The United States and its 13 kinetic allies – part of an international alliance usually known as the Coalition – began an extensive campaign against so-called Islamic State in August 2014, after the terror group had occupied large parts of of Iraq and Syria. By the end of President Trump’s term in office in 2021, the Coalition had publicly declared over the entirety of the war more than 34,000 air and artillery strikes against ISIS.
The United States and its 13 kinetic allies – part of an international alliance usually known as the Coalition – began an extensive air and artillery campaign against so-called Islamic State in August 2014, after the terror group had occupied large parts of of Iraq and Syria. By the end of President Trump’s term in office in 2021, local communities had alleged more than 29,000 non combatants killed by Coalition actions. This graphic breaks down those alleged deaths according to Airwars’ own assessment methodology, though includes more than 1,400 civilian deaths officially conceded by the US and its allies.
The Belgian parliament is considering adopting a resolution to help protect civilians from the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. The resolution calls for Belgium’s active participation in ongoing diplomatic negotiations among nations on an international political declaration to avoid the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, to help reduce civilian suffering.
In a joint statement published on January 12th, Airwars, Humanity & Inclusion, PAX Christi Vlaanderen and PAX for Peace called upon Members of Parliament in Belgium to support the resolution. The statement reads: “Such resolution is a good step in the right direction as it clearly demands the Belgian Federal Government for an unequivocal commitment against the use of high-impact explosive weapons in populated areas, in line with the presumption of non-use; a recognition of the “domino effects” of wide-range explosive weapons; and a commitment to victim assistance and unconditional access to humanitarian aid. After dozens of parliamentary questions, motions and public hearings in France, Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg and the UK, the adoption of this resolution would be pioneering as it is the first of its kind.”
Parliamentary hearing
On January 6th, the National Defence Commission of the Belgian Federal Parliament came together to discuss a draft of Resolution 1222/1 on the protection of civilians from the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. Prior to the hearing, Airwars, Humanity & Inclusion, Pax Christi Vlaanderen and PAX for Peace sent Members of Parliament a letter with key recommendations.
If the Resolution is adopted by the Belgian parliament, it could be a key event in the ongoing negotiations between nations on an international political declaration. Since October 2019, more than 70 countries, including Belgium, have participated in diplomatic negotiations led by Ireland to draft such a declaration.
During the parliamentary hearing on January 6th, experts from the Belgian Red Cross and Humanity & Inclusion (HI) gave short presentations on the importance of the proposed resolution. Anne Hery, director of advocacy and institutional relations at HI, stated: “How can one systematically claim to respect the principles of precaution and proportionality of attack when using artillery or mortar shells in places where children, women and men are concentrated, or when bombing near infrastructures vital for the survival of populations, such as hospitals, schools or even power stations? The devastation in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Ukraine, Libya, more recently in Nagorno Karabakh or in the Tigray region, in Ethiopia, forces us to rethink the methods, tactics and choice of weapons of war used today.”
"Comment peut-on prétendre systématiquement respecter les principes de précaution & proportionnalité de l’attaque lorsqu’on utilise obus d’artillerie/mortier dans des lieux où se concentrent des civils ou quand on bombarde à proximité d’infrastructures vitales?" @Anneh2906 #EWIPA pic.twitter.com/40NFKrBiKj
— Baptiste Chapuis (@Baptiste_Cps) January 6, 2021
Resolution 1222/1
Samuel Cogolati, a Member of Parliament for ECOLO-Groen, is one of the initiators of the resolution. Mr Cogolati told Airwars: “Today’s armed conflicts in Yemen, Syria and Libya are not the same as those of 20, 30 or 50 years ago. Because although conflicts are increasingly urban, battles are most often fought with weapons or ammunition systems with indiscriminate effects, initially designed for use on open battlefields.”
According to Cogolati, the draft resolution is “simply an attempt to respond to the call of the UN Secretary-General, as well as the ICRC and Handicap International. The text itself was written in close cooperation with civil society.” The text calls upon the Belgian federal government to not only avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas, but also requests that the government actively pushes for the recognition of reverberating effects of explosive weapons and victim assistance as key elements of the international political declaration.
Mr Cogolati also emphasised the reverberating effects for civilians of the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects, such as the destruction of vital infrastructure, contamination by explosive remnants of war and massive waves of forced displacement. In October 2020, Airwars and PAX for Peace presented their joint report Seeing through the Rubble on the long-term effects of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas to MPs in Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
Camilla Roberti, advocacy officer for Humanity & Inclusion, is hopeful that the Resolution will be adapted, but also has reservations. “We remain concerned as Belgium reiterates its belief that IHL is strong enough and that strict compliance and implementation of IHL rules will suffice [to limit civilian harm during urban fighting]. On the contrary, we believe that IHL, which remains crucial, must be coupled with policies and standards that enhance its effectiveness during conflict and address the harm caused to civilians and civilian infrastructure during and after conflict.”
Roberti also warns that Belgium “doesn’t seem to take into account the indiscriminate effects caused by these weapons even in those cases where attacks appear ‘legitimate’. This is something we call on all States, and Belgium in particular, to put at the very centre of the future political declaration, as it will be the only way to put the people at the centre and prevent harm to civilians.”
Denial of civilian harm
Whilst Belgian parliamentarians are focused on pushing Belgium to become a pioneer in the protection of civilians, the Belgian Ministry of Defence continues to refuse taking responsibility for any civilian harm its own actions may have caused.
During a recent public event ‘New Military Technologies: What About Drones?’, organised by PAX Christi Vlaanderen, Vrede Vzw and the European Forum on Armed Drones on December 2nd 2020, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Air Forces, Colonel Geert de Decker, stated that “Neither in Libya, nor in Iraq, we have any reports of civilian casualties as a result of Belgian interventions. That is one of the things that we pride ourselves on. You are never one hundred per cent sure, but we do everything possible to avoid making civilian casualties.”
Belgium has, in fact, been implicated in several civilian harm incidents that were officially acknowledged by the US-led Coalition, but has repeatedly refused to answer on its possible involvement in these incidents. It remains unknown whether it was Belgium or France which was responsible for five airstrikes which led to the confirmed deaths of at least 22 civilians. When the Belgian Ministry of Defence was asked about their possible involvement in these strikes, officials told Airwars: “For the year 2017, BAF [Belgian Armed Forces] was certainly not involved in all events”, indicating that the Belgians were in fact involved in some of those events. It remains unclear why Belgium then still continues to state that its actions in Syria and Iraq have caused zero civilian casualties. On September 30th, 11 international and Belgian NGOs sent an open letter to then Minister of Defence Phillipe Goffin, calling on the Belgian government to finally take concrete steps to improve its transparency and accountability for civilian harm.
The Belgian parliament will likely vote on whether to adopt Resolution 1222/1 by February 2021.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Patrouille dans le canal de Syrie pour la frégate Aconit
Au cours de la semaine écoulée, la frégate Aconit a poursuivi ses patrouilles au profit de l’opération CHAMMAL dans le canal de Syrie. Depuis hier, la frégate française est en relâche opérationnelle à Larnaka (Chypre).
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 06 au 12 janvier inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.
Le volume d’heures de vol est en légère hausse du fait d’une augmentation des opérations conduites par les forces de sécurité irakiennes pour lesquelles les aéronefs de la coalition apportent leur soutien.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Patrouille dans le canal de Syrie pour la frégate Aconit
Après une relâche opérationnelle de quelques jours dans le port de Limassol (Chypre), la frégate Aconit a appareillé le lundi 4 janvier pour reprendre ses patrouilles au profit de l’opération CHAMMAL dans le canal de Syrie.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 30 décembre au 05 janvier inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
February 04, 2021
Release No. 20210204-02
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, December 2020
SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and
its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.
CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers
(42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer
live under Daesh oppression. CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring
defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region
and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.
Strike Summary
Between December 1 and December 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 25
strikes consisting of 41 engagements in Iraq and Syria.
In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted 10 strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
25 engagements. This resulted in 49 enemy killed and one defensive fighting
location destroyed.
In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted 15 strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
16 engagements.
This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter,
attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled
artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.
A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic
engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a
single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single
aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one
strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a
group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the
cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use.
Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.
CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a
strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of
individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to
compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.
#DefeatDaesh
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Visite du CEMAAE sur la BAP au Levant
Le jeudi 24 décembre 2020, le général d’armée aérienne Philippe Lavigne, chef d’état-major de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace (CEMAAE), s’est rendu sur la Base aérienne projetée (BAP) au Levant pour rendre visite aux militaires déployés dans le cadre de l’opération CHAMMAL.
Très attaché à passer les fêtes auprès des forces sur les différents théâtres d’opérations, il était accompagné de Monsieur Ludovic Haye, sénateur du Haut-Rhin et de Madame Nicole Duranton, sénatrice de l’Eure.
Alors que les missions aériennes des Rafale déployés se poursuivaient, le CEMAAE, tout en respectant les mesures sanitaires qui s’imposent, s’est fait présenter l’ensemble des composantes armant la BAP (les aéronefs, le 25e Régiment du génie de l’air (visite dynamique avec présentation du matériel), les pompiers, les fusiliers commandos, les équipiers de la lutte anti drone, les équipes cyno, l’équipe EOD du « DETPRO », le détachement mixte du commissariat, du service infrastructure et du service des essences, etc.)
Les mesures sanitaires ont bien évidemment été une préoccupation dans l’organisation de cet évènement afin que le CEMAAE puisse s’adresser à chaque militaire projeté, dans le respect des gestes barrières, tout en conservant l’esprit de Noël.
Patrouille dans le canal de Syrie pour la frégate Aconit
Intégrée au sein de l’opération CHAMMAL, la frégate Aconit, après avoir reçu le général d’armées François Lecointre, chef d’état-major des armées à bord, a patrouillé au large de Chypre.
