Military Reports

Military Reports

CJTF–OIR for November 1, 2020 – November 30, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

November 30, 2020

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

January 6, 2021
Release No. 20210106-01
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, November 2020

SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and
its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.

CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers
(42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer
live under Daesh oppression.  CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring
defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region
and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.

Strike Summary
Between November 1 and November 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 14
strikes consisting of 34 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 22 engagements. This resulted in 35 enemy killed and one weapons cache
destroyed.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 12 engagements.

This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter,
attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled
artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.

A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic
engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a
single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single
aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one
strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a
group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the
cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use.
Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.

CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a
strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of
individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to
compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.

#DefeatDaesh

-30-

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Report Date

November 30, 2020

Report Summary

  • 14 total strikes
  • 7 in Iraq
  • 7 in Syria

Confirmed Actions

US
Between November 1 and November 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 14
strikes consisting of 34 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 22 engagements. This resulted in 35 enemy killed and one weapons cache
destroyed.
November 1, 2020 – November 30, 2020
Syria: 7 strikes
Between November 1 and November 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 14
strikes consisting of 34 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting
of 12 engagements. 

French MoD for November 18, 2020 – November 24, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

November 24, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et active ponctuellement le maillage de ses cellules dormantes pour poursuivre ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Le CEMA se déplace sur la frégate Aconit
Déployée en Méditerranée orientale dans le cadre de l’opération CHAMMAL, la frégate Aconit a effectué une relâche opérationnelle dans le port de Beyrouth. Avant de reprendre la mer, la frégate a accueilli le général d’armée François Lecointre, chef d’état-major des Armées, alors en visite officielle au Liban.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 18 au 24 novembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 26 sorties aériennes .

The Credibles: How Airwars secured the most comprehensive locational data on civilian harm ever released by the US military

Published

November 18, 2020

Written by

Chris Woods

Assisted by

Abbie Cheeseman, Alex Hopkins, Clive Vella, Eeva Sarlin, Hanna Rullmann, Ned Ray and Sophie Dyer

published in partnership with

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Major transparency breakthrough may help Iraqis and Syrians to secure restitution and reconciliation

The US-led Coalition has released to Airwars the near coordinates of almost all confirmed or ‘Credible’ civilian harm events in Iraq and Syria in the long war against so-called Islamic State, allowing for the first time the accurate locating of 341 confirmed incidents and almost 1,400 civilian deaths since 2014.

The groundbreaking decision by the US-led Coalition – which came after several years of patient engagement by Airwars – will enable affected Iraqis and Syrians for the first time to know whether their loved ones were caught up in a particular event. That in turn could open the way for both apologies and ex gratia payments from the US and its international allies.

Former chief Coalition spokesman Colonel Myles Caggins said that the decision to share the data had been taken in the interest of transparency: “We take every allegation of civilian casualties with the utmost sincerity, concern, and diligence; we see the addition of the geolocations as a testament to transparency, and our commitment to working with agencies like Airwars to correctly identify civilian harm incidents.”

“The release of this locational data for confirmed civilian harm events in Iraq and Syria – accurate in some cases to just one metre – sets a new and welcome transparency benchmark,” Airwars noted. “We appreciate the US-led Coalition’s decision to release this important material, which should help affected Iraqis and Syrians to secure some closure following tragic losses within their families.”

What the data shows

In August 2014 the US-led coalition began bombing so-called Islamic State after militants had seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. Millions of civilians were trapped in a brutal war that lasted several years, with fighting often taking place in heavily built-up neighbourhoods.

Over the years the US-led Coalition has admitted many hundreds of civilian deaths from its own actions – though identifying exactly where these took place has been a major challenge.

The release to Airwars of hundreds of coordinates of Credible incidents – most accurate to within 100 metres and some to within just one metre  – is believed to be the most comprehensive locational civilian casualty data ever released by the US military.

