject to an intense period of fighting – otherwise known as the ‘Battle of Kharkiv’.
The second largest city in Ukraine, Kharkiv has been among the hardest hit urban areas in the war. Located some 40km from the Russian border, with a large Russian speaking population and close ties to Moscow’s economy, it was a key target when the invasion began on February 24, 2022.
As Russian forces invaded Ukraine from multiple directions, thousands of troops entered the Kharkiv region. Cities and villages were heavily shelled. In a few weeks key towns and cities in Kharkiv oblast were occupied by Russian forces, including Izyum, Kupiansk and Balaklia.
Kharkiv city itself was never occupied but instead became the scene of intense fighting and a mass exodus. Pre-war analysis estimated its population at 1.4 million, but by March 2022 that number had allegedly fallen as low as 300,000. Yet the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in defending Kharkiv is believed to have played a significant role in bolstering morale in the early days of the Russian invasion.
At the end of April 2022, Ukrainian forces began a counter offensive in Kharkiv. By May 13th, Russian forces were pushed from the surroundings of the city. The eventual Russian retreat was described as one of the Ukrainian military’s fastest advances since Russian troops abandoned their assault on Kyiv. In June 2022, Mayor Ihor Terekhov estimated Kharkiv city’s population had returned to around one million.
However, in the wider Kharkiv region, most occupied areas were only reclaimed following the successful Ukrainian counter-offensive in September 2022.
Today Kharkiv city is largely calm, though occasional Russian shelling continues in the oblast. The city’s infrastructure remains devastated while the human impact can be counted both in the lives lost and the large number of residents who have still not yet returned.
The archiving process
Our new archive contains crucial details about where and how civilians were harmed, as reported by local sources during the war in Kharkiv.
Our open source research is intended to be the starting point for investigators, journalists, human rights groups and families and individuals affected by this conflict, as we aggregate and preserve all local allegations to build a permanent database of harm. It is also aimed at humanising those harmed in war, and to make it clear to powerful militaries around the world that civilian harm, even in the most intense modern urban battlefields, can and must be recorded.
Our estimates of civilian harm are not definitive, as, given the widespread scale of casualties, it is likely that other incidents were not covered by sources we have tracked.
Our methodology note outlines in more detail how we applied our casualty recording methodology to this dense and complex battleground.
Frequency and intensity of harm incidents
Civilian harm incidents were recorded almost daily for the first two months of the invasion. This intense period of battle was the most deadly for civilians: in the first five days of fighting alone, between 18 and 38 civilians were reported killed, and up to another 119 wounded.
In one incident tracked by Airwars on April 10th, a community official in the city of Zolochiv told Suspilne TV that “since the morning, Zolochiv has been under fire almost all day, and for the last two and a half hours it has been non-stop.” In April 2022, the Mayor of Kharkiv, Ihor Terekhov, described the city as being bombed “day and night.”
Even as the Ukrainian Armed Forces were pushing back Russian troops from Kharkiv city and its surroundings towards the end of April, civilian harm incidents continued throughout the rest of the oblast: the day before analysts considered Ukraine had likely won the Battle for the city of Kharkiv, at least two civilians were reported killed in incidents beyond AFU front lines in Shebelynka, Derhachi and Balaklia.
Civilians were usually the only reported casualties
A key debate throughout the war has been the extent to which Russian forces have been striking legitimate military targets. Russian officials accuse Ukraine of placing military targets near civilian population centres, while Ukraine has claimed that the strikes are deliberately indiscriminate.
Our data shows that in 95% of cases where civilians were allegedly killed or injured (189 incidents), local sources reported that civilians were the only victims of Russian actions, and did not mention any other military object or Ukrainian military personnel harmed.
While public reporting on Ukrainian military casualties is forbidden under Ukrainian law, which may be a factor in the relatively low numbers, this is a finding that echoes other on the ground reporting from human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch.
In three incidents, the sources were conflicted or unclear as to whether among those reportedly harmed were also members of the Ukrainian military or only civilians.
In one incident, on March 26th, Russian forces reportedly shelled the town of Barvinkove in Izyum district, resulting in the deaths of at least four Ukrainian soldiers and one civilian. Multiple Ukrainian sources, including on social media, covered the event, noting that the shelling caused a fire in a secondary school. One source known to come from a pro-Russian account claimed that the school was being used by Ukrainian forces to create a “human shield” for Ukrainian soldiers. It reiterated that a Russian missile caused the casualties but referred to those killed and injured as soldiers. See our methodology note for how we assess and account for conflicting information.
Life under bombardment
In documenting civilian harm, local sources revealed key insights into civilians’ daily lives, and the far-reaching human toll of war.
Harmed at home
In at least 60 incidents (nearly a third of all allegations), civilians were reported to have been killed or injured at home when Russian artillery shelling or strikes hit residential buildings or houses. In one incident, on March 17th 2022, a mother and her four-year-old daughter were reportedly sleeping in their house when the shelling started. Sources claimed that the woman covered her daughter with her body to protect her. She was killed in the incident while her daughter was injured.
Sources reported civilians killed in their kitchens and bedroom. Details provided by local media give an insight into lives lost: of a Russian woman who had been living in Kharkiv for ten years; of a ninety-six year old man who survived the Holocaust, of two neighbours about to have lunch together – all killed in their homes by alleged Russian bombardment.
Local sources also recorded stories of civilians killed while running for safety. On April 6th, 2022, a 33-year-old civilian was reported killed after an alleged Russian shelling of Zolochiv, Kharkiv. A local official, Viktor Kovalenko, stated that the young man was running “from his house to the basement of his neighbours” for shelter “because he didn’t have his own. And he didn’t run a metre and a half – his legs were blown off by an explosion.”
Routines disrupted
Civilians were also killed or injured while buying groceries and getting other essential supplies, according to local sources.
On February 28th, four civilians, including a child, were reportedly killed collecting drinking water after leaving their bomb shelter. On March 6th, a woman was severely injured while queuing in front of a shop. And on March 24th, in one deadly incident, six civilians were likely killed and up to 17 others injured in an alleged Russian shelling on a supermarket.
Many examples of daily routines disrupted by tragedy were recorded by local sources. In one incident, a mother was reportedly walking with her daughter in the street when an alleged Russian shell landed close by, killing her and seriously injuring her daughter. In another incident, an elderly woman feeding cats in a park was killed by alleged Russian artillery shelling. Sources also reported a mother was killed while she was on the phone coming back from a store, in front of her house. Her neighbour told Suspilne News that “If, perhaps, she had come a minute earlier, she would have had time… Two children were left without their mother.”
Civilians were also reported harmed while waiting for public transport, while driving in their cars, or while at work.
In March and May, in two separate incidents, several volunteers and workers at Feldman Ecopark, a zoo located north of Kharkiv city, were killed and seriously injured by reported Russian shelling. Among the victims was a fifteen-year old boy who died while attempting to evacuate the park’s animals.
Destruction of a city
In Kharkiv city, the highest number of incidents of civilian harm were recorded in Saltivskyi, in Kyivsky and Shevchenkivskiy city districts, the northern and eastern parts of the city. In September 2022, Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said in an interview that ‘there are some residential areas where there is nothing left’.
In Izyum, a city located some 100km south of Kharkiv, which was occupied by Russian forces for over six months, Ukrainian officials estimated that between 70 and 80% of residential buildings have been destroyed.
Airwars identified 56 incidents where civilian infrastructure was damaged alongside reports of the deaths and injuries of Kharkiv residents. For the purposes of this report, ‘infrastructure’ has been defined as any mention of the following key terms by sources: hospital, school, agriculture, humanitarian delivery services, humanitarian evacuation routes, religious institutions, marketplaces, energy supplies (gas, power, and water infrastructure).
We also monitored damage to administration buildings, shops, hostels, parks – including a zoo -, railway stations, a prison facility, and a cemetery.
The incidents related to infrastructure damage tracked by Airwars only reflects those cases where civilian deaths and injuries were also recorded, providing just a small snapshot into the wider picture of damaged infrastructure in Kharkiv.
On March 16, two to three civilians were reportedly killed and at least five others, including three rescuers, were injured by alleged Russian shelling of Novosaltivs’kyy Budivel’nyy market, in Kharkiv city. Sources tracked did not mention combatants harmed or military objects hit alongside these civilian casualties
Damage and destruction to infrastructure have reverberating effects on civilian lives. In one civilian harm incident tracked by Airwars, a gas pipeline was damaged following an alleged Russian strike, leading to more than 500 families being left temporarily without gas supply. In another incident, in May 2022, a 46-year-old woman was reportedly killed in her backyard while she was cooking over a fire due to a lack of electricity.
Access to healthcare
Destruction of the Central City Hospital (Центральна міська лікарня) of Izium (Ізюм) following reported Russian shelling on March 8th 2022, posted on Facebook by a user whose name has been redacted for security reason
Among the incidents with reference to infrastructure damage tracked by Airwars, the highest number of mentions were related to healthcare institutions, directly impacting access to medical treatment for civilians.
Airwars documented damage to 16 healthcare facilities in incidents where civilians were also killed or injured. Among these were hospitals, a blood donation centre, a pharmacy, and an ambulance. On March 3rd, a Syrian doctor, described as a gynaecologist originally from Deir Ezzor, was killed when an alleged Russian mortar hit the Kharkiv Regional hospital.
In a pattern similar to what is often reported in Syria, Airwars also tracked three allegations of so-called double-tap strikes, where a strike is followed by a second round of strikes just as emergency services or nearby civilians respond to the incident. These incidents were also captured by the Attacks on Healthcare Project, which documented cases of multiple strikes targeting the same hospitals in Kharkiv: “One was hit five times, and another was hit four times”. They added that between February 2022 and December 2022, the Kharkiv region recorded the highest number of damaged or destroyed hospitals in Ukraine.
In documenting civilian harm, local sources also often reported on the challenge that Russian bombardment was having on the ability of rescuers to respond to the incidents.
In a civilian harm incident reported in March, Kharkiv Today reported that rescuers “could not even drive up” to Kharkiv “due to constant volleys of enemy artillery.” One month later, in another incident in Izyum, Russian forces reportedly hit evacuation buses, causing civilian casualties. One local source claimed that due to destroyed roads and bridges in the area, it was impossible to bring medicine and other vital aid, “as well as the fact that the Russian occupiers prohibit movement between villages in the community.”
Munitions documented
The fighting in Kharkiv oblast mainly took place with the use of explosive weapons.
Civilians were predominantly reported killed or injured by artillery fire (accounting for 77% of incidents recorded), while the remaining incidents of harm resulted from airstrikes (eight incidents) or unexploded ordnance (six incidents).
Between 12 and 14 civilians were recorded killed, and between four and 11 injured, by planted explosives and unexploded ordnance. In one such case, sources reported that two men in their 30s were killed when their car drove over an anti-tank mine while driving to Chornohlazivka village. They were reportedly on their way to visit one of their mothers. According to a local official, the two “died on the spot, the car was blown to pieces. The occupiers had recently withdrawn from this village, they could have left it behind.”
The limited number of incidents related to mines or other explosive hazards tracked by Airwars does not reflect the scale of land contamination in the Kharkiv region, given the fact that harm related to contamination is likely to occur and be reported well beyond the initial campaign period.
Kharkiv Chief Prosecutor, Oleksandr Filchakov, explained to AP News that “no one can say now the total percentage of territory in Kharkiv that is mined, we are finding them everywhere.”
In 14 incidents, local sources accused Russian forces of having used cluster munitions. The use by Moscow of such weapons in Ukraine has been widely documented. In April 2022, Airwars showed the impact of a single Russian cluster munition that struck a hospital and blood donation centre in Kharkiv on the second day of the invasion. Damage was reported in a 350m radius. The same month, three deminers were killed and four others injured while trying to remove alleged Russian mines. Ukrainian Interior Minister Denys Monastyrskiy stated that cluster munitions were among the munitions that exploded during the operation.
In one incident, local sources mentioned the use of a projectile by Russian forces that fell on a factory with a parachute, also referred to as “parachute bomb”. The alleged Russian incident led to one civilian killed and up to six others injured. By April, the use of such weapons was already being reported in Kharkiv city by the Mayor of Kharkiv.
The information environment
As per Airwars’ standard methodology, all incidents are categorised according to the nature of information identified in relation to the incident: incidents where all sources are in agreement about the cause and case of harm are marked ‘fair’, incidents where sources disagree as to who was responsible or if civilian casualties occurred are marked ‘contested’, and incidents where there are very few sources or only generic information reported are marked ‘weak’. See our methodology note for details.
In Kharkiv, ‘fair’ events – where sources accused Russian forces for civilian harm accounted for 138 incidents, and between 275 and 387 civilian casualties.
Our team also recorded two additional ‘fair’ incidents where all sources attributed civilian harm to Ukrainian Armed Forces. These incidents account for between two and five civilian deaths. As this Brief focuses on alleged Russian actions, these two incidents were not included in our casualty totals, though they continue to be investigated by our research team.
‘Weak’ incidents accounted for 60 incidents, and between 41 and 42 casualties. All of these ‘weak’ cases accused Russian forces of being responsible for the civilian harm. In two incidents, Airwars found civilian casualties where some local sources alleged that harm resulted from the Ukrainian Armed Forces as they were pushing back Russian forces.
Although concerns around disinformation are widespread, Airwars found that individual civilian harm allegations were rarely contested in any level of detail. Where civilian harm claims were dismissed or accused of being fraudulent, accounts mainly focused on general trends.
Two types of information were found to typically be put forward by sources discrediting local civilian harm claims: either the source claimed that harm was caused by Ukrainian Armed Forces, or that Ukrainian troops were deliberately installing military equipment in residential areas or inside civilian infrastructure.
This includes claims by the Russian state at the highest levels, that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have used human shields. In March 2022, President Vladimir Putin alleged that Ukrainian security forces used Indian students in Kharkiv as “human shields” after an Indian student was reported killed in Kharkiv city by Russian shelling.
Other claims communicated by the Russian Ministry of Defense include allegations that Ukrainian forces deliberately destroyed civilian infrastructure to protect sensitive information; such as the Institute of Physics and Technology in Kharkiv, in which nuclear technology was apparently being developed. On March 1st, the building of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration and Svobody Square in Kharkiv city were hit by a rocket, leading to six to 11 casualties, among them a child, and up to 35 civilians were allegedly injured. Russian officials alleged that the strike was voluntarily conducted by Ukrainian forces against Ukrainian civilians ‘dissatisfied with the city administration’; while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed Russia conducted the bombing and that ‘there were no military targets in the square’.
Russia has not admitted to any civilian casualties yet and official statements published by the Ministry of Defense repeatedly affirmed that only military targets and combatants were hit by Russian shelling or strikes.
Critical gaps in casualty records
Key details of victims missing
In a number of incidents our researchers encountered a major gap in the information publicly available – the identities of the victims. In Ukrainian language reporting there has been few mention of names of victims, and limited information related to their gender, age or occupation.
This differs dramatically from other conflicts Airwars has monitored, including US airstrikes in Yemen and Iraq, Russian bombing in Syria, and Israeli bombardment in Gaza and Syria.
As an example, in one intense month of Russian and Syrian government bombing of the Syrian city of Aleppo in July 2016, our team tracked 76 different civilian harm incidents – in which we recorded 187 named victims. In March 2022, in the Kharkiv region, we tracked 70 separate civilian harm incidents from Russian strikes, but only a total of 37 named victims.
There are a number of potential reasons for this gap. A key factor is Ukraine’s privacy policy that is being applied by authorities to protect civilians’ identities. This allows the release of names only when approval has been given by the victim or his/her family.
Ukraine also has a functioning state, with security, investigative, forensic and medico-legal structures that worked to record civilian harm since earlier Russian advances on the country. In Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Syria such official structures are either lacking or distrusted by civilians. As such civilians have been forced to fill the gaps – posting details of the dead on social media, particularly Facebook.
Other reasons might involve security risks related to documentation of civilian harm within areas of active combat such as Kharkiv, including difficult or forbidden access for civilians to destroyed or collapsed buildings in urban areas looking for their loved ones due to safety issues relating to unexploded ordnance, as well as internet and/or electricity blackouts that prevented local people from communicating information to the outside world.
Missing persons
Local sources documenting civilian harm in Ukraine reveal key challenges in capturing accurate civilian casualty records due to the difficulties in recovering and identifying victims. In one incident tracked by Airwars, local sources reported that it took 20 days before a woman and her 11-year old son were found buried under the rubble of their house.
Some experts have said that it could take years to find and identify civilian victims, with Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group estimating that nearly 2,000 individuals remain missing in Kharkiv oblast alone.
Information in occupied areas
The identification of civilians killed in the conflict has been particularly challenging in Kharkiv Oblast given that many areas were occupied by Russian forces for several months. Several incidents identified by Airwars were only widely reported after Ukrainian forces had retaken control of certain areas. In Izyum, for example, Airwars identified open sources that described the death of an entire family in May 2022, when their car drove over an alleged Russian mine as they attempted to evacuate Kharkiv. It was not until October 2022 that police forces were able to report the incident for the first time through on the ground interviews and a site visit.
In areas under occupation, Kharkiv governor Oleg Synegubov stated that “the first thing they [Russian forces] did was to cut people off from any information”.
In another incident, also in Izyum city, on March 9, 2022, the Russian military was reported to have launched airstrikes on and then shelled a five story residential building – causing it to collapse. The incident killed between 47 to 54 people, including many families who were trapped in the debris. The incident was only widely reported in September, when Ukrainian forces retook control of the area.
In October 2022, Ukrainian authorities reported that they found more than 500 bodies in newly retaken areas. The causes of death are still unknown, while many families are still waiting for the results of DNA tests and additional investigations to know the fate of their loved ones.
In many incidents recorded by Airwars, sources recorded mentions of investigations launched by the Kharkiv Prosecutor Office while the conflict is still ongoing. The outcomes of these investigations are likely to reveal new details about the nature and scale of civilian harm.
Airwars will continue to update our archive as new information comes to light.
Conclusion
While the full human toll of the war is not yet fully known, the harm documented in Kharkiv reveals once again the devastating impact of conflict on civilian populations.
The severity and nature of this human cost of war underlines the need for greater measures to protect civilians in conflict across the world, particularly in densely populated areas. As documented widely by local sources, the level and severity of harm is likely to have long lasting and reverberating effects for many years to come.
In the second year of President Joe Biden’s administration, the number of US airstrikes fell to an historic low as some military engagements appeared to take a different form — with the redeployment of US forces to Somalia and a shift towards targeted raids on Islamic State figures in Syria.
The overall number of declared US airstrikes across all monitored military theatres fell from 441 in 2021 to a minimum of 36 in 2022 – mostly due to the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan. This is the lowest number of strikes the US has declared annually since the 9/11 terrorist atrocities in 2001 and subsequent launch of the so-called ‘War on Terror’.
This drastic drop was also indicative of another shift – while airstrikes seemed to occur with less frequency in all military theatres except Somalia, the number of more loosely defined military operations increased in some, particularly in Iraq and Syria.
2022 saw intense focus on US civilian harm policy – with the launch of the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHM-RAP). The proposals are supposed to reduce the number of civilians killed in future conflicts and improve the civilian harm review process. It came after years of work organisations like Airwars and journalists documenting how the US military’s process for assessing, reviewing and investigating civilian harm was unfit for purpose.
During the year the Biden Administration also altered US policy on engaging militants outside of recognised conflicts by issuing a Presidential Policy Memorandum to Congress – but not to the public. Airwars joined over 50 civil society organisations in calling on the White House to release the new lethal force policy.
Iraq and Syria
There was a noticeable shift in the kind of operations the US carried out in Iraq and Syria in 2022, and this was reflected in changing language from CENTCOM – the military command responsible for the Middle East and Afghanistan.
In Iraq, the US officially ended its combat role at the end of 2021 – formally transitioning to advising, assisting and enabling the Iraqi Security Forces. However, there are still around 2,500 US troops in the country and it remains unclear what the exact definition and limits of ‘assistance’ entails.
In Syria, the US has yet to make an equivalent official declaration – partly as its estimated 900 troops in the country are there without the support of the Damascus regime. However the pattern of behaviour is similar to Iraq – with most activities in partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), primarily in the north and east of the country.
Based on official reporting, Airwars estimates that the US conducted a minimum of 20 airstrikes in Syria in 2022. This is by far the lowest figure since 2014, when the US-led Coalition against the Islamic State was formed.
CENTCOM’s end of year review stated that US forces carried out a total of 313 operations in Iraq and Syria during 2022, with 686 militants allegedly killed. In Iraq, US forces conducted 191 partnered operations, with at least 220 operatives killed and 159 ISIS operatives detained. In Syria, they conducted 108 partnered operations and 14 unilateral operations – with 466 ISIS operatives killed and 215 detained. CENTCOM does not define what an ‘operation’ is – making it difficult to understand the discrepancy between these figures and those in press releases throughout the year.
The 2022 report by CENTCOM also doesn’t mention civilian casualties. However, Airwars recorded 13 incidents where harm to civilians allegedly occurred from the actions of the US-led Coalition.
In 10 of these incidents, the Coalition was reported as the only belligerent responsible. In those incidents between seven and 13 civilians were reported killed. In the other three incidents, it was unclear from local sources whether the civilian harm was caused by the US-led Coalition, their SDF allies or ISIS militants. In total these incidents could account for up to 15 additional deaths, excluding the casualty toll of a complex ISIS prison breakout that began on January 20th.
That incident was the largest reported US action during the year and came as ISIS militants led a daring raid at al-Sinaa prison, a detention facility where thousands of alleged former fighters were detained. CENTCOM provided aerial and ground-based support and carried out airstrikes throughout the ten days of battle. A year on, limited definitive information exists as to how many civilians and militants were killed by the different military forces and militants involved. The exact number of US strikes conducted also remains unclear – with the US-led Coalition referring only to a “series of strikes.” Airwars monitored a minimum of 13 strikes during ten days of fighting though this is likely an underestimate, with other monitoring organisations estimating the figure to be several dozen. A joint Airwars and VICE News investigation examined the failures that led up to the prison break.
In early February 2022, US Special Operations Forces conducted a raid that resulted in the death of ISIS leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, as well as his wife and children – with up to thirteen civilians killed, including six children and four women. Local reporting was conflicted as to whether the civilian casualties were caused by US forces or by Qurayshi detonating a suicide device.
Airwars also tracked an incident where a civilian was reportedly killed when he was run over by a vehicle allegedly belonging to the Coalition on November 14, 2022 in Deir Ezzor, Syria.
It is unclear whether the US-led Coalition in Iraq and Syria, known as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), is still actively assessing civilian harm allegations. OIR last released a civilian casualty report in March 2022, which indicated that it still had 37 reports of civilian casualties still under review.
Somalia
US direct involvement in Somalia increased in 2022.
US troops were officially withdrawn from the country in January 2021; shortly before President Biden assumed power. Between then and May 2022, rotating groups of American special operations units provided training and assistance to Somali and African Union forces. The then head of AFRICOM – the US military command for Africa – General Stephen Townsend, complained this structure was “not effective.”
In May 2022, Biden approved a plan to deploy several hundred ground forces to the country.
On August 9th 2022, a new head of AFRICOM – General Michael Langley – was instated, while the new Somali administration has requested the US loosen its restrictions on drone strikes.
US strikes have since increased – in total AFRICOM declared 15 strikes in Somalia in 2022, up from 11 in 2021. Airwars tracked a further five strikes that local sources attributed to US forces but were not declared by AFRICOM.
Airwars Graph of US declared strikes in Somalia in 2022 by month
In the 15 declared strikes, AFRICOM claimed 107 alleged al-Shabaab militants were killed, while local reporting or statements by the Somali government put casualties significantly higher. To date it has released only two quarterly civilian casualty assessments which referenced strikes in 2022 (covering the period from January 1-June 30), but did not acknowledge any civilian harm was caused by its actions.
Airwars tracked two allegations of civilian harm in 2022 where local sources pointed to US forces’ involvement. One of these occurred on September 9, when up to ten civilians were reportedly killed in an airstrike south of the capital Mogadishu. The Somali government initially released a statement acknowledging the strike but other sources pointed out that the attack allegedly involved a drone – a capability Somali forces were not believed to have until their recent reported acquisition of Turkish Bayraktar drones. To date no belligerent has accepted responsibility.
Less than a month later, the US declared an airstrike on an al-Shabaab leader, Abudullahi Yare. Local sources alleged that Ibrahim Hassan Dahir was also killed – some referred to him as a civilian and a farmer, while others said that he was the son of a former extremist leader who is under house arrest.
Information gathered from areas under the control of the militant group al-Shabaab is notoriously limited, making determinations of civilian status in Somalia a significant challenge. Multiple sources have called into question the status of those that the US alleges are militants. In a recent report examining the impact of US airstrikes on Jubbaland, a part of Somalia controlled by al-Shabaab, Dutch organisation Pax and journalist Amanda Sperber explained:
“The interviews for this report do raise serious questions about the ability of the US to consistently distinguish between armed men who are not involved with Al-Shabaab, armed pastoralist community members who are forced to work for Al-Shabaab and actual Al-Shabaab fighters. Al Shabaab is thoroughly ingrained in Jubbaland society, which complicates external observations about who is and is not Al Shabaab and can thus hamper proper application of the principle of distinction.”
Yemen
The US officially withdrew its support from the Saudi-backed coalition in Yemen in 2021, in one of Biden’s major first foreign policy announcements. A ceasefire came into effect in the country in April 2022, which was later extended until October.
In 2022, CENTCOM did not declare any airstrikes or operations in Yemen. Airwars tracked two incidents allegedly conducted by US forces, in which civilians were killed and injured. The first was a February 6 drone strike that killed three al-Qaeda militants but also reportedly injured and killed civilians who were nearby – though the exact number was not reported by local sources.
The second alleged strike, on November 30, reportedly targeted the home of a member of Islamist group Ansar al-Sharia, causing secondary explosions which killed up to three civilians and injured up to five others.
Since 2017, Airwars has tracked a minimum of 78 deaths and 28 injuries to civilians resulting from US actions in Yemen. However, CENTCOM has only admitted to causing the deaths of 13 civilians, and injuring a further three. The CIA has carried out sporadic strikes throughout the period, but none of them have been officially recognised.
Yemeni organisations such as Mwatana for Human Rights continue to seek accountability from the Department of Defense, with questions around specific civilian casualty incidents unanswered or inadequately resolved. One victim of a 2018 drone strike, Adel al Manthari, resorted to a GoFundMe campaign in 2022 to pay for his insurance and medical bills.
Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan
When the US officially withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, Biden said he retained the right to conduct ‘over the horizon’ strikes from nearby countries. The only acknowledged US airstrike in 2022 was the July drone strike that killed al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in central Kabul. This was allegedly conducted by the CIA and did not result in any allegations of civilian casualties.
Airwars does not monitor US involvement in Afghanistan, but UNAMA – the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan– tracked civilian casualties in the country for years. Since the US withdrawal, UNAMA has stopped publishing regular updates.
There were no reports of US airstrikes in Libya or Pakistan during 2022.
Methodology note – counting US airstrikes
Iraq and Syria:
Until 2022, Airwars would review AFCENT reporting, press releases published by CJTF-OIR, and other official CENTCOM reports. No AFCENT reports were released in 2022, with only sporadic reporting from CENTCOM and CJTF-OIR throughout the year on strike reporting. To reach estimates of airstrikes in 2022, the following information methodology was applied – see table below for details:
| Source | Date | Language used in official reporting | Country | Airwars’s estimated number of declared strikes* |
| CJTF-OIR | Jan 4 2022 | “four suspects captured” | Syria | 0 |
| CJTF-OIR | Jan 30 2022 | “Coalition forces conducted (…) a series of strikes throughout the days-long operation” | Syria | 13 |
| CJTF-OIR | Jun 16 2022 | “counterterrorism operation” | Syria | 0 |
| CENTCOM | Jun 27 2022 | “CENTCOM Forces conducted a kinetic strike” | Syria | 1 |
| CENTCOM | Jul 12 2022 | “U.S. Central Command Forces conducted a UAS strike” | Syria | 1 |
| CENTCOM | Aug 23 2022 | “U.S. military forces conducted precision airstrikes” | Syria | 2 |
| CENTCOM | Aug 25 2022 | “CENTCOM forces struck at Iran-affiliated militants in the area with AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, AC-130 gunships, and M777 artillery” | Syria | 3 |
| CENTCOM | Dec 11 2022 | “Helicopter raid” | Syria | 0 |
| CENTCOM | Dec 16 2022 | “6 partnered operations” | Syria | 0 |
| CENTCOM | Dec 20 2022 | “three helicopter raids” “partnered operations” | Syria | 0 |
| CENTCOM | Dec 29 2022 | “CENTCOM conducted 313 total operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria” | Syria/Iraq | 0 |
| Estimated Total Strikes | 20 | |||
* according to US sources and Airwars Local Monitoring
Reporting from AFRICOM for Somalia was consistent with previous years; in 2022, exact numbers of airstrikes were released routinely throughout the year. In Yemen, CENTCOM press releases were used to monitor declared airstrikes – of which there were none in 2022 – while estimates from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism and Airwars monitoring were used to identify possible or alleged strikes for previous years. See our Yemen data page for a full breakdown.
In Afghanistan, Airwars formerly monitored AFCENT reporting – the only reported strike in 2022 was released by the State Department.
It should be noted that the term ‘airstrike’ is also not used consistently across different military forces, and between military commands – see our overview on this here.
For any questions or clarifications on our methodology, please contact info@airwars.org.
Correction issued to update Yemen airstrike data in July 2023 to note the sole inclusion of ‘declared’ strikes in the overall figures for 2020. See below the original sources and extracts Airwars used to assess these 2020 strikes as declared:
The Pentagon’s annual report to Congress, released yesterday, on civilian deaths and injuries resulting from US military actions in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq and Syria has declared responsibility for 12 deaths and five injuries in 2021. All 12 deaths conceded were in Afghanistan; injuries were reported resulting from actions in both Somalia and Afghanistan.
While these mostly align with public reports on Afghanistan and Somalia – the lack of any incidents for Syria are of serious concern. Airwars has documented at least 17 incidents in which harm to civilians occurred as a result of US actions; this includes 15 civilian deaths, and 17 injuries.
Alongside reports of casualties in 2021, included in the annual report are additional cases from past actions under Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) – the operation to defeat ISIS. In these cases too, conceded casualty reports are significantly lower than local reporting suggests.
These casualty releases have been much anticipated this year, as the Department of Defense worked on its new Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action plan, published earlier this month. Towards the end of last year, reporting from Azmat Khan at the New York Times drew renewed attention in international media to the range of issues around how civilian casualties were assessed by the US in Iraq and Syria, prompting the review by US officials.
However the US’ military actions and its track record on civilian casualties have long been the subject of criticism, with calls for accountability and greater transparency on civilian harm mitigation and tracking throughout the so-called ‘forever wars’. In last year’s annual report, Airwars and others raised serious concerns with the 2020 annual casualty admissions – noting that reporting from other sources placed the civilian death toll at five times higher than the numbers admitted by the DoD.
OIR
In its 2021 report, the Department of Defense conceded no deaths or injuries in either Iraq or Syria for 2021. The report states that there were six cases of civilian harm received by OIR in 2021; 3 of which have been assessed as non-credible, while the other three are still open.
These rejected civilian harm claims likely correspond to incidents mentioned in previous press releases by OIR, which account for at least one civilian fatality and two injuries. The civilian fatality assessed as ‘non-credible’ was claimed by local sources to be a 7-year old boy, killed while US forces were reportedly conducting a training exercise.
It is unclear if the remaining open cases mentioned in the annual report include the two cases previously noted as open by CENTCOM earlier this year.
Airwars own research indicates that there were at least 15 additional cases alleging harm resulting from US actions carried out in Syria throughout 2021. US military actions in Syria in 2021 primarily included support to local ally the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in north eastern Syria – where civilian harm was often reported during targeted operations on suspected ISIS militants.
In one such incident, typical of the types of allegations recorded last year – a man and his son were allegedly killed in a raid carried out by the SDF with air support from the US military while they were said to be grazing their sheep. Local sources reported that the incident sparked “a wave of panic” among the civilians in the neighbourhood.
Our full incident archive can be found here.
Baghouz, Syria – the last ISIS stronghold
This year’s report contained three cases of previous harm allegations in Baghouz in 2019 – including the controversial March 18th 2019 strike which was the subject of an extensive investigation by the New York Times released at the end of last year, and prompted an internal investigation at the directive of the Secretary of Defense.
In the final major battle in the war against ISIS, the US-led Coalition carried out an intensive campaign to recapture the last ISIS territorial stronghold. Mass civilian casualty incidents were reported at the time – by the end of the campaign in March, reports of hundreds of casualties were being circulated online, including disturbing footage of mass graves and charred bodies. The New York Times revealed that one of the final strikes by the US-led Coalition included a 2000-pound bomb, dropped on a crowded area.
The 2021 annual report continues a pattern observed consistently by casualty recorders of significant discrepancies between conceded casualties and local allegations throughout this campaign; more so even than in other – more contested – battlegrounds, such as the Battle of Mosul.
In total – the US has conceded just 3% of even the most conservative estimates of civilian harm reported during the Battle of Deir Ezzor; compared with over a third of casualties alleged in the Battle of Mosul, for example.
Airwars puts the minimum likely estimate of deaths during this campaign at 695, while the US admits to less than 30 – including those now conceded in the annual report.