La frégate a accosté le mardi 29 décembre dans le port de Limassol pour une relâche opérationnelle de quelques jours.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 23 au 29 décembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 16 sorties aériennes.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Patrouille dans le canal de Syrie pour la frégate Aconit
Ayant appareillé de Beyrouth au Liban le 19 décembre, la frégate furtive de type La Fayette (FLF) Aconit a poursuivi sa patrouille dans le canal de Syrie.
Le mardi 22 décembre, elle a également accueilli à son bord le chef d’état-major des armées, le général Lecointre, qui est allé à la rencontre de l’équipage.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 16 au 22 décembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 17 sorties aériennes.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Patrouille dans le canal de Syrie pour la frégate Aconit
Après avoir participé à l’exercice MEDUSA au large de l’Égypte et conduit un exercice dans le cadre de la Quadripartite initiative, initiative multilatérale commune de la République de Chypre, de la Grèce, de l’Italie et de la France, la frégate a rejoint le canal de Syrie pour y patrouiller au profit de l’opération CHAMMAL.
Actuellement en relâche opérationnelle à Beyrouth au Liban, la frégate française appareillera dans les jours à venir pour une nouvelle patrouille en Méditerranée orientale.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 9 au 15 décembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 14 sorties aériennes.
Basnews reported that three children were killed in an alleged Turkish airstrike on Deraluk town of Amedi district, Duhok province, on December 12th, 2020. No further info is available at the moment.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Frappe d’opportunité pour les Rafale B au standard F3-R de la BAP
Le 5 décembre 2020, engagée au titre de la Coalition dans une mission de Close Air Support (CAS) au profit des forces de sécurité irakiennes au nord du pays, une patrouille de Rafale biplace provenant de la Base aérienne projetée (BAP) au Levant a réalisé une frappe d’opportunité sur une position de Daech.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 2 au 8 décembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 20 sorties aériennes et une frappe.
Three civilians were killed in alleged Turkish airstrikes on the town of Deraluk, Dohuk governorate, on December 7th, 2020, according to local sources. The bodies of the three men were found on December 12th. On December 12th, Roj News reported: “On December 7th, three civilians from the Derelok district of Amed were bombed by Turkish
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Premier déploiement opérationnel du pod TALIOS monté sur Rafale
Fin novembre, deux systèmes optroniques d’identification et de ciblage à longue distance de nouvelle génération, plus communément connus sous l’appellation de TALIOS (TArgeting Long-range Identification Optronic System), ont été acheminés sur la base aérienne projetée au Levant puis montés sur les Rafale. Ces nouvelles nacelles optroniques multifonctions, évolutions des pod DAMOCLES, sont dotés de capacités accrues de guidage laser de munitions, d’évaluation des dommages infligés à longue distance et de reconnaissance de cible efficaces de jour comme de nuit. Elles permettent non seulement de détecter et d’identifier des cibles au sol et en vol, mais également de délivrer de l’armement avec une grande précision. Leur interface homme-système est moderne et enrichie d’une capacité Rover (Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver) intégrée, permettant les échanges d’images en temps réel avec les troupes au sol.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 25 novembre au 1er décembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 14 sorties aériennes.
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
January 6, 2021
Release No. 20210106-01
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, November 2020
SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and
its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.
CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers
(42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer
live under Daesh oppression. CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring
defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region
and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.
Strike Summary
Between November 1 and November 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 14
strikes consisting of 34 engagements in Iraq and Syria.
In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 22 engagements. This resulted in 35 enemy killed and one weapons cache
destroyed.
In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 12 engagements.
This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter,
attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled
artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.
A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic
engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a
single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single
aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one
strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a
group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the
cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use.
Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.
CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a
strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of
individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to
compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.
#DefeatDaesh
-30-
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Le CEMA se déplace sur la frégate Aconit
Déployée en Méditerranée orientale dans le cadre de l’opération CHAMMAL, la frégate Aconit a effectué une relâche opérationnelle dans le port de Beyrouth. Avant de reprendre la mer, la frégate a accueilli le général d’armée François Lecointre, chef d’état-major des Armées, alors en visite officielle au Liban.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 18 au 24 novembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 26 sorties aériennes .
The US-led Coalition has released to Airwars the near coordinates of almost all confirmed or ‘Credible’ civilian harm events in Iraq and Syria in the long war against so-called Islamic State, allowing for the first time the accurate locating of 341 confirmed incidents and almost 1,400 civilian deaths since 2014.
The groundbreaking decision by the US-led Coalition – which came after several years of patient engagement by Airwars – will enable affected Iraqis and Syrians for the first time to know whether their loved ones were caught up in a particular event. That in turn could open the way for both apologies and ex gratia payments from the US and its international allies.
Former chief Coalition spokesman Colonel Myles Caggins said that the decision to share the data had been taken in the interest of transparency: “We take every allegation of civilian casualties with the utmost sincerity, concern, and diligence; we see the addition of the geolocations as a testament to transparency, and our commitment to working with agencies like Airwars to correctly identify civilian harm incidents.”
“The release of this locational data for confirmed civilian harm events in Iraq and Syria – accurate in some cases to just one metre – sets a new and welcome transparency benchmark,” Airwars noted. “We appreciate the US-led Coalition’s decision to release this important material, which should help affected Iraqis and Syrians to secure some closure following tragic losses within their families.”
In August 2014 the US-led coalition began bombing so-called Islamic State after militants had seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. Millions of civilians were trapped in a brutal war that lasted several years, with fighting often taking place in heavily built-up neighbourhoods.
Over the years the US-led Coalition has admitted many hundreds of civilian deaths from its own actions – though identifying exactly where these took place has been a major challenge.
The release to Airwars of hundreds of coordinates of Credible incidents – most accurate to within 100 metres and some to within just one metre – is believed to be the most comprehensive locational civilian casualty data ever released by the US military.
Airwars has now added a new mapping and research tool to its website, The Credibles, which comprehensively maps all located incidents across both Iraq and Syria. The data has also been visualised in partnership with The Washington Post.
The locational data provided by the US military is, Airwars believes, unique. No previous belligerent is thought to have revealed at scale – either during or after a war – exactly where and when it has harmed civilians.
Using the US Department of Defense’s preferred Military Grid Reference System (MGRS), 70 of these Credible civilian harm events have now been publicly geolocated by the Coalition to an accuracy of just one metre squared, with all additional events geolocated to an accuracy of a one hundred metre square box.
Many of these incidents have already been well documented by affected communities themselves, with associated photographs, videos, and eyewitness narratives. Airwars also presently lists the names of more than 900 victims from these located events.
Just three of 344 confirmed Coalition civilian casualty incidents have been omitted from the data release. One recent case involved Coalition ground troops in Iraq, suggesting possibly sensitive Special Forces operations. Another event is still being queried with US Central Command (CENTCOM). The third case is the sole British-confirmed anti ISIS event, from March 2018 – with the UK Ministry of Defence still declining to release any locational information.
Some of the 341 Credible locations released to date by the US-led Coalition
More than 29,600 civilians have locally been alleged killed by US-led Coalition actions in Iraq and Syria since 2014, according to Airwars monitoring of local populations. The US was initially slow to engage – with just three civilian harm events confirmed by CENTCOM in the first 16 months of the war.
Beginning in 2016, the process of casualty assessments by the US military became more systematised – in part as a result of an increased focus on casualty mitigation by the Obama administration during its last months in office; and in part because of pressure from Airwars and other NGOs, which between them were tracking local allegations of civilian harm from Inherent Resolve actions in both Iraq and Syria.
CENTCOM established a permanent civilian casualty assessment team at Tampa covering the war against ISIS in mid 2016, and began publishing more regular public reports on confirmed civilian harm events. An additional 60 Credible incidents were admitted that year, for example.
In December 2016, the Coalition took over civilian casualty assessments from CENTCOM (although almost all personnel continued to be drawn from US forces.) The US-led alliance also began publishing monthly civilian harm assessments – which continue today. In total, CENTCOM and the Coalition have now assessed almost 3,000 alleged civilian harm events in the war against ISIS, to date confirming as Credible some 344 of these incidents.
Around one in four of these Credible events have resulted directly from Airwars referrals to the Coalition, meaning that without local reporting by affected communities – and the patient work of Airwars’ own Syrian and Iraqi researchers collating and preserving those reports – the events would not have come to light.
While the confirming of multiple civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria by CENTCOM and the Coalition was generally well received, there were often significant challenges in properly identifying the location of such events.
Press releases issued via military public affairs teams only tagged a Credible event to the nearest large population centre. In the September 2017 report for example, the Coalition declared a major confirmed civilian harm event in Mosul: “March 14, 2017, near Mosul, Iraq, via media report: During a strike on ISIS fighters engaging partner forces from a fighting position, it was assessed that 27 civilians in an adjacent structure were unintentionally killed.”
The month of March 2017 saw very heavy fighting at Mosul. Airwars tracked five separate claimed civilian harm events in the city for March 14th alone (two of them mass casualty incidents), with some days seeing more than a dozen allegations. Without the correct coordinates, affected Moslawis could never know whether their loved ones were (or were not) affected by particular strikes.
For the March 14th 2017 event cited above, Coalition officials eventually provided Airwars with coordinates in Mosul accurate to within just one metre (38SLF2901422174), confirming that the event took place in the neighbourhood of al Jadida. The challenge was whether such precise data could now be acquired for all confirmed events.
Such data could also help to prise open the door on possible restitution for civilian harm from US and Coalition actions in Iraq and Syria. According to the Pentagon, only six ex gratia payments were made to Iraqis during 2019, compared with more than 600 such awards for Afghanistan. Poor public locational data from Operation Inherent Resolve for confirmed civilian harm events has majorly hampered the ability of Iraqis and Syrians to pursue claims – until now.