Airwars has now added a new mapping and research tool to its website, The Credibles, which comprehensively maps all located incidents across both Iraq and Syria. The data has also been visualised in partnership with The Washington Post.

The locational data provided by the US military is, Airwars believes, unique. No previous belligerent is thought to have revealed at scale – either during or after a war – exactly where and when it has harmed civilians.

Using the US Department of Defense’s preferred Military Grid Reference System (MGRS), 70 of these Credible civilian harm events have now been publicly geolocated by the Coalition to an accuracy of just one metre squared, with all additional events geolocated to an accuracy of a one hundred metre square box.

Many of these incidents have already been well documented by affected communities themselves, with associated photographs, videos, and eyewitness narratives. Airwars also presently lists the names of more than 900 victims from these located events.

Just three of 344 confirmed Coalition civilian casualty incidents have been omitted from the data release. One recent case involved Coalition ground troops in Iraq, suggesting possibly sensitive Special Forces operations. Another event is still being queried with US Central Command (CENTCOM). The third case is the sole British-confirmed anti ISIS event, from March 2018 – with the UK Ministry of Defence still declining to release any locational information.

Some of the 341 Credible locations released to date by the US-led Coalition

The civilian casualty assessment process

More than 29,600 civilians have locally been alleged killed by US-led Coalition actions in Iraq and Syria since 2014, according to Airwars monitoring of local populations. The US was initially slow to engage – with just three civilian harm events confirmed by CENTCOM in the first 16 months of the war.

Beginning in 2016, the process of casualty assessments by the US military became more systematised – in part as a result of an increased focus on casualty mitigation by the Obama administration during its last months in office; and in part because of pressure from Airwars and other NGOs, which between them were tracking local allegations of civilian harm from Inherent Resolve actions in both Iraq and Syria.

CENTCOM established a permanent civilian casualty assessment team at Tampa covering the war against ISIS in mid 2016, and began publishing more regular public reports on confirmed civilian harm events. An additional 60 Credible incidents were admitted that year, for example.

In December 2016, the Coalition took over civilian casualty assessments from CENTCOM (although almost all personnel continued to be drawn from US forces.) The US-led alliance also began publishing monthly civilian harm assessments – which continue today. In total, CENTCOM and the Coalition have now assessed almost 3,000 alleged civilian harm events in the war against ISIS, to date confirming as Credible some 344 of these incidents.

Around one in four of these Credible events have resulted directly from Airwars referrals to the Coalition, meaning that without local reporting by affected communities – and the patient work of Airwars’ own Syrian and Iraqi researchers collating and preserving those reports – the events would not have come to light.

The challenges of properly locating Credible events

While the confirming of multiple civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria by CENTCOM and the Coalition was generally well received, there were often significant challenges in properly identifying the location of such events.

Press releases issued via military public affairs teams only tagged a Credible event to the nearest large population centre. In the September 2017 report for example, the Coalition declared a major confirmed civilian harm event in Mosul: “March 14, 2017, near Mosul, Iraq, via media report: During a strike on ISIS fighters engaging partner forces from a fighting position, it was assessed that 27 civilians in an adjacent structure were unintentionally killed.”

The month of March 2017 saw very heavy fighting at Mosul. Airwars tracked five separate claimed civilian harm events in the city for March 14th alone (two of them mass casualty incidents), with some days seeing more than a dozen allegations. Without the correct coordinates, affected Moslawis could never know whether their loved ones were (or were not) affected by particular strikes.

For the March 14th 2017 event cited above, Coalition officials eventually provided Airwars with coordinates in Mosul accurate to within just one metre (38SLF2901422174), confirming that the event took place in the neighbourhood of al Jadida. The challenge was whether such precise data could now be acquired for all confirmed events.

Such data could also help to prise open the door on possible restitution for civilian harm from US and Coalition actions in Iraq and Syria. According to the Pentagon, only six ex gratia payments were made to Iraqis during 2019, compared with more than 600 such awards for Afghanistan. Poor public locational data from Operation Inherent Resolve for confirmed civilian harm events has majorly hampered the ability of Iraqis and Syrians to pursue claims – until now.