The incidents
Notably, this is the first time that the March 18th incident has been officially confirmed in public reporting by DoD – the incident was rejected previously as ‘non-credible’ twice by OIR; with an assessment reopened only after widespread media attention on the case at the end of last year.
Local sources have alleged at least 160 civilian fatalities resulted from the strike, including up to 45 children. In May this year, General Garrett – the four-star general put in charge of leading an investigation into the case – rejected almost all allegations of wrong-doing by US military forces during the operation. His investigation, which was kept classified apart from the Executive Summary, concluded that nearly all those killed were combatants.
In another of the incidents included in the report, from February 2019, we were able to identify at least three possible matches to incidents in our archive (here, here and here). While no civilian deaths were conceded by the US, local reports indicate that in one incident alone at least 50 civilians were said to have been killed.
One of the conceded events also matches a confirmed incident published in a press release earlier this year – an airstrike on March 13th 2019; nearly all sources reported that those killed in this strike had been women and children living in a camp in Baghouz. Fatality estimates ranged from 20 to 100 civilians, while the US admitted to four civilian deaths.
Afghanistan
The US withdrew officially from Afghanistan in September 2021. There were 10 reports of civilian casualties from combat operations in Afghanistan, 4 of which were deemed credible – the DoD conceded the deaths of 12 civilians, and the injuries of 2 civilians. 10 of the civilians who died all died in the same incident on August 29, 2021 in Kabul – this likely refers to the botched drone strike on an aid worker in Kabul, which the DoD later admitted was a ‘tragic mistake’.
UNAMA, which monitors civilian casualties in Afghanistan, raised the alarm over increasing civilian casualties in Afghanistan as the situation deteriorated. However, it appears that these incidents had not been attributed by UNAMA to the US at the time of their latest report published in June last year, which contained no casualty incidents resulting from international military actions in 2021 – though notably some incidents were still under review at the time of publication.
Somalia
The US also maintains an active military presence in Somalia, recently bolstered by Biden’s decision to redeploy US troops in Somalia in May of this year. The report did not state a total number of cases in 2021 that it had investigated, but reported on one incident that had previously been conceded by AFRICOM.
Despite an initial assessment by AFRICOM that no civilians had been harmed in the strike, which took place in January 2021, in its first quarterly report last year AFRICOM admitted that three civilians had been ‘inadvertently injured’ when US forces conducted an air strike on what was reported to be an al-Shabaab radio station.
The US has carried out at least 254 raids or airstrikes in Somalia since 2007, and has acknowledged five civilian deaths throughout this period. Airwars own research puts this total number at minimum 78 fatalities.
While the 2021 figure aligns with public reporting, it should be noted that there are significant challenges with harm documentation in Somalia given the security environment.
DoD acknowledges “inconsistent” civilian harm investigation process
This year’s annual report references the recently released Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) in part to explain any potential discrepancies between DoD admissions and public reporting. The annual report acknowledges that “specific processes for reviewing or investigating incidents have varied over the years”, while the CHMR-AP explicitly noted that practices for conducting assessments and investigations had been “applied inconsistently across DoD”.
The comprehensive action plan is intended to address such inconsistencies; though for those civilians who have had their cases rejected as non-credible, or for those who have never had their cases investigated at all – the promise of review and reform is likely too late.
According to Airwars’ archive, the possible death toll from the US-led Coalition’s actions in the war against ISIS alone could be at least 8,192 and as many as 13,247 civilians killed. OIR in total has acknowledged killing approximately 1500 civilians – though notably, many individual member states have yet to accept responsibility for their own efforts. The UK MoD, for example, has yet to admit more than one civilian was killed by its actions in the entire campaign.
The US-led International Coalition has quietly admitted to killing 18 more civilians in Iraq and Syria and injuring a further 11, its first such public concession in eight months.
On March 10th, Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) – the US-led coalition against the so-called Islamic State – quietly released on its website its first public civilian harm assessment since July 2021. It assessed a total of 63 incidents dating back to 2015, of which 10 were assessed to be ‘credible’ – meaning the Coalition accepted causing civilian harm.
The statement conceded that 18 civilians were killed and 11 were injured cumulatively in these ten events. Matching the incidents to its own archive, Airwars put the likely casualty numbers far higher for these events, with between 45 and 166 civilians reportedly killed. The remaining 53 incidents were deemed ‘non-credible.’
Unlike previous Coalition announcements on civilian harm, there was no accompanying public press statement or social media commentary. In a phone call to Airwars, CENTCOM confirmed it had published the information without any public announcement.
The release came after US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin had ordered a comprehensive review into US military civilian harm processes following intense media scrutiny. As the Coalition itself noted in its opening paragraph, “this report is released as part of the commitment by the U.S. government to increased transparency and accountability.”
In total since the beginning of the war against ISIS in 2014, OIR has assessed 3,034 incidents of reported civilian harm from its air and artillery strikes. The alliance has only conceded 360 of these events to be credible allegations of civilian harm, according to Airwars analysis.
While the Coalition now concedes killing, overall, at least 1,437 civilians in its long war against the Islamic State, Airwars believes the likely tally is in fact at least 8,192 to 13,243 civilians killed.
Decline in releases
Civilian harm assessments released by the US-led Coalition were published monthly for a number of years, although they have significantly dropped in frequency since 2020. Last year, only seven such reports were released – four of them in the month of July. This was the first report since then.
Of the 10 incidents designated credible by the Coalition in its new report, seven were referrals from Airwars’ own archive. We were able to match an eighth event which was referred via both Amnesty and Airwars, to an incident within Airwars’ own database.
In only two of the eight events in the Airwars database admitted by CENTCOM did its own civilian casualty estimates match the public record. In the other six, US military concessions were far lower than the figures local communities had reported.
One of the ten ‘credible’ civilian harm incidents occurred on June 9th 2017 in Raqqa, during the most intense period of fighting for that city. Eight members of the al-Nasser family, including four children, were killed by a Coalition airstrike when their family home was hit. Najma Fadawi al-Nasser, whose 60 year old brother Faddawi was killed in the attack, had briefly left her cousin’s home when the strike happened. As she later told Amnesty “we were together and then I went to my cousins’ house across the road and my brother’s house was bombed and they were all killed. Why did they kill innocent people?” The incident was initially assessed by the Coalition as non credible. Now, four years later, the Coalition has conceded that eight civilians “were unintentionally killed due to their proximity to the strike.”
A further 53 incidents in the new report were assessed or reassessed by the Coalition to be ‘non-credible.’ A range of reasons are usually given for such categorisation, including ‘no strikes were conducted in the geographical area’; or that the ‘original allegations did not have sufficient information on the time and location of the incident’. However, these 53 incidents were all – highly unusually – designated as ‘non-credible’ for the same reason: that “after review of all available evidence it was determined that more likely than not civilian casualties did not occur as a result of a Coalition strike”.
Along with basic information about each incident, the Coalition’s own assessments also included an MGRS code, a military variation of latitude and longitude coordinates, which makes it possible to geolocate where each incident is alleged to have happened. Airwars found that at least one of the ‘non credible’ incidents had a location code in Turkey, indicating an error.
New York Times investigation
One of the ‘credible’ incidents in the new report, in Baghouz, Syria in March 2019, had previously been rejected twice by the Coalition as ‘non-credible’. A blockbuster New York Times investigation into the event recently led the Department of Defense to open an investigation into the incident – despite CENTCOM still classifying it as ‘non-credible’. While Airwars estimates that between 20 and 100 civilians were likely killed as a result of this strike, CENTCOM itself now says, “Regrettably, four civilians were unintentionally killed due to their proximity to the strike.” The release does not detail how this number was reached, or why it has only conceded four.
In January 2022, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a 90-day review into the Baghouz event and associated processes, which is due to publish by the end of April. Given that ongoing investigation by a four star US general – which Airwars has assisted – it remains possible that CENTCOM may yet release a fourth assessment of the event.
Speaking about the latest Coalition civilian harm release, incoming Airwars Director Emily Tripp noted: “While we welcome the release of these civilian harm assessments, it is clear that there still needs to be radical improvement in DoD processes.”
“We are seeking clarity in particular on when the remaining 37 open cases will be reviewed, as well as further information from DoD on their civilian harm assessment standards.”
Since the beginning of Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015, Airwars has tracked, documented and preserved every local allegation of civilian harm resulting from Russian actions – over 4,000 individual incidents from 61,915 unique sources.
We have collected 11,181 names of civilians reported killed, and identified 1,383 family members killed in the same incidents. In total, our archive indicates that by March 2022, as many as 24,743 civilians had been locally-alleged killed by Russian actions in Syria, and another 43,124 injured. To date Russia has yet to publicly accept responsibility for the death of a single civilian during the campaign.
Russian and Syrian regime pilots often fly the same Russian airframes, use the same munitions and tactics, and also fly joint patrols. For this reason, local communities can find it extremely challenging to attribute civilian harm directly to one party or another.
In those events where only Russia is implicated Airwars believes the likely civilian fatality toll to be between 4,300 and 6,400. Between 10,000 and 17,100 further deaths are alleged from contested events – where Russia is only one of the belligerents blamed for an attack, primarily alongside the regime.
This briefing focuses on Russia’s engagement in Syria in order to help civil society, journalists, researchers and humanitarian practitioners understand patterns of civilian harm resulting from Russian actions, which can also help inform understanding of Moscow’s ongoing attacks in Ukraine. Airwars continues to document recorded civilian harm resulting from the actions of all other foreign belligerents in Syria – such as Turkish military engagement and US led coalition activities.
Our findings on Russia in Syria present aggregated results from our newly updated civilian harm archive. Each incident of civilian harm presents a unique data point but we encourage all those engaging with these findings to also review our open access archive, where each incident can be reviewed in its entirety: click here.
While we consider all events in our archive as active – meaning they will be updated as new information comes to light – the data presented here reflects can be considered up to date as of March 24th 2022.
More details on our methodology and casualty counting standards can be found here.
Scale of civilian harm
Russia first intervened directly in Syria in September 2015, five years into the country’s civil war, in support of the Syrian regime. In the first three years of the conflict, more than 45,000 airstrikes were declared by Russian forces. While the initial alliance between Russian and the Syrian regime declared they were targeting the Islamic State, the two actors have increasingly focused on clearing rebel-held areas – with the final rebel stronghold in Idlib appearing to be Russian’s primary target today.
Over the course of Russian involvement in the conflict, overall up to 24,743 civilians have been locally alleged killed by Russian actions; including those incidents with contested attribution to the Syrian regime. This includes up to 5,318 children, 2,953 women and 4,208 men where the gender and ages of victims are known.
Our data includes all allegations where one or more local sources pointed to Russian forces as being responsible for civilian casualties – including those events where additional sources blamed the Syrian regime (or in a small number of events, other actors such as the US-led Coalition or Turkey). In total these contested incidents account for 60% of the civilian fatalities linked to Moscow’s actions in Syria in our archive. Until Russia and the Syrian regime are transparent about their actions in Syria, it is highly likely that we will not be able to identify the specific perpetrator of each contested event. That said, the likelihood that civilians were harmed in such attacks is often high.
Each data point represents the number of alleged civilian fatalities in a single civilian harm incident.
Civilians have been reported killed by Russian forces in both large-scale civilian harm incidents and more consistently in smaller-scale harm events that are rarely covered by international media. Most civilian harm incidents involve allegations where between one and 10 civilians are reported killed, although several mass casualty incidents have also been attributed to Russian actions.
As widely documented by conflict monitors, civilian casualties are more likely to occur when actors target populated areas, especially when using explosive weapons with wide area effects. Airwars data shows that there are at least 299 civilian harm incidents in Syria where local sources have alleged that ‘vacuum’ missiles have been used by Russian forces: a particularly deadly explosive that can suck the oxygen from the air and cause a blast wave so massive it can destroy even reinforced infrastructure. These incidents account for up to 1,480 alleged civilian fatalities.
Location of incidents referencing use of vacuum missiles during the Battle of Aleppo – 2016.
In the campaign to capture Aleppo in 2016, Russian forces were alleged to have used these weapons 23 times on the densely populated city, according to Airwars monitoring of hyperlocal sources.
While vacuum missiles are not banned under international law, their deliberate use on civilian neighbourhoods is prohibited. Russian forces have also been accused of using prohibited ‘cluster’ bombs – munitions that have a large and inaccurate blast radius, and are likely to cause significant harm beyond the intended target.
In 567 civilian harm incidents recorded in the Airwars archive, local sources reported that cluster munitions have been used – accounting for up to 3,640 civilian deaths, and 7,040 civilian injuries.
Civilian targets – attacks on residential neighbourhoods and civilian infrastructure
Within the first three months of Russian attacks in Syria in late 2015, Airwars found that local reports of civilian harm were already indicating a clear trend of systematic attacks on civilian neighbourhoods and vital infrastructure.
Local communities and civil society organisations, such as the Syrian Network for Human Rights, have continued to report on and document this major trend. On February 27th 2022, less than a week after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, local activists described “massive destruction” on a marketplace in the town of Afes in Idlib province; up to two people were killed and another four injured in the action attributed both to Russian forces and the Syrian regime.
This is one of 204 unique incidents in the Airwars archive where Russian forces were locally blamed for civilian harm in an attack on a marketplace; in total these incidents account for up to 3,051 civilian fatalities.
While it is not unusual for belligerents monitored by Airwars to harm civilians in attacks which strike marketplaces, our data indicates that Russian forces are likely to do so at a far higher rate than most. Our monitoring of alleged civilian harm resulting from US-led Coalition actions in Syria, for example, finds that despite similarly intensive campaigns conducted predominantly by airstrikes, US-led Coalition actions led to claimed civilian harm events in marketplaces on forty occasions. Of those events, Airwars presently assesses that 23 incidents did likely result from Coalition bombings. The alliance itself has also publicly conceded civilian deaths and injuries in six of those marketplace attacks – a clear contrast with Moscow’s ongoing refusal to concede any harm from its seven-year campaign.
Russian forces in Syria, along with the Syrian regime, have also been accused of repeatedly attacking medical facilities, hospitals, and clinics throughout Syria with explosive munitions. Overall, our research identified 229 incidents where civilian harm reportedly occurred in medical facilities following alleged Russian and/or Syrian regime actions. In many incidents, local sources reported “total destruction” of facilities – without any possibility of reconstruction.
#حلبطيران النظام و روسيا يدمر مشفى بغداد في قرية عويجل بشكل كامل بعد قصفه بصاروخين ارتجاجيين وهو المشفى الثالث الذي يتم تدميره خلال يومين pic.twitter.com/H2523kXUz2
— شدا الحرية (@tv_shada) November 15, 2016
Other civilian spaces have also been hit during Russia’s campaign; in at least 180 civilian harm incidents recorded by Airwars, fatalities and injuries occured in schools. Educational facilities have frequently been the site of reported Russian incidents, including universities, where at least two attacks struck campuses, including the University of Ebla. On January 21st 2018, one civilian was reported to have been killed when Russian “heavy aerial bombardment” struck the university. On the same day there were 15 additional raids on the area which further damaged the University buildings.
Local reporting also reveals at least 53 cases where civilians were reported killed by Russian strikes on factories and water sanitation stations. In 2016 alone, eight attacks on factories and twelve attacks on water stations were reported; most of these were part of a major regime-led campaign to gain control of Aleppo city. In one incident on September 23rd 2016, up to 250,000 people in eastern Aleppo were reported to have temporarily lost access to water completely, when an air raid on the neighbourhood of Bab al Nayrab hit a water pumping station.
As Russian forces and their Syrian regime allies have closed in on the final rebel-held enclave in Idlib, critical civilian infrastructure continues to come under attack. From September 2021 until January of this year, civilian harm incidents have been reported resulting from attacks on poultry farms at least twice a month. Overall, despite the lower tempo of the conflict in 2021, it was also the year that saw the most attacks on farming facilities.
“Oh God, by the size of the beauty of your paradise, show me the beauty of the next in my life and fulfil for me what I wish, and comfort my heart.” – Jude Yasser Shara’s, aged 21, last Facebook post minutes before artillery shelling killed her in Idlib City on September 7th 2021. Jude was reported to have recently gradauated from an undergraduate degree in Psychology and was he head of Al Seraj al Munir Kindergarten (Image shared via Idlib Media Centre).
Targeting humanitarian response
In 12 cases identified in our datasets, civilians were harmed in incidents where Russia was accused of targeting humanitarian response efforts – often in conjunction with the Syrian regime.
In four incidents, local sources reported civilian harm after attacks on food convoys. In the first of these cases, on November 25th 2015, eight civilians were reported killed, including a child, when Russian planes hit a series of trucks close to the Turkish border. Russia accepted responsibility for the attack, but did not accept responsibility for the civilian casualties – and denied that the trucks were part of a humanitarian convoy.
Potential implications of Russia’s actions in Syria for Ukraine
Airwars has actively monitored, assessed and preserved all community-reported civilian harm claims from Russian actions in Syria since September 2015 – resulting in a major public database that presently runs to 650,000 words.
Our detailed findings are clear. Civilian harm from Russia’s actions in Syria has been both extensive and continuous. Civilian neighbourhoods are routinely targeted by both air and artillery strikes, often with no suggestion of the presence of armed rebels. Marketplaces, hospitals, schools, critical infrastructure, and first responders, are also routinely struck. Indeed the frequency of such attacks compared to those of other actors in Syria, leads Airwars to conclude that Russia deliberately and routinely targets both civilians and civilian infrastructure, as part of a broader strategy to drive civilians from rebel-held areas.
Many of the profoundly concerning and potentially unlawful Russian actions in Syria – which Airwars and others have extensively documented – are now reportedly being witnessed at scale across Ukraine, with multiple towns and cities under direct attack. Indeed, with the addition of tens of thousands of Russian ground forces and weapon systems never deployed in Syria – such as guided missile strikes and MRLS salvoes – the potential exists for far greater civilian harm in Ukraine than that extensively documented for Syria.
Moscow’s extensive ongoing attacks on urban centres – where millions of Ukrainians remain trapped – is particularly concerning. According to United Nations monitors, the great majority of civilian deaths and injuries result from the use of wide area effect explosive weapons on urban areas. Upcoming UN-brokered talks in Geneva to restrict the urban use of such weapons offer a clear opportunity for other nations to distance themselves from Russia’s outrageous actions.
There has been much speculation in recent weeks about what President Biden’s first year in office shows us about his foreign policy – and in particular whether he is ending 20 years of America’s so-called ‘forever wars’.
As 2021 nears its end, Airwars reached out to US combatant commands to request strike data for conflicts. Coupled with the long-delayed release of crucial strike data from Afghanistan, Airwars can assess for the first time what the ‘war on terror’ looks like under Joe Biden.
The biggest take-home is that Biden has significantly decreased US military action across the globe.
Overall, declared US strikes have fallen by 54% globally during 2021
In total, declared US strikes across all five active US conflict zones – Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria and Yemen – fell from 951 actions in 2020, to 439 by mid December 2021, a decrease of 54 percent. This is by far the lowest declared annual US strike number since at least 2004, and reflects a broader trend of declining US actions in recent years.
During 2021, the overwhelming majority of US strikes (372) took place in Afghanistan prior to withdrawal on August 31st. In fact, the United States carried out more than five times as many strikes in Afghanistan this year than in all other active US conflict zones combined.
If you were to remove Afghanistan from the data, the United States has declared just 67 strikes across the globe so far in 2021.
Afghanistan dominated US military actions during 2021
Civilian casualties also down
This trend is also reflected in far lower numbers of civilians allegedly killed by US strikes. During 2021, there were no credible local allegations of civilians likely killed by US strikes in Iraq, Libya, Pakistan or Yemen.
However, at least 11 civilians were likely killed by US actions in Syria. In Afghanistan at least 10 civilians were confirmed killed by US actions. That latter figure is almost certainly higher, since we now know the US dropped more than 800 munitions on Taliban and Islamic State fighters during the year. At least some of those strikes were in urban areas where civilians are particularly at risk. However exact estimates remain elusive, due to ongoing confusion between US strikes and those carried out by Afghan security forces up to August.
In Somalia one civilian was locally reported killed by US strikes, though this occurred before Biden assumed office on January 20th.
Biden is partly continuing a trend seen in recent years – the number of strikes has largely fallen since 2016 when the war with the so-called Islamic State reached its apex. Below, we provide breakdowns of both US and allied airstrikes and locally reported civilian casualties – as well as emerging trends – for each individual conflict.
Over the length of the ‘War on Terror’, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 still marks the highest number of declared US strikes.
Afghanistan
On December 17th 2021, Biden’s administration finally released strike data for the final two years of the Afghanistan war. Such monthly releases were standard practice for nearly two decades but were stopped in March 2020, with the Trump administration arguing that their ongoing release could jeopardise peace talks with the Taliban. The Biden administration then chose to continue with that secrecy.
Now we can see why. The new releases show that despite a ‘peace’ agreement with the Taliban signed on February 29th 2020, under which the US was expected to withdraw in 14 months, the Pentagon continued its aggressive aerial campaigns in Afghanistan. Between March and December 2020, more than 400 previously undeclared strikes took place under Trump, while there were at least 300 US strikes in Afghanistan under Biden until August.
In total, almost 800 previously secret recent US airstrikes in Afghanistan during the Trump and Biden administrations have now been declared.
While Airwars does not track allegations of civilian harm in Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) has done so for more than a decade. Yet the decision by the Pentagon to stop publishing strike data in early 2020 may have led the UN to significantly underestimate casualties from US actions.
In its report detailing civilian casualties in Afghanistan from January to June 2021, UNAMA found that 146 civilians had been killed and 243 injured in airstrikes. Yet it seemed to assume these were all carried out by US-backed Afghan military forces, instead of the US.
“UNAMA…did not verify any airstrike by international military forces that resulted in civilian casualties during the first six months of 2021,” the report asserted. Such assessments will likely now require a fresh review, in the wake of recent US strike data releases.
We do know for certain that ten civilians were killed by US actions after that six-month period, on August 29th this year in Kabul – in the final US drone strike of a 20-year war. The US initially claimed this was a “righteous strike” on an Islamic State terrorist. However investigative journalists quickly showed the victims were in fact an aid worker and nine members of his young family, forcing the military to admit an error. Despite this, it recently concluded no disciplinary measures against personnel were necessary.
After the ignominious US withdrawal on August 31, US strikes have stopped. While at the time Biden discussed the possibility of continuing “over the horizon” airstrikes from a nearby country, this has not yet happened.
“The skies over Afghanistan are free of US war planes for the first time in two decades. A whole generation grew up under their contrails, nobody looks at the sky without checking for them,” Graeme Smith of the International Crisis Group told Airwars. “Their absence heralds the start of a new era, even if it’s not yet clear what that new chapter will bring.”
Iraq and Syria
During 2020, the number of air and artillery strikes conducted by the US-led Coalition against the Islamic State – Operation Inherent Resolve – has continued to fall, alongside an ongoing reduction in civilian harm allegations.
OIR declared 201 air and artillery strikes in Iraq and Syria in 2020, and only 58 strikes by early December 2021. This represents a reduction of around 70 percent in one year, and a 99 percent reduction in declared strikes between 2017 and 2021.
In Iraq, Airwars has tracked no local allegations of civilian harm from US led actions during 2021, down from an estimated five civilian fatalities in 2020. At the height of the Coalition’s war against ISIS in 2017, Airwars had tracked a minimum of 1,423 civilian fatalities.
In Syria, however, civilian harm allegations from Coalition actions actually increased this year, up from a minimum of one death in 2020 to at least eleven likely civilian fatalities in 2021. This does still represent a low figure compared to recent history: in 2019, Airwars had identified a minimum of 490 civilians likely killed by the Coalition, a reduction of 98 percent to this year.
Since 2019, Afghanistan has replaced Iraq and Syria as the primary focus of US military actions.
One key concern in Syria is that most recently reported civilian deaths have resulted not from declared US airstrikes, but from joint ground operations with Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), often supported by US attack helicopters.
These include a raid on the town of Thiban in Deir Ezzor, carried out by the SDF with the support of the US-led Coalition at dawn on July 16th 2021. Eyewitnesses reported that a “force consisting of several cars raided civilian homes, without warning, accompanied by indiscriminate shooting between the houses with the aim of terrorising the ‘wanted’”. Two civilians, a father and son, were killed in the raid, reportedly shot outside their home.
Separately, on the morning of December 3rd 2021, a declared US drone strike killed at least one man and injured at least six civilians, including up to four children from the same family. Multiple sources reported that the drone targeted a motorcycle but also hit a passing car that the Qasoum family were traveling in. Ahmed Qasoum, who was driving, described the incident; “the motorcycle was going in front of me and I decided to pass it, when I got parallel to it, I felt a lot of pressure pushing the car to the left of the road….It was horrible.” His ten-year-old son had a fractured skull, while his 15-year-old daughter sustained a serious shrapnel injury to her head.
On December 6th, Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby said the strike had targeted an Al-Qaeda linked militant but “the initial review of the strike did indicate the potential for possible civilian casualties.”
+18 | "دوبلت الموتور إجت طيارة استطلاع ضربتني"يستمعون إلى الموسيقا وفجأة..مشهد مرعب للحظة استهداف عائلة في ريف #إدلبخاص #تلفزيون_سوريا@syriastream pic.twitter.com/ao0hy4stb1
— تلفزيون سوريا (@syr_television) December 5, 2021
A dashboard camera captures the moment a US strike also hits a passing civilian vehicle.
Libya, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen
Under Donald Trump, there had been a record rise both in declared US airstrikes in Somalia, and in locally reported civilian deaths and injuries – with the last likely death from a US action tracked by Airwars on the final day of Trump’s presidency.
Since then, Airwars has tracked no locally reported civilian deaths in Somalia under Biden. For the entire year, AFRICOM has declared nine strikes so far, four of which occurred under Biden. When he came to power, his administration implemented a six-month moratorium on strikes, multiple sources said. This meant that both AFRICOM and even the CIA had to have White House permission before carrying out strikes in either Somalia or Yemen.
On July 20th 2021, the day the moratorium ended, AFRICOM declared the first Somali strike of the Biden era – targeting the Al-Shabaab Islamist group. Multiple militants were reported killed, though no civilians were among them. A small number of additional strikes against Al-Shabaab occurred in the weeks afterwards, the most recent of which was on August 24th. Since then, there have been no declared strikes.
In Yemen, where the US has carried out periodic strikes against alleged Al-Qaeda affiliates since 2009, there have so far been no reliable reports of US strikes under Biden. In August, Al-Qaeda itself claimed two of its fighters had been killed in a US action, though there were no details on the date or location of this event.
Responding to an email query from Airwars on November 18th, the US military denied carrying out any recent attacks, noting that “CENTCOM conducted its last counterterror strike in Yemen on June 24, 2019. CENTCOM has not conducted any new counterterror strikes in Yemen since.”
However, in a more ambivalent statement to Airwars on December 16th, CENTCOM spokesperson Bill Urban noted only that “I am not aware of any strikes in Yemen in 2021.” Airwars is seeking further clarity, particularly since it is known that the CIA carried out several airstrikes on Al Qaeda in Yemen during 2020.
In both Libya and Pakistan, long running US counter terrorism campaigns now appear to be over. The last locally claimed CIA strike in Pakistan was in July 2018 under President Trump, while in Libya, the last likely US strike was in October 2019.
A crucial year ahead
Based on official US military data, it is clear that Joe Biden is building on a trend seen in the latter years of Donald Trump’s presidency, further decreasing the scope and scale of the ‘forever wars.’
In Iraq and Syria, US forces appear to be transitioning away from carrying out active strikes in favour of supporting allied groups – although Special Forces ground actions continue in Syria, sometimes with associated civilian harm. The war in Afghanistan is now over, and it seems the long-running US campaigns in Pakistan and Libya have drawn to permanent halts. US airstrikes in Somalia and Yemen have all but stopped for now.
Still unknown is the likely framework for US military actions moving forward. In early 2021, Biden commissioned a major review of US counter terrorism policy. Led by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, the results are expected to be announced in the coming months. This will likely give us a far clearer idea how Biden believes the US should fight both ongoing wars and future ones.
Is 2022 the year Biden rescinds the AUMF? (Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz)
And then there is amending – or even repealing – the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). That law, passed by Congress in the wake of 9/11, essentially granted the US President the right to conduct strikes anywhere in the world in the context of the ‘war on terror.’ Initially designed for use against Al-Qaeda, it has been employed against an ever widening pool of US enemies.
The future of the 2001 AUMF is once again likely to be debated by Congress in 2022. While unlikely to be repealed, it could possibly be significantly amended, Brian Finucane, senior advisor for the US programme at International Crisis Group, told Airwars.
“That would entail at a minimum specifying who the United States can hit – explicitly identifying the enemy. Secondly identifying where it should be used – geographical limits. And thirdly giving a sunset clause,” he said. “As it is now that AUMF is basically a blank cheque to be used by different administrations.”
To mark the sixth anniversary of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, Airwars is highlighting just five of the countless civilian harm events that characterise Russian involvement in the conflict.
Overall since 2015, we have identified 4,615 incidents where Russia is alleged to have caused civilian deaths or injuries. This September alone, we estimate that ten civilians have been killed by alleged Russian strikes – including five children. This brings the total estimate since 2015 to a minimum of 14,216 civilians killed only in incidents Airwars has deemed fair, confirmed or contested.
This figure is a conservative estimate. As many as 23,936 civilians overall are locally alleged to have been killed by Russian actions – among the worst tolls of any belligerent or conflict monitored by Airwars. However, many of these reported deaths are contested between Russia and the Syrian regime it supports, making clear attribution frequently challenging. Airwars is continuing to carry out deep research into events that took place between late 2019 and 2020, with the updated civilian harm data expected to be released early next year.
Our Syrian team members have selected five major incidents from our archives that show how Russia has waged war in Syria – and the ongoing cost of its operations on civilian life.
We focus on civilian harm caused by high-intensity vacuum missiles; the staggering numbers of children credibly reported harmed; the challenges of naming all victims during such a high intensity conflict; and finally, the use of targeted attacks on healthcare workers and first responders.
Focusing on the civilian harm caused by Russia alone does not reflect the full picture of large-scale death and destruction over the past ten years of conflict in Syria. Airwars continues to monitor all foreign interventions in the Syrian conflict; for example, our monitoring of US led coalition activities can be found here, while our monitoring of Turkish military engagement can be found here.
Syrian monitoring groups – such as the Syrian Network for Human Rights; the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights; and the Violations Documentation Center – also continue to track the devastating civilian harm caused by the ongoing civil war, most of it resulting from the actions of the Assad regime.
Case 1 – Vacuum missiles
Vacuum or ‘thermobaric’ missiles are a particularly deadly weapon, allegedly used by both Russian and Syrian Regime forces throughout the conflict. Russian forces were first accused of using vacuum missiles in Syria on the first day of airstrikes, on September 30th 2015, in an attack that reportedly killed 18 civilians in Talbiseh. A doctor working at the hospital receiving casualties described the impact of the missile as causing “cases of suffocation as a result of dust and smoke”, killing civilians with “enormous pressure or shrapnel that pierced their bodies and tore some of them into pieces”.
Absolute confirmation of the use of a particular weapon in Syria remains a major challenge. Of the 4,615 civilian harm events categorised by Airwars as likely being Russian (including contested events such as Russian and/or regime attacks), we identified 244 incidents where local sources mentioned that ‘vacuum missiles’ had been used in the attack. These strikes were found to have caused at least 875 deaths.
While we may not know for sure if vacuum missiles were used in each of these events, we have chosen to highlight one case that offers some insight into the level of destruction caused by high explosive weapons, and the complexity of such events.
April 17th-18th 2017: Ma’arat Hurma
This incident took place in April 2017, where nine children and their grandmother were likely killed in repeated airstrikes on Ma’arat Hurma, Idlib. The site was reportedly hit multiple times, with buildings almost completely raised to the ground and victims buried under many layers of rubble. In the final high-intensity strike, an ambulance being used to tend to the initial victims, was left burning.
Media outlet RFS observed that “the raids were highly explosive and caused extensive destruction to civilian homes. Six houses and more than 25 shops were destroyed and other material damage occurred in the places where rockets fell”.
Our assessment identifies the victims likely killed in the attack – all members of the Al Nabo family, with the youngest child just two years old. Images posted to social media show the buildings razed to the ground, while a video posted by first responders, the White Helmets, show the bodies of small children being carried through the rubble.
Read the full assessment on our website here.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1_AOIJ1WY-A
The moment missiles hit Ma’arat Hurma.
Case 2 – Children killed and injured
At least 4,831 children have been reported killed by alleged Russian airstrikes in Syria since 2015. In 2016, one of the deadliest years for civilian casualties in Syria, an average of 169 children were killed each month by alleged Russian actions.
While ceasefire agreements in 2020 saw a downturn in Russian strikes, this temporary relief for Syrians has likely now come to an end, as we’ve seen the resumption of weekly, and sometimes daily, Russian airstrikes in different parts of Syria. In September 2021 alone, children account for half of all deaths caused by alleged Russian strikes and almost half of all injuries. This includes one child reported injured earlier this week, in alleged Russian or Syrian regime strikes on the town of Majdlaya.
Taking the most conservative estimates – the minimum number of reported civilians killed – children could account for 34% of all casualties in Syria resulting from alleged Russian strikes. The indiscriminate nature of Russian airstrikes has resulted in the deaths of entire families of children, including babies just a few months old.
August 19th & 20th 2021: Balshoun and Kansafra
Two civilian casualty events took place over 48 hours in August 2021, where alleged Russian airstrikes in Idlib hit two families. At least eight children were killed and another injured.