Ex gratia payments awarded by the US in Afghanistan during 2019 were one hundred times higher than in Iraq. Poor public locational data by CJTF-OIR for confirmed events likely contributed to that disparity.
Following a face to face meeting with senior officials in Tampa in May 2016, CENTCOM and Airwars began regularly sharing data on civilian casualty allegations, in order to improve understanding, on both sides, of reported non combatant harm. That relationship has continued, with sometimes weekly confidential engagements between the Coalition’s CIVCAS Cell and the Airwars military advocacy team, involving granular queries from both parties.
CENTCOM also began sharing with Airwars occasional precise locational data for Credible events in mid 2016, in order better to clarify particular cases. Over time this became more systematised.
Alongside its monthly public press releases, the Coalition for several years provided Airwars with a private, annotated version of the monthly release, which both identified the geolocation of the event – and also, where possible, specifically cross matched Credible incidents to coded events already in the Airwars database. This locational information was provided by CJTFOIR on the expectation that Airwars would make it public through its own database of civilian harm events.
By early 2018 the Coalition was consistently providing MGRS data every month to Airwars for both Credible and later, for ‘Non Credible’ events. However this still left 126 historical confirmed cases for which Airwars had no locational data.
In early 2019, Airwars asked both the Coalition and the US Department of Defense to release this information – arguing that the alliance’s significant transparency in confirming civilian harm cases was being weakened by our then being unable publicly to determine where such cases had actually occurred. It was also argued that the US could better distinguish itself from Russia and other belligerents, who instead chose to hide or deny civilian harm from their own actions.
The missing locational data was provided to Airwars in Summer 2019 by the Coalition’s civilian casualty assessment team – a major step forward for transparency and public accountability. Later that year, the Coalition also began publishing MGRS data as part of its regular monthly public reporting.
The Coalition began sharing Credible close coordinates with Airwars in 2016, at first in private annotated versions of public reports.
The Credibles dataset offers significant potential for visualisations, allowing for each confirmed US and allied civilian harm event in both Iraq and Syria to be precisely mapped and timelined. Additionally, each event can be cross matched to an associated Airwars incident report. More than 900 victim names are linked, along with associated photographs, videos, witness statements, and satellite imagery analysis of bomb sites.
Airwars has built a new subsite illustrating the remarkable potential of this unique transparency dataset. Each US-led Coalition Credible event has been precisely mapped down to at least 100 metres, and timelined across the war.
“The significance of this information for the affected communities led us to create an interface that would make the dataset easily accessible, and represent the information in a way that reflected its accuracy,” says Lizzie Malcolm of Scottish-American design team Rectangle, which conceived the new subsite.
The Credibles data sets a new benchmark for US military accountability for civilian harm. It’s hoped that the release of such accurate geolocational data can now become standard both for the US military and its allies.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 11 au 17 novembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 21 sorties aériennes dont une frappe (le 11/11).
At least one civilian was killed in alleged Turkish drone strikes on an alleged PKK vehicle near the town of Khalaf or Qassim Malako, Sinjar district, Nineveh governorate, on November 8th, 2020. Up to five militants were reportedly also killed and at least three others were wounded. Hawar News reported that “The “Nasr Mobin” forces
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Frappe
Le 11 novembre, dans le cadre de missions de support aérien aux troupes de la coalition, les aéronefs français ont conduit 1 frappe contre une position de Daesh.
Tirant plusieurs bombes de précision, les aéronefs ont ainsi détruit des caches.
Opération CHAMMAL – L’Aconit relève le La Fayette
Le 10 novembre, au terme d’un déploiement de plus de 100 jours en Méditerranée orientale au profit de l’opération CHAMMAL, la frégate La Fayette a passé le témoin à la frégate Aconit.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 04 au 10 novembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 16 sorties aériennes dont 1 frappe.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL
Dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate of interagency and civil environment (DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences), le général Tardif, SNR-O de l’opération CHAMMAL, poursuit sa série de rencontres sur le théâtre irakien.
Ces derniers jours, il a rencontré des représentants de l’United Nations investigative team to promote accountability for crimes committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD – organisme des Nations Unies en charge des enquêtes sur les crimes commis par Daech) puis le général Carignan, commandant la Nato Mission Irak (NMI), dont la mission de formation au profit des Irakiens est en phase finale d’élaboration.
Le général Tardif s’est entretenu également avec des personnalités du comité international de la Croix rouge.
Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 28 octobre au 03 novembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
December 14, 2020
Release No. 20201214-01
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, October 2020
SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.
CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers (42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer live under Daesh oppression. CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.
Strike Summary
Between October 1 and October 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 10 strikes consisting of 27 engagements in Iraq and Syria.
In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted six strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 18 engagements. This resulted in seven enemy killed and 23 caves destroyed.
In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted four strikes against Daesh targets consisting of nine engagements. This resulted in four terrain denial operations.
This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter, attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.
A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use. Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.
CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.
#DefeatDaesh
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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED
On the night of June 2nd to June 3rd 2015, Dutch F-16s bombed an ISIS Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (VBIED) factory in the city of Hawijah, in Iraq’s Kirkuk province. Secondary explosions triggered by the airstrike killed at least 70 civilians and wounded hundreds more. Today, the city of Hawijah is still recovering – not only from long-standing ISIS control of the area, but also the lasting impact on civilian lives of the Dutch airstrike five years ago.
For their new joint report, Seeing through the rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS, Airwars and PAX interviewed Hawijah Mayor Subhan Al Jabouri about the direct, indirect, and ongoing effects of the strike.
The questions were answered via e-mail on September 28th, 2020. The first part of the interview discusses the direct consequences of the Dutch air raid. The second focuses on the indirect effects. In the third section, the Mayor was asked about the impact the Dutch air raid still has on the lives of civilians in Hawijah. Finally, the Mayor examines the overall damage that both the ISIS occupation and the anti-ISIS Coalition have caused in his city.
Subhan Al Jabouri, the Mayor of Hawijah, in his office (Image courtesy of the Mayor)
Part I: Direct harm
1. What is Hawijah Council’s present estimate of civilian deaths and injuries resulting from this Dutch airstrike?
According to preliminary reports, more than 70 civilians were killed and more than 500 others injured.
2. Can the Council please characterise the damage caused to civilian objects such as houses, roads, medical facilities, shops, schools, childcare facilities, pharmacies, factories? Is there a list of damaged properties?
Besides severe damage to civilian properties, factories, workshops and homes in the surrounding area of the explosion, a power station, civil defence centre and a wheat mill were also destroyed.
3. How many schools were damaged in the attack, and are these functional again?
A total of 37 schools were damaged and four schools are out of service and no longer running and these have not yet been rebuilt.
4. How many pharmacies were damaged and are these open again?
No answer.
5. Is it true that an ice- and brick factory were damaged, and are these operational again?
Yes, it was confirmed that more than one ice production plant and brick factories were destroyed as a result of the airstrike. The factories have not completely reopened, nor have their owners returned to the area.
6. Is it true that the surface water sewage system was damaged, and is that operational again?
No answer.
7. Is there an overall estimate of buildings both damaged and destroyed in the Dutch airstrike?
According to the first assessment of the size of the destruction and the diameter of the impact of the shock wave of the explosion, the size of the damage reached a diameter of more than 2km and 500 buildings were subject to major damage.
8. Can the Council please outline damage to infrastructure, such as electricity, gas pipelines, water pipelines, communication lines, etcetera?
The infrastructure in the area of the explosion and the surrounding neighbourhoods were damaged, which led to the suspension of a large number of facilities, including a power station, main communication lines and water pipes in the area.
Part II: Indirect harm
9. What has been the impact of the damage to civilian objects and infrastructure from the Dutch airstrike such as a decline in access to water, electricity, heating or other essential services such as water and sanitation services, health services, displacement, environmental impact, rubble and waste management
The great damage caused to the infrastructure of the region and the surrounding areas, as well as damage to the power station and water pipelines, led to the displacement of a large number of families from the affected areas and a significant decrease in access to basic services to them.
10. What psychological impact on local communities does the Council believe has occurred?
The horror of this strike had a profound psychological effect on the psyche of the victims, as it led to the death of dozens of families and the injury of hundreds. Some families were completely wiped out, others lost at least three or four family members. The absence of direct health care and the inability of the people to help their families and watch them die under the rubble induced trauma for the people. This is in addition to the loss of their homes, properties and sources of income and their experiences of being displaced.
11. It has been reported that Hawijans remain concerned about possible radiological and other contaminant effects of both the Dutch strike and the broader campaign to remove ISIS. Can the Council please update us on these concerns?
Despite the liberation of the area and the return of locals and their attempts, the industrial zone and surrounding residential areas have not been rebuilt. However, there are still concerns among the residents about the radiological effects and polluting materials as a result of the tremendous force of the explosion, as some believe that radioactive materials are present in the area.
Part III: Long-term effects 12. How are survivors of the Dutch airstrike presently doing?
The Al-Ghad organisation, in cooperation with the local authorities, is ensuring the registration of survivors and those affected by the airstrike through voluntary work. The information currently recorded shows that the survivors are divided between internally displaced persons in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorate, and internally displaced persons inside Hawija as a result of the destruction of homes, sources of income and laboratories, and the lack of basic services in the area.
13. Can the local authorities please confirm the estimate that as a result of this attack, that around 2,000 people experienced psycho-social problems?
Yes, and the number of people affected may exceed this number due to the side effects of the strike.
14. Are psychological and physical rehabilitation programs available?
There are no specialized rehabilitation or psychological support programs that specifically target survivors of the Dutch airstrike, but they may be included in public programs that target the Hawija area or Internally Displaced Peoples.
15. Have victims been compensated in any way? Can the Council confirm that there has been only one family that has received compensation?
No compensation programs were implemented for survivors.