Ex gratia payments awarded by the US in Afghanistan during 2019 were one hundred times higher than in Iraq. Poor public locational data by CJTF-OIR for confirmed events likely contributed to that disparity.

Securing the locational data

Following a face to face meeting with senior officials in Tampa in May 2016, CENTCOM and Airwars began regularly sharing data on civilian casualty allegations, in order to improve understanding, on both sides, of reported non combatant harm. That relationship has continued, with sometimes weekly confidential engagements between the Coalition’s CIVCAS Cell and the Airwars military advocacy team, involving granular queries from both parties.

CENTCOM also began sharing with Airwars occasional precise locational data for Credible events in mid 2016, in order better to clarify particular cases. Over time this became more systematised.

Alongside its monthly public press releases, the Coalition for several years provided Airwars with a private, annotated version of the monthly release, which both identified the geolocation of the event – and also, where possible, specifically cross matched Credible incidents to coded events already in the Airwars database. This locational information was provided by CJTFOIR on the expectation that Airwars would make it public through its own database of civilian harm events.

By early 2018 the Coalition was consistently providing MGRS data every month to Airwars for both Credible and later, for ‘Non Credible’ events. However this still left 126 historical confirmed cases for which Airwars had no locational data.

In early 2019, Airwars asked both the Coalition and the US Department of Defense to release this information – arguing that the alliance’s significant transparency in confirming civilian harm cases was being weakened by our then being unable publicly to determine where such cases had actually occurred. It was also argued that the US could better distinguish itself from Russia and other belligerents, who instead chose to hide or deny civilian harm from their own actions.

The missing locational data was provided to Airwars in Summer 2019 by the Coalition’s civilian casualty assessment team – a major step forward for transparency and public accountability. Later that year, the Coalition also began publishing MGRS data as part of its regular monthly public reporting.

The Coalition began sharing Credible close coordinates with Airwars in 2016, at first in private annotated versions of public reports.

Visualising the data

The Credibles dataset offers significant potential for visualisations, allowing for each confirmed US and allied civilian harm event in both Iraq and Syria to be precisely mapped and timelined. Additionally, each event can be cross matched to an associated Airwars incident report. More than 900 victim names are linked, along with associated photographs, videos, witness statements, and satellite imagery analysis of bomb sites.

Airwars has built a new subsite illustrating the remarkable potential of this unique transparency dataset. Each US-led Coalition Credible event has been precisely mapped down to at least 100 metres, and timelined across the war.

“The significance of this information for the affected communities led us to create an interface that would make the dataset easily accessible, and represent the information in a way that reflected its accuracy,” says Lizzie Malcolm of Scottish-American design team Rectangle, which conceived the new subsite.

The Credibles data sets a new benchmark for US military accountability for civilian harm. It’s hoped that the release of such accurate geolocational data can now become standard both for the US military and its allies.

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French MoD for November 11, 2020 – November 17, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

November 17, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 11 au 17 novembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 21 sorties aériennes dont une frappe (le 11/11).

Report Date

November 17, 2020

Report Summary

  • 1 total strikes
  • 1 in Iraq

Confirmed Actions

France
Weekly air actions (results from November 11 to 17 included)

French aircraft based in the Levant and the United Arab Emirates are continuing their actions against Daesh, within the Coalition. This week, the planes engaged in Operation Chammal carried out 21 air sorties including one strike (11/11).