On August 19th, four children were killed and another injured by alleged Russian or regime strikes on Balshoun. Three of the children were killed alongside their mother and their young cousin – all members of the Ajaj family.
One of the children killed was 8-year old Hamza Khaled Habib, cousin of the Ajaj family. In an event that reflects the scale of civilian harm in Syria, Hamza was being raised by his uncle, as his own father had already been killed in a previous airstrike. The Syrian Civil Defense (also known as the White Helmets) posted a video capturing Mr Mohamed Ajaj mourning for his wife, children and young nephew, all killed in this attack.
Read our full assessment of the incident here.
Only a day later at Kansafra, another Idlib town, another family was almost entirely killed, including at least four children – aged three, six, nine and twelve years old, members of the Al Omar family. A reporter with AFP saw the father crying over the bodies of three of his children in a cemetery. The reporter observed that the fourth child had to be buried in a hurry, because bombing had begun again in the area.
Only one of the Al Omar children survived the attack, the youngest, who the mother managed to rescue just moments before the strike.
Read our full assessment of the incident here.
The bottle belonging to one of the children killed in alleged Russian strikes on Kansafra town, Idlib – August 2021 (Image posted on Twitter by @thawrat111)
Case 3 – The unnamed
Of all civilians alleged harmed by Russian airstrikes – estimated by Airwars at as many as 23,936 killed and 41,452 injured – we have found full or partial names for just 8,472 individuals.
This means that 87% of all civilians reported harmed in Russian strikes cannot be identified using current available datasets. While on-going deeper research being conducted by Airwars might be able to address at least some of these events, it is highly likely that we may not know the identity of many thousands of victims until Syria’s conflict ends, and a substantial truth and reconciliation process can begin.
This is due to a number of reasons, not least that the use of high-intensity weapons by Russian and other forces in Syria cause significant destruction, and often make immediate identification of casualties impossible. Syria also houses the highest number of internally displaced people in the world, estimated by UNHCR at 6.2 million, including 2.3 million children. Local sources in many cases may not recognise victims, especially those recently arrived with little documentation.
March 22nd 2019: Kafriya and Al Fou’a
On March 22nd 2019 in Kafriya and Al Fou’a in Idlib, an incident that was referred to by several sources as a “massacre”, killed up to 28 civilians and injured as many as 30 others. A doctor named Abu Mohammed was quoted by Smart News as identifying more than 15 raids on the towns of Kufriya and al-Fuha and he noted that many civilians had moderate injuries, “mostly children and women”. The use of cluster bombs and high explosive missiles was pointed out in various sources and could be one of the reasons for the difficulty identifying victims.
Despite Airwars’ researchers finding 28 unique sources reporting on the incident, we were only able to identify one individual who was killed – Ali Wahid Qalla, a 50 year old man displaced from Eastern Ghouta. The identity of dozens of others, including children, remains unknown.
Read our assessment in full on our website.
https://twitter.com/abuhuzaifa_/status/1109391514495578112?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1109391514495578112%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fairwars.org%2Fcivilian-casualties%2Frs3609-march-22-2019%2F
‘The death toll from the massacre committed by Russian planes in the town of #كفريا North Idlib killed 20 civilians, including 4 children, and more than 30 wounded, including critical cases, and 13 children. These have become just numbers for the hypocritical media’
Case 4 – Attacks on healthcare workers and rescuers
In March 2020, WHO’s Regional Emergency Director in the Eastern Mediterranean, Richard Brennan, called out the international community for ignoring attacks on healthcare facilities in Syria: “What is troubling, is that we’ve come to a point where attacks on health — something the international community shouldn’t tolerate – are now taken for granted; something we have become accustomed to”.
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) provide on-going monitoring of attacks on healthcare centres, noting that such operations are against International Humanitarian Law and constitute war crimes. According to PHR, 244 attacks on medical facilities have been carried out by either the Syria Regime or Russian forces. One such attack was investigated by the New York Times, which showed how Russian airstrikes hit four hospitals in just 12 hours in May 2019.
As PHR notes: “When these attacks on health care become as prolonged and widespread as they have in Syria, the consequences reach far beyond the individuals and facilities lost – the attacks reverberate across the civilian community, inciting fear that seeking medical treatment or going to a hospital will result in death, injury, kidnapping, torture, or imprisonment, both for the patient and the medical provider.”
One type of event Airwars researchers often report on during monitoring of Russian strikes in Syria, are so-called double-tap strikes – where first responders are hit in a second airstrike after an initial attack has caused casualties.
These first responders are most often the White Helmets, officially known as the Syrian Civil Defense, who report that 252 of their volunteers have been killed since the start of the conflict and over 500 volunteers injured. White Helmets continue to risk their lives and are often the only response teams available in remote or poorly resourced areas.
June 26th 2019, Khan Sheikoun
An event that took place in June 2019 is one such example, where an alleged Russian strike killed two White Helmets volunteers in Khan Sheikoun, Idlib, who were tending to the victims of an earlier strike. The two volunteers, Ali Al Qadour and Omar Kayyal, had been in an ambulance treating victims of an initial strike in the east of Khan Sheikhoun; another five of their colleagues were also wounded.
The Syrian Civil Defense published a statement that said “a thorough examination of the evidence, such as eyewitness accounts and the identification of munitions used in the attack on white helmets, has proved conclusively that the aircraft that committed the crime of targeting and killing our volunteers belong to the Russian Air Force, which used surveillance aircraft”.
The assessment is available in full on our website.
The burial of a White Helmets volunteer, following a reported Russian airstrike in June 2019 (Image via Idlib Media Centre)
This article was originally published by The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft on August 8th 2021.
For the little media coverage it receives these days, you might be forgiven for believing the US-led coalition’s war in Syria and Iraq to be over. Osama Al-Hamid’s family knows better. Last month, the young boy died during reported fighting between Washington’s local Syrian allies and the Islamic State, in which US airstrikes hit the building he was in. Osama was the latest of thousands of alleged victims of coalition strikes.
August 8th marked seven years since the international coalition, led by the United States, began its concerted bombing campaign against the Islamic State, the terrorist group that by 2014 had seized much of northern Iraq and Syria. Since then, the coalition has declared 34,987 strikes against the Islamist group. Today, ISIS has been reduced from a de facto state controlling territory roughly the size of Britain on either side of the Iraqi-Syrian border, to a few disparate cells living in hiding and conducting occasional terror attacks.
The final piece of ISIS territory, the town of Baghouz in eastern Syria, was recaptured in April 2019. Since then, the intensity of the international campaign has dropped dramatically. Only 483 strikes, or less than two percent of the war’s total, have taken place in the last two years.
The civilian toll has also dropped sharply. Of the 1,417 civilians the Operation Inherent Resolve, or OIR Coalition, has officially admitted killing since 2014, only one has occurred since Baghouz fell.
Airwars puts the real figures of civilians killed by coalition strikes far higher — at between 8,317 and 13,190 likely fatalities between 2014 and today. And since April 2019, between 57 and 112 civilians have been likely killed, the watchdog believes.
Yet despite the near destruction of ISIS, the coalition remains in place, even as President Joe Biden’s administration withdraws from Afghanistan, and claims to be looking to end the “forever wars.” The United States retains an estimated 900 troops in Syria and a further 2,500 in Iraq. Other nations have also seemingly increased the intensity of their involvement in the campaign in recent months. Of the 44 confirmed OIR airstrikes against the Islamic State this year, more than half were French or British. Belgium, which resumed its own involvement in the war in October 2020, has provided no data on its own recent strikes.
No perfect exit
Seven years on, and with most of the war’s objectives seemingly achieved, what is to become of the anti-ISIS Coalition?
There are plenty of legitimate reasons for the Coalition to remain concerned.
Thousands of family members of ISIS militants, including those with British, French, and other citizenships, remain stuck in vast prisons in northern Syria, including the infamous Al-Hol camp near Hassakeh. With some countries unwilling to repatriate their nationals, violence in the camps remains a concern and there are fears the conditions could serve to radicalize a new generation of ISIS.
Outside the camps, fears of an ISIS resurgence remain, with periodic claims of their influence increasing. Recently, reports circulated that ISIS cells were forcing villagers in one part of eastern Syria to pay them money or face punishment. The US’s allies in Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, may not be able to cope without continued Western military support.
The Coalition is also yet to tackle its historic legacy, with rights groups and family members still seeking recompense for the thousands of civilians killed by its own actions. A recent report by Agence France Presse interviewed victims of the single worst disaster, when a U.S. strike killed more than 100 civilians in the Iraqi city of Mosul in March 2017, and found they were still waiting for compensation.
So there are arguments that supporters of the Coalition mission may may make in favour of staying. But bear in mind that just because it is not in the media that doesn’t make it a cost-free exercise — either financially for the US and partners, or for Syrian and Iraqi civilians.
Data from Airwars’ annual report shows conflicts across the Middle East were less violent in 2020
Last month, Osama Al-Hamid — who looks perhaps four or five in the images posted online of him — tragically died. The exact circumstances of his death, in Kharbet Al Janous near Hassakeh in northern Syria on July 21st, are disputed. What is clear is that the United States carried out two airstrikes against alleged ISIS members while supporting the SDF. Somewhere along the way Hamid was killed. The Coalition’s spokesman said the child was being “held captive” by ISIS, but provided no evidence for the claim.
The intensity of Syria’s civil war more generally has dipped significantly in recent years. Airwars data shows that the number of civilians reported killed last year was roughly a third of the tally during 2019. And as the level of violence decreases, so the questions that leaders have to ask themselves shift.
With US, Russian, Turkish, Iranian and other forces seemingly becoming permanent fixtures in Syria, the potential for fatal miscalculation remains. And with no clear long-term strategy currently being articulated by the Biden administration, there remains a risk of another grinding conflict with no end in sight.
In Iraq, the US-led coalition often found itself fighting alongside Iranian-backed militias during the height of the campaign against ISIS. Yet since the Caliphate’s decline, some of those same groups have begun turning their ire on US bases, particularly as tensions with Tehran again escalate. In another echo of the earlier US-UK occupation of Iraq, Shia politicians from across the spectrum increasingly call on the Americans to leave.
When President Obama withdrew from Iraq in 2011 at the insistence of the Iraqi government, he later faced allegations that his purported hasty exit helped lead to the emergence of ISIS. Biden will be wary of repeating the mistake. But he is also perhaps learning from Afghanistan that there is no perfect time to end a war. Maintaining the coalition in perpetuity in Iraq and Syria, against an elusive foe, brings with it a risk of a new forever war.
The Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on civilian deaths and injuries resulting from US military actions around the world has declared more than 100 recent casualties. Researchers and human rights groups, including Airwars, Amnesty International and UN monitors in Afghanistan, place the actual toll significantly higher.
For 2020 alone, the Department of Defence said that its forces had killed 23 civilians and injured a further 10 in Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq. An additional 63 historical deaths and 22 injuries were reported for the years 2017-2019, mostly in Syria and Yemen.
By contrast, the minimum public estimate of civilian deaths caused by US forces during 2020 across five conflict nations was 102 fatalities – almost five times higher than DoD admits.
Casualties from US actions in Afghanistan in particular appear to have been officially undercounted. While the Pentagon reports only 20 deaths and 5 injuries from its own actions last year, UNAMA – the respected UN agency in Afghanistan – says that international forces killed at least 89 civilians and injured a further 31. United States personnel made up the great majority of those foreign forces.
For Somalia, DoD declares only one civilian death from US actions last year – while Airwars and others suggest a minimum civilian toll of seven killed.
And for Iraq and Syria, while US forces declare only one death, local reporting indicates at least six civilians killed by US actions.
Only for Yemen is there agreement, with monitoring organisations and the DoD both indicating that there were no likely civilian deaths caused by US actions during the year.
Major decline in US actions
The 21-page Pentagon document, quietly released May 28th and entitled ‘Annual Report on Civilian Casualties In Connection With United States Military Operations in 2020,’ has been a requirement of US law since 2018.
The latest report captures the very significant fall in tempo of US military actions during the latter years of Donald Trump’s presidency. According to Airwars estimates, there were around 1,000 US strikes across four conflict countries during 2020 – down from approximately 3,500 strikes the previous year and a peak of 13,000 such US actions during 2016. Declared civilian deaths fell from 132 to 23 from 2019 to 2020.
The majority of civilian deaths declared by the Pentagon during 2020 were in Afghanistan – despite a major ceasefire between US forces and the Taliban for much of the year. According to the new DoD report, 20 civilians were killed and five injured in seven US actions, primarily airstrikes.
The seven civilian casualty events conceded in Afghanistan by the Pentagon for 2020
However the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which has been recording extensive data on civilian harm from all parties to the fighting since 2009, placed the toll far higher. According to its own annual report for 2020 published earlier this year, “UNAMA attributed 120 civilian casualties (89 killed and 31 injured) to international military forces”.
While these casualties represented just one per cent of the overall reported civilian toll in Afghanistan for the year – with most civilians killed by the Taliban and Afghan forces – of concern was DoD’s major undercounting of its own impact on civilians – with UNAMA logging four and a half times more deaths primarily from US actions than those officially conceded by the Pentagon.
Reported civilian casualties from US actions against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria have remained low since the terror group’s defeat as a territorial entity in mid 2019. According to the Pentagon, just one civilian was killed by an action in Iraq, after US forces targeted Iranian linked militias at Karbala airport on March 13th 2020. Twenty three year old security guard Karrar Sabbar was killed in that US attack. However the additional reported deaths of two civilian policemen in the attack are not acknowledged by the US.
In Syria, Airwars estimates three to six likely civilian deaths from US actions during 2020, mainly during counterterrorism raids against ISIS remnants. None of these were conceded either.
In Somalia, between 7 and 13 civilians were likely killed by US actions during the year, according to Airwars monitoring of local communities. The US military itself concedes five injuries and one death, in two events in early 2020 near Jilib.
Only for Yemen did human rights organisations and DoD appear to agree, with both reporting no likely civilian deaths from US actions during the year.
US forces in Somalia killed one civilian and injured five others during 2020, according to official estimates
Public transparency
Despite continuing disparities between public and military estimates of civilian harm, the Pentagon’s annual report to Congress still represents a significant transparency breakthrough. Close ally France, for example, has refused to declare a single civilian fatality from almost seven years of air and artillery strikes in Iraq and Syria – and recently lashed out at the United Nations after a French airstrike struck a wedding party in Mali.
Later this year the Pentagon will also issue a major overhaul of its civilian casualty mitigation policies, which it has been reviewing in consultation with human rights organisations for several years. On May 25th, new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr Colin Kahl confirmed in writing to NGOs that the new policy – known as a Department of Defense Instruction, or DoD-I – would be published by the Biden administration.
“We welcome the Pentagon’s publication to Congress of its latest annual civilian harm report, as well as confirmation that the DOD-I on civilian casualty mitigation will be published by the new administration,” noted Airwars director Chris Woods. “We remain concerned however that DoD estimates of civilian harm once again fall well below credible public estimates, and call on officials to review why such undercounts remain so common. Civilians surely deserve better.”
The US military has blamed an “administrative mistake” after conceding it forgot its own admission of the killing of up to 12 civilians during a raid on a Yemeni village in early 2017. Details of the admission feature in the Airwars annual report for 2020 which published March 2nd.
The US military led a raid targeting alleged senior Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) operatives in January 2017, just days after President Trump’s inauguration. According to the residents of Yakla, at least 20 and as many as 56 civilians died in the attack – including women and children. One American soldier was also killed in the fierce assault.
The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) admitted the deaths of civilians just days after the assault; and CENTCOM’s then commander General Joseph Votel later told the US Senate he took personal responsibility for the deaths of “between four and 12” civilians.
However in a public statement issued November 5th, in response to Airwars’ recent findings on the Trump administration’s actions in Yemen, CENTCOM appeared to row back heavily on Gen. Votel’s earlier admission, claiming only that “there may have been civilian casualties” during the Yakla raid.
Asked by Airwars to clarify whether it still stood by General Votel’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), a contrite CENTCOM admitted it had effectively forgotten its own role in the deaths of Yemeni civilians during what it described as an intense firefight between US forces and Al Qaeda.
“USCENTCOM stands by GEN Votel’s statement to the SASC, and we have subsequently found the appropriate documentation that credibly assesses between 4 and 12 non-combatant casualties died”.
Captain Bill Urban, CENTCOM’s spokesman, also insisted that this represented an administrative error.
“Please accept our apologies for our errant ‘may have’ in yesterday’s initial statement regarding the Jan 2017 raid…Our failure to provide an accurate assessment was an administrative mistake, and not an intent to deceive.”
Bonyan Gamal, a lawyer with the Yemeni human rights organisation Mwatana, said the US mistake would be “painful” for the families of those killed at Yakla, many of whom had hoped for an official apology or compensation from the US government.
“It is shocking and I think it will cause more anger. This raid caused such sadness and shock in Yemen,” she told Airwars.
“A key criticism in our recent report on US counterterror actions in Yemen was of systemic failings in civilian casualty assessments at CENTCOM,” said Chris Woods, director of Airwars, which monitors civilian casualties in multiple conflicts. “It’s insulting to both Yemenis and Americans that the deaths of so many civilians in a recent botched US raid don’t appear to form a part of CENTCOM’s institutional memory.”
Years of unaccountable war
Yemen, an impoverished country on the Arabian Peninsula, has been locked in civil war for half a decade. Neighbouring Saudi Arabia has also carried out a prolonged aerial campaign, supported by the United States, in a bid to unseat Houthi rebels in the capital Sanaa.
Parts of the country remain fertile territory for Al-Qaeda and more recently, for a local Islamic State franchise. Since 2009 the US has been conducting counterterrorism airstrikes and occasional ground raids. These ramped up significantly during Donald Trump’s presidency, with the US military conducting at least 190 armed actions in Yemen – but with at least 86 civilians also allegedly killed, according to Airwars research.
The most deadly single incident came on January 29th 2017, only nine days after Trump’s inauguration.
US forces snuck into the village of Yakla, reportedly to target senior AQAP leaders. In the ensuing firefight dozens were killed. Several field investigations concluded that at least twenty civilians died in the attack, including women and children reportedly gunned down from the air. US Navy SEAL Chief Petty Officer William Owens also died in the attack.
“This raid was one of the worst cases we have seen in Yemen,” Bonyan Gamal said. “I can only imagine the psychological and mental impact.”
During in-person testimony to the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2017, Gen. Votel admitted his troops had killed between four and 12 civilians at Yakla.
“We lost a lot on this operation. We lost a valued operator, we had people wounded, we caused civilian casualties,” Votel told the committee. “We have made a determination based on our best information available that we did cause casualties, somewhere between 4 and 12 casualties that we accept – I accept – responsibility for.”
An Airwars report published October 28th highlighted civilian casualties reportedly caused by US strikes and raids in Yemen during the Trump era, including the Yakla raid. Airwars provided comprehensive data and evidence on locally alleged civilian harm to CENTCOM more than two months ahead of publication, but received no reply until after the report was released.
On November 5th CENTCOM then admitted its first civilian harm case since Yakla, crediting Airwars for drawing a September 2017 incident to its attention. However Central Command rejected 39 other civilian harm allegations under Trump which had been flagged by Airwars – and claimed only that it “may” have harmed civilians in the notorious Yakla raid.
Transparency lacking
In 2016, outgoing US President Barack Obama had signed an Executive Order requiring the Director of National Intelligence to publish an annual summary of strikes against militant groups, and associated civilian harm, in countries such as Yemen.
Donald Trump, however, reversed that ruling in 2019 and critics say transparency around strikes had then decreased.
Peter Salisbury, senior Yemen analyst with the International Crisis Group think tank, said the Trump administration had a far worse record on transparency than the Obama administration, “which itself was hardly open about what it knew.”
President Joe Biden recently announced an end to US support for the brutal Saudi-led air campaign against Houthi rebels. The status of the 12-year long US campaign against al Qaeda in Yemen is less clear – though a recent report suggested the entire US covert drone strikes campaign is now in review.
According to Mwatana’s Bonyan Gamal, unaccountable US strikes can feed extremism. “Yakla is in a very remote area in Yemen,” she noted. “They don’t get basic services such as water, schooling, or even cell phone service. Nothing reaches there except US drones.”
A renewed campaign by Turkey in mid February against a Kurdish militant faction – which has seen Turkish troops pushing deeper than ever before into northern Iraq – also saw the deaths of thirteen Turkish civilian and military captives in a highly controversial attack, Airwars monitoring of the region shows.
On February 10th, the Turkish Armed Forces launched a major air and ground operation codenamed Operation Claw Eagle 2 against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Gara Mountain in Dohuk Governorate in northern Iraq. The PKK is designated as a terrorist group by the EU and the United States among others, though some Kurds view the group as a liberation organisation.
Turkey has launched a number of operations against the PKK in northern Iraq in recent years, the most recent being Operations Claw Eagle and Tiger in June 2020, which took place in the Qandil Mountains, the Sinjar District, and Makhmur.
According to Turkish military expert Levent Kemal, the military campaigns against the PKK have been effective in reducing the group’s operational capabilities. “The PKK’s [ability to] infiltrate into Turkey has been noteworthily reduced thanks to these operations. In particular, PKK infiltration routes have been under control and guerrilla hideouts in the Bradost area have been destroyed. In the West, in Zakho and Duhok areas, cooperation between the Turkish Armed Forces and the Kurdistan Democtatic Party’s (KDP) Peshmerga forces annihilated PKK’s presence near the Turkish border, forcing the PKK to retreat further south”.
According to the Turkish Ministry of Defence, the purpose of the most recent operation was to clear the PKK from the mountains, which it said had been used as a transit area for PKK fighters to cross from Iraq to Turkey; and also to secure the border to prevent what the ministry described as an imminent “large-scale attack” on Turkish forces in Iraq.
Another stated goal of Operation Claw Eagle 2 was to rescue Turkish captives held by the PKK. More than a dozen civilians and military personnel had been abducted by the PKK within Turkey in recent years, and were being held captive in Duhok.
The early hours of Operation Claw Eagle 2 saw Turkish aircraft reportedly bombing six villages in the area, causing severe damage to local vineyards and agricultural lands. The Turkish Minister of Defence, Hulusi Akar, claimed that 50 PKK targets were destroyed including air raid shelters, ammunition depots, and headquarters in the initial aerial bombardment. While no civilians were believed harmed during the attack as almost all inhabitants had apparently fled the area, locals say that the operation had nevertheless severely affected their livelihoods.
Kurdish analyst Abdulla Hawez assessed the impact of the campaign on local communities, saying that while civilians weren’t killed in the operation, “Turkish warplanes and drones were extensively bombarding dozens of locations; overall 90 villages were affected and were within the scope of the operation”.
The airstrikes were followed by a ground attack led by Turkish commandos against the People’s Defence Forces (HPG), the military wing of the PKK. According to Minister Akar, 50 PKK fighters were killed in the operations and three members of the Turkish forces died. However, figures from Kurdish sources differed considerably, with ANF claiming that only 14 PKK fighters were killed as well as more than 30 Turkish soldiers.
‘Prisoners of war’
On the third day of operations, thirteen Turkish nationals that were being held captive by the PKK in a location close to the village of Siyane were found dead by Turkish forces. According to both Kurdish and Turkish sources, some of those killed were civilians. Among the civilians killed were Sedat Yabalak, a civilian police officer and father of three in charge of Şanlıurfa Police Department; and Aydin Köse, a resident of the city of Adıyaman. Along with others, both men had been seized in Turkey by the PKK and held captive for several years in Kurdistan.
12 of the 13 Turkish captives killed in the Gara Mountain (via Muhsin.guler Facebook)
According to the Turkish Ministry of Defence, Turkish forces discovered the dead bodies of the thirteen captives after entering a bunker, suggesting that the PKK had executed them. However, the PKK has contested these claims, asserting that the captives were instead killed by Turkish airstrikes during the initial bombardment of Gara Mountain.
According to a PKK statement, the “camp where prisoners of war belonging to the Turkish security forces were held has been attacked in Gare. The camp was intensively bombed from the air at five o’clock [not clear if am or pm] on February 10th…. After this strike, the occupying Turkish army retreated a bit. Although it knew that there were prisoners there, the camp was again intensively bombed by fighter jets. The bombardment, which lasted for three days, and the fierce battles inside and outside the camp resulted in the death of some of the MIT members, soldiers and policemen we had captured.”
The deaths of the prisoners caused outrage across Turkey, with the Presidency’s media director, Fahrettin Altun emphasising Turkey’s intent to “chase down every last terrorist hiding in their caves and safe houses” and exact “painful” revenge and “swift” justice. There were fears that Turkey could use the captives’ deaths as a pretext to expand operations against Kurdish militant groups in northern Iraq, causing more peril for civilians.
“I expect the Turkish government to use the deaths to expand its military operations against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey may also attack Sinjar but this may have far more ramifications as pro-Iran militias are widely present in Sinjar and are allied with PKK-backed Yazidi groups”, explained Hawez.
These expectations may soon be realised, given the increasingly hawkish rhetoric adopted by Ankara following Operation Claw Eagle 2. Speaking at a party rally on February 15th, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaffirmed his desire to expand operations outside of Turkey in response to the botched rescue attempt in Gara, saying “we will extend our operations to areas where danger exists. We will stay in those areas we secure as long as necessary.”
Civilian harm from foreign military action in all tracked conflicts have remained low, with little change observed in November compared to previous months. In Syria, Russian actions have decreased from October. It has also been a quieter month for US-led actions in Syria, although reports of US-led strikes on Iranian forces in Syria have continued. While most belligerents have seen their military activity in Syria scale back, Turkey began escalating its shelling of key towns held by the predominantly-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with Ain Issa bearing the brunt of the military escalation.
In Iraq, Turkish strikes on fighters belonging to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continued during the month, with civilians caught in the crossfire once again. Meanwhile, International Coalition-led actions against ISIS remained sporadic throughout the month, especially in central and northern Iraq.
In Libya, the ceasefire that was officially signed between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) at the end of October has largely held, with only sporadic reports of strikes taking place in the country.
November also saw a major breakthrough for Airwars, with the launch of The Credibles, published in conjunction with The Washington Post. After several years of patient engagement with the US military, the US-led Coalition against the so-called Islamic State provided Airwars with the near locations of nearly all of the 344 publicly confirmed civilian harm events in the war against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. In total this interactive dataset allows for the first time the accurate location of almost 1,400 civilian deaths the coalition has admitted to causing since 2014. These located events represent the most accurate and comprehensive data ever publicly revealed by the US military about the harm it causes in war and raises hopes for families of those killed for potential apologies and ex gratia payments.
November saw a marked increase in Turkish military activity in northeastern Syria, centred largely around the town of Ain Issa and other areas controlled by the SDF. Airwars tracked six civilian harm incidents in Syria during the month, five of which occured in the last two weeks of November in and around the town of Ain Issa. According to local reports, four civilians were killed and up to 20 others were injured. In addition to this, there have been numerous reports suggesting that the Turkish-led shelling of the town has targeted residential homes, leading to large levels of displacement in Ain Issa.
While Turkish pressure on Ain Issa had been constant in the weeks prior to the establishment of a Turkish military base just north of Ain Issa on November 19th, the situation for civilians has deteriorated significantly since then. Tensions between the SDF and Turkish-backed forces in the region reached new heights on November 24th after an attempted offensive by the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) near Ain Issa failed and resulted in the deaths of 31 SNA fighters. This incident prompted a significant increase in Turkish shelling on Ain Issa.
The recent escalation has further raised fears that Turkey is preparing to gear up for another offensive in northeastern Syria. Turkey’s weariness over the continued influence exerted by the PKK-affiliated YPG so close to the Turkish-Syrian border has not gone away despite the military gains made last October, which saw Turkey take control of the border strip between Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain and Kurdish forces pull back 32 kilometers from the Turkish border. While support for the SDF by the United States remains strong, the current presidential transition period may serve as an opportunity for Turkey to launch an offensive against the Kurdish-led group. Kurdish officials believe that Joe Biden’s arrival to the Oval Office could make it significantly harder for Turkey to achieve its objectives through military means, given the strong support Kurdish groups had under previous Democratic President Barack Obama.
The last week of the month saw the highest number of civilian casualties. On November 23rd, Turkish-led forces launched an attack on the Ain Issa camp and the villages of Maalak and Sidon, north of the Ain Issa district. The attack took place at night, with local sources claiming that the areas were targeted with “hundreds of mortar shells and rockets”. At least eight civilians were injured in the attack. Just five days later, two civilians were reported killed and up to four others including a woman and her two children were injured as Turkish forces targeted the city once again at night.
In Iraq, Turkey’s campaign on the PKK has continued this month, albeit at a lower intensity compared to the summer. With PKK fighters dispersed in the mountains of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, most of Turkey’s strikes target remote areas with low population densities. Despite this, reports of civilian harm from these strikes have continued.
On November 8th, one civilian was reportedly killed in a Turkish drone strike on an alleged PKK vehicle near the town of Khalaf in the Sinjar district, Nineveh province. Up to five militants were reportedly also killed and at least three others wounded. According to Hawar news, the strike killed a civilian who was working on a nearby water well.
Additionally, tensions between the PKK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) increased during the month. This came when the PKK and some Peshmerga affiliated with the KDP clashed directly in Chamanke District on November 4th. According to Rudaw, PKK fighters attacked Peshmerga forces in the area, killing one soldier and injuring two more. Although the two groups did not reconcile following this incident, no further clashes were reported during the month.
People looking at the vehicle that was targeted by alleged Turkish drones near Sinjar on November 8th, 2020 (via Hawar News).
The beginning of the month saw a notable escalation in Russian strikes and Syrian Regime-led shelling on rebel-controlled parts of Idlib Governorate. This came off the back of rising tensions between Turkish-backed opposition groups and Russia following Russian strikes on a Faylaq al-Sham camp on October 26th near the town of Kafr Takharim in northern Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, killing dozens of fighters. Airwars researchers tracked four civilian harm incidents during the month – a slight decrease from October’s tally of six incidents resulting in civilian harm. Up to nine civilians were killed in the attacks.
On November 4th, at least four civilians, including a child, were killed in alleged Russian or Syrian regime artillery strikes on the city of Ariha, Idlib governorate. Among the victims were two men working for the Ihsan Relief and Development Organization. Up to six others were reportedly wounded. The bombardment also targeted the Martyr Zakariya Saedou School, partially destroying the yard and lightly damaging other parts of the school. Local sources named the victims as Raghid Zakariya Al Jasri, a driver for the Ihsan Relief and Development Organization, Samer Madi, Rimas Hindawi, a child who was killed while at school and Ibrahim Al Younis, a psychological support worker at Ihsan Relief and Development Organization
Injured civilians being brought to an ambulance after alleged Russian or Syrian regime strikes on Ariha on November 4th, 2020 (via SNHR).
The week after, on November 13th, a number of Russian soldiers were wounded after entering a minefield in Jabal al-Zawiya. Following this, further strikes were reported on towns in Idlib including Arab Saeed in Idlib’s western countryside. No civilians were reportedly harmed in the airstrike.
This month has seen local sources recording the long-term impact that Russian raids on populated areas have on civilians. On November 17th, two separate incidents of civilians being harmed as a result of previous Russian actions were reported. In the town of Qastoun in Hama, a civilian by the name of Nassar Ahmad Nassar died when his house collapsed on him. According to local sources, the man’s home had been previously severely damaged by alleged Russian or Syrian regime strikes. A similar incident occurred in the Sarja village of Idlib, where a civilian died and another civilian was injured when the roof of their home also collapsed after being subjected to heavy bombing from Russian warplanes.
Meanwhile, Russian and Syrian regime forces resumed clashes with ISIS militants in northwestern Syria. The clashes have mainly been centered in the desert areas that stretch between the governorates of Hama, Aleppo, and Raqqa. Major clashes were reported on November 28th, when regime forces lost at least ten soldiers and 16 ISIS militants were killed in clashes.
Syrian Civil Defence teams carrying a victim after a civilian home in Sarja village collapsed on November 17th, 2020, following alleged Russian or Syrian regime strikes on an unknown date (via SNHR).
The International Coalition continued its operations across Syria and Iraq during the month of November. Civilian harm once again fell to low levels, with only one incident reported in November in Syria.
In both Syria and Iraq, the US-led Coalition and its partners on the ground were relatively active in the first week of the month. According to the Coalition’s spokesperson, Colonel Wayne Marotto, local forces carried out 15 operations against ISIS militants during the first week of November.
In Syria, the only alleged civilian harm incident took place during this period. Local media sources reported that on November 7th, the US-Led Coalition conducted a joint operation with the SDF against suspected ISIS members in the village of Ghariba Al Sharqiya, north of Deir Ezzor and arrested three suspected ISIS members. Local sources reported that during this operation a man by the name of Mohammed Abdullah Al Dibs, also known as Abu Fatima, was killed in the crossfire. His body was later found near the Al Khabour river. While some local sources claimed that this man was a civilian, some outlets insisted that Abu Fatima was not a civilian, and instead had been an assistant of Saddam Al Jabal, ISIS commander of the Euphrates area during the group’s control of the territory.
The body of Mohammed Abdullah al-Dibs, which was found near the Khabour River on November 7th (via Euphrates Post)
Furthermore, Iranian positions in Syria were reportedly targeted by US warplanes. It is not clear whether these strikes were carried out unilaterally or as part of the International Coalition. There are also doubts about whether the US was involved at all in these attacks. On November 8th local sources reported that airstrikes conducted by US warplanes targeted Iranian Revolutionary Guard officers in Albu Kamal. Further strikes were reported on both November 12th and 13th targeting Iranian-backed groups in the deserts of Mad’an and Al Sabkha, in Raqqa’s southern countryside. Another airstrike was allegedly carried out targeting Iranian-backed groups around the town of Mohsen in Deir Ezzor’s eastern countryside on November 14th.