The aftermath of the Dutch strike on Hawijah in 2015 which killed an estimated 70 civilians (via Iraqi Revolution).
16. Have the homes of citizens been repaired? If so, how many? Could the Council please confirm the estimate that 50-60 per cent of the buildings in the area have now been rebuilt?
The houses have not been completely rebuilt, and the percentage of repaired homes does not exceed 40% of the homes. Families returning to the area live in houses damaged by the effects of the strike, as they are unable to repair their homes. It is difficult to confirm this percentage, as there are many buildings that were completely destroyed and the owners of those buildings have not returned.
17. Have people returned or are they still displaced and under which circumstances are they living now? How many Hawijans remain displaced from the neighbourhood damaged in the Dutch strike?
Living conditions are very difficult due to the lack of basic services, sources of income and the destruction of homes. It is difficult to determine the percentages of returnees in these areas because some displaced persons from outside these areas have returned to live in the affected areas and many of them are still displaced or settled in other areas such as Kirkuk and Salah al-Din.
18. Has infrastructure and or factories/shops/facilities been repaired? What has and has not so far been repaired?
The local government has launched plans to rebuild the infrastructure, but it has not been fully implemented and the region still suffers from a lack of services. Some factories have been rebuilt, such as the wheat mill and a few workshops and shops, but a number of factories are still destroyed along with many car showrooms, workshops and schools.
19. Do people have access to water and electricity again? Did they have access to it before the attack?
A number of transmission lines and water pipes have been repaired, but the main station that was damaged as a result of the bombing has not been operational yet.
20. Have roads been repaired? If so how many?
Yes, only the main road in the area has been repaired.
21. Has the rubble been cleared? How much?
Some of the debris has been removed but the bigger proportion remains in the area.
22. Is it safe to live in the affected neighbourhoods again? Or is there a risk of unexploded ordnance?
Yes, it is safe, and the Al-Ghad Organisation for Women and Children’s Care is implementing an awareness project about the dangers of war remnants in Hawija now.
23. Do people have access to the same local facilities as before, such as medical facilities, shops, daycares, pharmacies etcetera?
Yes, some facilities were reopened thanks to individual efforts.
24. Can the local authorities confirm the loss of jobs which resulted from this attack (because stores, workshops and factories closed and are still not opened because the area still lacks electricity and has not been rebuilt)?
Hundreds of Hawija residents lost their jobs and sources of income as a result of the destruction of workshops, car showrooms and factories, as well as the destruction of the basic infrastructure of the area. Some people have reopened a small number of workshops and shops, and the mill was rebuilt too, but the lack of services hinders the complete restoration of economic and urban life.
Part IV: General damage ISIS occupation and anti-ISIS Coalition
25. One source mentions that one of two water treatment plants (WTP) in the city were damaged in another airstrike. However another source says the WTP itself wasn’t damaged by an airstrike, but instead a power station was damaged that normally provided the WTP with electricity to pump the water. Was it the WTP itself or the power station and pipelines that were damaged?
Yes, the water transmission lines, the supplied electricity network and the power station were all damaged.
26. The source also mentions that currently, only one WTP is functioning in Hawijah, through the public grid. However because the grid is not reliable, the functioning of the WTP is limited and it cannot cover the needs of the population. Can the Council please confirm if this was and remains true?
Yes, it is true and the situation is still as mentioned.
27. A 2018 report noted that two of the three healthcare facilities in Hawijah had been damaged by fighting with only one functioning at that time – meaning people had to travel to Kirkuk for specialized care. However, a separate local source asserts that “No health care center has been damaged because airstrike, only some minor damages in the Directorate of Health building and it already been rehabilitated, Hawija General Hospital and public health center is functioning now – but according to field staff there are huge gaps in sanitation facilities.”
Could the Council please confirm whether two out of three health centres were or were not damaged – and if so, whether they have now been repaired?
The Health Directorate, known to the government as the ‘second health sector’ was affected by the strike.
28. Can the local authorities please confirm that there are no rehabilitation or psycho-social support programmes for the victims presently available in Hawijah?
Humanitarian organizations generally implement psychological support programs in Hawija, but there are no programs specifically for survivors of the strike.
محافظ الحويجة سبهان الجبوري في مكتبه. الصورة مقدمة من المحافظ.
ليلة الثاني إلى الثالث من حزيران عام 2015، قصفت طائرة حربية هولندية من نوع F-16s معملاً لداعش متخصصاً في تصنيع القنابل في الحويجة بالعراق. قتلت الانفجارات الثانوية التي سببتها الضربة ما لا يقل عن 70 مدنياً وأدت لجرح مئات آخرين. اليوم، لا تزال مدينة الحويجة تتعافى، ليس من حكم داعش طويل الأمد على المنطقة فقط، بل من التأثير المستمر على حياة المدنيين من الضربة الجوية الهولندية قبل خمس سنوات.
أجرت Airwars و PAX مقابلة مع محافظ الحويجة سبهان الجبوري عن التأثير المباشر وغير المباشر للضربة الهولندية، لتقريرهما المشترك الأخير “الرؤية من خلال الركام: تأثير استخدام الأسلحة المتفجرة في الحرب ضد داعش على المدنيين”.
تمت الإجابة على الأسئلة عبر البريد الإلكتروني يوم الثامن والعشرين من أيلول 2020. يدور القسم الأول من الأسئلة حول التأثيرات المباشرة للغارة الجوية الهولندية، فيما يركز القسم الثاني على الآثار غير المباشرة. في القسم الثالث سئل المحافظ عن التأثيرات المستمرة للضربة على حياة المدنيين في الحويجة حالياً. يبحث المحافظ في القسم الرابع الضرر الإجمالي الذي سببه احتلال داعش والتحالف المضاد لداعش على المدينة.
القسم الأول: الأذى المباشر
1.ما هو تقدير مجلس الحويجة الحالي للقتلى والجرحى المدنيين نتيجة هذه الغارة الجوية الهولندية؟
بحسب التقارير الاولية لأعداد القتلى المدنيين فقد بلغت أكثر من 70 قتيلا وأكثر من 500 جريح.
2.هل يمكن للمجلس أن يصف الأضرار التي لحقت بالممتلكات المدنية مثل المنازل والشوارع والمرافق الطبية والمحلات التجارية والمدارس ومرافق رعاية الأطفال والصيدليات والمصانع. هل توجد قائمة بالممتلكات المدمرة أو المتضررة؟
تعرضت الممتلكات المدنية إلى أضرار كبيرة حيث تعرضت المعامل والورش والمحال التجارية والمنازل المحيطة بمنطقة الانفجار الى محو ودمار بالكامل، إضافة إلى تدمير محطة الكهرباء ومركز للدفاع المدني ومطحنة.
3. كم عدد المدارس التي تضررت جراء الهجوم، وهل عادت للعمل مجدداً؟
تعرضت 37 مدرسة للضرر في المجمل، مع خروج 4 مدارس عن الخدمة، ولم تتم إعادة بنائها.
4. كم عدد الصيدليات التي تضررت وهل تم فتحها مجدداً؟
لا جواب
5. هل صحيح أن معمل ثلج وطوب تضرر نتيجة الضربة وهل عاد للعمل مجدداً؟
نعم، تم تأكيد تدمير أكثر من معمل لإنتاج الثلج وكذلك معامل للطوب نتيجة الضربة الجوية . لم يتم اعادة افتتاح المعامل بشكل كامل او أن أصحابها لم يعودوا للمنطقة.
6. هل صحيح أن نظام الصرف الصحي السطحي تضرر وهل عاد للعمل مجدداً؟
لا جواب
7. هل هناك تقدير إجمالي للمباني المتضررة والمدمرة في هذه الغارة الجوية الهولندية؟
حسب التقييم الأولي لحجم الدمار وقطر تأثير الموجة الارتدادية للانفجار، وصل الدمار الى دائرة يزيد قطرها عن 2 كيلومتر وتعرض 500 مبنى لدمار بنسبة كبيرة.
·8. هل يمكن للمجلس أن يحدد الأضرار التي لحقت بالبنية التحتية مثل الكهرباء وأنابيب الغاز وأنابيب المياه وخطوط الاتصال وما إلى ذلك؟
نتيجة للأضرار الكبيرة التي لحقت بالبنى التحتية للمنطقة والمناطق المحيطة وتعرض البنى التحتية في منطقة الانفجار والأحياء المحيطة بها إلى أضرار، توقف عدد كبير من المرافق منها محطة كهرباء و خطوط الاتصالات الرئيسية وأنابيب الماء في المنطقة.
القسم الثاني: الأذى غير المباشر
9. ما هو تأثير الأضرار التي لحقت بالممتلكات المدنية والبنية التحتية من الغارة الجوية الهولندية مثل: صعوبة الوصول إلى المياه والكهرباء والتدفئة أو غيرها من الخدمات الأساسية مثل خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي والخدمات الصحية والنزوح والأثر البيئي والأنقاض وإدارة النفايات؟
أدت الأضرار الكبيرة التي لحقت بالبنى التحتية للمنطقة والمناطق المحيطة وتضرر محطة الكهرباء وأنابيب الماء إلى نزوح عدد كبير من العوائل من المناطق المتضررة وتدني نسبة وصول الخدمات الأساسية إليهم .
10. ما هو الأثر النفسي الذي حدث على المجتمعات المحلية؟
كان لهول هذه الضربة أثر نفسي عميق على الضحايا حيث أدت إلى مقتل العشرات من العوائل وإصابة المئات. بعض العوائل محيت بالكامل والبعض الآخر خسر ما لا يقل عن 3-4 أفراد من أفراد الأسرة . تسبب غياب الرعاية الصحية المباشرة وعدم قدرة الأهالي على إسعاف ذويهم ومشاهدتهم يتوفون تحت الركام بصدمة كبيرة لدى الأهالي، إضافة لخسارتهم منازلهم وممتلكاتهم ومصادر الدخل اليوم وتعرضهم للنزوح .