Meanwhile in Iraq, the US-led Coalition coordinated with local Iraqi forces on a number of operations against ISIS across the country. The operations focused mainly on the Makhoul, Khanouka and Hamrin mountain ranges, where ISIS continues to maintain a presence. The Coalition confirmed that it had conducted a series of strikes on ISIS targets in the Hamrin Mountains on November 7th as well as assisting Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in their operations in the Makhoul Mountains on November 8th.
Later in the month, Iraqi forces, in conjunction with the US-led Coalition, carried out a major operation in the area between Wadi Zgaitoun and Wadi al-Khanajer in Kirkuk Governorate on November 19th and 20th. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Services released footage of airstrikes that were carried out on alleged ISIS guesthouses in that area.
جانب من الضربات الجوية التي إستهدفت مضافات بقايا داعـش في المنطقة الرابطة بين وادي زغيتون – وادي الخناجر ..#جهاز_مكافحة_الإرهاب
Part of the air strikes that targeted ISIS remnants' guesthouses in the area linking Wadi Zgaitoun – Wadi Al-Khanajer pic.twitter.com/wt5QeJ77tU
— جهاز مكافحة الإرهاب (@iraqicts) November 20, 2020
Fighting in Libya has remained minimal into November following the official ceasefire deal that was signed in Geneva on October 23rd.
Only two airstrikes were reported in November in Libya, the same number as in October. Both strikes were allegedly conducted by Turkish drones on fuel smugglers.
The first event took place on November 16th near Sabratha. The second incident took place one day later in Al Ajaylat. Neither resulted in reports of civilian harm.
(Fuel truck burning after alleged Turkish drone strike near Al Ajaylat on November 17th, 2020)
In Yemen, local reports surfaced of a possible US drone strike in Marib province on November 14th. According to local media sources, a US drone hit a farm near the Bin Maelli station and the al-Nakhil Resthouse in Wadi Obeida. According to reports, the drone strike targeted three al-Qaeda members. The strike injured one member, but the other two managed to survive the attack.
CENTCOM claimed that there were no US military strikes during November 2020 in Yemen. The last publicly declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province.
#مارب طائرة بدون طيار امريكيه تستهدف ثلاثه اشخاص من تنظيم القاعده بالقرب من استراحة النخيل ـ محطة بن معيلي صباح اليوم السبت
حيث اصيب احدهم جراء الضربه فيما نجى الاثنين الاخرين منها #علي_النسي
— علي النسي (@aalnaasi) November 14, 2020
Only one event with potential US involvement was reported in November, one less than in the previous month.
One CIA officer officer, later named as John Goodboe by The Intercept, was allegedly killed by an IED or VBIED. The exact circumstances of the incident remain unclear. A Guardian report said he was killed on November 6th while other sources reported he died later in November.
AFRICOM stated in an email to Airwars that no other US actions have been conducted in November.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during November 2020. The last such reported US strike was in August 2018.
November also saw a major breakthrough for Airwars, with the launch of The Credibles, published in conjunction with The Washington Post. After several years of patient engagement with the US military, the US-led Coalition against the so-called Islamic State provided Airwars with the near locations of nearly all of the 344 publicly confirmed civilian harm events in the war against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. In total this interactive dataset allows for the first time the accurate location of almost 1,400 civilian deaths the coalition has admitted to causing since 2014. These located events represent the most accurate and comprehensive data ever publicly revealed by the US military about the harm it causes in war and raise hopes for families of those killed for potential apologies and ex gratia payments.
November also saw a major breakthrough for transparency, with the launch of The Credibles, published by Airwars in conjunction with The Washington Post. After several years of patient engagement with the US military, the US-led Coalition against the so-called Islamic State provided Airwars with the near locations of nearly all of the 344 publicly confirmed civilian harm events in the war against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. In total this interactive dataset allows for the first time the accurate location of almost 1,400 civilian deaths the coalition has admitted to causing since 2014. These located events represent the most accurate and comprehensive data ever publicly revealed by the US military about the harm it causes in war and raise hopes of potential apologies and ex gratia payments for the families of those killed.
Airwars UK Advocacy team participated in the UK’s Protection of Civilians Working Group meeting in November to discuss updates in the UK and plan for a meeting with Lord Ahmad, the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict and Minister of State, following a letter sent by the group requesting that Protection of Civilians be prioritised throughout different parts of the government. The group is awaiting details about the meeting.
Airwars participated in a closed-door round table discussion organised by Saferworld about the UK’s training of local, national and regional forces titled ‘“Are we speaking to the right people when undertaking monitoring, evaluation and learning?” The discussion drew on experience from different fields and organisations and participants unanimously concluded that local populations are not engaged enough in the monitoring and evaluation of operations and they should be represented well.
Airwars also took part in Save the Children’s parliamentary launch of the latest report ‘Stop the War on Children’, which discussed the devastating impact of conflict on children living in or near war zones. The launch focused on the trends and themes identified in the report, the experiences of children living in conflict, and how the UK can play a pivotal role in protecting children in war, an aim shared by Airwars.
Following the October release of Seeing through the Rubble, our joint report with PAX for Peace which examines the long-term effects of the use of explosive weapons in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah, we presented the report to our partners at the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW) in a virtual meeting on November 2nd.
On November 12th, Airwars attended the starting session of the so-called Roadmap Process with the Dutch Ministry of Defence. The process is a chance for civil society and the Ministry to review how the Dutch transparency and accountability practices in regard to civilian harm can be improved. Airwars director Chris Woods emphasized in his opening statement that, despite the different perspectives, there is a shared goal among the civil society consortium and Defence officials: to see fewer civilians harmed in conflict.
Airwars deputy director Dmytro Chupryna attended webinars organised by INEW on November 19th and 26th, which discussed the common misconceptions that states often have regarding the Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA) political declaration. The purpose of the webinars was to agree on a joint position in tackling common pushbacks and misconceptions.
The months of September and October 2020 saw a flurry of activity from Airwars. Starting with the launch of new interactive mapping of reported civilian harm during the recent siege of Tripoli; through to our major joint report with PAX examining the civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in cities; and the launch of our latest project , tracking the ongoing US counterterrorism campaign in Yemen.
Meanwhile, military activity continued across all tracked conflicts during September and October, with the latter month seeing a notable rise in civilian harm incidents in Syria. Meanwhile, after the single worst month for reported civilian harm incidents in Iraq from Turkish action since 2015 in August, no locally claimed Turkish civilian harm incidents were tracked by our team in the country during the months of September and October. In Syria however, civilian harm incidents involving Turkish-led forces continued to be reported throughout this period.
In Libya, military activity remained minimal, as it had done since June 2020. In a major breakthrough, the GNA and LNA jointly agreed to a UN-brokered official ceasefire deal in Geneva on October 23rd, four months after hostilities had already effectively ceased.
The month of September saw a continuation of a trend observed the previous month – low levels of civilian harm from Russian actions in Syria. Airwars researchers tracked a total of four locally claimed civilian harm incidents attributed to Russian forces – an increase of one from the previous month’s tally. According to local reports, two civilians were killed and up to six more were injured in these attacks. This was down from at least five civilian deaths and up to 11 others injured from alleged Russian incidents reported in August.
The only known incident which led to civilian deaths occurred on September 7th in the town of Ariha in Idlib Governorate. A local source reported that Russian and/ or Regime missile strikes on the town killed two civilians and injured at least two others.
However, October saw alleged Russian aggression on both civilians and Syrian rebel groups rise significantly. It was also characterised by a notable rise in both the number of civilian harm incidents allegedly resulting from Russian actions in the country; and the total number of civilians killed and injured. Airwars tracked six claimed civilian harm incidents from Russian actions in October. According to local reports, six civilians were killed and up to 33 more were injured by these airstrikes.
One significant incident occurred at the end of October on Turkish-backed Syrian rebels. On October 26th, Russian airstrikes reportedly targeted a training camp run by Faylaq al-Sham, near the town of Kafr Takharim in northern Idlib, which is close to the border with Turkey. The strike killed at least 78 rebel fighters and injured over 100 more. According to Airwars’ assessment of the incident, at least two civilians were also killed, including local journalist Rashid al-Bakr.
Journalist Rashid al-Bakr was killed in alleged Russian airstrikes on a Faylaq al-Sham camp on October 26th 2020 (via Euphrates Post)
The attack was met with outrage by Ankara and prompted a fierce counterattack by Syrian rebel factions on Regime positions in Idlib, Hama, Aleppo and Latakia. While there had been previous periods of heightened tension between Turkey and Russia since a major Idlib ceasefire came into effect in March, this attack posed the most serious threat to the agreement to date. However, observers noted that Russia’s motivation for the initial attack was more a statement against Turkey itself rather than an indication that Russia and the Regime might restart their offensive against Syrian rebels. The attack came in the context of Russia’s wider concerns regarding Turkey’s growing military involvement in the war in Libya, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
October also witnessed a possible increase in Russia’s use of armed drones in Syria. On October 31st, two alleged Russian drone strikes in Idlib governorate resulted in civilian harm. The first occurred in the village of Taltuna, near Maarate Misrin. A drone strike on the village killed one civilian and injured five others. However, there were also conflicting reports as to which belligerent launched the attack, with some sources blaming the Syrian Regime and Iran. According to reports, the type of drone used by Russia is a ‘suicide drone’, which is designed to destroy remote ground target by carrying a small warhead. Meanwhile on that same day, more consistent reports emerged of an alleged Russian drone attack on Nahla village in Idlib, which injured three civilians including an elderly woman. According to Shaam News Network, the civilians injured were harvesting olives when the strike occurred.
An elderly woman injured in a reported Russian drone attack on Nahla village in Idlib on October 31st (via Idlib Plus)
In Iraq, following the single worst month during August for civilian harm incidents in Iraq from Turkish actions, there were no reports of civilian casualties during the past two months, although Turkey’s military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued.
Across September and October, Airwars researchers tracked eight alleged Turkish civilian harm incidents in Syria. The team tracked two civilian harm incidents in Syria involving Turkey during September. On September 12th, local sources reported heavy Turkish shelling on the villages of Aqiba, Soghanka and Burj al-Qass in the Shirawa area of Aleppo. According to reports, ‘several’ people from the village of Burj al-Qass were injured in the attack.
Eight days later on September 20th, Turkish-led shelling on the village of Awn al-Dadat in northern Manbij, Aleppo, was reported. According to local sources, two women were injured and a house destroyed as a result of the shelling. Local outlet, Manbij MC, named the two civilians as Maryam Al-Kadro, aged 50, and Ali Al-Daher.
Maryam Al-Kadro was reported injured in an alleged Turkish forces artillery attack on Awn Al-Dadat in Aleppo on September 20th, 2020. (via ManbijMC).
October 2020 then saw a rise in reported civilian harm incidents in Syria involving Turkey. Airwars tracked six civilian harm claims during the month, resulting in three civilian deaths and injuring up to 27 more. Four of the six incidents occurred during the third week of the month (October 13th – 22nd), suggesting a notable escalation in Turkish-led military activity in SDF-held areas during this time.
The first incident occurred on October 9th in al-Boraz village, near Kobani in Aleppo Governorate. According to local sources, Turkish-led shelling on the village injured two children, identified as Muhammad Kamel aged 12, and his brother Mahmoud Kamel aged 14.
The first civilian death occurred on October 16th in Ain Issa. Hatem Hazem, aged 13, died of injuries he sustained as a result of alleged Turkish-backed shelling on the Ain Issa area and its camp. The Free Burma Rangers, an on-the-ground humanitarian organisation, reported that the first mortar rounds were reported at 9:30am. One reportedly landed in the midst of a herd of sheep, killing many and lightly injuring two men and the young boy Hatem Hazem. Shrapnel reportedly tore through the boy’s left leg just above the ankle, a serious injury that claimed his life. According to local reports, as many as eight other civilians were injured in the attack.
Four days later, on October 20th, an alleged Turkish drone strike struck a car near Mazra village, Hasakah governorate, killing two civilians. According to local reports, at least two other civilians were injured in the strike.
Meanwhile in Iraq, clashes between Turkish forces and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) members continued. Tensions reached a critical point after two Turkish soldiers were killed and another was wounded after Kurdish militants fired rockets at a military base in northern Iraq on September 18th. Turkey later responded with heavy strikes on PKK positions. On September 20th, a Turkish drone strike then targeted a vehicle near the Yazidi Sharaf al-Din shrine in Sinjar. According to Iraqi security officials, three PKK fighters were killed in the attack.
Meanwhile, on October 7th, the Turkish Parliament ratified a motion extending authorisation to launch cross-border ‘anti-terrorist operations’ in northern Iraq and Syria. The motion, submitted by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government, claimed to give authorisation to the Turkish military to carry out operations for another year, from October 2020 until October 2021. This was the sixth time this motion had been extended since it was first approved in 2014.
Hatem Hazem died of injuries sustained as a result of Turkish or pro-Turkey forces shelling Ain Issa on October 16th, 2020. (via ANHA)
The International Coalition continued its operations across Syria and Iraq during the months of September and October. According to local sources, four civilian harm incidents locally attributed to the international alliance were reported, resulting in up to nine civilian deaths and the wounding of ten more. One civilian harm incident was reported in September and three in October.
The US-led Coalition reported that between September 1st and September 30th 2020, a total of 15 strikes were conducted in Iraq and Syria. Seven took place in Iraq, reportedly killing 18 ISIS members, destroying six cache sites and four tunnels. In Syria, eight strikes against ISIS were conducted – up from six conducted the previous month.
On September 29th, local sources reported that a civilian was killed and two others wounded when Coalition forces and the SDF undertook a joint landing operation in Jadid Uqaydat in Deir Ezzor. Two other people, locally described as oil merchants, were reported arrested as a result of the operation. The fatality was identified by local sources as 50 year-old Faisal Al-Khalfu, nicknamed Dakar. The two arrested people were named as Ghannam Al-Mahmoud Al-Haloush, and his nephew Kamel Hisham Al-Haloush.
However, the status of the victims has been contested. The Coalition’s spokesperson tweeted that the victim was an ISIS member. “Early this morning we removed three terrorist fighters from Jadid Uqaydat, Syria. Together, we’ll keep fighting to keep Syria safe from Daesh,” OIR Spokesman Col. Wayne Marotto asserted.
@CMOC_SDF and @CJTFOIR are keeping up the pressure on Daesh. Early this morning we removed three terrorist fighters from Jadid Uqaydat, Syria. Together, we’ll keep fighting to keep Syria safe from Daesh. #defeatdaesh
— OIR Spokesperson (@OIRSpox) September 29, 2020
However, local Facebook sources such as Euphrates Eyes and Eye on Hasakah reported that the slain victim was instead a civilian, and even alleged that the operation was conducted by the SDF in a bid to ‘steal money from civilians’ in the area.
Faisal Al-Khalfu (with his son), was killed in a joint Coalition-SDF operation in Jadid Akidat on September 29th (Image via Euphrates Eyes)
In October, three civilian harm incidents involving the US-led Coalition were reported by local sources. All took place within a single week (October 15th – 22nd). On October 15th, local reports alleged that an International Coalition warplane targeted a vehicle belonging to Huras al-Din, an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria, killing three people including a child. Among those slain was Abu Dhar al-Masr, a senior figure within the terror group. The incident took place in the village of Arab Saeed, west of Idlib.
White Helmets volunteers putting out a fire resulting from an airstrike in Arab Saeed on October 15th (via Edlib Media Center).
Later, local sources revealed that the incident had also led to the death of a humanitarian worker. According to Bonyan Organisation, Dima Abdan, an employee with the NGO, died of her injuries after she was critically wounded by shrapnel as a result of the strike. Bonyan is described as an “Independent Non-government, Non-profit organization established for building human capacity and rehabilitating war-torn communities”, working in northwestern Syria. Another humanitarian worker was also injured in the attack.
The next day, local sources reported that a civilian was killed and another arrested during a ground operation conducted by the SDF and the US-led Coalition in the village of Al Majbal, Deir Ezzor governorate. Al-Khabour news identified the slain civilian as Asad Suleiman Al-Sawadi. Al-Sawadi was reportedly shot in the neck and died immediately. According to a Deir Ezzor 24 correspondent, “the operation resulted in one death, two injuries, including a woman, and one arrest, in addition to the bombing of an abandoned house in the village”.
The third civilian harm incident reportedly took place in the village of Jakara in the Salqin countryside near the Syria-Turkey border. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a strike on a gathering of Haya’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) members on a farm in the area killed up to 22 people, including five civilians. It was later revealed that the strike was in fact conducted by CENTCOM. Major Beth Riordan, the spokeswoman for United States Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed that US forces carried out a drone strike on a meeting in Idlib against “a group of Al-Qaeda in Syria (AQ-S) senior leaders”.
Libya only witnessed three reported artillery strikes during September, four less than in the previous month, as parties to the conflict mostly continued to respect the ceasefire. Two strikes were allegedly conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and one by the Government of National Accord (GNA), none of which resulted in civilian harm.
In October, there were reports of two airstrikes. One of these allegedly resulted in civilian harm, on October 19th in Al Jaghboub near the border with Egypt. An Egyptian airstrike allegedly hit two people claimed to be fishermen, whose bodies were later found in the desert.
In the other event the GNA alleged LNA shelling on its forces in Buerat. However, the LNA later denied a breach of the ceasefire.
On a more positive note, the GNA and LNA agreed to an official UN-brokered ceasefire deal in Geneva on October 23rd, after hostilities had already effectively ceased in June. The agreement was largely received positively by commentators, as it contained more solid mechanisms than the previous agreement struck in Berlin in January.
Representatives of GNA and LNA shake hands after striking a ceasefire deal in Geneva on October 23rd, 2020 (via UNSMIL)
On October 28th, Airwars launched its new investigation into the ongoing US counterterrorism campaign in Yemen. A new report, Eroding Transparency, examined US air and ground actions against both Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Islamic State in Yemen, since 2017 under President Trump, as well as incidents leading to alleged civilian harm.
More than 230 declared and alleged US military and CIA actions were identified by the team – among them 41 events reported to have led to civilian casualties. The report indicated that US operations in Yemen too often lacked both the transparency and accountability standards of other recent US military interventions, and identified a significant recent increase in both clandestine and covert activity.
Airwars’ accompanying public database detailed every alleged US action in Yemen since 2017 under Donald Trump. The all-source monitoring approach adopted by Airwars has allowed the research to be significantly reoriented towards Yemeni voices and experiences. There were approximately 4,400 unique sources in the new public database, 60% of these in Arabic. Additionally, more than 140 alleged or confirmed US actions had also been geolocated by Airwars to village-level accuracy.
According to reports, on September 4th an alleged US drone strike targeted a car reportedly carrying al-Qaeda operatives, including Abu al-Bara al-Qifi, a senior figure within the group, in Shaqra, east of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan governorate. However, some local sources claimed that the strike was in fact carried out by the UAE.
And on October 27th, another alleged US drone strike took place in the Arak al-Shabwan area of Marib governorate. The attack reportedly targeted a car carrying three people on board. According to local sources, two militants were killed and a third seriously injured.
With CENTCOM denying any US military strikes in Yemen since June 2019, there was speculation that one or more recent events were the work of the CIA.
In September, Somalia saw four alleged US actions – one less than in August.
On September 7th at least one US service member was injured in an exchange of gunfire between Somali troops supported by US forces and Al Shabaab militants. Al Shabaab claimed a higher casualty toll among Somali and US forces.
The only alleged civilian harm event of the month occurred on September 20th when a local source alleged that US-trained Danab forces had killed eight civilians in a Mosque in Moyiloow. An AFRICOM investigation into the incident is reportedly ongoing.
In addition, AFRICOM confirmed two airstrikes during the month. A September 9th strike allegedly killed 17 Al Shabaab fighters near Amreereey. The second event, confirmed at Airwars’ request to AFRICOM for details of recent strikes, destroyed a vehicle in Jana Cabdalle on September 21st.
In October, only two US actions were reported. A single source claimed that an unidentified strike killed ten or eleven Al Shabaab in Weelshit on October 6th. And in the second event, again confirmed following an Airwars request, an Al Shabaab member was targeted on October 18th. The event did however not result in any casualties.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during September and October 2020. The last such reported US strike was in August 2018.
Airwars and CIVIC submitted their joint submission to the UK Government’s call for evidence to the Integrated Review – an examination of foreign policy, defence, security and international development goals. The joint paper included recommendations by both organisations for the UK to mainstream the protection of civilians in conflict within government policies; to establish systems for casualty tracking and investigations; and to improve UK accountability for civilian harm. The Integrated Review is expected to be published in late January 2021.
Following the UK’s publishing of the latest paper on the Approach to Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Airwars, together with UK partners, sent a joint letter to Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, Minister of State and the Prime Minister’s Special Representative on Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict, welcoming the newly released Paper on Protection of Civilians (PoC) and calling for Protection of Civilians to be embedded across government and for the Policy to be regularly updated in consultation with stakeholders. Lord Ahmad responded to the letter, welcoming a requested meeting with the group to discuss issues raised in the letter.
Airwars Deputy Director Dmytro Chupryna took part in NATO’s 2030 Online Stakeholder Dialogue on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Human Security and Humanitarian Issues, contributing to the discussion on NATO’s role in minimising the impact of conflict on civilians. Participants stressed the importance of the Protection of Civilians framework, which has to be implemented in all of NATO’s operational theatres. The rise of hybrid tactics and fighting in urban areas are placing civilian populations at greater risk. There is therefore a need for NATO to address this component strategically; and to set civilian harm reduction standards which can positively influence other States.
In response to recent sanctions imposed by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on senior figures within the International Criminal Court, Airwars together with US and international partners, published an open statement in September calling upon the US Government to end its targeting of ICC officials; and regretting what was referred to as the US’s recent abandonment of key international mechanisms designed to protect civilians. “As condemnatory statements from close US allies make clear, the United States has lost significant international standing through these sanctions, which have undermined the international rule of law and provided succour to war criminals seeking to evade justice,” the joint statement noted.
On September 24th, our European advocacy officer Laurie Treffers wrote an opinion piece for Belgian daily De Standaard regarding a new Belgian aircraft deployment to the US-led Coalition against so-called Islamic State. The op-ed questioned how much longer Belgium could continue to insist that previous military actions in the fight against ISIS had led to zero civilian casualties.
A group of 11 international and Belgian NGOs also sent then-interim Minister of Defence Philipe Goffin an open letter regarding the new Belgian weapon deployment on September 30th. Organisations including Airwars, Amnesty Belgium and Humanity & Inclusion, called on the Minister to increase transparency and accountability for civilian harm and – following a recent parliamentary motion – to ensure cooperation with external monitoring groups and human rights organisations.
On October 26th, Seeing through the Rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS, a joint report by Airwars and Dutch NGO Pax for Peace, was published. The report was officially launched at a virtual event for Members of Parliament from Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The Irish ambassador to the United Nations, Michael Gaffey, who has been leading efforts to draft a political declaration on limiting the use of explosive areas in populated areas, opened the event. “We would not have reached the point of acceptance for the need for a political declaration [on explosive weapons] if it was not for the work of civil society organisations. Their research and advocacy are vital to the process,” Ambassador Gaffey noted.
Airwars and PAX have published a new joint report, Seeing Through The Rubble, examining the dire and long-lasting effects of explosive weapons on civilian populations in urban areas in recent international military campaigns in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah. The report calls upon States to develop and support an international political declaration to better protect civilians against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
The report was launched at a virtual event on October 26th. Ambassador Michael Gaffey of Ireland, which is spearheading efforts to create an international consensus on limiting the use of explosive weapons in cities, told participants: “We would not have reached the point of acceptance for the need for a political declaration [on explosive weapons] if it was not because of the work of civil society organisations. Their research and advocacy are vital to the process.”
The new report concludes that ‘precision’ when using explosive weapons in urban areas is not the key determinant of civilian harm. “Rather”, write the authors, “it is the wide area effect of an explosive weapon in relation to the proximity of civilians in populated areas.”
The PAX and Airwars report furthermore concludes that the cases of Mosul, Raqqah and Hawijah show that States acting in accordance with International Humanitarian Law is not enough in itself to prevent immense civilian harm and civilian suffering when explosive weapons are deployed in populated areas.
Co-author of the report Roos Boer, programme leader of the Humanitarian Disarmament programme at Dutch peace organisation PAX, states: “Large aircraft bombs and heavy artillery are intended for open battlefields. When bombing and shelling take place in towns and cities, civilians are killed and suffer life-changing injuries, and vital infrastructure like hospitals and schools are destroyed. We need to see states agree to stronger rules that will stop these urban attacks.”
Explosive weapons in populated areas
According to data monitoring by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 92 per cent of the 19,401 civilian deaths and injuries tracked by the organisation from the worldwide use of explosive weapons in 2019 occurred in urban areas. Furthermore, AOAV concludes that when explosive weapons, such as artillery, grenades, missiles, rockets and aircraft bombs, are used in towns and cities, nine out of ten casualties are civilians.
Explosive weapons are a major driver of forced displacement of civilians – not only because of fear of death and injury and the destruction of homes, but also because of their devastating impact on critical infrastructure services such as health care, education and water and sanitation services.
Cities in rubble
Two nations particularly affected by recent urban fighting are Iraq and Syria. While a variety of actors have caused major civilian harm and widespread destruction in both countries, the report focuses on military operations by the US-led International Coalition against ISIS. Using publicly available sources, the report analyses the short- and long-term effects of the use of explosive weapons in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah.
These cases illustrate that the effects of explosive weapons continue long after the bombs have exploded. In Mosul, the costs of the 2016-17 campaign to drive ISIS out of the city were high: at least 9,000 civilians were reportedly killed in the fighting. Around 700,000 Moslawis were displaced; and city officials have stated that 80 per cent of the inner city’s buildings were destroyed.
In June 2019, the UN International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported that entire neighbourhoods of Mosul had yet to be rebuilt and that a lack of essential services and poor sanitation were still threatening public health. Additionally, unexploded bombs, missiles, rockets and shells prevented civilians from returning to the city.
A federal Iraqi recovery team removes a body from the ruins of west Mosul, May 2018. (Image courtesy of Mosul Eye).
New details on Hawijah disaster
Seeing Through The Rubble also adds fresh information on the current situation in Hawijah. Six different sources, including Hawijah’s mayor, were interviewed for the report on the recent state of the city after a devastating 2015 Dutch airstrike on an ISIS IED factory, leading to the deaths of at least 70 civilians and hundreds more injured.
The report estimates that the secondary explosions triggered by the Dutch airstrike damaged between 400 and 500 buildings in the area, including many shops, homes and schools. Sources also reported that the airstrike caused major damage to crucial infrastructure, including roads and water pipelines.
According to the Mayor of Hawijah, Subhan Al Jabouri, less than 40 per cent of the buildings have been rebuilt and much rubble remains. The industrial area in Hawijah still suffers from a shortage of water and electricity.
Chris Woods, director of Airwars and a co-author of the report along with Laurie Treffers and Roos Boer, notes: “In highlighting the negative consequences for civilians of recent Western military interventions at Mosul, Hawijah and Raqqa, our new report demonstrates why militaries can’t rely simply upon compliance with the laws of war when trying to reduce civilian casualties during urban fighting. Large scale civilian harm during city battles is a terrible reality – and greater international safeguards are urgently needed.”
International political declaration
Since 2019, Ireland has been leading a series of consultations in Geneva, aimed at drawing up an international political declaration to ban the use of explosive weapons in urban areas. The International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), a network of NGOs, urges states to take immediate action to prevent human suffering from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. “These case studies show once again the unacceptably high levels of civilian casualties and destruction as a result of bombing and shelling in cities and other populated areas,” says Laura Boillot, coordinator of INEW, responding to the new report.
“Every year we see tens of thousands of civilians killed and injured, that suffer psychological trauma, and are forced to flee for safety. Cities are being torn apart – housing, hospitals, schools and vital infrastructure is destroyed which has disastrous consequences for the survival and wellbeing of the people that live there”, continues Boillot.
“This pattern of civilian harm should not be considered an inevitable consequence of war. Using heavy explosive weapons such as heavy artillery, multi-barrel rocket launchers and large bombs and missiles in populated areas – even against military targets – is not acceptable and must stop.”
While civilian harm from foreign actions in the conflicts monitored by Airwars mostly decreased during August, Ankara’s continuing air and ground campaign against Kurdish militants led to the worst reported civilian harm tally in northern Iraq from Turkish action since 2015.
Civilian harm incidents involving Russia in Syria (already at a low tempo) were less than half the previous month’s tally. Meanwhile the US-led Coalition continued its own operations against ISIS in Syria at a seemingly higher intensity, though with no local claims of civilian casualties.
Reported civilian harm incidents, as well as air and artillery strikes in Libya, saw a further significant decrease after warring parties continued their military stalemate at Sirte. Despite this – and increased international calls to end the fighting – both sides seemed unable to reach an agreement, with Khalifa Haftar’s LNA seemingly rejecting the Government of National Accord’s offer of a ceasefire.
Turkish-led actions against Kurdish irregulars in both Iraq and Syria continued throughout the month. Airwars researchers tracked 12 alleged civilian harm incidents in both countries during August – double the previous month’s tally and reflecting an escalation in Turkish actions. Five reported incidents took place in Syria, while seven occurred in Iraq. In total, between 12 and 18 civilians were alleged killed across all the locally reported events, and up to eight more were injured.
In Syria, three civilian deaths were reported across five events, and seven others were injured. The first incident took place in Ain Issa, where alleged Turkish shelling wounded three children. ANHA named the children as Hussam Ali (aged 12), Mahdi Ali (aged 10), and Muhammad Ali (aged 11).
Additional civilian harm event took place in the village of Efdikê in western Tal Abyad on August 4th; in Qamishlo on August 6th; in Ain Issa on August 17th; and in Sheikh Hassan village in Raqqa Governorate on August 26th. The incident near Ain Issa caused the most civilian harm, with two civilians reportedly killed and two injured following Turkish shelling in the vicinity of the M4 highway.
BreakingA civilian injured by a shell probably from a drone on Allaya neighborhood, east to #Qamishli, northeast #Syria, Sources from Internal Security Forces told pic.twitter.com/oMKhoMSAdw
— (زانا العلي) Zana Al-Ali (@ZanaAlali) August 6, 2020
In Iraq, up to 15 civilian deaths were reported from seven civilian harm allegations – a stark increase from the previous month’s tally of two fatalities. In fact, according to Airwars data, August 2020 marks the highest civilian harm allegations against Turkey in Iraq since our tracking began in 2015.
The first week of August saw two civilian harm incidents in northern Iraq. On August 1st, two civilians were killed in an alleged Turkish strike in Amediye in Dohuk province. Two days later, another strike reportedly took place in Nohadra in Dohuk province, also killing two civilians.
The incident which reported the highest number of civilian deaths occurred in the Bradost region of Erbil province on August 11th. Five civilians were killed along with five Iraqi border guards, and five Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) members, in one of the deadlist mass-casualty incidents involving Turkey this year. According to AFP, two high-ranking Iraqi military officers were additionally killed in the attack, prompting public outrage in Iraq. Following the event, Baghdad cancelled a visit by the Turkish Minister of Defence to Iraq, and summoned Turkey’s ambassador.
Other civilian harm incidents took place in the Ardana area of Dohuk on August 13th; in Kani Mazi in Dohuk on August 19th; in the village of Bhrava in Nineveh on August 25th; and in the Zab area of Dohuk on August 30th.
Airwars tracked no locally reported civilian harm incidents resulting from Kurdish counterfire actions during the month of July. Since the end of March 2020, Airwars researchers have tracked only one civilian harm incident allegedly involving Kurdish factions in Syria.
Doctors treating one of the children injured by alleged Turkish shelling of Ain Issa on August 1st 2020 (via ANHA)
August 2020 once again saw relatively low levels of civilian harm from Russian actions in Syria. Airwars researchers tracked a total of three reported civilian harm incidents – less than half the previous month’s tally of eight civilian harm claims. According to local reports, between five and six civilians were killed and up to 11 more were injured in these latest attacks. Two of the incidents took place in Idlib Governorate, while one took place in Homs Governorate.
The first incident of the month took place in the town of Binnish on August 3rd, where three civilians from one family were killed and seven others were injured. According to STEP Agency, those killed were displaced civilians who were residing in camps in the area. Later, the Syrian Network for Human Rights revealed their names to be Majed Jasem al Muhammad, and two brothers, Zaid and Majed Mesleh al Muhammad from Burj village in the eastern countryside areas of Idlib. The apparent Russian strike was linked with artillery shelling carried out by Syrian regime forces in the same area.
The second incident took place on August 14th in the Syrian Badia, although reporting on this incident was scarce. According to local reports, Russian planes targeted a civilian car, wounding those in it.
On August 18th, Russian Major General Vyacheslav Gladkikh was killed on August 18th by an improvised explosive device that detonated under a convoy of Russian soldiers and Syrian pro-regime forces in the desert near the city of Deir Ezzor. Three other Russian military personnel were wounded and a local commander of Syria’s National Defense Forces was also reportedly killed in the attack. The killings prompted several days of continuous Russian strikes against ISIS targets in the eastern Homs countryside; in southern and western Raqqa governorate; and in Deir Ezzor.
The final civilian harm incident tracked by Airwars took place on August 30th after shrapnel from a Russian strike fell on a displacement camp near the village of al-Sheikh Bahr in the Armanaz area of Idlib, reportedly injuring an unspecified number of civilians.
The children of Majed Mesleh al Muhammad, killed by a reported Russian airstrike in Binnish on August 3rd (via @abuhuzaifa_)
The month of August saw no locally reported civilian harm incidents involving the US-led Coalition in Syria. This was the second recent month in a row where no civilian harm claims were made against the International Coalition. However, US-led Coalition actions in Syria continued throughout the month, in conjunction with local partners.
According to the International Coalition’s Strike Summary Report for August 2020, the alliance conducted six strikes in Syria against ISIS targets throughout the month, a slight increase on the four strikes conducted in July. Throughout August, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) also continued to carry out anti-ISIS operations. The SDF confirmed for example that on August 7th, they were able to capture eight ISIS militants in a major operation in Deir Ezzor, following air support from the US-led Coalition.
.@CJTFOIR air strike in support of our security partners, 20 Aug. in Iraq🇮🇶. The @coalition provides aviation, intelligence and logistical support to @modmiliq in the fight to #DefeatDaesh https://t.co/FDpoeWGqGr
— Operation Inherent Resolve (@CJTFOIR) August 27, 2020
Meanwhile, reports of unilateral US airstrikes were reported throughout the month. On August 13th, a drone targeted a car in the town of Sarmada. Local sources reported that Abu Yahya Al Uzbaki, a leading figure in the al Qaeda linked group Huras al-Din, was killed in this attack. There were conflicting reports about whether the drone strike was conducted by the International Coalition, or unilaterally by the United States.
Tensions later flared up between Regime forces and the US-led Coalition in the town of Tal al Zahab in Qamishli’s countryside areas in northern Hasakah Governorate. This came as a result of clashes between both sides on August 17th. According to local sources, the Coalition launched airstrikes that targeted regime forces, killing two members. However, the Coalition, in an official statement, denied launching an airstrike in the area saying that its routine patrol came under fire at the time and that Coalition troops returned fire in self-defence.
Meanwhile in Iraq, the International Coalition was significantly more active. The alliance declared 11 strikes against Daesh targets which it said consisted of 36 engagements, killing nine suspected ISIS militants. The Coalition confirmed it had conducted strikes in Wadi al-Tharthar, in the Qara Chokh Mountains; and at Tarmiyah, north of Baghdad, in a bid to provide air cover for Iraqi Special Forces in their own operations against ISIS.
Amidst these actions, International Coalition forces once again came under fire in Iraq from unidentified armed groups during the month. On the evening of August 15th, two rockets landed near the Taji military base, although there were no casualties reported. This came eight days before the International Coalition officially departed the Taji military base, transferring $347 million in equipment and property to Iraq. It was described as the eighth base transfer by the International Coalition to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) so far this year.
White Helmet members near the car that was targeted by a US drone strike in Sarmada (via SCD)
The number of air and artillery strikes in Libya once again dropped in August as most parties to the fighting abided by a ceasefire deal. Only seven strikes were locally reported, two less than in July. No civilian harm was reported from any of these actions.
Six of the strikes were allegedly conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA), while one Government of National Accord (GNA) attack was reported.
Reports continued that both sides were continuing to re-arm, even as international efforts to secure a lasting peace continued.
Smoke rising after an alleged GNA drone strike on fuel smugglers near Zintan on August 12th, 2020 (via 218TV)
Airwars recorded five reported US actions in Somalia in August, one more than in the previous month.
On August 8th two US strikes were claimed by local sources – one in Haway and the other in Sablale, allegedly killing one senior Al Shabaab operative in each. However AFRICOM denied conducting the strikes, leaving open the possibility either of an AMISOM or CIA operation..
Twelve days later, the US confirmed conducting an airstrike on al Shabaab near Kurtun Warey. An “unnamed senior member of the group’s local bomb-making and IED explosives unit was killed in the strike”, according to VOA.
An August 24th US strike in combination with US and Somali ground operations killed six Al Shabaab fighters and injured three more near Darusalaam in Lower Shabelle, AFRICOM said. Al Shabaab claimed that US service members had been injured in the fighting, an allegation which Africa Command later rebutted.
One day later Sheikh Abduqadir Kumandos, an Al Shabaab senior leader was killed by a confirmed US strike near Saakow.
According to CENTCOM, there were no US military strikes during August 2020 in Yemen.
The last publicly declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province. Airwars researchers also tracked no local claims of US actions in Yemen during the month.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during August 2020. The last such reported US strike was in August 2018.
The Integrated Review is a strategic look by the UK Government at its foreign policy objectives, along with its future defence, security and international development strategies. During August, Airwars and our UK partners continued discussions and the sharing of policy ideas, in preparation for our evidence submission to the Integrated Review.
Furthermore, Airwars continued coordination with the Security Policy Alternatives Network (SPAN) Accountability group coordinated by Saferworld. The group is currently working on a research paper examining accountability for military actions in West Africa.
During August, Airwars continued building a coalition of partners in Belgium. Given that Belgium has been one of the least transparent countries in the International Coalition against ISIS, and there are no accountability mechanisms in place for potential civilian casualties, Airwars aims to conduct a collective engagement approach with the Belgian government to improve its poor track record in this regard. The initial steps of the joint advocacy approach will be discussed at the roundtable scheduled for early September.
For the sixth successive month, the US-led Coalition in Iraq and Syria conceded no additional civilian harm during August from its long running war against ISIS.
During the same six month period, the alliance rejected 190 further locally reported civilian harm claims from Iraqis and Syrians as ‘non credible.’
Two months after the brutal siege of Libya’s capital ended, new interactive Airwars mapping shows the impact of 14 months of fighting between two rival governments on the city’s beleaguered civilians.
Airwars has visualised every allegation of civilian harm from air and artillery strikes during the period of war in and around Tripoli between April 2019 and June 2020. Glasgow-based consultants Rectangle designed the innovative mapping, in an effort to find fresh ways of visualising civilian harm on the modern battlefield.
The new Airwars mapping uses a sliding timeline to enable an overview of often indiscriminate air and artillery strikes on Tripoli and its suburbs. A fine-detail satellite map of Tripoli and its suburbs makes it possible to see the siege evolving over the 14 months of its duration.
The map utilises a 1km radius hexagonal system, whose height represents the number of civilians reported killed in an incident. This in turn enables users to see the extent of shelling on various neighbourhoods, with casualty spikes clearly revealed in heavily hit areas such as Salaheddin, Abu Salim and Tajoura. The new mapping can also be used as a portal to access individual civilian harm assessments on the Airwars website.
Lizzie Malcolm and Daniel Powers of design consultancy Rectangle explain their rationale behind the new approach: “The challenge of mapping and visualising civilian harm is to balance the presentation of aggregated information and individual details. Maps of large areas and timelines of conflicts are useful for understanding scale. But any visualisation should be a gateway to the evidence and stories about individuals and families,” they tell Airwars.
Over the course of the siege, Airwars recorded 339 civilian harm events in Libya, 197 of which around Tripoli, nearly tripling the number of locally reported incidents since the end of the NATO campaign in 2011. At least 197 civilians were killed by the violence and another 537 were injured by the violence, as the LNA and GNA fought for control of Tripoli.
The LNA’s Tripoli offensive introduced Libyans to a degree of conflict violence not seen since NATO’s intervention almost a decade earlier. Even when the conflict was over, LNA forces and Wagner mercenaries reportedly booby-trapped houses and planted landmines, leading to gruesome additional reports of killed and injured civilians.
The siege of Tripoli has previously been visualised by other organisations, though not via an interactive map. UN agency OCHA has for example provided infographics summing up their findings. And Dzsihad Hadelli has previously visualised Airwars data on civilian casualties for the Libya Observer.
https://twitter.com/dhadelli/status/1246883657148661761
Is justice possible?
Mapping and recording harm in conflicts can help both with the proper investigation of civilian casualties, and of possible war crimes – potentially leading to reconciliation and justice in those parts of society affected by the fighting. “There is no way out of this without people being held accountable,“ says Elham Saudi, Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya.
Her organisation seeks to document violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Libya, in turn hoping for accountability. “If you’re aiming for criminal responsibility, the threshold is really high. First hand accounts and witnesses are the most important thing,“ Saudi explains. Establishing the chain of command that leads to an event in question is another crucial point, she adds.
As a former resident of Tripoli suburbs, Saudi knows from friends and family what the siege did to Tripoli’s population: “The impact was felt throughout the city, the fear and anticipation of being targeted was quite overwhelming – even if you didn’t live in the areas being targeted, because of the indiscriminate nature of the attacks. You always felt like you were a target.”
However, her organisation does not focus only upon recent events around Tripoli but investigates violations committed in the civil war across the country. The highly polarised political landscape poses an additional challenge, as activists and media in Libya are often affiliated with one of the parties to the conflict: “The hyper-politicisation of everything makes it very difficult to keep the distance from what’s being said in the media. I don’t disregard anything just because it belongs to a certain party.”
“Things get lost if you don’t preserve evidence in a conflict. Preserving evidence is absolutely vital, it’s not just about the present but also about the future for civil society,“ the lawyer elaborates. Social media plays an increasing role there as “Perpetrators help you because they incriminate themselves.“
Mahmoud Werfalli’s arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, for example, was based on social media accounts of extrajudicial killings. The former LNA commander is accused of executing ten prisoners in Benghazi in 2018, a case that was widely documented on social networks – as are many cases of potential war crimes in Libya.
At this point it remains difficult to predict which alleged incidents might potentially bear fruit in court. War crimes were alleged on both sides of the conflict. “The US is promising because Haftar, as a US citizen, is subject to its jurisdiction; it also allows for individuals to pursue civil responsibility,” Saudi says. Three civil lawsuits attempting to do that have been filed in the US for example, whereby affected families are suing the General for compensation for his alleged responsibility in the deaths of family members as a result of the indiscriminate shelling of Tripoli neighbourhoods by his forces.
Links to individual case assessments that occurred in the Salaheddin neighbourhood of Tripoli
Bringing Libyans back to the negotiations table
Even as the search for accountability continues, rifts remain deep within Libyan society after so many years of civil war. The big question is: how might Libya finally find a way towards a peaceful future?
A pause in fighting between Libya’s rival camps might be expected to generate optimism in a country riven by intermittent civil war since 2011. But instead of improving the livelihoods of the population, both seem keen to return to the status quo that partly led to the siege of Tripoli in the first place. Infighting within both the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA); profound economic problems; and deep distrust between all the main political actors, make a peaceful future more uncertain.
Recently popular protests erupted in both GNA- and LNA-controlled territories, that were in turn met with violence by both governments. At the same time, a new military build-up around Sirte has raised fears of another escalation in violence – while a dire economic situation exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic has pushed the population into ever deeper poverty.
Virginie Collombier, Professor of Social and Political Dynamics in Libya at the European University Institute of Florence, has been working on grassroots mediation processes led by Libyans for many years. She sees the first step to a lasting ceasefire taking place at the international level – getting countries now meddling in Libya to respect the commitments they made during the Berlin peace conference: “The aim of the mediation process is to find someone who has the capacities to provide guarantees and enforce things. The UN can’t do anything alone as we see; and the EU doesn’t have the capacities or willingness.“
“Who has the capacities to influence things on the ground: Russia? Turkey?“ Collombier asks. Neither seems a likely candidate given the ongoing geopolitical struggle between these two states: “Most importantly [there is] the US, but will they work as a guarantor on broader issues related to the economy, and the political framework?“
The current stalemate may however make things easier, Professor Collombier believes: “There is clearly a sense of exhaustion, the meaning of the war is lost, which is something we can see on both sides of the divide.“ She adds: “There is not much we can achieve through violence and weapons, the situation has stabilised around two camps that can block each other.“
However, internal divisions in both the GNA and in Haftar’s camp show that the situation could turn violent again if issues are not resolved. Collombier stresses the need for a dialogue that includes all Libyans, beyond the GNA and LNA: “Voices of Libyans can be heard and put pressure on politics; and diversifying the political sphere is absolutely crucial. There is a need for alternative voices and leaders. There is deep distrust in the current political elite.”
Whatever the result of both reconciliation and accountability processes in Libya, there is a long way ahead for the country to finally find peace. Documenting and archiving the crimes committed during the civil war is only an initial step towards accountability that can then lead to reconciliation between former enemies.
July 2020 saw a continuation of a trend observed the month before, with foreign action in Syria slowly increasing, particularly by Russia. Meanwhile, the US-led Coalition continued its operations against both ISIS and Iranian-backed groups in Syria, though at a seemingly lower intensity.
In Iraq, ISIS’s insurgency had slightly increased in tempo, owing to a renewed campaign by the group at the end of the month known as the ‘Raids of Attrition’, which saw 60 synchronised attacks in both Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, Turkey’s air and ground campaign against Kurdish militants in northern Iraq continued, though also at a lower intensity
Meanwhile, reported civilian harm incidents in Libya decreased significantly, as warring parties reached a military stalemate. Fears remained that Egypt’s potential intervention in the conflict could escalate tensions further – as well as signs that both the GNA and LNA were using the pause in fighting to secure fresh arms shipments.
Both reported strikes and civilian harm majorly decreased in July as the military stalemate between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) continued. The number of tracked air and artillery actions by all parties to the fighting fell from 94 to nine, while alleged civilian deaths dropped from between 44 and 54 casualties to zero.
Most reported strikes during July were LNA actions, with four attributed to Khalifa Haftar’s forces. Two further strikes were allegedly conducted by the GNA and/or Turkey. Three more strikes were either contested between parties, or conducted by an unknown belligerent.
Even though none of these events led to reported civilian harm, explosive remnants from the recent battle for Tripoli posed a significant problem for the local population. Many deaths and severe injuries were reported from landmines, allegedly planted by LNA and Wagner forces after abandoning the capital.
In a major political development, Egypt threatened to intervene in Libya should GNA and Turkish forces go east of what was described as a ‘red line’ at Sirte and Jufra airbase. However, parliamentary approval in Cairo of sending troops has so far only contributed to the standoff in central Libya.
Civilian allegedly injured by a landmine explosion near Ain Zara, Libya on July 6th 2020 (via Field Medicine and Support Center)
Following on from June, which saw Russian airstrikes resume after three months of calm in northwestern Syria, Russian actions saw a notable increase in July, particularly in the middle of the month. Airwars researchers tracked a total of eight civilian harm incidents – doubling the previous month’s figure. According to local reports, five civilians were killed and up to 27 others injured in these incidents. Two occurred in Hama Governorate, while the other six events took place in various towns in Idlib Governorate.
Four incidents occurred on a single day: July 14th. This sequence of strikes came after a roadside landmine hit a joint Russian-Turkish patrol in the M4 area, wounding three Russian soldiers. Immediately following that attack, Russian warplanes carried out more than a dozen airstrikes on rebel-held parts of Idlib and Latakia, with the Syrian Observatory for Human rights claiming that 23 separate Russian airstrikes occurred on that day.
This sudden escalation raised fears that Russia’s aerial campaign on Idlib might resume. Tensions between Turkey and Russia seemed to escalate even further after Russian airstrikes were conducted on July 15th on the city of al-Bab, where Turkey and its proxies enjoyed a significant military presence. These strikes – the first to occur in the city since 2017 – resulted in the reported death of one civilian and left as many as eleven more injured, eight of whom were children. However, just one week later, Russia and Turkey resumed their joint patrolling of the M4 highway and completed the first end-to-end patrol, which many observers saw as a sign of de-escalation.
Apart from the airstrike on al-Bab, the town of Ariha witnessed a brutal action on July 14th which killed two civilians, named by Ariha Today as Muhammad Deeb Halbiya (40 years old) and his son, Karam Halbiya (12 years old), and injuring up to five others, including four children [Mohammed Al-Mady (13 years old), Mohammed Al-Hassan (12 years old), Noor Aberas (30 years old) and Youssef Al-Hassan]. According to MMC, this came after Russian warplanes allegedly launched 40 missiles on the town of Ariha on that day.
The destructive aftermath of the alleged Russian airstrike in al-Bab on July 15th (via Syrian Civil Defence)
July 2020 saw no locally reported civilian harm incidents involving the US-led Coalition in Syria. This follows on from just one such claim in June.
However, US-led Coalition actions in Syria continued throughout the month, in conjunction with local partners. Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) conducted a number of raids on suspected ISIS hideouts in eastern Syria with the support of the Coalition. The first took place on July 3rd in Deir Ezzor province, where SDF special forces dismantled an ISIS terror cell and arrested three suspected ISIS members, confiscating a number of weapons and equipment. The second phase took place on July 17th-18th in the areas of al-Busayrah and al-Shuhail in Deir Ezzor, with the International Coalition providing advice and intelligence. According to the Coalition, ‘several’ ISIS militants were arrested and dozens of weapons were seized during the operation.
Meanwhile, local sources reported that an International Coalition drone targeted a vehicle, north of the town of Ahtamilat in Aleppo’s northern countryside on July 20th. According to Step News, the vehicle belonged to a man named Shujaa al-Muhammad from the town of al-Safira in Aleppo. Local sources said that the driver and two others in the car who were reportedly killed had been ISIS operatives.
Local sources also reported one strike against Iran-backed groups by planes locally identified as belonging to the International Coalition on the town of Duwair in Deir Ezzor’s countryside areas.
The Iraqi Falcons Intelligence Cell and Baghdad Intelligence Directorate🇮🇶, alongside the 54th Brigade, eliminated 4 suicide bombers💀💣with a fifth self destructing🔥, in the village of Ma'amra al-Zaidan. CJTF-OIR drones supported the operation.💪 #defeatdaesh https://t.co/vlZdAkoXXr pic.twitter.com/QFJnh95RyG
— Operation Inherent Resolve (@CJTFOIR) July 13, 2020
In Iraq, the International Coalition supported Iraqi Security Forces in their own operations against ISIS throughout the month. On July 1st, two French Rafale jets launched a series of strikes in northern Iraq, destroying three ISIS caves and killing an unspecified number of reported ISIS militants. A day later, Coalition F-15E jets targeted an ISIS cave complex in Wadi al-Shai, in the Tuz Khurmato district of Kirkuk. Additionally, during the last week of July, the Coalition provided close air support for Iraqi Special Forces in operations on the outskirts of Baghdad, and south of Kirkuk.
The aftermath of a reported Coalition drone strike Ahtimalat on July 20th (via Step News)
Turkish-led actions in both Iraq and Syria continued. Airwars researchers tracked six civilian harm incidents in both countries during the month of July. Four took place in Syria, while two occurred in Iraq. Tracking for Iraq indicated a notable decrease in Turkish operations after it had launched an aggressive campaign against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in June, which had seen up to 150 PKK positions targeted by Turkish jets, helicopters, drones and artillery.
The four incidents in Syria caused up to eight civilian deaths and as many as 15 injuries. Meanwhile, the two civilian harm incidents in Iraq resulted in two civilian deaths and five more injuries.
The first incident in Syria took place at 10am on July 16th in the district of Derbasiyah. Local reports suggest that the incident was either caused by Turkish shelling or by a drone strike which injured a civilian. Later that day, another more significant strike, allegedly launched by a Turkish drone, took place in the same district targeting a Russian communication centre. According to local sources, this attack injured two Russian soldiers, a Regime soldier and two Asayish members. The event came amidst heightened tensions following recent Russian airstrikes on al-Bab [see above].
The incident which reported the highest number of civilian deaths occurred in the villages of Qurt Wiran and Willanli, just northwest of Manbij on July 27th. According to local reports, six civilians were killed and up to ten more were injured after Turkish-led forces shelled the two villages. Three of those killed were reportedly children Hawar news agency obtained the names of five of the victims: Alia Diab (60 years old), Fatima Makhlouf (35 years old), Fares Diab (13 years old), Ghofran Diab (7 years old) and Jamila Diab (11 years).
The incident in Qurt Wiran and Willanli on July 27th prompted a large number of locals to come out to protest Turkish action in Syria on July 30th. (Image via ANF)
Meanwhile in Iraq, the two Turkish strikes resulting in civilian harm occurred within the space of three days. The first took place in Hasinpirka village in the Amedi district of Dohuk. According to reports, a Turkish strike hit two vehicles in the area, reportedly killing two civilians. However, Hamid Zubair, the mayor of the sub-district of Bamarne told Rudaw that the vehicles in fact belonged to PKK fighters, and not civilians. According to reports, the victims’ names were Abdulla Ahmad and Dilovan Shahin. On July 29th, another incident involving Turkish forces occurred in Mount Shekif in Erbil province. According to ANF, Turkish forces shelled the area and injured civilians collecting herbs in the mountains. One woman was reportedly severely injured in the attack.
Airwars tracked no civilian harm incidents resulting from Kurdish counterfire actions during the month of July. Since the end of March 2020, Airwars researchers have tracked only one civilian harm incident involving Kurdish factions in Syria.
Russian soldier limping out of hospital following a Turkish drone strike in Derbasiyah on July 16th (via FM Dirbesiye)
After a lull in airstrikes from mid-May – likely at least partly due to the Covid-19 pandemic – the US resumed activities in Somalia in early July. Three strikes were confirmed by AFRICOM, with one allegedly leading to civilian harm.
On July 9th, one Al Shabaab fighter was allegedly killed by a US strike on a checkpoint near Hantiwadaag.
On July 21st the US conducted its first strike against ISIS Somalia since October 2019 near Timirshe, killing seven members of the terror organisation. The operation was accompanied by Puntland Security Forces on the ground who allegedly killed around 12 ISIS fighters in an exchange of gunfire. US partner forces assisted.
And on July 29th a US strike in Jilib killed one Al Shabaab member and injured another one, according to AFRICOM. However, local media sources close to the terror organisation said that in fact three named children had been killed when their home was hit by a US missile.
AFRICOM also published its second quarterly civilian casualty assessment report, acknowledging responsibility for one civilian death and three more injured during an event on February 2nd 2020. For six further incidents, AFRICOM denied causing civilian harm, while four recent cases were described as still pending.
Home allegedly destroyed by US strike on Jilib on July 29th, 2020 (via Somali Memo)
Airwars tracked one US drone strike allegation in Yemen during July.
According to some local reports, a strike took place in the town of Ateq in Shabwa province on July 3rd. This reportedly hit the house of Bin Adio, the Governor of Shabwa. However, this claim has not been corroborated by other reports from prominent Yemeni outlets such as the Yemeni Press Agency, which says that the fire was instead caused by an electrical fault. CENTCOM itself told Airwars that its forces did not carry out any strikes in Yemen during the month.
Image showing a house on fire after an explosion in Ateq on July 3rd (Image via @Mohamme19780462)
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during July. The last such reported or claimed US action was in July 2018.
In July, our UK Advocacy Officer attended a virtual Panel Discussion on preventing internal displacement due to armed conflict/violence and disasters. Among the suggestions made was that belligerents avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, as a way to prevent reasons of internal displacement.
Also, Airwars and others in the UK’s Protection of Civilians (PoC) working group – which consists of partners including Crisis Action, STC, AOAV, and the APPG on Drones -resumed regular meetings, and agreed to request an update from the UK Government on its ongoing PoC strategy review. Members also discussed upcoming opportunities for engagement and future actions.
Airwars additionally attended a webinar organised by EveryCasualty on ‘COVID-19 and Casualty Recording’. Insights into statistics gathering and data analysis will help inform our own work at Airwars.
On July 3rd, our European advocacy officer virtually attended a meeting with the Utrecht Centre for Global Challenges (Utrecht University). One of the topics discussed was how Community Service Learning (CSL) programmes can connect academia and practice. Airwars is currently exploring with the Centre how we can help create spaces for students, for example those studying Conflict Studies, International Affairs or International Humanitarian Law, to better learn from and engage with the work we do at Airwars.
On July 7th, we published a story with updates on progress at the Dutch Ministry of Defence on revising its transparency and accountability practices, in the aftermath of the Hawijah scandal. In a letter to Parliament on June 29th, Minister of Defence Ank Bijleveld laid out a number of changes which she claimed would improve both transparency and accountability regarding civilian harm.
“While Airwars welcomes this next step towards a more transparent Defensie, the content of the data [of airstrikes] is still below standard,” Airwars deputy Dmytro Chupryna noted at the time. ”Other Coalition allies such as the UK already report the specific date, targets and near locations of their airstrikes. For Defensie to become more transparent, improving their reporting on airstrikes really is one of the first steps to take.”
June 2020 saw a slight resurgence in foreign action in Syria, with sporadic Russian strikes being reported in Idlib; and with the US-led Coalition continuing its operations against Iranian-backed groups in Syria. In Iraq, ISIS’s insurgency has decreased significantly as Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have increased the tempo of their own Counter-Terrorism campaigns. Meanwhile, Turkey launched a major joint air and ground operation against Kurdish militants over the border into northern Iraq, in a bold attempt to dislodge the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the region. This led to several disturbing civilian casualty events.
While the conflict in Libya continued to rage on, the number of strikes decreased significantly as the Government of National Accord (GNA), with Turkish support, continued to consolidate its gains from the previous month against the Libyan National Army (LNA) and its foreign allies. A stalemate at the frontline in Sirte led to almost complete inaction between the two sides. However, foreign actors reportedly used the impasse to funnel more weapons into Libya.
As the chart below shows, the number of civilian harm incidents decreased during June across all major conflicts tracked by Airwars apart from Iraq (due to Turkey’s Operation Tiger Claw against the PKK.) The number of reported civilian harm incidents in Libya decreased by almost 75%.
June marked the first month in Libya where the GNA and Turkey allegedly caused more civilian harm than the LNA and its allies. While the number of tracked air and artillery strikes dropped significantly from 274 to 94, locally reported civilian deaths only decreased from 64-81 to 44-54.
The GNA and Turkey allegedly conducted 25 air and artillery strikes leading to between 24 and 32 civilian deaths in a successful effort to regain territory from the LNA. In the worst event of the month, between 12 and 20 civilians were killed by a GNA or Turkish drone strike on Qasr Bin Gashir on June 3rd.
Civilian harm reported from LNA and Emirati strikes significantly decreased compared to previous months, as the GNA finally managed to oust Khalifa Haftar’s forces from Tripoli. The siege of Libya’s capital officially ended on 4th June after more than 400 days. Between 16 and 17 civilian deaths were alleged from 59 LNA and Emirati actions in June. The most severe incident took place in Gheryan on June 2nd, when five civilian males were reportedly killed by a drone strike.
Another six strikes by unknown belligerents allegedly led to a further four to five civilian deaths.
The vast majority of these strikes were conducted at the beginning of June, with only seven reported towards the end of the month. Military activity had effectively stalled due to a stalemate at the Sirte frontline, where both sides were sending in reinforcements. AFRICOM also once again overtly called out Russia for supplying the LNA with fighter jets. Strikes by Russian-supplied MiGs reportedly led to civilian harm on two occasions.
Lujain Muhammad Buresh, allegedly killed by GNA shelling on Qasr Bin Gashir on June 1st, 2020 (image via Tarhuna 24)
After three months of relative calm in northwestern Syria, Russian airstrikes were reported for the first time on June 3rd and then again on June 8th-9th, with some reportedly leading to civilian harm. These actions brought into sharp focus the fragility of a major ceasefire initially agreed in March – raising fears that Russia’s aerial campaign on Idlib could resume. In total, four civilian harm incidents allegedly involving Russia were reported during the month, resulting in eight civilian deaths and the injury of 16 others.
The June 3rd airstrikes took place in an area where the boundaries of Hama, Idlib and Latakia provinces meet, close to the highly strategic M4 highway, where Turkish and Russian forces conduct their joint patrols as part of the truce agreement. These strikes were aimed at pushing Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militants – who enjoy a significant presence in this area -further away from the M4 highway, to create a buffer from the Sahl al-Ghab area in northern Hama province.
Five days later, Russian warplanes began reportedly striking a number of areas in Idlib. On June 8th, local sources reported that Russian warplanes hit the al-Muzarra village in Jabal al-Zawiya in southern Idlib, According to SMART News Agency, two civilians were killed and three others were wounded in the attack. According to Baladi News, four civilians from the same family were injured.
The next day saw alleged Russian strikes in Balyoun, Kansafra, and Idlib city resulting in civilian harm. In Balyoun, one civilian was killed and eight others were injured in an aerial bombardment on residential areas in the western part of the village. According to Baladi News, the civilian killed was Abdullah Ahmad al-Dani from the neighbouring town of Kansafra. In Kansafra, Russian raids killed one civilian and injured four others. Meanwhile, on the same day, three children (Salah Ghajar, Rand Saed al Din and Rand’s brother Huthaifah) were killed when a cluster munition left behind from the previous bombing by Russian warplanes exploded near a farm in the al-Jedar area.
Following this June 8th spike in alleged Russian action, there were no further reports of civilian harm from Russian strikes for the rest of the month.
Civilian body being carried following an alleged Russian airstrike in Balyoun on June 9th (via Syrian Network for Human Rights)
The month of June saw only one civilian harm incident locally reported to have involved the US-led Coalition in Syria. This was a welcome decrease from the four incidents reported for the previous month, which remains the highest monthly tally of the year to date.
On June 24th, on the road between Idlib city and the town of Binnish, a Coalition drone reportedly targeted a ‘Santa Fe’ car, allegedly killing Abu Adnan Al-Homsi, a senior figure in Huras al-Din, an affiliate of al-Qaeda. According to SMART, the drone strike also killed a civilian riding a motorbike near the targeted car. This came ten days after a similar incident, when a drone targeted a car carrying two members of Huras al-Din, known as Qasim al-Urduni and Bilal al-Sana’i. However, no civilians were reportedly harmed in that event.
Another strike on Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham was reported by locals on June 16th, south of Sarmada in northern Idlib. According to local sources, the strike hit an Islamic tribunal in the area. However, both the number and combatant status of people killed in that event is still not known.
Meanwhile, military operations against ISIS targets were also reported throughout the month. On June 20th, the US-led Coalition allegedly launched a strike on the road between al-Dana and al-Bad in eastern Aleppo, killing ISIS commander Fayez al-Akkal, who also served as the former ‘governor’ of Raqqa. On June 21st, another International Coalition strike took place on a motorcycle belonging to an unidentified ISIS militant near the Kubaiba oil field in southern Hasaka Governorate.
Local sources also reported four strikes against Iran-backed groups by planes locally identified as belonging to the International Coalition. The first took place in the town of Maizilliah in Deir Ezzor province on June 6th, killing approximately eight people. The second was in the Thalathat area, west of al-Boukamal on June 8th. Another airstrike was reported in the al-Akershi desert, southeast of Raqqa city, and finally, the last locally reported strike took place in al-Abbas village near al-Boukamal, where according to reports, six headquarters were targeted in a major raid on June 28th.
In Iraq, there was one civilian harm incident reported in the Abu Zuwair area near Baiji. This came after a US MQ-IC Gray Eagle armed drone crashed in the area, which led to shepherds approaching the fallen drone. However, another drone arrived and struck the same area killing the four shepherds near the crashed drone. According to other sources, the shepherds had carried parts of the drone in a pickup truck and were then pursued by a second drone and killed as they tried to leave the area.
Turkish-led actions varied considerably in Syria and Iraq during June. The number of civilian harm incidents involving Turkish action decreased considerably in Syria, while Iraq saw Turkey escalating its ongoing anti-PKK campaign, after launching Operation Claw-Tiger.
Airwars tracked one civilian harm incident in Syria involving alleged Turkish action. On June 23rd, a Turkish drone strike reportedly killed three women in the village of Helince, east of Kobani. According to local reports, the house of Amina Waysi, was hit, killing her and two other women – Zehra Berkel, a coordinating member of the Kongra Star women’s movement; and Mizgin Xelil.
#UrgentThree civilians lost their lives due to the targeting of a drone believed to be a #Turkish drone in the village of Helinc east of #Kobanê. pic.twitter.com/0sRPoexp99
— Hoshang Hassan (@HoshangHesen) June 23, 2020
In Iraq, Turkey launched a major joint air and ground operation against the PKK in northern Iraq on June 17th. According to reports, Special Forces were airlifted to the border region of Haftanin in the early hours of Operation Claw-Tiger. According to the Turkish Ministry of Defence, the campaign targeted 150 suspected PKK positions with jets, helicopters, drones and artillery.
The unprecedented scale and scope of these latest operations posed a significant risk to civilians living near the Turkish border of northern Iraq. The week following the beginning of operations was particularly harmful to civilians in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaimaniyah.
As a result, five civilian harm incidents were reported during Juneh, four of which took place following the beginning of Operation Claw-Tiger. In these events, seven people were reported killed and at least nine others injured.
The first alleged civilian harm case from Turkish actions took place in Sinjar on June 14th, where local sources reported that “several civilians” were injured in Turkish airstrikes on civilian areas – though the exact number of injured civilians was not specified in local sources. In the first two days of the campaign, three more? civilian harm incidents were reported. The first took place on June 17th, within hours of the launch of the operations in Bradost, northern Erbil province, where a shepherd by the name of Ebas Mexdid Nimet was killed and up to three others were injured.
Two days later on June 19th, two civilian harm incidents took place. One took place in the Kokar area near the Avamark Resort in Dohuk province, where a Turkish airstrike killed three people and injured two others. Another airstrike on the same day in Barwari reportedly killed a civilian.
https://twitter.com/HanaComani/status/1273971419718791169
The final incident took place in Kunamasi, near a resort in the Sulaimaniyah province on June 25th. That airstrikes hit a vehicle carrying PKK fighters, but also struck a mini market belonging to a local family. According to some reports, two civilians were killed and up to five others were injured. A widely shared video showed children playing nearby showered with debris.