11. أفادت التقارير أن أهالي الحويجة ما زالوا قلقين بشأن الآثار الإشعاعية المحتملة وغيرها من الآثار الملوثة من الضربة الهولندية والحملة ضد داعش. هل يمكن للمجلس إطلاعنا على هذه المخاوف؟
رغم تحرير المنطقة وعودة الأهالي ومحاولاتهم لإعادة بناء المنطقة الصناعية والمناطق السكنية المحيطة إلا أن المخاوف ما زالت مستمرة بين الأهالي من الاثار الإشعاعية والمواد الملوثة نتيجة لقوة الانفجار الهائلة حيث يعتقد بعضهم وجود مواد إشعاعية في المنطقة.
القسم الثالث: الآثار طويلة المدى
12. كيف حال الناجين من الغارة الجوية الهولندية حالياً؟
تقوم منظمة الغد بالتعاون مع السلطات المحلية بعملية تسجيل للناجين والمتضررين من الغارة الجوية بعمل تطوعي، حيث بينت المعلومات المسجلة حالياً أن الناجين منقسمون بين نازحين داخلياً الى محافظة كركوك وصلاح الدين، و نازحين داخل الحويجة نتيجة دمار المنازل ومصادر الدخل والمعامل ونقص الخدمات الأساسية في المنطقة .
13. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد التقديرات أنه نتيجة للهجوم تعرض حوالي 2000 شخص لمشاكل اجتماعية – نفسية؟
نعم ويمكن أن يتجاوز عدد المتضررين هذا العدد بسبب الآثار الجانبية للضربة.
14. هل تتوافر برامج للتأهيل النفسي والجسدي؟
لا توجد برامج تأهيل أو دعم نفسي متخصصة تستهدف الناجين من الضربة الجوية الهولندية تحديداً، لكن قد يتم شمولهم بالبرامج العامة التي تستهدف منطقة الحويجة او النازحين.
15. هل تم تعويض الضحايا بأي شكل من الأشكال؟ وهل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد أن احدى العائلات تلقت تعويضاً؟
لم يتم تنفيذ أي برامج تعويضات للناجين.
آثار الضربة الهولندية على الحويجة عام 2015 والتي أدت لمقتل ما يقارب 70 مدنياً (عن صفحة الثورة العراقية).
16. هل تم إصلاح منازل المواطنين التي تضررت؟ في حال تم ذلك، كم عددها؟ هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد أن ما بين 50-60 بالمئة من المباني في المنطقة أعيد بناؤها؟
لم يتم ترميم المنازل بشكل كامل ولا تتجاوز نسبة المنازل المرممة 40% من المنازل رغم عودة العوائل للمنطقة، إلا أنهم يسكنون في منازل متضررة من آثار الضربة لعدم قدرتهم على إصلاح تلك المنازل .
قد يكون من الصعوبة تأكيد هذه النسبة لوجود العديد من المباني التي دمرت بالكامل وعدم عودة أصحاب تلك المباني .
17. ما الظروف التي يعيشها الناس الآن؟ هل عادوا إلى ديارهم أم لا يزالون نازحين؟ كم عدد سكان الحويجة الذين ما زالوا نازحين من المناطق المتضرر من الضربة الهولندية؟
الظروف المعيشية صعبة جداً بسبب نقص الخدمات الأساسية ومصادر الدخل ودمار المنازل. من الصعب تحديد نسبة العائدين في تلك المناطق بسبب عودة بعض النازحين من خارج تلك المناطق للسكن في المناطق المتضررة، ومازال العديد منهم نازحين او استقروا في مناطق أخرى مثل كركوك وصلاح الدين.
18. هل تم إصلاح البنية التحتية و المصانع و المحلات والمرافق؟ ما الذي تم إصلاحه ولم يتم إصلاحه حتى الآن؟
أطلقت الحكومة المحلية خططاً لإصلاح البنى التحتية إلا أنها لم تنفذ بشكل كامل ومازالت المنطقة تعاني من نقص الخدمات. تم اعادة بناء بعض من المصانع مثل مطحنة الحنطة وعدد قليل من الورش والمحال لكن لا يزال عدد من المصانع مدمراً والكثير من معارض السيارات والورش والمدارس.
19. هل يحصل الناس على الماء والكهرباء من جديد؟ (هل تمكنوا من الوصول إليهما قبل الهجوم)؟
تم إصلاح عدد من الخطوط الناقلة وأنابيب المياه لكن المحطة الرئيسية التي تضررت نتيجة القصف لم تعمل حتى الآن.
20. هل تم إصلاح الطرق؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك فكم منها تم إصلاحه؟
نعم، تم إصلاح الطريق الرئيسي للمنطقة فقط.
21. هل تمت إزالة الأنقاض؟ في حال حدث ذلك فكم حجمها؟
تم ازالة جزء من الركام لكن الجزء الاكبر باق في المنطقة.
22. هل الأحياء المتضررة آمنة للعيش فيها مرة أخرى (بالنسبة للألغام و ما إلى ذلك)؟
نعم آمنة وتقوم منظمة الغد لرعاية المرأة والطفل بتنفيذ مشروع التوعية من مخاطر المخلفات الحربية داخل الحويجة حالياً.
23. هل تتوفر نفس المرافق المحلية لأهالي الحويجة كما كانت من قبل (مثل منشآت طبية، محلات، ومراكز رعاية للأطفال، وصيدليات)؟
نعم، تم إعادة افتتاح بعض المرافق بجهود ذاتية بسيطة.
24. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد خسارة وظائف بسبب الهجوم (باعتبار أن محالاً وورش عمل ومصانع أغلقت ولا تزال غير فاعلة لأن المنطقة لا تزال تعاني من انقطاع الكهرباء ولم تتم إعادة بنائها)؟
فقد المئات من أهالي الحويجة وظائفهم ومصادر دخلهم نتيجة لدمار الورش ومعارض السيارات والمصانع وكذلك دمار البنى التحتية الأساسية للمنطقة. أعاد بعض الناس افتتاح عدد قليل من الورش والمحال وكذلك إعادة بناء المطحنة إلا أن نقص الخدمات يعرقل إعادة الحركة العمرانية بالكامل.
القسم الرابع: التأثير العام لاحتلال داعش و للتحالف المضاد لداعش على الحويجة.
25. يذكر أحد المصادر أن إحدى محطتي معالجة المياه (WTP) في المدينة تضررت في غارة جوية أخرى. ومع ذلك ، يقول مصدر آخر إن محطة المعالجة نفسها لم تتضرر من جراء الغارة الجوية ولكن بدلاً من ذلك تضررت محطة طاقة كانت تزود محطة معالجة المياه بالكهرباء لضخ المياه. هل تضررت محطة المعالجة نفسها أم محطة الطاقة وخطوط الأنابيب؟
نعم تضررت الخطوط الناقلة والشبكة المجهزة للكهرباء ومحطة الطاقة.
26. ويشير المصدر أيضًا إلى أن محطة معالجة واحدة فقط تعمل حاليًا في الحويجة من خلال الشبكة العامة. ومع ذلك ، نظرًا لأن الشبكة غير موثوقة ، فإن تشغيل محطة المعالجة محدودة ولا يمكنها تغطية احتياجات السكان. هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد ما إذا كان هذا صحيحًا ولا يزال كذلك؟
نعم صحيح ومازال الوضع كما هو مذكور.
27. أشار تقرير صدر عام 2018 إلى أن اثنتين من مرافق الرعاية الصحية الثلاثة في الحويجة تضررت بسبب القتال وكان هناك مركز واحد فقط يعمل في ذلك الوقت – مما يعني أن الناس اضطروا أن يسافروا إلى كركوك للحصول على رعاية متخصصة. ومع ذلك، أكد مصدر محلي منفصل أنه “لم يتضرر أي مركز رعاية صحية بسبب الغارة الجوية، فقط بعض الأضرار الطفيفة في مبنى مديرية الصحة وتم إعادة تأهيله بالفعل، ومستشفى الحويجة العام ومركز الصحة العامة يعملان الآن – ولكن وفقًا للموظفين الميدانيين هناك فجوات هائلة في مرافق الصرف الصحي”.
هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد ما إذا كان 2 من أصل 3 مراكز صحية قد تضررت أو لم تتضرر – وإذا كان الأمر كذلك ، فهل تم إعادة إعمارها الآن؟
تضررت مديرية الصحة من أثر الضربة واسمها المعروف لدى الحكومة حالياً القطاع الصحي الثاني.
28. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد غياب وجود برامج دعم اجتماعية نفسية للناجين الموجودين حالياً في الحويجة؟
تقوم المنظمات الإنسانية بتنفيذ برامج الدعم النفسي في الحويجة بشكل عام، لكن لا توجد برامج مخصصة للناجين من الضربة.
Subhan Al Jabouri, de burgemeester van Hawija in zijn kantoor (foto via de burgemeester).
In de nacht van 2 op 3 juni 2015 bombardeerden Nederlandse F-16’s een ISIS Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (VBIED) -fabriek in Hawija, Irak. Secundaire explosies veroorzaakt door de luchtaanval hebben minstens 70 burgers gedood en honderden anderen raakten gewond. Vandaag de dag is de stad nog steeds aan het herstellen van niet alleen de langdurige ISIS-controle over het gebied, maar ook van de blijvende impact op het burgerleven van de Nederlandse luchtaanval vijf jaar geleden.
Voor hun recentelijk gepubliceerde gezamenlijke rapport Seeing through the rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS, interviewden Airwars en PAX de burgemeester van Hawija Subhan Al Jabouri over de directe en indirecte aanhoudende gevolgen van de aanval.