Turkish attacks in northern Iraq in the first week of the campaign drew widespread condemnation from neighbouring countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Iraqi Government also condemned the latest incursion by Turkey into Iraq’s territory as a violation of the country’s sovereignty.
Is this okay with you? @masrour_barzani @qubadjt @jensstoltenberg this is my brother playing with my nephew when a Turkish bomb drops 20 meters away from them in Kuna Masi. #TwitterKurds pic.twitter.com/tNUK8HeWt0
— Jîl Şwanî (@thejilswani) June 25, 2020
After more than three months without any civilian harm incidents allegedly resulting from Kurdish counterfire, local Syrian news outlets said that a child was killed after a mortar shell, reportedly from the YPG, exploded near the city of Mare’a in Aleppo province on June 28th. According to Bawabat Aleppo, the child killed was 14 year-old Hamza Ibrahim. The explosion reportedly took place on the road to the nearby village of Esnabel.
There were no publicly alleged or announced US strikes in Somalia during June, with the last declared AFRICOM action taking place on May 17th.
Airwars tracked one alleged US drone strike in Yemen during the month of June. According to local reports, the strike took place on Wadi Obeida, just northwest of Marib city on June 24th. The strike reportedly hit al-Qaeda militants, who had just escaped a battle with Saudi-backed Yemeni forces in the Qaniyah front of Baydha province. According to one source, the airstrike killed an unnamed senior figure within AQAP. However, this claim has not been corroborated by other reports on the airstrike.
CENTCOM itself said that it did not carry out any strikes in Yemen during the month. However it remains possible that the June 24th event was conducted by the CIA, which carries out a parallel, covert campaign in Yemen.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during May. The last such reported or claimed US action was in July 2018.
Airwars participated, along with 1,000 other organisations, in a high level virtual convening on United Nations Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, which reflected on how the UN’s present counter-terror policies impact on peace, human rights and development
Airwars also observed discussions and side events of the ‘Supporting the future of Syria and the region – Brussels IV Conference,’ and sent a followup question to the panel on ‘Ensuring accountability and civilian protection in Syria’. The question focused on the need for accountability from all the actors involved in the Syrian conflict:
While casualty tracking indicates that the Syrian regime and its Russian allies are responsible for the deaths of many thousands of Syrian civilians, including women and children, as a result of airstrikes on civilian residential areas, research from monitoring organisations shows that other international actors – such as Turkey and the US-led Coalition – are also responsible for civilian harm, often at significant levels. How can we hold the Syrian regime and its allies to account, while ensuring that other States calling for the protection of civilians are themselves fully committed to meeting accountability standards?
The US State Department – which hosted the ‘Brussels IV’ discussion on Syria – has yet to respond to those questions which resulted from the session.
In June, the Airwars European advocacy team held several roundtables with our Dutch civil society partners. As Dutch Minister of Defence Ank Bijleveld wrote in her letter to Parliament on June 30th, several NGOs, including Airwars, have been meeting with the Ministry to discuss our previously submitted roadmap to improve Dutch policy regarding transparency and accountability for civilian harm. The aim is to agree on a joint plan by the end of the summer, as stated in the Minister’s letter.
On June 25th, the Utrecht Centre for Global Challenges (UCGC) at the University of Utrecht launched its latest project War/Truth: Civilian harm in remote warfare. In January, Airwars’ European advocacy officer moved into the UCGC office as a societal partner of the centre in order to help facilitate better collaboration on the topic of civilian harm. The goal of our collaboration is to “connect Airwars’ work recording civilian harm with research carried out by the Intimacies of Remote Warfare programme (Utrecht University) into wider questions of transparency, accountability, responsibility and legitimacy.”
All 38 historical civilian harm allegations from US-led Coalition actions in Iraq and Syria, covering a period from January 2015 to July 2017 – and reviewed by the Coalition for its June report – were rejected as ‘non credible. Each of the 38 cases had been an Airwars referral.
As Airwars noted in a letter of concern to Coalition commanders, this meant that of the 257 incidents so far reviewed by OIR for 2020, only eight had been deemed Credible – or just 3.1%.
Airwars expressed concern “that OIR may once again be moving away from engaging with external sources on civcas claims – and instead [is] institutionally focusing on self-reported events. If that is the case it would represent a backward step – particularly with DoD itself now emphasising the value of external sources.”
Following on from April, the COVID-19 pandemic has continued to deliver a limited ‘peace dividend’, at least in some conflict nations. Civilian harm allegations against international actors in Syria continue to be minimal – though with a spike in claims against the US-led Coalition. In Iraq – despite reports of an ISIS resurgence – no civilian harm incidents from International Coalition actions were reported. And in Somalia too, the most intensive US campaign ever seen against al Shabaab, which began earlier this year, now appears to be on hold.
Meanwhile, the violence in Libya continued unabated, with the Government of National Accord (GNA), supported by Turkey, making significant headway in its bid to retake areas in western Libya recently lost to Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA).
The above graph shows the number of alleged civilian harm incidents from tracked belligerents in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Somalia. In Syria, all the incidents reported were conducted either by the US-led Coalition, or by Turkish-led forces. In Iraq, the solitary incident was allegedly the result of a Turkish airstrike. More than six times the number of civilian fatalities resulting from actions by tracked belligerents were reported during the month in Libya than in Syria.
Libya saw another increase in both airstrikes and reported civilian harm during May, with the GNA and Turkey for the first time since the beginning of the Tripoli offensive out-bombing the LNA and its allies. However, the LNA was still reportedly responsible for the majority of civilian harm.
The number of overall reported air and artillery strikes by all belligerents slightly rose month on month, from 245 in April to 274 in May. The number of locally reported civilian deaths also increased, from 44-52 to 64-81.
Between 33 and 44 civilian deaths were reported from 52 LNA or Emirati airstrikes. The high ratio of civilian harm stemmed from the often indiscriminate nature of shelling on Tripoli neighbourhoods. In one of the worst LNA incidents, six civilians were killed and up to 24 injured on May 9th on the capital’s Al Sour road.
Some 120 reported GNA and Turkish air and artillery strikes allegedly resulted in 18 to 21 civilian deaths. Between nine and ten civilians were allegedly killed by a Turkish airstrike in the worst event of the month in Qasr Al Hajj on May 8th, 2020.
While 95 further strikes could not be attributed to any one belligerent, 6 were contested between GNA and LNA. These allegedly led to 10 to 13 additional civilian deaths.
After the LNA’s withdrawal from Tripoli in late May, landmines and IEDs left behind by Haftar’s forces posed an additional risk for civilians. AFRICOM also called out Russia for allegedly supplying combat aircraft to the LNA. According to the US military command “there is concern these Russian aircraft are being flown by inexperienced, non-state PMC mercenaries who will not adhere to international law.”
Tariq Mustafa Homs, who reportedly lost a leg after shelling by LNA on Tripoli on May 31st, 2020 (via Burkan Al Ghadab)
The month of May saw an unexpected increase in US-led Coalition military activity in Syria. Airwars researchers tracked four separate claimed civilian harm incidents throughout the month, the highest monthly tally this year so far, leading to eight locally reported civilian deaths. All four incidents took place in Deir Ezzor governorate, which has seen most of the Coalition’s military actions in Syria during 2020.
The first incident took place on May 1st in the Koniko oil fields of Deir Ezzor. According to local reports, a civilian was killed by a US sniper. The victim, who worked as a teacher in Raqqa city, was identified as Yasser Al-Asman. According to Step News, he “was heading on the main road from the countryside of Deir Ezzor Al-Sharqi to Raqqa, but his car veered off the road towards the [oil] field by mistake, which drove the American forces to kill him instantly.”
On May 16th, a major air raid was conducted in the vicinity of the Abu Bakr Mosque in al-Basira, Deir Ezzor. As part of a joint operation between Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the International Coalition, a number of houses were reportedly bombed. According to Euphrates Eye, Coalition forces struck three buildings housing Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the town, killing five civilians in Ibrahim al-Baraka’s house. The day after saw another civilian harm allegation in al-Zir town. According to local reports, a civilian named Muhammad Khleif Al Hamra was killed on the roof of his own house, while watching Coalition forces conduct a raid on neighbouring properties in al-Shouhaibi town.
The final incident took place on May 22nd in al-Shabaka, once again in Deir Ezzor. According to Euphrates Post, Muhammad Al-Ouda Al-Khaled Al-Addad from the city of Al-Shuhail was killed during a joint operation led by the International Coalition. Further details of the raid are not presently known.
Reports also emerged that a senior ISIS figure, Mu’taz Numan Abd Nayif Najm al-Jabouri, was killed in a Coalition airstrike. Al-Jabouri, who went by the nom de guerre, Hajji Taysir, was known as the group’s ‘Governor’ of Iraq and head of foreign operations. He was also claimed to have overseen the group’s chemical and biological weapons research, as the deputy head of ISIS manufacturing in Syria.
Additionally, there were six other unilateral actions that were allegedly conducted by the US during the month. These took place in a number of different Governorates in Syria such as Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Aleppo and Hasaka. Most of these incidents targeted Iranian-backed groups in Syria – suggesting that these attacks may instead have been the work of Israel.
Meanwhile, International Coalition airstrikes in Iraq also continued. On May 13th, the US-led alliance conducted a major strike on a cave system used as a hideout by ISIS cells in the southwestern desert of Hadar, in Nineveh province. The attack reportedly killed four militants. Five days later, the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (ICTS) confirmed that 11 airstrikes were conducted against ISIS remnants in Mount Ghurra, south of Dibis in Kirkuk. Additionally, the US-led Coalition conducted another strike on ISIS targets in Wadi Ashi in Kirkuk on May 31st, as part of the Iraqi-led “Heroes of Iraq” operation.
May 13, @modmiliq requested Coalition bombs an ISIS cave. We did. ISF found 4xEKIA. #ReadyAF #DefeatDaesh 💥🇮🇶 في 13 آيار ، قصف التحالف كهف لداعش في نينوى، ممّا أدى الى مقتل 4 إرهابيين وقد تبين ذلك من خلال عمليات التفتيش التي قامت بها الفرقة 20 في الجيش العراقي بعد الغارة pic.twitter.com/MPTzYaGSqA
— OIR Spokesperson (@OIRSpox) May 15, 2020
The Royal Air Force (RAF) has also remained active in Iraq, conducting four airstrikes against ISIS targets in May. On May 8th, an RAF Reaper targeted an ISIS bunker west of Tuz Khurmato in northern Iraq. On May 10th, a pair of Typhoons struck a cave system reportedly used by ISIS militants southeast of Hatra, on the banks of the Tharthar Lake in Anbar province. The third strike took place three days later in Tuz Khurmato against an ISIS bunker, and finally, on May 23rd a RAF Reaper targeted a group of ISIS militants in an unidentified location in northern Iraq.
Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service forces advance across a field near Dibis, southern Kirkuk on May 18th 2020 (via ICTS social media)
In total, the US-led Coalition confirmed that in the month of May, Partner Forces in Iraq and Syria conducted 52 anti-ISIS operations.
For the second month in a row, Airwars did not monitor a single locally reported civilian harm incident from Russian actions in Syria. April and May of this year mark the only complete months without civilian casualties claimed from Russian military actions – and the longest continuous period without reports of civilian harm since the beginning of Moscow’s campaign began in Syria in September 2015.
Despite the absence of Russian actions, there were concerns that hostilities could resume at any moment. Sporadic reports emerged throughout the month of attacks by both Syrian Government forces and rebels.
On May 10th for example, al-Qaeda-linked Huras al-Din reportedly attacked regime forces in the Ghab plain area of Idlib. It was said the fighting had left 21 troops and 13 Huras al-Din members dead. Additionally, on May 15th, there were reports that regime shelling on the town of al-Bara in Idlib killed at least two civilians and injured up to five others.
Airwars tracked five separate civilian harm allegations against Turkish-led forces over the course of May – three less than last month’s tally. According to local sources, these incidents led to three civilian deaths, compared to two such deaths in April. At least one child was harmed from alleged Turkish actions.
All the civilian harm incidents which took place in May occurred in the week starting May 13th. That day in the town of Maranaz in Aleppo governorate, a young boy was reportedly severely injured after being peppered by shrapnel from alleged Turkish shelling on the town. Three days later, up to two civilians were killed when according to pro-regime outlets, Turkish-backed forces opened fire on a van coming from Raqqa city near a checkpoint in Ras al-Ain. Kurdish expert Wladimir van Wilgenburg reported that the two civilians killed were Mihemed Xidir Husên and Ziyab El-Elî.
The third incident occurred in Deir Ghosn in Hasaka Governorate on May 17th, when Turkish forces allegedly opened fire on farmers in the area. Just two days later, 30-year-old Mohammed Hajj Hussein Al Khalaf was wounded by an artillery strike on the village of Arab Hassan Kabir, Aleppo governorate. Hawar News spoke to the uncle of the victim, Ali Al Khalaf, who stated that the shelling occurred at 5am while his family was sleeping. The final incident took place in the town of Şiyûx, west of Kobani city after Turkish forces shelled the town, reportedly injuring two civilians.
In Iraq, Turkish fighter jets continued to target Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions throughout the month. On May 30th, a Turkish airstrike reportedly hit the Deralok sub-district of Amedi, close to the border with Turkey in the province of Dohuk. The strike killed a father and a son in the area and injured another person. The Turkish Ministry of Defence, however, claimed that the attack had killed two PKK fighters, and not civilians.
Mohammed Hajj Hussein Al Khalaf was injured in alleged Turkish-backed artillery strikes on the village of Arab Hassan Kabir on May 19th, 2020 (via Hawar News).
Airwars tracked no civilian harm incidents resulting from Kurdish counterfire actions during the month of May. This is the second month in a row that no civilian harm allegations against Kurdish armed groups have been locally reported – and marked the longest period without reports of civilian harm from Kurdish actions since July 2019.
Airwars recorded four locally alleged US strikes in Somalia during May, of which only one was officially declared. In two events, civilian harm was claimed against AFRICOM.
Up to two civilians were allegedly killed by a US or Kenyan strikes on Araboow on May 13th. The strikes reportedly hit minibuses departing from Mogadishu. AFRICOM denied any involvement in the event.
On May 17th, a US strike allegedly injured four civilians in Kunya Barrow. Sources close to Al Shabaab reported that the strike hit a civilian home, injuring a mother and three of her children.
Picture of an alleged victim of US strike on Kunya Barrow on May 17th, 2020 (via Halgan Media)
On May 13th, Yemen Press Agency alleged that US drones had targeted positions in both Marib and Abyan. The first attack occurred in the Wadi Obeida area of Marib city. According to reports, a drone strike hit a house, killing an al-Qaeda operative named Shurfan and injuring the group’s alleged communications officer, Abdullah al-Maliki. Photographs published locally showed an injured Maliki receiving medical treatment.
Yet according to an email from CENTCOM to Airwars, there were no US military strikes during May 2020 in Yemen. This was despite the US Justice Department confirming that a senior Qaeda operative was targeted in a drone strike during the month, with an official press release on May 18th noting that “a counterterrorism operation targeting AQAP operative Abdullah al-Maliki, one of Alshamrani’s overseas associates, was recently conducted in Yemen.”
Meanwhile, a reported US strike in Abyan targeted an al-Qaeda site near the Shakra area, and resulted in the death of Abu al-Bara al-Qifi, a senior figure within the terror group. A third claimed US action took place in al-Arqoub in Abyan on May 16th, killing senior al-Qaeda figure Saad al-Atiqi al-Awlaki. According to Yemen Press Agency, the attack took place between the Laudar district in Abyan province and the Mokiras district of Bayda province. The action came as Saudi-backed forces also launched an attack in the area, which is held by fighters allied to the al-Islah party.
With multiple reports from local sources of US drone strikes in both Marib and Abyan provinces during May – and confirmation of a US attack on al-Maliki, despite CENTCOM denials – this strongly indicates that the US’s covert CIA campaign in Yemen is continuing.
Abdullah al-Maliki who was injured in a US drone strike on Wadi Obeida in Marib on May 13th 2020. Image via @YemeniFatima
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during May. The last such reported or claimed US action was in August 2018.
Airwars marked the UN’s Protection of Civilians week in May 2020 with the Conflicting Truth project, in partnership with the Scottish-American design team Rectangle, who also produce the complex mapping and data representations on the Airwars website.
The project live-streamed the names of 8,337 civilian casualties which Airwars has documented in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Somalia in recent years. The Airwars/Rectangle project aims to show that those killed and injured in conflict are not mere statistics – they are people with names, friends and families. Their loss inflicts severe pain on relatives, and the communities they belong to.
Airwars also joined other international partners and organisations in a Civil Society Call for Action to Protect Civilians during PoC week. The joint statement, signed by 22 organisations, called on the UN Security Council, on Member States, and on the UN System to take urgent, bold and practical steps to respond to the challenges that remain in the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
Airwars’ Deputy Director additionally joined with US partners in a three-day virtual workshop hosted by InterAction, ‘Building the Evidence Base: Addressing the Reverberating Effects of Military Operations on Civilian Life’. This gathered together experts undertaking systematic research on the effects of explosive weapons in populated areas. Participants came up with a number of practical and methodological challenges associated with analysing the reverberating effects of conflict, and outlined a way forward to overcome them.
May was a busy month for European advocacy. In the run up to the fourth Dutch parliamentary debate on the Hawijah case, we published a blog with our partner the Open State Foundation (available in Dutch) about the poor quality of the Dutch Ministry of Defence’s recently released weekly reports on Dutch airstrikes as part of the US-led Coalition between 2014 and 2016.
The parliamentary debate was itself held on May 14th. Our livetweeting of the nine-hour-long event was widely followed by international media. One topic discussed during the debate was our news story from March, in which Airwars revealed that at least one other Coalition ally had refused the airstrike on Hawijah, based on the available intelligence. During all four debates, Airwars was mentioned no less than 54 times.
On May 1st, the US-led Coalition published its fifth civilian harm report of 2020, declaring that from August 2014 to March 31st 2020 it had conducted 34,819 strikes against so called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Of the 41 historic assessments reviewed by Combined Joint Task Force – Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), 40 locally reported civilian harm events were rejected as ‘non credible’ – with a single additional event flagged as a duplicate assessment. All but one of the events – covering civilian harm claims in both Iraq and Syria between September 2015 and November 2019 – were Airwars referrals.
This blanket rejection of all locally reported civilian harm events reviewed during May reflected a recent and concerning trend. Of 217 locally alleged civilian harm events in Iraq and Syria assessed by CJTF-OIR to May 2020, only eight events (3.6%) had been accepted as Credible.
On May 6th, the Pentagon also published its third annual report on civilian harm to Congress. This declared that US forces in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Somalia had between them killed at least 132 civilians and injured 91 more during 2019. The Pentagon also reported a further 79 historical deaths from its actions in Syria and Iraq during 2017-18.
Of the 21 historical cases officially conceded from US actions in Iraq and Syria for 2017 over the past year, 18 had been Airwars referrals. Yet every single allegation referred by Airwars to the Coalition for both 2018 and 2019 was rejected – amounting to many hundreds of dismissed local claims.
As Airwars director Chris Woods noted at the time, “Many hundreds of civilian deaths which were credibly reported by local communities appear to have been ignored. This goes against the Pentagon’s repeated promise to engage better with external NGOs including monitors, and we will be asking for an urgent explanation from officials of this apparent backward step.”
The COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as the most serious public health crisis this century and continues to dominate most governments’ domestic and foreign policy. Airwars research shows that the crisis has brought about a significant though perhaps short-lived peace dividend in a number of conflict nations. April 2020 saw an almost unprecedented reduction in civilian harm incidents in Syria for example, whilst Iraq continues to see minimal reported civilian harm allegations against foreign actors.
However, this peace dividend has failed to extend to Libya. That conflict has escalated significantly, as Turkey has stepped up its armed intervention on behalf of the Government of National Accord (GNA), against the opposition Libyan National Army. As both sides sought military dominance in Tripoli and other towns and cities across Libya, civilian suffering also multiplied from previous months.
As shown by the below graph, since the outbreak of COVID-19, civilian harm in Syria, usually the most active conflict which Airwars monitors, has decreased significantly. However, this welcome trend has not applied to Libya, where the fighting became more intense in April, following the escalation of Turkey’s air campaign against the LNA. For the first time since we began tracking civilian harm in both nations, reported deaths in Libya outstripped those in Syria.
Libya witnessed a significant increase in both reported civilian casualties and airstrikes in April, partly due to the Turkish air campaign in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA). The number of reported civilian deaths rose from 17-19 in March to 44-52. The number of alleged air and artillery strikes increased by 50% from 163 to 245.
The majority of civilian harm was still allegedly caused by the Libyan National Army (LNA), which reportedly shelled civilian neighbourhoods of Tripoli on many occasions. This led to between 20 and 23 locally reported civilian deaths. In the worst incident, up to four civilians were allegedly killed and up to eight more injured by LNA shelling on Tajoura on April 9th.
Civilian harm from GNA or Turkish actions spiked in April as a result of combined efforts to recover territory previously lost to the LNA in Western Libya. Between eight and ten civilians were reportedly killed by 55 GNA or Turkish air and artillery strikes. On April 28th for example, a GNA/Turkish drone strike allegedly killed up to five civilians in a civilian truck near Ra’s at Tabal.
Once again during the month, many civilian harm events could not be clearly attributed because of indiscriminate shelling in urban areas. These led to 16 to 19 reported civilian deaths either contested between the GNA and LNA, or where the responsibility of no one belligerent could be determined.
Image via Tk Yahroug Kl shy of a truck carrying beehives that was allegedly hit by a Turkish/GNA drone on April 28th 2020
As countries across the world battled to contain the spread of COVID-19, the campaign in Idlib was brought to an almost complete halt. Airwars tracked no civilian harm incidents involving Russia during all of April – the first such month of no reported civilian casualties since Moscow first intervened in Syria in September 2015.
The pause in fighting came after UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for a global ceasefire at the end of March so that governments could focus on fighting the virus, and allow for humanitarian workers to reach populations in conflict zones that were most vulnerable to the spread of the virus. The absence of civilian harm attributed to Russia suggested that the ’ceasefire dividend’ brought about by COVID-19 may have been quite effective in bringing about much-needed respite from conflict, at least in Syria.
However, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Russian airstrikes were carried out during April in desert regions of Syria against ISIS positions, killing 28 alleged militants. Additionally, there were sporadic reports of Regime shelling in Idlib Governorate in areas near the southeastern Jabal al-Zawiya region on April 2nd.
April was once again a relatively calm month for the US-led Coalition in Syria, with no civilian harm allegations reported.
However, there were reports of Coalition strikes against ISIS positions in Syria, as well as claimed unilateral US strikes on Iran-backed forces in the country. On April 18th, a Coalition aircraft targeted two people riding a motorbike, near a school in Al-Hawaij town in the eastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. According to Deir Ezzor 24, the strike came moments after ISIS militants had destroyed a school with explosives. Most sources reporting on the airstrike say that the two people killed were ISIS militants that were likely involved in the destruction of the school.
On April 21st, local sources reported that a convoy carrying up to 15 members of Iranian-backed groups in Syria was allegedly targeted by a US strike. The convoy reportedly came from Iraq to the al-Thalatat area in the Al-Bukamal desert area, east of Deir Ezzor.
Meanwhile, International Coalition airstrikes in Iraq also continued. On April 10th, the UK declared its first actions against ISIS targets since September 2019. According to a statement by the Ministry of Defence, a pair of Royal Air Force Typhoon jets, assisted by an RAF Reaper drone, struck ISIS militants in Tuz Khurmatu, south of Kirkuk, “removing several Daesh fighters from the battlefield and further degrading the terrorist movement.”
Three days later, US F-15s conducted airstrikes on ISIS locations near Kirkuk in Iraq. The strikes reportedly took place in a river valley, 15 kilometres south of Daquq. According to the Iraqi Security Media Cell, the joint operation with Iraqi Security Forces led to 23 ISIS militants being killed. These attacks came after a recent uptick in ISIS activity in northern Iraq.
Image via CENTCOM of the USAF airstrike in Kirkuk on April 13th 2020.
While fighting in Syria had largely subsided following the ceasefire deal signed between Presidents Putin and Erdogan in Moscow on March 5th, civilian harm incidents resulting from Turkish-led actions continued to be sporadically reported, albeit at a slightly lower rate than previous months.
Airwars tracked seven separate civilian harm allegations against Turkish-led forces over the course of April. These incidents led to two civilian deaths and the injury of up to 14 more, according to local sources. This represents a significant decrease from the previous month, which saw four civilian fatalities and 27 injuries from ten Turkish-led civilian harm incidents. Additionally, according to Airwars data, children were less harmed from alleged Turkish incidents compared to the previous month when three of the four civilians reported killed were children. In April only one child was reportedly injured.
All the incidents took place in the first ten days of the month (again suggesting a possible ‘Covid effect’.) The deadliest took place on April 2nd in the villages of Qabr al-Saqir and al-Abosh in the Tal Tamr district of Hasakah Governorate. According to local sources, two people lost their lives and four others were injured after Turkish forces fired a barrage of shells on residential neighbourhoods in the villages.
In Iraq, there were local reports of two civilian harm incidents resulting from Turkish airstrikes on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during the month. On April 15th, an alleged Turkish airstrike on the Makhmour IDP camp killed three women and injured up to four others. In a separate incident on April 28th, Turkish warplanes struck the Xakurke area, on the Iran-Iraq border. The airstrike reportedly killed two civilians, whose identities were later given as Fakher Tazewared (35 years old) and Rashid Miroir (36 years old). The victims were reportedly from the town of Shino in Iran.
Image via Politika of a funeral held for the three women killed in the airstrike on the Makhmour IDP camp on April 15th.
Airwars tracked no civilian harm incidents resulting from Kurdish counterfire actions during the month of April. This is the first month that no civilian harm allegations against Kurdish armed groups have been reported since September 2019 – before Turkey’s offensive in Northeastern Syria.
However, on April 28th a large VBIED was detonated in the city of Afrin, killing as many as 42 people and injuring more than 50 others. The explosion took place near the densely populated main market in the city. Some sources claimed that the YPG was responsible for the attack, though these reports were not confirmed.
Image via SCD of a fireman putting out the flames from the car bomb in Afrin city on April 28th.
The number of reported US strikes in Somalia decreased sharply in April, presumably because of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. AFRICOM declared conducting eight strikes at the beginning of the month, seven less than in March. It claimed these had killed 32 Al Shabaab fighters in total.
Local sources at times conflicted with AFRICOM’s own press releases, alleging civilian harm on two occasions. On April 6th, between two and three civilians were reportedly killed by a US strike near Jilib. In addition, one child was allegedly injured, while AFRICOM said no civilians were harmed in the attack.
Additionally, on April 10th one elderly clan leader was allegedly killed according to some local sources. However, AFRICOM later vehemently refuted the claims in a statement: “Immediately prior to the airstrike, this al-Shabaab terrorist displayed the murdered bodies of Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers in a village. Following this act of coercion and intimidation, the al-Shabaab terrorist departed the village. Once isolated in a remote and secluded area, the terrorist was killed by an airstrike executed by the command in coordination with the Federal Government of Somalia.”
On April 27th, AFRICOM for the first time released a quarterly civilian harm report, conceding two civilian deaths – believed to be a father and child – from an incident in Kunyo Barrow on February 23rd, 2019. AFRICOM had originally dismissed the claim. But it reopened an assessment after Airwars submitted a detailed dossier on the incident in January 2020, including what were believed to be precise coordinates for where casualties took place.
Image via Morad News of Ahmed Hussein, allegedly injured in a US strike on Jilib on April 6th, 2020.
According to CENTCOM, there were no US military strikes during April 2020 in Yemen. However, there were multiple reports from local sources of two US drone strikes in Marib and Shabwa provinces. It remains possible that one or both of these incidents was conducted by the CIA, which has intermittently been conducting strikes in Yemen since 2002 – but which neither confirms nor denies such actions.
On April 11th, the Yemen Press Agency reported an alleged US drone strike on the home of a leading figure of the Islah party in Marib, Ali bin Ghareeb, under the pretext of combating al-Qaeda’s presence in the area. Although Ali bin Ghareeb was unharmed, there were reports of civilian casualties from the attack, although no details have emerged on the number harmed or their identities. There were conflicting reports which suggested that the attack was instead carried out by a Houthi ballistic missile, though most sources seemed to allege that US drones were responsible.
A second claimed drone strike took place in Wadi Amaqin in the district of Bayhan in Shabwa Governorate on April 26th. According to Associated Press, two strikes were conducted in the area killing six al-Qaeda militants. Bayhan has long been a stronghold for al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula and has therefore been the subject of numerous drone strikes over the last few years.
Map via Intelligence Fusion-Asia showing the claimed location of a recently alleged US drone strike in Shabwa on April 26th.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during January. The last such reported US strike was in August 2018.
Airwars gave a presentation, ‘Using casualty monitoring to hold militaries to account’ in a webinar hosted by EveryCasualty’s Casualty Recorders Network. This was a great opportunity to present Airwars’ work and experience and our recent investigation into European civilian harm, as well as a chance to meet and talk with other organisations who work in this domain.
Airwars also signed a joint letter coordinated by Crisis Action to the UN Security Council, to support calls for a global ceasefire in light of the COVID-19 crisis.
We additionally submitted a short paper to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, concerning the impact of the diversion of arms and unregulated or illicit arms transfers on the human rights of women and girls in Libya.
In April Airwars also signed the NGO Global Compact coordinated by InterAction, which includes commitments towards environmental action and sustainability as a result of the climate crisis.
And finally, Airwars has updated its Arabic-language Methodology, which can be accessed on our website.
With the past few months heavily focused on Dutch advocacy after the Hawijah scandal broke in October 2019, our deputy director and European advocacy officer have taken the opportunity to reconnect with our partners and allies in France and Belgium. Several digital meetings were held to discuss how civil society in both countries might better encourage progress in terms of transparency and accountability, following our Europe’s Shame investigation in March.
We also held several online roundtable meetings with our Dutch partners to discuss a conceptual roadmap towards greater transparency and accountability from the Dutch Ministry of Defence, which we plan to present to the Ministry in early June.
As a member of the International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), Airwars’ advocacy team also sought with opur partners to improve the forthcoming Political Declaration by nations, which is expected to address the humanitarian harm arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
The US-led Coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria published no monthly civilian harm reports during April. However the Coalition’s civilian casualty assessment team reached out to Airwars on several occasions during the month to request clarification from our specialists on a number of publicly claimed civilian harm events.
The Department of Defense (DoD) informed Congress on May 6th that US forces in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Somalia had between them killed at least 132 civilians and injured 91 more during 2019. The Pentagon also reported a further 79 historical deaths from its actions in Syria and Iraq during 2017-18.
The 22-page Annual Report on Civilian Casualties In Connection With United States Military Operations is the third such public declaration, mandated in law by Congress since 2018.
According to the report – which included details of continuing Pentagon efforts to improve both accountability and transparency for civilian harm – “U.S. forces also protect civilians because it is the moral and ethical thing to do. Although civilian casualties are a tragic and unavoidable part of war, the U.S. military is steadfastly committed to limiting harm to civilians.”
During 2019, the majority of declared civilian deaths from US actions took place in Afghanistan. According to the Pentagon, 108 civilians were killed and 75 injured in 57 incidents. Fourteen of those events involved US ground forces.
That casualty tally represented a significant undercount according to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which has been comprehensively monitoring civilian deaths from all parties for more than a decade. According to UNAMA’s own Annual Report, at least 559 civilians were killed and 786 injured by international military actions during 2019 – almost all by airstrikes.
Table from UNAMA’s 2019 annual report, showing the number of civilian deaths and injuries it believed had resulted from pro-government forces that year.
Officially confirmed civilian deaths from US actions in Iraq and Syria fell steeply – down from 832 fatalities declared to Congress last year, to 101 deaths conceded in the latest report.
That sharp reduction was partly expected, given the significant reduction in battle tempo following the bloody capture of both Mosul and Raqqa in 2017. However, in early 2019 very significant civilian fatalities were locally alleged from Coalition air and artillery strikes during the final stages of the war – only a fraction of which have been admitted.
Of the 73 known civilian harm claims against the US-led Coalition during 2019, Airwars presently estimates that at least 460 and as many as 1,100 non combatants likely died. However in its own report to the Pentagon, the US has conceded just 22 civilian deaths for the year across Iraq and Syria, in eleven events.
The Defense Department’s report reveals other worrying trends. Of the 21 historical cases officially conceded from US actions for 2017 over the past year, 18 had been Airwars referrals. Yet every single allegation referred by Airwars to the Coalition for both 2018 and 2019 was rejected – amounting to many hundreds of dismissed local claims.
According to Airwars director Chris Woods, the apparent move by the US-led Coalition away from engaging with external sources marks a backward step, which the organisation plans to take up with both Congress and DoD officials.
“Almost all of the deaths conceded by the US in Iraq and Syria for 2019 represented self referrals from pilots and analysts, with external sources cited on only three occasions. Many hundreds of civilian deaths which were credibly reported by local communities appear to have been ignored,” says Woods. “This goes against the Pentagon’s repeated promise to engage better with external NGOs including monitors, and we will be asking for an urgent explanation from officials of this apparent backward step.”
The Pentagon’s latest report to Congress also brings further clarity to a controversial June 2017 Coalition attack in Mosul, Iraq which killed 35 members of the same extended family – including 14 children, nine women and two respected imams.