De vragen zijn op 28 september 2020 via e-mail beantwoord. Het eerste deel van de vragen gaat over de directe gevolgen van de Nederlandse luchtaanval. Het tweede deel focust op de indirecte gevolgen. In het derde deel is de burgemeester gevraagd naar de impact die de Nederlandse luchtaanval vandaag de dag nog altijd heeft op het leven van burgers in Hawija. In het vierde deel gaat de burgemeester in op de algehele schade die de ISIS-bezetting en anti-ISIS Coalitie hebben achtergelaten in zijn stad.
Deel I: Directe gevolgen 1. Wat is uw huidige inschatting van het aantal burgerdoden en gewonden door de Nederlandse luchtaanval op Hawija in de macht van 2 op 3 juni?
Volgens de eerste rapportages zijn er meer dan 70 burgers gedood, en meer dan 500 gewond geraakt.
2. Kunt u de schade aan civiele objecten omschrijven; zoals schade aan huizen, wegen, medische voorzieningen, winkels, scholen, kinderopvang, apotheken, fabrieken, enzovoorts? Is er een lijst van beschadigde objecten?
Er zijn behalve zware beschadigingen aan civiele objecten zoals fabrieken, werkplaatsen, winkels en huizen in de directe omgeving van de explosie ook een elektriciteitscentrale, een Civil Defense Center en een molen vernietigd.
3. Hoeveel scholen zijn beschadigd geraakt, en zijn deze inmiddels weer operationeel?
Er zijn in totaal 37 scholen beschadigd waarvan vier scholen volledig zijn gesloten; deze zijn nog niet opnieuw opgebouwd.
4. Hoeveel apotheken zijn beschadigd, en zijn deze weer open?
Geen antwoord.
5. Klopt het dat er ook een ijs- en een baksteenfabriek zijn beschadigd, en zijn deze weer operationeel inmiddels?
Ja, het is bevestigd dat er meer dan een ijsproductiefabriek en steenfabrieken zijn verwoest door de luchtaanval. De fabrieken zijn nog niet volledig heropend, of de eigenaren zijn nog niet teruggekeerd.
6. Klopt het dat het (oppervlakte water) riool is beschadigd; is dit inmiddels weer gerepareerd?
Geen antwoord.
7. Is er een schatting van de totale schade van gebouwen die beschadigd of vernietigd zijn door de Nederlandse luchtaanval?
Volgens het eerste onderzoek naar de reikwijdte van de schade, en de doorsnee van het gebied dat door de drukgolf van de explosie is geraakt, heeft de vernietiging een diameter van meer dan 2 kilometer, waarbij 500 gebouwen voor een groot deel werden verwoest.
8. Kunt u de schade aan infrastructuur zoals elektriciteitsvoorzieningen, gasleidingen, waterleidingen, communicatie infrastructuur etcetera beschrijven?
De infrastructuur van zowel het explosiegebied als de omliggende buurten is beschadigd, wat heeft geleid tot gebrek aan veel diensten die deze faciliteiten leverden, zoals een elektriciteitscentrale, communicatielijnen en waterbuizen.
Deel II: Indirecte gevolgen
9. Wat is de impact van deze schade aan civiele objecten en infrastructuur ten gevolge van de Nederlandse luchtaanval geweest, zoals verminderde toegang tot water, elektriciteit, verwarming en andere essentiële diensten zoals water en sanitaire voorzieningen, gezondheidszorg, ontheemd raken, de impact op milieu en vuilnis- en puinverwerking?
De grote schade aan de infrastructuur van de buurt en omliggende buurten, maar ook de schade aan de elektriciteitscentrale en Waterbuizen heeft ervoor gezorgd dat een groot aantal families uit de getroffen gebieden ontheemd is geraakt en heeft geleid tot een significant verminderde toegang tot basisvoorzieningen.
10. Wat is volgens u de psychosociale impact op de lokale gemeenschap geweest?
De verschrikking van deze aanval heeft een heftige psychologische impact op de zielen van de slachtoffers achtergelaten, aangezien het in tientallen families tot de dood heeft geleid, en honderden gevallen tot verwondingen. Sommige families zijn volledig weggevaagd, andere families verloren minsten drie of vier gezinsleden. De afwezigheid van directe medische zorg en het onvermogen van mensen om hun families te helpen en hen te zien sterven onder het puin veroorzaakten een enorme schok bij inwoners. Tel daarbij op het verlies van hun huizen, bezittingen, inkomstenbronnen en het verworden tot vluchteling.
11. Er leven naar verluidt onder de mensen in Hawija zorgen over mogelijke radiologische en andere giftige effecten van zowel deze Nederlandse aanval, als ook de bredere militaire campagne om ISIS te verjagen. Kunt u ons over deze zorgen vertellen?
Ondanks de bevrijding van het gebied en de terugkomst en pogingen van inwoners ten spijt, zijn het bedrijventerrein en de omliggende woonwijken nog niet opnieuw opgebouwd. Er zijn nog steeds zorgen onder de inwoners over stralingseffecten en verontreinigde materialen ten gevolge van de enorme explosie, aangezien sommigen zeggen dat er ook radioactieve materialen in de wijk aanwezig zouden zijn geweest.
Deel III: Langdurige gevolgen
12. Hoe gaat het met de overlevenden van de Nederlandse luchtaanval?
De organisatie al-Ghad registreert samen met de lokale autoriteiten op vrijwillige basis de ontheemden (Internal Displaced People) en diegenen die schade hebben geleden door de aanval. De tot nu toe verzamelde informatie laat zien dat het ene gedeelte van de ontheemden in Kirkuk en de Salah al-Din provincie leeft, en het andere gedeelte in Hawija, aangezien hun huizen vernietigd zijn, hun bronnen van inkomsten en de fabrieken zijn weggevallen, en het aan basisvoorzieningen ontbreekt in het gebied.
13. Kunt u bevestigen dat als gevolg van de Nederlandse aanval rond de 2000 mensen psychosociale problemen ondervinden?
Ja en mogelijk nog meer, gezien de neveneffecten van de aanval.
14. Worden er psychologische en fysieke revalideringstrajecten aangeboden?
Er zijn geen rehabilitatieprogramma’s of speciale psychologische hulpprogramma’s, specifiek voor de groep ontheemden van de Nederlandse aanval, maar mogelijk doen ze mee in de bredere programma’s die worden aangeboden in het gebied Hawija of aan ontheemden.
15. Zijn de slachtoffers op welke wijze dan ook gecompenseerd? Kan de burgemeester bevestigen dat er maar een familie is die tot nu toe compensatie heeft ontvangen?
Er is geen compensatie geweest voor ontheemden.
De ravage na de Nederlandse aanval op Hawija in juni 2015 (via Iraqi Revolution).
16. Zijn de huizen inmiddels weer opgebouwd? Zo ja, hoeveel? Klopt het dat rond de 50 tot 60 procent is herbouwd?
De huizen zijn niet volledig gerestaureerd, en niet meer dan 40 procent van de huizen zijn gerepareerd. Teruggekeerde families wonen in de door de luchtaanval beschadigde huizen omdat ze niet in staat zijn hun huis te repareren. Het is moeilijk het percentage precies te bevestigen, omdat er veel gebouwen volledig zijn verwoest en de eigenaren van deze gebouwen niet zijn teruggekeerd.
17. Zijn de mensen inmiddels weer teruggekeerd, of zijn ze nog op de vlucht, en wat zijn hun leefomstandigheden? Hoeveel mensen uit Hawija zijn nog steeds dakloos door de door de Nederlandse aanval veroorzaakte schade?
De leefomstandigheden zijn slecht vanwege het gebrek aan basisvoorzieningen, inkomstenbronnen en verwoeste huizen. Het is lastig een percentage te geven van hoeveel mensen zijn teruggekeerd, omdat sommige vluchtelingen van elders in het gebied zijn gaan wonen. En nog steeds zijn velen van hen ontheemd of hebben zich gevestigd in andere gebieden zoals Kirkuk en Salah al-Din.
18. Is de infrastructuur en zijn fabrieken/winkels/andere faciliteiten inmiddels gerepareerd? Wat is er wel en niet heropgebouwd tot nu toe?
De lokale overheid heeft plannen gelanceerd om de infrastructuur te repareren, maar ze heeft die niet volledig uitgevoerd en het gebied gaat nog steeds gebukt onder een gebrek aan voorzieningen. Sommige fabrieken zijn herbouwd, zoals de tarwemolen, en een paar werkplaatsen en winkels, maar nog steeds is een aantal fabrieken verwoest, net als veel autoshowrooms, werkplaatsen en scholen.
19. Hebben mensen weer stromend water en elektra? (En hadden ze dit voor de aanval?)
Een aantal transportleidingen en waterbuizen gerepareerd, maar de centrale die verwoest werd door het bombardement is tot nu toe nog niet operationeel.
20. Zijn er wegen hersteld, en zo ja hoeveel?
Ja, alleen de hoofdweg in het gebied is gerepareerd.
21. Is het puin geruimd? Hoeveel?
Een deel van het puin is geruimd, maar het grootste gedeelte ligt nog in het gebied.
22. Is het veilig om weer in de getroffen wijken te wonen? Of liggen er nog explosieve oorlogsresten?
Ja het is veilig, en Al-Ghad Organisation for Women and Children’s Care geeft momenteel voorlichting over de gevaren van oorlogsresten in Hawija.
23. Hebben mensen weer toegang tot dezelfde voorzieningen als voor de aanval, zoals medische faciliteiten, winkels, kinderopvang, apotheken, etcetera?
Ja, sommigen zijn weer geopend met basale individuele inspanningen.
24. Kunt u bevestigen dat veel mensen als gevolg van deze aanval hun baan hebben verloren, omdat winkels, werkplaatsen en fabrieken zijn gesloten en niet meer open zijn gegaan, en het gebied nog steeds niet herbouwd is en gebrek heeft aan elektriciteit?