In January 2019 the Australian Defence Force (ADF) accepted responsibility for some of those deaths – confirming that a strike by one of its aircraft had killed between 6 and 18 civilians.
However the ADF also made clear that there was a second attack on the location by another Coalition ally that day – the identity of which was until now not known.
It its May 6th report to Congress, the Pentagon revealed that US aircraft conducted that second strike, additionally killing at least 11 civilians at the scene.
In February 2019, surviving family elder Engineer Amjad al-Saffar told the Sydney Morning Herald: “The level of accuracy of the bombing had always indicated to us that the attack couldn’t have been by Iraqi forces, because the house was targeted twice at the same point without any damage to the neighbouring building, and with very high accuracy.”
Asked to comment from Mosul on the Pentagon’s recent admission that its aircraft too had played a role in the mass casualty event, Engineer Amjad told Airwars: “As a well known and respected Mosul family, we feel both very sad and disappointed to learn of the US’s confession – three years after our catastrophe.- of their own role in an airstrike which killed so many. Along with Australia we hold the US fully responsible for our heavy loss of 35 family members, and demand both an apology and financial compensation.”
Other than this one case, the Pentagon’s report to Congress also revealed that all civilian harm events conceded by the US-led Coalition for Iraq and Syria over the past 12 months had been caused by US forces.
This contrasted with the previous report – which had inadvertently ‘outed’ fourteen strikes by America’s European allies which according to the Coalition itself had killed at least 40 civilians – but which the UK, France and Belgium refused to acknowledge. It remains unclear whether the Coalition’s civilian casualty cell has now ceased assessments of claims against other nations within the alliance.
Photo montage of some of the 35 victims of June 13th 2017 strikes by Australian and US aircraft, courtesy of the Al Saffar family.
Two more civilian deaths from US actions in Somalia were officially conceded on April 27th, as US Africa Command issued its first ever quarterly civilian casualty report. Those same deaths were also reported to Congress two weeks later.
The newly admitted event – which according to local reports involved the death of a father and his child, and the injuring of at least three more civilians – relates to a US strike on the al Shabaab-occupied town of Kunyo Barrow on February 23rd 2019. AFRICOM had originally dismissed the claim. But it reopened an assessment after Airwars submitted a detailed dossier on the incident in January 2020, including what were believed to be precise coordinates for where casualties took place.
The latest admission has doubled both the number of cases and deaths publicly admitted by AFRICOM, during its sometimes controversial 13-year campaign to defeat the regional terror group al Shabaab. However those four deaths remain dwarfed by Airwars’ own current estimate of at least 70 civilians killed in 29 separate US actions in Somalia since 2007.
The US military’s campaign in Somalia has intensified significantly under President Donald Trump, with at least 186 declared actions since 2017 – more than four times the number of strikes officially carried out by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations combined. Local civilian harm claims have also intensified under Trump, with as many as 157 non combatant deaths locally claimed to date.
Until recently AFRICOM had routinely denied any civilian harm from its actions in Somalia – leading to complaints of poor accountability. In April 2019, AFRICOM conceded its first civilian casualty event – though also had to admit to misleading Congress on the issue. Three months later, General Stephen Townsend took command.
When previously head of the US-led Coalition against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Townsend had overseen key transparency reforms including the publishing of regular civilian harm reports; and routine engagement with external casualty monitors such as Airwars. Those same key reforms are now being implemented at AFRICOM.
Here's the precise geolocation work that our Airwars specialists recently provided @USAFRICOM for the Kunyo Barrow strike – and which likely played a role in today's Credible determination. pic.twitter.com/idlgKAHz0f
— Airwars (@airwars) April 27, 2020
As the COVID-19 pandemic morphed into the most widespread global public health crisis in a century, there were growing calls for an end to conflicts around the world in order to give public authorities the respite needed to manage the crisis. This, along with Turkey’s unprecedented intervention in Idlib at the end of February, prompted Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan to hold high-level talks in Moscow on March 5th. Six hours of negotiation concluded with a ceasefire agreement, which would take hold the next day.
As part of the deal, a security corridor 6km north and 6km south of Idlib’s key M4 motorway, which connects the government-held cities of Aleppo and Latakia, would be created and joint Turkish-Russian patrols along the M4 would take place. According to local sources, there were reports of Syrian Regime bombardment on the first day of the ceasefire on the towns of al-Ziyarah, Bara and Sarmin. However, from March 7th onwards, the ceasefire was largely maintained by both sides. As a result, Airwars researchers reported no civilian harm allegations attributed to Russian airstrikes after March 5th.
However before the ceasefire came into effect, Airwars tracked 10 locally reported civilian harm events that were both solely and partially attributed to Russia. Of these strikes, seven targeted areas in Idlib governorate, while two took place in Aleppo and one strike hit an area in Hama.
Unsurprisingly, this represented a dramatic decline in alleged civilian harm incidents attributed to Russia duringFebruary. In total, across these 10 new incidents in March, between 32 and 48 civilians were allegedly killed by Russian strikes – in comparison to between 182 and 226 civilians who were reportedly killed the previous month. Among the latest victims were up to 12 children and 7 women. Up to 86 further non-combatants were reportedly wounded during the month by Russian military actions.
While the number of casualties was significantly lower, it is important to note that the number of civilian fatalities per incident was actually higher this month than in February. In March, on average up to 4.8 civilians were killed per incident – more than double the fatality rate per incident for February, which stood at 2.1. This suggests that a greater proportion of strikes took place in densely populated areas where the risk of civilian harm was high.
On March 1st four civilian harm incidents took place. Two occurred in Aleppo governorate (the towns of Kafar Natin and al-Sahara), one took place in the town of Qatoun in Hama, and one in Batneta in Idlib. All the other incidents during March took place in Idlib.
Two of the most devastating airstrikes occurred in al-Fou’a on March 2nd and in Idlib city. In al-Fou’a, local reports estimate that up to 11 civilians were killed and 15 more injured in an attack. The day after in al-Thalatheen Street in Idlib city, up to nine civilians were killed and 21 more were injured after Russian warplanes and Regime forces based in Saraqib allegedly targeted a building sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs). According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, three members of the Hamdou family were killed including two children named Rimas and Shahem.
However, the most deadly attack this month came on March 5th, on the day Presidents Putin and Erdogan held their talks in Moscow. This alleged Russian airstrike, which many local sources described as a “massacre” hit a shelter for displaced families in Ma’arat Masrin in the northern countryside of Idlib, killing up to 16 civilians and injuring another 32. As many as five children were among the dead, as well as seven women.
طائرات الاحتلال الروسي تقتل 16 مدنياً في "معرة مصرين" بريف #إدلبhttps://t.co/XihIwSITOg#سوريا #روسيا pic.twitter.com/qSwChrSJL3
— الائتلاف الوطني السوري (@SyrianCoalition) March 5, 2020
The deal signed between Presidents Putin and Erdogan in Moscow on March 5th effectively saw the end of Turkish military actions in Idlib and northwest Syria. However, there were several reports of civilian harm incidents that were attributed to Turkish actions in other parts of Syria after March 5th. In fact, despite the ceasefire in Idlib and Turkey supposedly de-escalating its intervention in Syria, Aiwars reported a slight rise in alleged Turkish civilian harm incidents in the month of March – though with a lower death toll from these actions compared to February.
According to local reports, as many as 10 civilian harm incidents allegedly resulted from Turkish-led actions, resulting in 4 civilian deaths and injuring up to 27 others. In comparison, February saw nine civilian harm incidents, resulting in six civilian deaths and the injuring of up to 22 others. Furthermore, children appeared to bear the brunt of these recent attacks, as three of the four civilian deaths reported were below the age of 17.
Three days before the ceasefire deal was signed, on March 2nd pro-Regime sources claimed that Turkish-led shelling on the town of Jourin in Hama had resulted in the deaths of a woman and a child, and the injuring of seven other civilians. This incident resulted in the most civilian casualties out of all Turkish incidents alleged this month.
https://twitter.com/HarbiehNadie/status/1234552547345666050
According to Airwars data, alleged Turkish-led attacks on civilians spiked in the last week of March. Half of the incidents recorded took place during that week. On March 23rd, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that an elderly man was injured in an artillery attack allegedly carried out by Turkish backed forces on the village of Um al-Hawaash in northern Aleppo. Two days later, Turkish-backed Faylaq al-Majd forces allegedly stormed the village of Sukariya in Tal Abyad district, injuring four people, including a child. On that same day, a child was killed and two others were injured in an alleged Turkish landmine explosion in the village of Zaytouna in Tal Abyad countryside. The following day, March 26th, Turkish forces stationed near Azaz reportedly fired rockets towards Tal Rifaat, injuring two civilians displaced from Afrin.
Image via ANF of a child who was injured following alleged Turkish shelling on the village of Sheikh Issa in Shehba, Aleppo.
Airwars researchers tracked four alleged civilian harm incidents linked to Kurdish counterfire actions in Syria in March – the name number of incidents reported in February. However, significantly more civilian deaths were reported. As many as seven civilians were allegedly killed from Kurdish actions compared to only one death tracked the previous month. Additionally, between 12 and 25 civilians were reportedly injured in these attacks.
The most deadly incident took place on March 18th in the city of Afrin. According to Al Modon news, YPG forces allegedly launched five mortars on various areas in the centre of Afrin. Two shells fell near the Dersem Hospital in Al-Failat Street, and two more near the Al Shifa’ Hospital near Mazout Street, witha shell also landing on Mazout Street. These attacks resulted in five civilian deaths, including two children, and injured up to 17 others. The Syrian Human Rights Committee published the names of the two children killed – Abdullah Al-Sayyid (10 years old) and Khaled Al-Daba’an (12 years old).
Image via Jesser Press showing the aftermath of the attack on Afrin city on March 18th.
March was yet another relatively quiet month for the US-led coalition in Syria, with no allegations of civilian harm attributed to the International Coalition. The Coalition declared a total of 28 strikes in Syria and Iraq in the month of March. In Iraq, 20 strikes were conducted against ISIS targets, killing 10 militants, CJTFOIR asserted. Meanwhile in Syria, the Coalition launched eight strikes against ISIS targets.
However, March did see a renewal of claims of unilateral actions by the United States. There were reports of at least four airstrikes in eastern Syria, all of which hit areas in Al Bukamal in the Deir Ezzor Governorate. The first set of strikes of the month took place on March 11th on the villages of Al-Suwayyah, Al-Heri, and the Green Belt near the city of Al Bukamal. These airstrikes reportedly targeted sites belonging to Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups such as Harakat al-Nujaba, the Sayed Al-Shuhada Brigades, and the Haydarioun Brigade. The next day saw another set of airstrikes against the same targets in Al Bukamal. One week later, on March 19th, there were reports that the US hit targets belonging to Iranian-backed groups in Albu-Kamal. Finally, on March 24th, US airstrikes once again allegedly targeted Hezbollah positions in the Albu-Kamal area. It should be cautioned that Israel has continued to conduct its own strikes in Syria against Iranian- and regime-linked targets, and the US has not confirmed any unilateral actions, despite local claims.
In Iraq, the US launched airstrikes in the early hours of March 13th on five sites, where rockets and other weapons were stored by Kata’ib Hezbollah. These strikes came in retaliation against a rocket attack that killed two Americans and a British soldier and wounded 14 others at Camp Taji, an Iraqi military base north of Baghdad. That attack was allegedly carried out by a group known as Isabat al-Tha’ireen, believed allied to other Iran-backed groups in Iraq. According to Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, the head of the US military’s Central Command, one of the five sites attacked by the US in response was a weapons storage site at an airfield in Karbala. However, local reports asserted that the airstrikes hit an unfinished civilian airport, killing three Iraqi soldiers, two police officers and a civilian worker named Kerrar Sabbar.
Image via @AIaaAIaabadi of Karrar, a guard at the Karbala International Airport, who was reportedly sleeping in one of the airport’s halls at the time of the attack, and was killed.
Allegations of civilian harm in Libya remained stable compared to February. Between 17 and 19 civilians were reported killed, a slight decrease on the previous month’s 18 to 23 deaths The number of locally reported strikes increased however by 33% – up from 128 to 163.
The great majority of civilian harm incidents were attributed to the Libyan National Army (LNA). As Khalifa Haftar’s forces lost the ability to conduct drone strikes on Tripoli due to improved Turkish air defence it resorted mostly to artillery shelling, allegedly resulting in 16 to 18 civilian deaths. Altogether 58 LNA actions were recorded, nearly all of them artillery strikes.
In the worst locally reported incident of the month, four civilians, three of them children, were allegedly killed by an LNA artillery strike on Ain Zara on March 19th.
March saw the return of Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones over Libya, helping the GNA (Government of National Accord) to regain some ground. Airwars recorded 20 GNA or Turkish strikes, allegedly leading to one civilian death and two injuries on March 28th.
A large number of strikes could not be attributed once again, most of them indiscriminate artillery shelling often hitting residential areas. Some 81 strikes were conducted by unknown belligerents and two more were contested between the GNA and LNA, reportedly resulting in two civilian injuries.
Image via Tk Yahroug Kl shy of Smoke rising over the Hadaba project area of Tripoli after shelling on March 25th 2020.
In March Airwars monitored 15 claimed US actions in Somalia, one more than in February and all of which were airstrikes. AFRICOM officially declared 11 strikes in public press releases.
Between four and eight civilians were allegedly killed in three civilian harm events and two more civilians allegedly injured.
In the worst locally reported incident between four and six civilians were said to have been killed by an airstrike near Janaale on a minibus on March 10th.
The Intercept investigated the event and reported that 13-year-old Abdi Farhan Mahmoud and 70-year-old Abdirahman Ali Waadhoor were among the victims. The magazine spoke to Wadhoor’s son who said that his “father is a disabled man. He never had a problem with anyone.”
AFRICOM initially said it killed five Al Shabaab terrorists. It added however that it was currently reviewing information about alleged civilian harm.
In early March, Airwars also held constructive talks at the Pentagon in Washington DC with senior US defence officials, on its new Somalia monitoring project and civilian harm concerns.
Image via Somali Memo of a minibus allegedly destroyed by a US strike near Janaale on March 10th, 2020, which reportedly killed several civilians.
According to CENTCOM, there were no US military strikes during March 2020 in Yemen. The last publicly declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province. Airwars researchers also tracked no local claims of US actions in Yemen during the month.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during January. The last such reported US strike was in August 2018.
During March, the US-led Coalition fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria released two monthly civilian casualty reports – covering respectively up until January and February 2020. Of the 79 historical local Iraqi and Syrian allegations reviewed by the Coalition, only one was determined to be credible – a disappointing tally.
In total to March 31st 2020, the US and its allies had conceded at least 1,377 civilian deaths from their actions across Iraq and Syria since 2014.
The one case conceded by the Coalition in March was an Iraqi event which had previously been flagged by Airwars to CJTFOIR. On September 27th 2015, an unknown aircraft had struck the town of Duquq, killing at least seven civilians according to local reports. Almost five years on, the alliance finally accepted responsibility, noting that “Coalition aircraft conducted an airstrike against Daesh fighters. Regrettably, seven civilians were unintentionally killed as a result of the strike.”
Just prior to the global travel lockdown, Airwars also joined several other international NGOs and agencies in Washington DC, for roundtable talks with Acting US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Dr James Anderson, and other senior officials. The meeting was part of an ongoing Department of Defense policy review into civilian harm reduction, which is expected later in 2020.
Airwars was also a signatory to new civil society guidance for a model DoD policy on civilian harm, which included six policy papers directed at different aspects of casualty mitigation.
Airwars attended both multilateral and unilateral talks at the Pentagon in March (Creative Commons image via Wiyre Media)
On March 10th, our European advocacy officer attended the European Forum on Armed Drones meeting in Brussels, where we presented on our new Somalia database to some of our European partners.
Airwars’ deputy director also engaged in talks with EU officials on their Concept of Protection of Civilians in EU-led Military Operations and provided our expert knowledge on matters such as civilian harm, the protection of civilians, and civilian harm mitigation.
On March 15th, Airwars published a major investigation with international media partners on how key European allies are denying dozens of civilian deaths from their own actions in Syria and Iraq, despite the US-led Coalition finding these civilian harm claims to be credible. The nine-month-investigation with Belgian newspaper De Morgen, French newspaper Liberation, the BBC and RTL Netherlands revealed some shocking facts about how Belgium, France and the UK routinely deny civilian harm from their own military actions.
This past month we also published our analysis of newly declassified documents released by the Dutch Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and the Netherlands Public Prosecutor’s Office, which revealed a number of concerning facts about Dutch airstrikes on Hawijah and Mosul in 2015, in which dozens of civilians were killed.
The article further revealed that Airwars recently learned that at least one other ally within the US-led Coalition had refused to conduct the Hawijah strike based on the available intelligence. Our publication caused Dutch Members of Parliament to raise questions with the Minister of Defence. Throughout March, Airwars also continued to work alongside our Dutch partners to pursue accountability for Hawijah and Mosul victims, and to improve the Netherland government’s transparency and accountability policies.
Airwars continued its advocacy work with the UK government in a bid to push for greater military accountability regarding civilian harm and working with partners towards that aim.
Airwars engaged with DFID on our extensive research database as well as our methodology for assessing civilian harm, whilst also discussing possible ways to expand engagement with the UK government on the protection of civilians in conflict.
Airwars also participated in a meeting with organisations such Save the Children, ICRC, UNA-UK Association, War Child, Protection Approaches and others in the Protection of Civilians Working group, to develop lines of engagement with the UK government on its own Protection of Civilian strategy. And the Security Alternative Policy Network’s accountability working group, of which Airwars is a part, held its first call in March, where members agreed on a series of action points and future steps.
At the end of March, Airwars additionally attended a virtual global conference organised by Crisis Action regarding the call for a global ceasefire by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. This morphed into a global campaign to push for a global ceasefire to allow countries better to confront COVID-19 global pandemic.
The month of February saw Russian airstrikes again ravage northwestern Syria, as the Syrian Regime continued its offensive in the governorates of Idlib and western Aleppo. For the first half of the month, Russia’s air campaign focused heavily on western Aleppo as regime forces attempted to capture the last remaining territory held by Syrian rebels in the province. The air campaign allowed Regime forces, on February 7th, to push through and take the strategic city of Saraqib, which had served as a bastion against the Assad Government since the early days of the Syrian Revolution. Meanwhile, heavy bombardment in western Aleppo allowed government forces to sweep through and take the last remaining rebel-held areas in Aleppo’s western periphery on February 16th, for the first time in over seven years.
In total, Airwars tracked 109 civilian harm events locally reported during the month of February that were both solely and partially attributed to Russia. Of these strikes, 52 targeted areas in Aleppo, while 57 took place in Idlib governorate.
This represented a nine per cent rise on the 100 events tracked in January 2020. In total, across these 109 new incidents, between 182 and 226 civilians were allegedly killed by Russian strikes – a notable increase from January, when between 145 and 213 civilians were allegedly killed. Among the victims were as many as 55 children and 32 women. Up to 404 further non-combatants were reportedly wounded during the month by Russian military actions.
The tempo of strikes and civilian harm were at their most intense at the beginning of the month, as Syrian regime forces made their most significant advances of the campaign in Idlib and Aleppo. There were an average of 5.5 daily alleged civilian harm incidents in the first week of February. This intensity somewhat lowered as the month wore on to 3.6 daily civilian harm allegations in the last week of the month.
Civilian deaths in Aleppo and Idlib spiked between February 8th and 11th and again on February 25th and 26th, as locals reported a series of mass casualty incidents. In the two days of February 25th-26th alone, Airwars researchers monitored up to 42 civilian deaths and as many as 81 injuries.
The city of Idlib saw two of the most significant mass casualty incidents of the month. On February 6th, Russain warplanes allegedly targeted a van in the Sheikh Thulth neighbourhood killing at least ten people including an ambulance driver, and wounding three others. Just five days later, a deadly airstrike reportedly carried out by Russian warplanes hit the al-Sinaa neighbourhood in Idlib, killing as many as 16 civilians and injuring up to 33 more – the worst incident recorded in the month of February. According to SMART News Agency, among those who perished were seven children. Jala Street and the industrial zones in the al-Sinaa neighbourhood were reportedly reduced to rubble following the deadly attack.
Destruction in the Sinaa neighbourhood in Idlib city following alleged Russian airstrikes on February 11th, 2020 (via Edlib Media Center)
Children were also among the main victims of mass casualty attacks in western Aleppo province. In the village of Abin Samaan, up to 12 civilians were killed, including six children; and up to 20 others were wounded in a series of four airstrikes allegedly carried out by Russian warplanes on a residential area of the village. Abin Samaan had reportedly been a refuge to hundreds of displaced persons fleeing conflict in the province.
The indiscriminate aerial bombardment of Idlib and Aleppo also resulted in another catastrophic wave of displacement. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, by the end of February, at least 950,000 people were forced from their homes as a direct result of the offensive, which began in December.
In February, Turkey took a more active role in the conflict in northwestern Syria, beginning with retaliation against the Syrian Regime’s attacks on Turkish soldiers, and artillery support for Syrian rebel counter-offensives against the Assad Government’s advances – actions which slowly escalated into a fully-fledged military operation in Idlib against Damascus.
By February 12th, Turkey had stationed 30,000 troops at the Syrian border, and sent 5,000 soldiers as reinforcements to Idlib as well as establishing new defensive positions around Idlib city, bringing the total number of troops in the governorate to 9,000. However, a joint Russian-Syrian airstrike on a Turkish Army convoy in Balyun, which killed at least 34 Turkish soldiers – the single deadliest attack on Turkish forces since the start of their involvement in the Syrian Civil War – proved to be a key turning point, and resulted in the beginning of Operation Spring Shield. On February 28th, the Turkish Ministry of Defence claimed that it had struck 200 Syrian Government targets and killed 309 allied forces throughout Greater Idlib, forcing Russia and the Syrian Government to agree to new ceasefire terms.
Meanwhile, Airwars reported a rise in civilian harm allegations from Turkish actions in Syria. According to local reports, as many as nine civilian harm incidents allegedly resulted from Turkish-led actions, resulting in six civilian deaths and the injuring up to 22 others. This was a significant rise from the one alleged death from Turkish actions reported in January 2020.
Coinciding with Turkey’s increased involvement in the conflict in Syria, six of the nine Turkish-led civilian harm allegations took place in the last week of the month. On February 25th, local Kurdsh news outlets reported that the Turkish army and allied forces shelled the village of Aqiba, killing three civilians and injuring three others. All those killed were from the same family: Seroşet Mihemed Hesen (12 years old), Fatma Ali (46 years old) and Hesen Izet Mihemed (55 years old).
A few days later, on February 28th, Turkish forces stationed at the Sheikh Nasser base reportedly launched rocket attacks on various areas in the town of al-Arima, west of Manbij. The attack also targeted Regime forces, killing four soldiers and injuring at least five others.
Civilians killed in the Akibe village as a result of alleged Turkish shelling (via @Karl_hakon)
Airwars researchers tracked four alleged civilian harm incidents linked to Kurdish counterfire actions in Syria in February, twice the number of cases reported in January. However, despite this increase, there was only civilian death reported, compared to the five deaths tracked the previous month. Additionally, between 22 and 24 civilians were reportedly injured as a result of YPG actions.
Three of the four civilian harm incidents took place on February 4th and 5th. At least one civilian was reportedly killed and thirteen others, among them five children, were reportedly injured in alleged YPG artillery strikes on the Al Ittehad al Arabi school in Afrin city on February 4th, 2020. Shabha Press reported that the artillery attack caused material damages to the school, while an educational course was taking place. The Syrian Civil Defence in Aleppo published the names of five of the injured children – Mervan Ali (8 years old), Qutaiba al-Quwatli (5 years old), Ryan Pasha (14 years old), Muhammad Salih al-Muhammad (15 years old) and Ali Arour (2 years old).
On that same day, another civilian harm incident took place in the village of al-Mihsinli near the city of Jarablus in eastern Aleppo, where up to three civilians were injured. The next day saw another attack on Azaz, injuring four civilians, including a woman and three children.
جرحى وأضرار مادية جراء استهداف ميليشيا PYD لمدرسة "الشريعة" في مدينة #عفرين شمال #حلب براجمات الصواريخ. pic.twitter.com/2RbN7gyUnH
— شهبا برس (@ShahbaPress) February 4, 2020
Images of the damage caused by an alleged YPG rocket attack on a school in northern Aleppo, February 4th 2020
On February 12th, the US-led Coalition was blamed for one civilian harm event in the Khirbet Amo area in the city of Qamishli, in Syria’s Hasaka province. According to local reports, the incident occurred after Coalition forces on patrol encountered a Syrian Regime checkpoint, whereupon dozens of locals began protesting the presence of US-led forces in the area. According to SANA, a pro-regime outlet, locals then began throwing stones at the patrol vehicles. According to reports by Shabha Press, some of the protesters were carrying light weapons This reportedly prompted Coalition forces to open fire, killing a civilian and wounding another.
The Coalition declared a total of 18 strikes in Syria and Iraq in the month of February. In Iraq, 10 strikes were conducted against ISIS targets, killing 16 militants, CJTFOIR asserted. Meanwhile in Syria, the Coalition launched eight strikes against ISIS targets. Airwars did not track any other unilateral strikes carried out by the US during the month.
According to AFCENT, 85 munitions were fired from the air over Iraq and Syria during the month. This represented a 25% increase from January, where only 68 munitions were released.
Official data from US Air Force Central Command showed 85 munitions were fired by Coalition aircraft during February 2020.
The number of civilian casualties from air and artillery rose slightly in Libya compared to January. Between 18 and 23 civilian deaths were reported, marking a 13% increase on the previous month. This was despite the number of reported strikes falling by 32%, from 189 to 128.
The Libyan National Army (LNA) allegedly conducted 46 of these actions, leading to between 8 and 13 civilian deaths. In the worst incident, between two and three civilians were reportedly killed by shelling on the Al Shok area of Tripoli on February 4th.
The Government of National Accord (GNA) and Turkey conducted 15 air and artillery strikes in February, according to local sources. One of the attacks led to civilian casualties, when a Turkish drone allegedly killed five civilians from one family in Castelverde on February 27th.
As the majority of strikes in Libya were allegedly being conducted by artillery at this time – continuing a trend from late January – it has become increasingly difficult to determine responsibility. A further 61 strikes were conducted by unknown forces; and another six were contested between the GNA and LNA. Between them, these led to five reported civilian deaths.
February was again marked by blatant violations of the UN arms embargo by both the UAE and Turkey. The continued fighting also led to a temporary suspension of ceasefire talks between the GNA and LNA.
Civilian being treated after injury sustained from alleged LNA shelling on Tripoli on February 4th, 2020 (via Tk Yahroug Kl shy).
On February 25th, Airwars published a major new resource for Somalia, tracking declared and alleged US counter terrorism actions in the country since 2007.
The nine month review identified significantly higher levels of locally reported civilian harm than previously thought, with up to 280 non combatants allegedly killed in US actions since 2007. Declared US actions and reported militant deaths were also sharply up.
For February 2020 only, Airwars tracked 14 claimed US actions in Somalia, all of which were publicly declared by US Africa Command. Among these were four locally alleged civilian harm events, which between them were said to have killed two civilians and injured seven others.
In the worst incident, a young disabled woman locally named as Nurto Kusow Omar Abukar died and three of her relatives were injured, after a US strike allegedly hit the town of Jilib in Middle Juba on February 2nd.
CENTCOM told Airwars that there were no US military strikes during February 2020 in Yemen. The last publicly declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province. Airwars researchers reported no US actions in Yemen during the month.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during January. The last such alleged strike was in August 2018.
Airwars deputy director Dmytro Chupryna presented in Poland at the 13th Europe-Ukraine Forum, titled ‘New Possibilities, New Threats’, on February 2nd-4th. Dmytro was on the discussion panel ‘Strength lays in numbers’, which aimed to explore security dilemmas in Central and Eastern Europe. The conversation focused on how a data-focused approach can help change military narratives in understanding civilian harm and broader protection of civilians, defence and security-related issues.
On February 6th, Airwars also published an interview by our Dutch conflict researcher and advocacy officer Laurie Treffers, with the authors of Missie F-16. The book interviewed pilots who were active as part of the US-led Coalition against ISIS and deals – surprisingly frankly – with pilot concern about civilian harm. The interview illustrated the likelihood that greater transparency could also significantly improve the experience of pilots once they return from the battlefield.
In February, Airwars director, Chris Woods participated in the conference ‘Conflict Reporting in the 21st Century’, organised by Action of Armed Violence (AOAV) and Birkbeck, University of London. This brought together leading conflict reporters, academics, photojournalists, film makers and investigators to discuss the main challenges and issues facing contemporary conflict reporting. Chris presented at the session ‘Civilians in modern war’ explaining the concept of all source monitoring and the vital work of Airwars into civilian harm from military actions.
Airwars Deputy Director, Dmytro Chupryna, at the Forum (Via Foundation Institute for Eastern Studies)
During January, Russia continued to bombard Idlib in support of the Assad government’s ongoing offensive. From the third week of the month, Russia’s air campaign also focused significantly on rebel-held areas of western Aleppo – resulting in further civilian harm.
In total, Airwars tracked 100 civilian harm events locally reported during January to have been carried out by Moscow alone or in partnership with the Assad regime -54 of which were in Idlib and 46 events in Aleppo.
This represented a 15% rise on the 87 events tracked in December 2019. In total, across these 100 January events, between 145 and 213 civilians were locally alleged killed – compared to between 132 and 170 such deaths during the previous month. Of these January numbers, as many as 77 were children and 31 women. Up to 548 further non-combatants were reportedly wounded during the month by Russian actions.
The tempo of strikes and civilian harm rose as the month wore on, as Syrian regime forces continued to advance in southern Idlib. Civilian harm events reported in Aleppo governorate spiked between January 16th and 24th . In the two days of January 20th to 21st alone, Airwars researchers monitored 20 incidents in Aleppo (20% of the entire month’s events). Of the 145 minimum claimed deaths during January, some 41% were in the province of Aleppo.
Once more, we saw reports of entire families killed. On January 21st, nine civilians including a family of six reportedly died in Russian or regime airstrikes on Kafr Ta’al village in the Western Aleppo countryside. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the airstrikes targeted a farm near the village. Shahba Press said that six children and their parents were among those killed. One victim was identified as 22-year-old Mustafa Jdou’e.
On the same day, January 21st, ten civilians including up to six children died and as many as 42 more non-combatants were wounded in alleged Russian airstrikes on the town of Kafr Nuran. The Local Coordination Committees of Syria reported that the bombing occurred around 4:35 PM local time. They published the names of nine dead civilians, including at least two children. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that “residential buildings and gatherings of displaced people” were deliberately bombed. Among the victims were eight members of the Al-Hassan family; and three members of the Al-Qusair family.
A man crying on site after alleged Russian airstrikes in the town of Kafr Nuran, Aleppo governorate, on January 21st 2020 (via Macro Media Center)
As with previous months, January also saw major civilian harm incidents in Idlib. In the worse incident, between 10 and 19 civilians including at least four children and two women were reportedly killed and more than 20 non-combatants injured after alleged Russian or Syrian regime airstrikes on the town of Kafr Lata on January 29th. According to the Smart News Agency, “Russian warplanes launched a four-missile attack on civilian homes, a mosque and a road for the displaced in the village”.
Destroyed vehicle after alleged Russian or Syrian regime airstrikes on the town of Kafr Lata on January 29th 2020 (via Syrian Civil Defence Aleppo)
In January, Airwars continued to monitor sporadic allegations of civilian harm from Turkish actions in Syria. Our current assessment is that one civilian likely died and two or three more were wounded across three events. This is a sharp fall from the 12 likely deaths tracked during December 2019.
On January 1st, one civilian, named as Ammar Alhaji, was reportedly shot dead by members of the al Majd Brigade of the Syrian National Army in Tal Abyad, Raqqa governorate. Euphrates Post said the victim was a taxi diver. According to Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, “the man was shot dead while he was trying to prevent fighters of Turkish-backed Al-Majd Legion from stealing his car.” Civilians took to the streets to protest in response to the alleged killing.
Protests in Tal Abyad following the death of Ammar Al-Haji, January 1st 2020 (via RBSS)
Up to three more civilians were likely wounded in two further events in Syria. On January 9th, one or two non-combatants were harmed when Turkish drones allegedly targeted an SDF Asayish (Kurdish Public Security Forces) checkpoint at the entrance of Ain Issa town, in Raqqa governorate.
Two days later, on January 11th, a woman, named as Zainab Mahmoud Hamada, was reportedly injured in Turkish artillery strikes on the village of Bashranda, Aleppo governorate, according to sources on the ground.
The woman Zainab Mahmoud Hamada back in her home after receiving medical help after being injured in a Turkish attack on the village of Bashranda, Aleppo governorate, on January 11th, 2020 (via Hawar News).
Likely deaths from Kurdish counterfire in Syria outweighed deaths from Turkish actions during January. Our researchers tracked two civilian harm events assessed as likely carried out by YPG forces, killing between three and five civilians and injuring 18 more.
Between two and four civilians including at least one child and one woman were killed and up to five more wounded in alleged YPG artillery strikes on the city of Afrin, Aleppo governorate on January 20th, local media reported. According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights, the child Muhammad Mar’i and Mrs. Turfah Meqdeh died. Additionally, @abowaelo tweeted a photo of a baby in the hospital, stating that the mother of the child was killed during the shelling earlier that day and that doctors managed to save the child by a cesarean operation on the deceased mother.