Honderden inwoners van Hawija hebben hun banen en hun bron van inkomsten verloren door de verwoesting van de werkplaatsen, autoshowrooms en fabrieken, en ook is de basale infrastructuur van het gebied verwoest. Sommige mensen hebben opnieuw een paar werkplaatsen en winkels geopend, en ook de meelfabriek is herbouwd, maar het gebrek aan voorzieningen hindert de volledige terugkeer van het economische en stadse leven.
Deel IV: Algemene schade ISIS-bezetting en anti-ISIS Coalitie
25. Een van onze bronnen meldt dat een van de twee waterzuiveringsinstallaties in de stad is beschadigd in een andere luchtaanval, terwijl een andere bron zegt dat niet de waterzuiveringsinstallatie zelf geraakt is, maar de elektriciteitscentrale die de zuiveringsinstallatie normaal voorzag van elektriciteit, en dat deze daarom niet werkt. Was de waterzuiveringsinstallatie zelf beschadigd of de elektriciteitscentrale?
Zowel de transportleidingen, het elektriciteit netwerk als de elektriciteitscentrale zijn beschadigd.
26. Diezelfde bron rapporteert ook dat er op dit moment maar een waterzuiveringsinstallatie werkt, die afhankelijk is van het openbare elektriciteitsnetwerk. Maar omdat het elektriciteitsnetwerk niet betrouwbaar is, is de watervoorziening beperkt en dus niet genoeg voor de behoefte van de lokale bevolking. Is dit inderdaad het geval?
Ja, dit is correct en is nog steeds het geval.
27. Een rapport uit 2018 meldt dat twee van de drie gezondheidscentra in Hawija beschadigd waren door de gevechten, en dat er op dat moment slechts een operationeel was – dit had als gevolg dat mensen naar Kirkuk moesten reizen voor meer specialistische zorg. Een lokale bron meldt echter dat er “geen gezondheidscentrum is beschadigd, maar dat er alleen kleine schade aan het “Directorate of Health”-gebouw was (inmiddels gerepareerd), dat het algemeen ziekenhuis in Hawijah weer open is, maar dat er wel enorme gaten zijn gevallen in de sanitaire voorzieningen in het ziekenhuis.”
Kunt u bevestigen of er inderdaad twee van de drie gezondheidscentra zijn beschadigd, en zo ja, of deze inmiddels zijn hersteld?
Het “Health Directorate” gebouw, ook bekend als de “tweede gezondheidssector”, is inderdaad beschadigd geweest.
28. Klopt het dat er geen revalidatie en psychosociale ondersteuning is voor de slachtoffers nu in Hawija?
Er zijn wel humanitaire organisaties die psychologische hulpprogramma’s bieden in Hawija, maar niet specifiek voor de overlevenden en ontheemden van deze aanval.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL
Que ce soit sur le terrain, en présentiel, ou bien par vidéo-télé-conférence, le général Tardif, SNR de l’opération Chammal, poursuit ses rencontres dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences.
Après l’ambassadeur d’Allemagne la semaine dernière au QG de la coalition de l’opération Inherent Resolve, le général Tardif s’est de nouveau entretenu avec Paul Jordan représentant de l’EIP en Irak et en Syrie, l’European Institut for Peace.
Il l’avait rencontré il y a quelques semaines à Erbil. En charge du dossier des réfugiés dans les camps IDP (Internal Displaced Persons), le DICE et Paul Jordan, qui revient de Syrie, ont fait le point sur les actions en cours de l’organisation européenne, avec à terme, un programme approfondi d’assistance pour certains des IDP.
Fin de mission pour le MRTT
Au terme de trois semaines intenses, l’A330 Phenix a décollé le 25 octobre de la base aérienne d’Al Udeid au Qatar pour regagner la métropole. Avec près d’une centaine d’heures de vol, 11 sorties pour le compte d’OIR et 47 avions ravitaillés, l’A330 Phenix a parfaitement rempli sa première mission. Les Rafale français et des Typhoon britanniques ont ainsi pu bénéficier de près de 260 tonnes de carburant.
Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 21 au 27 octobre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant, au Quatar et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 16 sorties aériennes dont 2 missions de ravitaillement.
Airwars and PAX have published a new joint report, Seeing Through The Rubble, examining the dire and long-lasting effects of explosive weapons on civilian populations in urban areas in recent international military campaigns in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah. The report calls upon States to develop and support an international political declaration to better protect civilians against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.
The report was launched at a virtual event on October 26th. Ambassador Michael Gaffey of Ireland, which is spearheading efforts to create an international consensus on limiting the use of explosive weapons in cities, told participants: “We would not have reached the point of acceptance for the need for a political declaration [on explosive weapons] if it was not because of the work of civil society organisations. Their research and advocacy are vital to the process.”
The new report concludes that ‘precision’ when using explosive weapons in urban areas is not the key determinant of civilian harm. “Rather”, write the authors, “it is the wide area effect of an explosive weapon in relation to the proximity of civilians in populated areas.”
The PAX and Airwars report furthermore concludes that the cases of Mosul, Raqqah and Hawijah show that States acting in accordance with International Humanitarian Law is not enough in itself to prevent immense civilian harm and civilian suffering when explosive weapons are deployed in populated areas.
Co-author of the report Roos Boer, programme leader of the Humanitarian Disarmament programme at Dutch peace organisation PAX, states: “Large aircraft bombs and heavy artillery are intended for open battlefields. When bombing and shelling take place in towns and cities, civilians are killed and suffer life-changing injuries, and vital infrastructure like hospitals and schools are destroyed. We need to see states agree to stronger rules that will stop these urban attacks.”
Explosive weapons in populated areas
According to data monitoring by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 92 per cent of the 19,401 civilian deaths and injuries tracked by the organisation from the worldwide use of explosive weapons in 2019 occurred in urban areas. Furthermore, AOAV concludes that when explosive weapons, such as artillery, grenades, missiles, rockets and aircraft bombs, are used in towns and cities, nine out of ten casualties are civilians.
Explosive weapons are a major driver of forced displacement of civilians – not only because of fear of death and injury and the destruction of homes, but also because of their devastating impact on critical infrastructure services such as health care, education and water and sanitation services.
Cities in rubble
Two nations particularly affected by recent urban fighting are Iraq and Syria. While a variety of actors have caused major civilian harm and widespread destruction in both countries, the report focuses on military operations by the US-led International Coalition against ISIS. Using publicly available sources, the report analyses the short- and long-term effects of the use of explosive weapons in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah.
These cases illustrate that the effects of explosive weapons continue long after the bombs have exploded. In Mosul, the costs of the 2016-17 campaign to drive ISIS out of the city were high: at least 9,000 civilians were reportedly killed in the fighting. Around 700,000 Moslawis were displaced; and city officials have stated that 80 per cent of the inner city’s buildings were destroyed.
In June 2019, the UN International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported that entire neighbourhoods of Mosul had yet to be rebuilt and that a lack of essential services and poor sanitation were still threatening public health. Additionally, unexploded bombs, missiles, rockets and shells prevented civilians from returning to the city.
A federal Iraqi recovery team removes a body from the ruins of west Mosul, May 2018. (Image courtesy of Mosul Eye).
New details on Hawijah disaster
Seeing Through The Rubble also adds fresh information on the current situation in Hawijah. Six different sources, including Hawijah’s mayor, were interviewed for the report on the recent state of the city after a devastating 2015 Dutch airstrike on an ISIS IED factory, leading to the deaths of at least 70 civilians and hundreds more injured.
The report estimates that the secondary explosions triggered by the Dutch airstrike damaged between 400 and 500 buildings in the area, including many shops, homes and schools. Sources also reported that the airstrike caused major damage to crucial infrastructure, including roads and water pipelines.
According to the Mayor of Hawijah, Subhan Al Jabouri, less than 40 per cent of the buildings have been rebuilt and much rubble remains. The industrial area in Hawijah still suffers from a shortage of water and electricity.
Chris Woods, director of Airwars and a co-author of the report along with Laurie Treffers and Roos Boer, notes: “In highlighting the negative consequences for civilians of recent Western military interventions at Mosul, Hawijah and Raqqa, our new report demonstrates why militaries can’t rely simply upon compliance with the laws of war when trying to reduce civilian casualties during urban fighting. Large scale civilian harm during city battles is a terrible reality – and greater international safeguards are urgently needed.”
International political declaration
Since 2019, Ireland has been leading a series of consultations in Geneva, aimed at drawing up an international political declaration to ban the use of explosive weapons in urban areas. The International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), a network of NGOs, urges states to take immediate action to prevent human suffering from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. “These case studies show once again the unacceptably high levels of civilian casualties and destruction as a result of bombing and shelling in cities and other populated areas,” says Laura Boillot, coordinator of INEW, responding to the new report.
“Every year we see tens of thousands of civilians killed and injured, that suffer psychological trauma, and are forced to flee for safety. Cities are being torn apart – housing, hospitals, schools and vital infrastructure is destroyed which has disastrous consequences for the survival and wellbeing of the people that live there”, continues Boillot.
“This pattern of civilian harm should not be considered an inevitable consequence of war. Using heavy explosive weapons such as heavy artillery, multi-barrel rocket launchers and large bombs and missiles in populated areas – even against military targets – is not acceptable and must stop.”
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL
Dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate (DICE – directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences), le général Tardif, SNR-O de l’opération Chammal, poursuit ses rencontres sur le théâtre irakien.
Après avoir rencontré plusieurs délégués des différentes missions de l’ONU en Irak, dont madame Hamida Lasseko de l’UNICEF, il s’entretient cette semaine avec l’ambassadeur d’Allemagne en Irak pour évoquer la contribution de l’Allemagne à la stabilisation de l’Irak ainsi que le programme allemand vers la jeunesse irakienne de prévention de la radicalisation.
Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 14 au 20 octobre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 19 sorties aériennes dont 5 missions de ravitaillement.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Le Phénix déployé dans le cadre de CHAMMAL
Depuis le 5 octobre 2020, et pour trois semaines environ, un A330 Phénix, nouvel avion ravitailleur de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace, est déployé en opération extérieure sur la base aérienne d’Al Udeid, au Qatar, au profit de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE.
Dès le 6 octobre 2020, le Phénix a procédé à sa première mission de ravitaillement au profit de la coalition et des Rafale de la base aérienne projetée au Levant.
Outre la capacité à déployer cet aéronef, cette mission démontre l’engagement de la France dans la lutte contre Daesh et sa capacité à intégrer ce type de moyens dans un environnement complexe.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 07 au 13 octobre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 23 sorties aériennes dont 5 missions de ravitaillement.
PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL
SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.
ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative (SNR) de niveau opératif
Le général Tardif, SNR opératif de l’opération CHAMMAL, de retour à Bagdad après quelques jours à Erbil, continue son programme de rencontres dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate of interagency and civil environment (DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences). Cette semaine, il a ainsi rencontré madame Irena Solano, l’adjointe de Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, chef de l’United nations assistance mission in Irak (UNAMI – mission d’assistance de l’ONU pour l’Irak). Puis, toujours dans un cadre onusien, le général Tardif a rencontré Sheri Ritsema-Anderson de l’Office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA – Office de coordination des affaires humanitaires). Enfin, pour le compte de l’Union européenne, le général Tardif a rencontré Simone Karlstetter et Matteo Salvatori, représentants en Irak de l’European union advisory Mission in Iraq, la mission de conseil de L’UE auprès du ministère intérieur irakien.
Le Phénix déployé dans le cadre de CHAMMAL
Depuis le 5 octobre 2020, le nouvel avion ravitailleur de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace, l’A330Phénix est déployé en opération extérieure.
Après avoir effectué des missions opérationnelles depuis la métropole au profit des opérations BARKHANE et CHAMMAL et une liaison sur la base aérienne projetée au Levant, il est déployé et stationné sur la base aérienne de Al Udeid au Qatar. Pendant quelques semaines, il opérera au profit de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).
Dès le 6 octobre 2020, le Phénix a procédé à sa première mission de ravitaillement au profit de la coalition et des Rafale de la base aérienne projetée au Levant.
Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 30 septembre au 06 octobre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 14 sorties aériennes.
Summary
Tuesday 6 October – an RAF Reaper killed terrorists who had attacked Iraqi security forces in the Anbar desert.
Detail
UK Armed Forces continue to provide a significant contribution to the global coalition ensuring the Daesh terrorist group does not become resurgent in Syria and Iraq, with Royal Air Force aircraft flying daily armed reconnaissance patrols. On Tuesday 6 October, a small group of Daesh extremists attacked Iraqi security forces in the desert of Anbar province, west of Baghdad. A coalition air strike provided immediate support to the Iraqi troops, and succeeded in destroying half the attacking Daesh group. An RAF Reaper was then tasked to deal with the remaining terrorists. The crew of the Reaper successfully located them, and at an appropriate moment, with no sign of a strike posing any risks to friendly forces or any civilians, conducted a carefully planned attack with a GBU-12 guided bomb. The Iraqi forces subsequently reported that the threat had been eliminated.
Previous update
As part of the UK’s contribution to the Global Coalition in the fight against Daesh, the Royal Air Force continues to fly daily missions against the terrorist movement in Syria and Iraq. Our aircraft conduct strikes on terrorist targets when required.
Intelligence analysis confirmed that a Daesh leadership group had established a cave network 85 miles west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. An RAF Reaper kept a close watch on the location during the early hours of Thursday 20 August. When terrorists were identified at the cave entrance, the Reaper’s crew conducted an attack with a single Hellfire missile, having first swept the area for any signs of civilians who might be placed at risk. The missile struck the target accurately, and the blast was observed to emerge from another part of the cave network, indicating that weapon’s effect had reached deep inside the caves.
In addition to this, an RAF Reaper maintained surveillance on another set of caves in the area on Wednesday 26 August, which confirmed the presence of a number of Daesh extremists at the site. When terrorists were observed at the mouth of one of the caves, the Reaper’s crew engaged successfully with a Hellfire missile, then provided surveillance support to a follow-up attack by two coalition fast jets which struck the rest of the Daesh position.
For more information see Daesh: UK government response page on GOV.UK
On October 1st, Belgium once again sent its F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Yet the Belgian, Iraqi and Syrian publics are still kept in the dark when it comes to civilian harm during previous deployments. The Belgian military to this day refuses to take responsibility for civilians its actions might have killed or injured.
Also this week, an open letter to defence minister Philippe Goffin from eleven civil society organisations including Airwars – calling for greater transparency and accountability for reported civilian harm – has been widely covered by the Belgian media.
Until the end of 2017, Belgium was one of the more active Coalition allies, alternating with the Dutch military. During some 991 declared missions, the Belgians fired nearly one thousand bombs and missiles. A total of 95 Belgian military personnel and a team of four Red Card Holders will now be deployed again until September 2021. According to the parliamentary resolution approving this latest weapon deployment, any possible action in Syria “covers only a buffer zone on the border with Iraq and is much more restricted than in 2017”. The stated aim of the mission is to protect troops on the ground, and to carry out planned or ad-hoc targeted attacks on ISIS.
In August, the Belgian news organisation HLN reported that the Belgian military had updated its weapons to ‘precision bombs’. F-16s will be armed with bombs of the type GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb. According to a Belgian military technician, the munition was chosen because of its “surgical precision”.
According to Alma Al Osta, Arms Advocacy Manager with Humanity And Inclusion, this change of munition is not enough: “There is much more to protecting civilians than just choosing a precise weapon. Belgium has indeed chosen GBU-39/B bombs, which are known for their precision, but these bombs weigh around 115kg and are capable of penetrating one meter of steel-reinforced concrete. If this weapon is used on open battlefields without the presence of civilians, then the risk would be smaller. But wars nowadays are fought in towns and cities where people live, children go to school, and civilians gather on markets.”
Besides the direct impact of explosive weapons in urban areas, Al Osta is worried about their secondary effects: “We have no information on how Belgium will prevent civilian harm and mitigate the so-called domino effects of airstrikes, such as trauma, damage to civilian objects, displacement, lack of access to education, health care and agricultural land, contamination with unexploded ordnances, damage to the environment and further instability,” she notes.
The zero civilian casualty myth
In March 2020, Commander of the Belgian Air Component Frederik Vansina refused to answer any questions on Belgian involvement in specific civilian harm incidents and told De Morgen: “Countries within the Coalition show solidarity and neither confirm nor deny [involvement]. Let’s talk about how the Syrian regime and Russia operate there. That’s a different story. Just look at the images of Homs and Aleppo.”
Back in 2017, a senior Belgian official had told Airwars that the government was planning to admit two civilian harm incidents – one at Al Qaim on February 27th 2017 and the second incident on March 21st of that year in the vicinity of Mosul. According to the US-led Coalition itself, the strikes had killed at least two civilians and injured four others. However, the Belgian government then publicly failed to take responsibility for these incidents, and even asserted that its actions had killed zero civilians.
In March 2020, a joint investigation by Airwars, RTL Netherlands, BBC, De Morgen and Liberation revealed that Belgium consistently refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions, even where the US-led Coalition has conceded particular Belgian strikes to have killed and injured non combatants. In response to this investigation, the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces (BAF) were “certainly not involved in all events.”
Previous comments by Colonel J. Poesen, head of operations at the Belgian Air Force, indicated that only incidents in which international humanitarian law was possibly violated were being investigated. However, the acknowledged civilian harm events recognised by the Coalition show that civilians are nevertheless killed in military actions, even where they might comply with international humanitarian law.
Lack of parliamentary overview
A major bottleneck to greater transparency and accountability for Belgian military actions abroad is a lack of effective parliamentary oversight. According to a 2018 report by Pax Christi Vlaanderen and Vredesactie, “there is no binding parliamentary approval for foreign missions, nor mandatory evaluations during and after the operation. Moreover, there is no formal and transparent framework under which the government periodically informs parliament about the specific objectives, content and consequences of military operations.”
In the special parliamentary commission Follow-up of Foreign Missions, established in the early 2000s, MPs are confidentially briefed about military interventions. Yf Reykers, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University notes: “This commission is special in the sense that there are not many countries having such a commission in which high-level classified information is shared. However, that information cannot be used by MPs who are part of that commission because they are bound to strict confidentiality. They are also unable to verify this information independently with other sources.”
Belgium about to send four #F16s to #Iraq and #Syria as part of #InherentResolve.For the #warpowers community: parliamentary approval by a remarkable coalition of minority government parties with @de_NVA and far-right @vlbelang. https://t.co/lVAIsQFRzP via @demorgen
— Yf Reykers (@YfReykers) June 26, 2020
The Parliamentary resolution approving the upcoming weapon deployment does include several amendments that call on the government to improve its transparency and accountability practices. For example, Parliament requests the federal government “to communicate publicly, after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations, about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations.”
Reykers is generally positive about the amendments: “It is progress that Parliament is even considering transparency and accountability practices. That is really a change compared to a few years ago. We see that Belgium is learning from its neighbouring countries, such as the Netherlands, especially after the Hawijah scandal.”
However, Reykers also sees possibilities for the Government to manoeuvre itself through the amendments with minimum levels of transparency and accountability: “The question is if these amendments will bring about structural change. One of the things that is really needed is systematic evaluations [of civilian harm claims] before, during and after a mission, ideally publicly available.”
While the new parliamentary resolution urges the federal Government to improve its transparency and accountability during the upcoming deployment, it is yet to be seen whether Belgium will structurally change its practices – and whether the civilian victims of its previous airstrikes will receive answers.