Syrian Civil Defence volunteers carrying a wounded or killed person after alleged YPG artillery strikes on Afrin, Aleppo governorate, on January 20th 2020 (via Syrian Network for Human Rights).
On January 29th, again in Afrin, local sources reported that one child died ad 13 more civilians, all adult males, were injured in alleged YPG artillery strikes on residential areas of the city. The White Helmets named the boy as 13-year-old Ahmed Tammam Qatayerji.
In January, for the first time since anti-ISIS operations began in August 2014, there were no civilian harm events attributed to the US-led Coalition against so-called Islamic State.
The Coalition said it had conducted just one strike in Iraq and seven strikes in Syria during January. The Iraq strike consisted of “one illumination mission for force protection”. The highly controversial unilateral US strike that killed Iran’s most powerful military commander, Gen Qasem Soleimani at Baghdad International Airport on January 3rd, was not counted in the monthly tally.
According to AFCENT, just 68 munitions were fire from the air over Iraq and Syria during January – a 57% fall on December 2019, and the lowest number of munitions fired in any one month since the start of Coalition actions against ISIS in August 2014.
Airwars continued to track reports of alleged US unilateral strikes in Syria during January; there were three reported unilateral strikes on Iran-backed groups, but no associated claims of civilian harm.
Official data from US Air Force Central Command showed the lowest munitions fired of the entire war, during January 2020.
The number of reported civilian casualties and airstrikes in Libya slightly fell in January from the previous month. While in December Airwars recorded 189 strikes and between 25 and 29 civilian deaths, January saw 117 strikes, and 16 reported civilian fatalities.
Those decreases can be explained by a very shaky truce between the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) which started on January 12th. In the first days after the agreement, both parties mostly abided by the agreement. But on January 16th repeated violations by both parties began, with 39 air and artillery strikes reported until the end of the month. It is worth pointing out that the majority of these strikes were conducted by artillery, unlike during previous months where airpower had dominated.
During the truce, international backers reportedly violated the arms embargo on several occasions – despite promising to stop at the Berlin peace conference on January 18th. Turkey apparently equipped the GNA with better air defences, rendering it difficult for the LNA to strike by plane or drone around Tripoli.
Bcos of #Turkey, it is no longer easy for the #LNA coalition to utilize airstrikes. LNA tried on Jan 28—& the drone was downed.
W/in this new context, #GNA coalition today launched a land offensive into #LNA’s Qasr bin Ghashir presence.
How will the #LNA manage to thwart these?
— Jalel Harchaoui جلال حرشاوي (@JMJalel_H) February 9, 2020
Overall, local sources reported 60 air and artillery strikes by the LNA or its ally the United Arab Emirates throughout January, reportedly killing 13 civilians. The GNA and Turkey allegedly conducted 15 strikes between them, reportedly resulting in one civilian death.
As many of the strikes reported in January were indiscriminate artillery shelling, attribution of responsibility was difficult. For 36 strikes during the month, no belligerent could be determined. Another four strikes were contested between the GNA and LNA; these reportedly killed three civilians.
Abdelhak Al-Maghrabi, allegedly killed by LNA shelling on Tripoli on January 25th, 2020 (via Hona Souq Al-Khmies)
On February 25th, Airwars launched a major new online resource on Somalia providing the most comprehensive look yet at US counter terrorism actions in eastern Africa, and associated civilian harm claims.
Meanwhile AFRICOM informed Airwars that it had conducted six airstrikes in Somalia during January – all against al-Shabaab. It stated that no civilians were harmed in these strikes. However local communities reported differently.
In its first declared action in Somalia of 2020, AFRICOM said that a strike on January 3rd killed al-Shabaab terrorists near Bacaw.
A January 16th strike near Qunyo Barrow killed two terrorists, while three more al-Shabaab fighters died in a January 19th strike near Bangeeni, Lower Juba.
During several days of fighting in Middle Juba, US forces conducted an airstrike on January 26th which targeted and reportedly destroyed an al-Shabaab compound in the vicinity of Jamaame.
Additionally, on January 27th, US Africa Command declared on the same day that it had conducted an airstrike on al Shabaab in the vicinity of Jilib, which it said had killed one militant. However, it was later reported that a 20-year old farmer named Mohamed Moalim was killed in the strike, with the location given as Hoombooy.
Relatives of the victim told Somali Memo that he was killed a “drone strike while planting a sesame field.” They added that he was “killed near some trees” and that only a “few parts of his body” were found.
https://twitter.com/MoradNews/status/1222465061282893824?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1222465061282893824&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fairwars.org%2Fcivilian-casualties%2F%3Fcountry%3Dsomalia%26belligerent%3Dus-forces%26search%3DUSSOM272-c
The last strike of the month was on January 29th, on an al Shabaab compound in Jilib. One al-Shabaab terrorist was killed, according to AFRICOM.
https://twitter.com/imukhtaar/status/1222463541711659009?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1222463541711659009&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fairwars.org%2Fcivilian-casualties%2F%3Fsearch%3DUSSOM273%26belligerent%3Dus-forces%26country%3Dsomalia
In addition, the US was implicated in several other events during January – though none had associated civilian harm claims. On January 7th, US troops were said to have participated in a ground operation together with Somali forces in Lafta Anole. This reportedly led to 35 dead Al Shabaab fighters. Xinhua also reported an airstrike without specifying who conducted it.
Between one and three Al Shabaab militants were allegedly killed on January 16th in Wanlaweyn, when government forces raided a house. It was unclear whether US forces took part in the attack.
And on January 22nd US airstrikes allegedly supported Somali forces near Hargessa Yarey in Middle Juba, killing several Al Shabaab members. On the same day US strikes allegedly targeted Saakow, reportedly killing several Al Shabab militants. However, in an email exchange with Airwars on February 4th 2020, an official stated said that AFRICOM did not conduct “any kinetic operations” on January 22nd.
CENTCOM told Airwars that there were no US military strikes during January 2020 in Yemen. The last declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province.
It is not known how many actions the CIA conducted in Yemen during the month, if any.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during January. The last such alleged strike was in August 2018.
After several wonderful years of Airwars’ Netherlands-based advocacy officer being embedded in the offices of PAX For Peace, our Dutch advocacy officer moved into the office of the Utrecht Centre of Global Challenges at Utrecht University at the beginning of January.
Our new partnership is similar to Airwars’ ongoing collaboration with Goldsmiths, University of London in the UK. We look forward to exchanging knowledge and experience with the Centre, which accommodates for example the Intimacies of Remote Warfare project. PAX will remain a crucial partner of Airwars in the Netherlands, and we look forward to future collaboration with their exceptional Protection of Civilians team in particular.
On January 28th, Airwars UK, Airwars Stichting, and our Dutch partners met with the Netherlands Ministry of Defence in The Hague, at the invitation of the Ministry. In the wake of the Hawijah scandal, the Ministry of Defence has shown some willingness to critically revise its transparency policies. We are hoping to launch a similar process in the Netherlands to Airwars’ engagement with the Pentagon’s current civilian harm reduction review. We therefore aim to share our knowledge, to help militaries improve their civilian harm monitoring and hopefully, in turn, reduce casualties on the battlefield.
During January, Airwars took on a key role within SPA-N (the Security Policy Alternative Network). This important resource includes civil society organisations, activists, foundations, researchers and other experts working together to challenge securitised responses to crises and threats, and promotes alternative security policies and approaches that promote peace, human rights and development.
The group brings expertise from among others, the Open Society Foundation, the Quaker Council for European Affairs, the Conflict Analysis Research Centre, OSIWA, BUCOFORE, and the Oxford Research Group, in addition to Saferworld which began the initiative.
November saw an alarming escalation in reported harm from Russia’s ongoing Idlib campaign, which once more left noncombatants trapped on the ground and in great peril. Overall, Airwars researchers tracked 77 locally claimed civilian harm events allegedly carried out by Moscow and/or the Assad regime in November – all but four of which were in Idlib. This was more than four times the 18 incidents tracked during October – and represented the greatest number of claimed Russian events in any one month since August 2019.
In total, across these 77 November events, between 108 and 124 civilians were locally alleged killed – compared to between 23 and 31 such deaths during the previous month. More alarmingly, of these November tolls as many as 35 children and 23 women were claimed killed – with as many as 298 civilians additionally wounded.
Once again, we saw frequent reports of entire families being killed in strikes on residential areas. On November 2nd, four members of one family including a woman and two children died and dozens more were wounded in alleged Russian airstrikes on the al Shamali neighborhood of Jabala village, in southern Idlib governorate, according to local sources. The fatalities were named as Faisal Al – Abdullah, Ahmad Mohammad Al-Abdullah, Hussein Al-Abdallah, and the wife of Ahmad Al-Abdallahadultfe.
The aftermath of an alleged Russian airstrike on Jabala town, November 2nd 2019 (via White Helmets)
On November 17th, six members of another family were reported killed in an alleged Russian airstrike on Al Mallaja village, Kafar Nubul, in Idlib governorate. ShahbaPress said that two children were among those killed, adding that 14 other civilians were wounded, though the Smart News Agency put the injured at three people. The fatalities were named as Ahmed Kamel Al Maqsous, Ahmed Kamel Al Maqsous (female), son of Ahmed and Amani Al Maqsous, Salma Kamal Al Maqsous (female), Nujoud Kamal Al Maqsous (female), and Amina Kamel Al Maqsous, also female.
SCD volunteers removing bodies of killed and injured civilians from rubble in the aftermath of an alleged Russian airstrike on Mallaja in Idlib on November 17th 2019 (via MMC).
However, the worst incident of the month followed on November 20th, when seven members of three families, including four children, reportedly died and 11 more civilians were wounded in alleged Russian airstrikes on Maarat al-Numan in Idlib. Citing the director of the civil defence in the town, Shaam News said there had been three Russian raids. According to Syria Live ua map, “a whole family – four children, a woman and a man displaced from Kafrnabouda town – were killed”. Seven victims from the Basas, Qtiesh, and Al Hammoud families were named as killed – four of whom were children. Sources published graphic images of the victims.
6 شهداء من المدنيين وعدد من الإصابات نتيجة استهداف الطيران الحربي الروسي مدينة معرة النعمان بريف ادلب الجنوبي بغارات جوية. pic.twitter.com/rYts1buv9n
— IDLIB PLUS (@IdlibPlus) November 20, 2019
Warning – contains graphic images: The aftermath of alleged Russian airstrikes on Maarat al-Numan, Nov 20th.
Despite a declaration of a ceasefire against Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces on October 23rd, strikes by both Turkish and Kurdish forces continued in November, though at a significantly lower rate.
Violations of the ceasefire – including executions of prisoners – continued on both sides throughout the month, indicating a certain brutality to this campaign which we didn’t observe to this extent during the previous Afrin conflict in early 2018. On November 27th for example, Human Rights Watch claimed that the ‘safe zone’ established by Turkey to protect civilians was instead the scene of possible war crimes, including executions.
In total during November, Airwars researchers tracked 25 alleged civilian harm events reportedly involving Turkey in Syria. This represented an 80% fall on November’s 124 events. Airwars is still assessing these 25 incidents, though our provisional assessment indicates that 14 civilians likely died across six events graded as ‘Fair’ – compared to the minimum of 125 civilians who died in such incidents in October. Up to a further 39 non-combatants were likely wounded.
On November 9th for example, local media reported the death of two civilians and the injuring of five more in an alleged Turkish drone strike on non-combatants who were collecting cotton in Hishe/Kisha village, Ain Aissa, in Raqqa. Hanî Ehmed Al-Rawî (25) was reported among the killed in the attack and Elî Hemîd al-Khilal (45), Tariq al-Ehmed (30), Mihemed al-Ehmed (29) and Hemûd al-Ehmed (20) were among the injured.
The worst event of the month occurred on November 23rd in the village of Mala, Ain Aissa, Raqqa. Five civilians were reported killed and between three and 22 others including a child injured in alleged Turkish forces mortar, gun fire and drone strikes on the village. ANF added that three civilians were injured when a Free Burma Rangers health team has been attacked by Turkey.
https://twitter.com/NPA_English/status/1198266353981050880?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1198266353981050880&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fairwars.org%2Fcivilian-casualties%2F%3Fsearch%3DTS398%26belligerent%3Dturkish-military%26country%3Dsyria
Airwars also tracked eight casualty incidents allegedly blamed on Kurdish counter fire during November. This was a sharp fall of 81% from the 42 claimed incidents in October. Our current estimate is that four or five civilians – of whom at least three were children – likely died in these events. As many as 41 more civilians were likely wounded.
On November 19th for example, three children died and ten other civilians were wounded in alleged YPG artillery fire on a school building being used as a shelter for IDPs in Jern Al Haj Salih in Tal Abyad, Raqqa governorate, local sources said.
Barış Pınarı Harekât bölgesine yönelik taciz/saldırılarına devam eden ve bombalı terör saldırıları düzenleyen terör örgütü PKK/YPG, bu kez de Tel Abyad’ın Curn köyüne attığı havanlarla okulu vurdu. 3 masum sivil yaşamını yitirirken, çocuklarla birlikte 8 sivil de yaralandı. pic.twitter.com/ifxV4LJiTR
— T.C. Millî Savunma Bakanlığı (@tcsavunma) November 19, 2019
Above: three children were reportedly killed in alleged Turkish fire in Tal Abyad, Raqqa, on November 19th.
Between one and three civilians were likely killed and up to six more wounded in one casualty incident assessed as fair by Airwars during November.
On November 22nd, Khalid Al Hamoud Al Hammadi was reported killed and his wife and five children wounded in an alleged Coalition airstrike on his house in the Latwa neighbourhood of Dhiban town, Deir Ezzor.
Local sources said that the Coalition carried out a raid with the SDF on suspected members of ISIS. According to Xeber 24, the operation “involved three US Apache helicopters, fighter planes and two reconnaissance planes, during which clashes took place between gunmen in the Al-Lattwa neighbourhood and SDF fighters”.
All sources claimed that Khalid Al Hamoud Al Hammadi was a civilian, though Jesr Press said that he also threw a bomb (grenade?) at members of the SDF ‘to defend himself.’ A strike was then reportedly called in on his home. The Euphrates Post said that two members of the SDF also died and five were wounded.
Poignantly, Jesr Press added that Khalid Al Hamoud Al Hammadi had been married just the previous day, stressing that he had no links with any armed groups.
The Coalition later issued a statement saying that it had conducted a “clearance mission in Deir ez-Zor province, Syria Nov. 22”. It added that the operation had “resulted in multiple ISIS fighters killed and wounded” and the capture of more than a dozen – though made no mention of civilian harm concerns.
Khaled Al Hamoud al-Hammadi Husse (via Jesr Press)
At time of publication of this report, the Coalition had not yet published strike data for November, though informed Airwars on December 16th that it would be published soon.
In total, throughout November, Airwars researchers independently tracked 11 reported airstrikes in Syria that were locally blamed on the Coalition. Of these 11 actions, seven reportedly targeting Iranian-backed groups. Airwars has asked CENTCOM whether the US is once again conducting unilateral strikes in Syria, but we had not yet received a response as we went to press. It is also possible that some or all of these unclaimed incidents were in fact Israeli actions.
Civilian harm was only reported in one of these 11 Syria events. On November 8th, a single source, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said that three tents were reportedly bombed in alleged Coalition airstrikes in Khabira area in the northeastern countryside of Deir Ezzor. It is unclear how many people died in this event.
According to AFCENT, 153 munitions were dropped on Iraq and Syria from the air in November by the US-led Coalition. This represented a modest 8% fall on the 166 munitions released in the previous month.
Compared to the previous month, Libya saw slightly lower levels of airstrikes and civilian harm in November. Between 23 and 31 civilians were locally alleged killed from 169 air and artillery strikes, while in October, 25 to 33 civilians were locally reported killed by 226 strikes.
The great majority of deaths resulted from strikes allegedly conducted by the Libyan National Army (LNA) or its ally the United Arab Emirates with 17 to 25 civilian fatalities blamed on their actions. Together, the two parties reportedly conducted 114 strikes, underlining their dominance in the air which led to General Khalifa Haftar declaring a no-fly zone over Tripoli in late November.
Six reported strikes by the Government of National Accord (GNA) led to one alleged civilian casualty on November 13th in Qasr Bin Gashir. The victim was named as Ahmed Abdel Razzaq Nouri Abu Sedira.
For 49 strikes the belligerent could not be determined or was contested between GNA and LNA. These lead to another civilian death.
In one of the worst incidents, seven to ten civilians were allegedly killed by an LNA or UAE strike on a biscuit factory in Tripoli on November 18th. The same belligerents were accused of conducting a strike on Umm Al Aranib on November 28th when between six and eleven civilians, many of them children, were reportedly killed.
Ahmed Abdel Razzaq Nouri Abu Sedira, killed in an alleged GNA artillery strike on Qasr Bin Gashir, Nov 13th (via heretripoli1)
US Africa Command declared that it had conducted three airstrikes against al-Shabaab during November – up from one strike the previous month. The command says it currently assesses that no civilians were injured or killed in these strikes – though local reporting suggested otherwise.
The first declared US strike occurred on November 12th in the vicinity of Jilib, killing one alleged terrorist.
A second strike occurred on November 19th in the vicinity of Qunyo Barrow, killing another terrorist, according to AFRICOM. However the terror group al Shabaab insisted the victim was in fact a local civilian businessman it named as Ismail Issa Bhutan. Somalia News 24/7 quoted a witness who said that the man killed “was a businessman who had a shop in the town, [and who] was killed in the attack.”
BREAKING: Suspected #US drone strike reported in #AlShabaab-controlled town of Kunya-Barow in #Somalia's Lower Shabelle region. Witnesses say that a man who was a businessman and had a shop in the town was killed in the attack. #Somalia pic.twitter.com/4SVDYT9Ize
— somalia (@somalinews247) November 19, 2019
The third strike of the month occurred on November 30th, again in the vicinity of Jilib. AFRICOM gave no information on the number of alleged terrorists killed in this strike, stating that it was still assessing the results, but that no civilians were harmed.
According to local source Ilwareed, there were in fact two actions. While the first targeted a communications centre, a second “targeted the home of an al-Shabaab official named Abu Abdalla, located in the southern outskirts of Jilib district. Government forces confirmed the time when the officer’s house was bombed, and said the entire house and vehicles were destroyed.”
Mareeg said that four al Shabaab fighters died when the communications centre was hit, though its report suggests a ground attack had been responsible: “The center announced last week that it has been upgraded with modern equipment to improve its communication with al-Shabaab leaders. The center was almost completely destroyed after being targeted by several rocket propelled grenades, according to credible sources.” Mareeg also said that it appeared that the militant target of the second strike had escaped injury.
CENTCOM told Airwars that there were no US military strikes during the month of November in Yemen. The last declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province.
It is not known how many actions the CIA conducted in Yemen during the month, if any.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during November. The last such alleged strike was in August 2018.
UK advocacy officer Maysa Ismael took part in an Action on Armed Violence workshop on ‘Gender and Explosive Weapons’ at Chatham House on November 26th. The workshop discussed the gendered impact of explosive weapons on civilians and the lack of gender-segregated data when it comes to recording casualties.
Additionally, Maysa attended the launch of Oxford Research Group’s report on ‘Fusion Doctrine in Five Steps: Creating Routine Fusion in Africa’ on November 26th which also presented an opportunity to meet with advocacy and research partners.
On November 4th, the Dutch Ministry of Defence finally claimed public responsibility for an airstrike in Hawijah, Iraq, in June 2015, which led to the deaths of at least 70 civilians. The acknowledgement followed after Dutch media organisations NOS and NRC had published a major investigation asserting that the Netherlands had been responsible for the deadly attack on an ISIS IED factory.
On November 5th, Dutch newspaper NRC published an opinion piece by Airwars director Chris Woods, who wrote that the Hawijah case represented a shocking example of the lack of military and political transparency for civilian harm in the Netherlands; and noting that the Iraqi and Dutch peoples had been denied the basic facts for more than four years.
Two debates were held by the Dutch parliament on the matter, on November 5th and November 27th. In the run-up to these, Airwars provided Members of Parliament with factual information. For example, we briefed MPs on how other Coalition countries, such as the United States, report on civilian casualty claims as a result of their own airstrikes. We also live tweeted the debates on Twitter in English.
Prime minister Rutte continues to state that "until today, it is unknown how many civilians died", while CENTCOM officials confirmed in December 2018 in an email to Dutch media @NRC and @NOS that 70 civilians had died. pic.twitter.com/AA1M8OSZXz
— Airwars (@airwars) November 27, 2019
In a letter from the current Dutch Minister of Defence published on November 27th, significant improvements for Dutch transparency were promised. For example, the Dutch MoD says it will now publish the date, location and weapons used in airstrikes during the first Dutch deployment period between 2014 and 2016; and to standardise weekly reporting of strikes in case of future missions. These were improvements that Airwars had been pushing for since the first appointment of a Netherlands-based advocacy officer by the organisation back in 2016.
The aftermath of the alleged strike in Hawijah (via Iraqi Revolution)
Civilians trapped in northeastern Syria faced renewed danger in October, with the start of ‘Operation Peace Spring’, conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) and its proxy the Syrian National Army (SNA), against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the YPG in northeastern Syria.
The operation, launched on October 9th, came following the chaotic United States decision to withdraw its own forces from northeastern Syria, where the US military had been supporting the SDF. The conflict began with Turkish forces launching air and artillery strikes on border towns such as Tal Abyad in Raqqa province and Ras al-Ain in Hasaka province.
The unilateral Turkish incursion was condemned by US Defence Secretary Dr Mark T Esper and led to dozens of civilian deaths within the first days of the campaign. By October 18th, an estimated 160,000 civilians had also been displaced by the fighting.
In total, Airwars researchers tracked 124 claimed civilian harm events linked to Turkey in northern Syria during October. The majority of events – 65% – were in Hassakah governorate, with 22% in Raqqa, followed by some 14% in Aleppo and a small number of cases in Idlib. The volume of allegations meant that at time of publication, Airwars had not managed to fully research all incidents. However, our current assessment is that between 125 and 165 civilians likely died in 72 events classed as fairly reported.
The violence was frequently bloody. In one of the most publicised events of the month, on October 12th, three civilians including a female politician, the Secretary General of the Future Syria Party, Hevrin Khalaf, were “executed” when the convoy they were travelling in was reportedly ambushed by “Turkish backed mercenary factions” on the road between Jazeera canton and Ain Issa, multiple sources said.
Hevrin Khalaf, 35, the General Secretary of the Future Syria Party, reportedly “execuedt” by Turkish-backed proxies on October 12th (via 35, the General Secretary of Syria Future Party)
The following day, October 13th, between six and 19 civilians – including at least four journalists from multiple countries – died and as many as 74 others were wounded in an alleged Turkish airstrike on a convoy, made up of around 400 civilian vehicles, heading from Jazeera to Ras Al Ain, local media said. Journalists from countries including Brazil, France, and the Ukraine were among the victims. Fatalities included Hawar agency journalist Saad Ahmad, Muhammad Hussein Resho, Fayz Mahmoud Baqi, and Eqîde Eli Osman.
Turkish bombardment on civilians on the road to serikaniye. pic.twitter.com/XnAa4oT3bR
— pyd rojava (@PYD_Rojava) October 13, 2019
GRAPHIC: Footage of the aftermath of an alleged Turkish airstrike on a civilian convoy on October 13th.
On October 18th, yet another “massacre” was reported as Turkish forces reportedly carried out strikes on Zirgan near Ras al Ain, in Hassakah governorate. Both @Raman_Hassi and @TurkeyUntold tweeted footage of the aftermath, in which at least 12 bodies were visible. According to the Kurdish Red Crescent which shared its data with Airwars, 17 civilians died, though their names are currently unknown.
Airwars also tracked 42 alleged civilian casualty events attributed to Kurdish forces counterfire during October. Of these, researchers currently assess 35 incidents as fairly reported. Twenty four events occurred in Syria, the majority in Aleppo governorate, while 11 were tracked across the border in Turkey.
Between 52 and 62 civilians were assessed as likely killed in these 35 events by Kurdish forces during October, with at least another 168 people wounded.
On October 11th for example, local media reported that up to eight civilians were killed and 35 were wounded in alleged SDF/YPG or PKK artillery strikes on the Turkish city of Nusaybin, Mardin province, as reported by several local sources. One civilian fatality was named as Mehmet Sirin Demir, the father of a prominent journalist.
@TRTKurdiTV journalist Gülay Demir‘s father Mehmet Sirin Demir was killed as the result of an attack of the terrorist organisation PKK/YPG on turkish town Nusaybin
8 civilians died and 35 were injured only today in the attack on Nusaybin pic.twitter.com/VSK5VvRJ0X
— EHA News (@eha_news) October 11, 2019
In the worst event attributed to Kurdish forces during the month, sources claimed that ‘the SDF’ executed seven civilians in Ras al Ain, in the northern countryside of al-Hasakah on October 20th, on charges of collaborating with ‘Operation Spring forces’.” The victims included three men from the same family. They were named as Mohamad Ali Al Khalaf, Ismail Ali Al Khalaf, and Abdallah Al Khalaf. According to Mohamad.alothman.1291, the victims were “shot several times in the head”.
Three civilians from the same family were allegedly executed by the SDF in Ras Al Ayn on October 20th, 2019 (via Raqqa RWB)
During October, there was a sharp increase in civilian harm events in Syria reportedly carried out by Russia and the Assad regime. Overall, Airwars researchers tracked 18 locally reported casualty events – a 28% rise on the five incidents recorded during September. All but one of these incidents was in Idlib governorate.
Across these 18 incidents between 23 and 31 civilians were locally reported killed – compared to just five civilians in the previous month. As many as 63 more civilians were claimed wounded.
Entire families trapped on the ground remained in peril throughout the month as Russia and the regime stepped up their assault. On October 19th, a man and woman from the town of Binnish were killed and three of their children injured in an alleged Russian airstrike on a house in Taftanaz, Idlib, local media reported. Alarmingly, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that the strikes “targeted a camp on agricultural land inhabited by displaced families”. The victims were named as Ahmad Kamrou Haj Qaddour, his wife Huda Al Shaar (both killed), and their three children, all of whom were wounded.
Photo of damage caused by an alleged Russian airstrike on the town of Taftanaz on October 19th, 2019 (via Edlib Media Center on Facebook).
In the worst incident of the month, seven or eight civilians died and at least 15 more were wounded in alleged Russian or regime artillery or rocket fire on Al Janoudia in Idlib on October 24th. According to @SyrianCoalition, regime rocket fire bombarded a vegetable market “packed with civilians and farmers”. However, @abuhuzaifa_ blamed “Russian militia shelling”. One of the victims, an adult male, named as Ammar Alikou, died of his injuries on October 27th, 2019, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights.
Photo of the alleged Russian and/or Syrian regime artillery and rocket strikes on the town of Al Janodia, Idlib province, on October 24th 2019 (via @SyrianCoalition).
On October 31st, three or four civilians including a member of the civil defence and a child died, and up to 12 more were wounded, in an alleged Russian or regime airstrike on an ammunition depot on the outskirts of Darkoush, Idlib, according to local sources.
The White Helmets named one of the victims, a volunteer, as Ahmad Abdul Hamid Qubba, reporting that he died “while inspecting successive explosions” caused by Russian and regime forces. The White Helmets added that Ahmad had lost his mother, niece and cousin in a previous regime airstrike on Darkoush in 2015. Most poignantly, it said that he was “martyred just days before his wedding”. @IdlibPlus said that a child also died in a “huge explosion” at the depot, though it said that it was unclear what had caused the blast.
استشهاد الشاب أحمد قبة من أبطال الدفاع المدني السوري في إدلب أثناء تفقده الانفجارات المتتالية في بلدة دركوش صباح اليوم التي أحدثها قصف إرهابي من روسيا وقوات الأسد.رحمه الله تعالى وتقبله وعوضه الفردوس الأعلى وألهم أهله ومحبيه الصبر والسلوان. pic.twitter.com/HU2AiR5Jxw
— الائتلاف الوطني السوري (@SyrianCoalition) October 31, 2019
Translation: “A young hero of the Syrian Civil Defence (Ahmad Qibba) was killed in Idlib while inspecting successive explosions in the town of Darkoush this morning [Oct 31st] caused by terrorist shelling from Russia and Assad forces.”
Between five and nine civilians were likely killed and up to 11 more wounded in one casualty incident assessed as fair by Airwars during October.
On October 26th, US forces conducted a ground raid that lethally targeted ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi in Barisha village in Idlib countryside. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, US helicopters came from Turkish territory, carried out a landing in the area and clashed with militants near the targeted house of al-Baghdadi west of Barisha where many casualties were reported. Among the nine alleged civilian deaths were two or three women and up to three children. However al Baghdadi himself was said to have killed three of his own children when he detonated a suicide vest.
Local medical sources said that as a result of the operation, a house was completely destroyed and a number of tents were burned. Seven bodies were found in the area, among them a child and three women, in addition to five injuries.
Aerial photos of the house targeted by US forces #Baghdadi (via Idlib Plus)
Overall, between October 1st and 31st the Coalition reported 19 strikes in Iraq – a 32% fall on September’s 28 strikes.
The alliance once again reported no air or artillery strikes in Syria. However additional ground operations and unilateral US actions also continued. In total, throughout October, Airwars researchers tracked 12 locally reported strikes in Syria that were blamed on the Coalition, though there were no reports of civilian harm attributed to these actions.
All but 11 of these October strikes were in Deir Ezzor governorate. Nine actions reportedly targeted Assad regime forces and the remainder Iranian-backed armed groups and IRGC forces. Airwars has reached out to CENTCOM and asked if the US is conducting unilateral air actions in Syria, as the Coalition has not publicly reported a strike in the country since August. It is also possible that some of these reported ‘Coalition’ actions were instead carried out by Israel, which conducts its own unilateral actions against Iranian and associated forces in Syria.
According to AFCENT, 166 munitions were dropped on Iraq and Syria from the air in October by the US-led Coalition. Despite the large fall in strikes, this actually represented a 21% rise on the 137 munitions released in the previous month.
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Libya saw an increase in reported civilian harm despite a similar number of air and artillery strikes compared to previous months. Between 25 and 33 civilians were locally reported killed by 226 strikes. In September, between 14 and 15 civilian deaths had been alleged from 230 strikes.
Another 56 to 75 civilians were reportedly injured in October by air and artillery actions.
The majority of civilian deaths were allegedly caused by the Libyan National Army (LNA), reportedly killing between 17 and 23 people. In the worst event, up to five civilians were allegedly killed by LNA shelling on Qasr bin Gashir, a town in the Triploi district, on October 31st.
A worrying development was the increased targeting of civilian infrastructure by the LNA. On October 7th a doctor was allegedly killed by either an LNA or allied UAE airstrike on Qasr Bin Gashir. And on October 23rd and 24th Haftar’s forces allegedly struck three field hospitals, killing two and injuring five more health workers. In another incident on October 6th, an LNA airstrike hit the Equestrian Club in Janzur, allegedly injuring six people, most of them children.
Government of National Accord (GNA) strikes only led to one reportedly wounded civilian during the month – an indication of the LNA’s near-total air dominance. However, various civilian harm events were contested between the GNA and LNA due to indiscriminate shelling by artillery and rockets, which in turn led to between 3 and 4 civilian deaths.
US Africa Command declared that it had conducted just one airstrike in Somalia, on al-Shabaab, during October – a sharp fall on the six declared actions during the previous month. AFRICOM told Airwars that it currently assessed that no civilians had been killed or injured in this strike.
The attack occurred on October 25th against “ISIS terrorists in the Golis Mountain region”. AFRICOM said it assessed that three terrorists had been killed.
U.S. airstrike targets ISIS-Somalia in support of the Federal Government of Somalia – https://t.co/mSj8dNYxWY pic.twitter.com/nYdzB4DdYP
— U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (@USAfricaCommand) October 25, 2019
CENTCOM told Airwars that there were no US military strikes during the month of October in Yemen. The last declared CENTCOM action was on June 24th 2019 in Al Bayda province.
It is not known how many actions the CIA conducted in Yemen during the month, if any.
There were no publicly alleged CIA strikes in Pakistan against either Al Qaeda or the Taliban during October. The last such alleged strike was in August 2018.
After a strong advocacy year by previous incumbent Maike Awater, Laurie Treffers has now taken over as our Netherlands based acting conflict researcher and advocacy officer as of October 1st.
Laurie has been working as a geolocation volunteer with Airwars for over a year now, researching both Coalition and Russian airstrikes in Syria and Iraq. With her experience in journalism and communications, and an MA in Conflict Studies and Human Rights, Laurie says she is excited to be continuing our work at Airwars to push European states for more transparency and accountability for civilians harmed in conflict.
On October 18th, our European advocacy team sent a joint statement in partnership with Amnesty International, PAX for Peace, the Open State Foundation and academics from the Conflict Studies Department at Utrecht University, to the Dutch Minister of Defence. This called on the Ministry to release data on historical Dutch airstrikes in Syria and Iraq; to publish the Ministry’s own research into civilian casualties in that conflict; and to put improved processes of accountability and justice in place. On the same day that the joint statement was sent to the Minister, a major news story broke on Dutch involvement in a mass casualty civilian harm event at Hawijah, Iraq in 2015. See our associated article here.
On October 21st, our UK Advocacy Officer, Maysa Ismael, took part in a parliamentary discussion on ‘Exploring Avenues for Accountability for Victims in Yemen’ organised by the All-Party Parliamentary Human Rights Group.