Incident date

November 8, 2020

Incident Code

TI051

LOCATION

خلف أو قاسم ملكو, Khalaf or Qassim Malako, Nineveh, Iraq

At least one civilian was killed in alleged Turkish drone strikes on an alleged PKK vehicle near the town of Khalaf or Qassim Malako, Sinjar district, Nineveh governorate, on November 8th, 2020. Up to five militants were reportedly also killed and at least three others were wounded. Hawar News reported that “The “Nasr Mobin” forces

Summary

First published
November 12, 2020
Last updated
January 18, 2022
Strike status
Likely strike
Strike type
Airstrike, Drone Strike
Civilian harm reported
Yes
Civilians reported killed
1
Cause of injury / death
Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
Airwars civilian harm grading
Weak
Single source claim, though sometimes featuring significant information.
Suspected belligerent
Turkish Military
Suspected target
Other
Belligerents reported killed
2–5
Belligerents reported injured
3
View Incident →

French MoD for November 4, 2020 – November 10, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

November 10, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Frappe

Le 11 novembre, dans le cadre de missions de support aérien aux troupes de la coalition, les aéronefs français ont conduit 1 frappe contre une position de Daesh.

Tirant plusieurs bombes de précision, les aéronefs ont ainsi détruit des caches.

Opération CHAMMAL – L’Aconit relève le La Fayette
Le 10 novembre, au terme d’un déploiement de plus de 100 jours en Méditerranée orientale au profit de l’opération CHAMMAL, la frégate La Fayette a passé le témoin à la frégate Aconit.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 04 au 10 novembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 16 sorties aériennes dont 1 frappe.

Report Date

November 10, 2020

Confirmed Actions

France
Weekly air outlets (report from 04 to 10 November included)

French aircraft based in the Levant and the United Arab Emirates are continuing their actions against Daesh, within the Coalition. This week, the planes engaged in Operation Chammal carried out 16 aerial sorties, including 1 strike.

French MoD for October 28, 2020 – November 3, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

November 3, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL

Dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate of interagency and civil environment (DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences), le général Tardif, SNR-O de l’opération CHAMMAL, poursuit sa série de rencontres sur le théâtre irakien.

Ces derniers jours, il a rencontré des représentants de l’United Nations investigative team to promote accountability for crimes committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD – organisme des Nations Unies en charge des enquêtes sur les crimes commis par Daech) puis le général Carignan, commandant la Nato Mission Irak (NMI), dont la mission de formation au profit des Irakiens est en phase finale d’élaboration.

Le général Tardif s’est entretenu également avec des personnalités du comité international de la Croix rouge.

Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 28 octobre au 03 novembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.

CJTF–OIR for October 1, 2020 – October 31, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 31, 2020

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

December 14, 2020

Release No. 20201214-01

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, October 2020

SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.

CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers (42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer live under Daesh oppression.  CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.

Strike Summary

Between October 1 and October 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 10 strikes consisting of 27 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted six strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 18 engagements. This resulted in seven enemy killed and 23 caves destroyed.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted four strikes against Daesh targets consisting of nine engagements. This resulted in four terrain denial operations.

This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter, attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.

A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use. Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.

CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.

#DefeatDaesh

-30-

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Report Date

October 31, 2020

Report Summary

  • 10 total strikes
  • 6 in Iraq
  • 4 in Syria

Confirmed Actions

US
Between October 1 and October 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 10 strikes consisting of 27 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted six strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 18 engagements. This resulted in seven enemy killed and 23 caves destroyed.
October 1, 2020 – October 31, 2020
Syria: 4 strikes
Between October 1 and October 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 10 strikes consisting of 27 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted four strikes against Daesh targets consisting of nine engagements. This resulted in four terrain denial operations.   

“Some families were completely wiped out”: The Mayor of Hawijah speaks out

Published

October 29, 2020

Written by

Laurie Treffers and Mohammed al Jumaily

Assisted by

Maysa Ismael

Header Image

Damage in the industrial area of Hawijah, years after the attack in June 2015 (image via NOS).
Read this article in:
English
Arabic
Dutch

A Dutch airstrike on Hawijah in 2015 led to the deaths of at least 70 civilians. In a key interview, the city's Mayor discusses events that day - and the ongoing suffering of affected civilians.

On the night of June 2nd to June 3rd 2015, Dutch F-16s bombed an ISIS Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (VBIED) factory in the city of Hawijah, in Iraq’s Kirkuk province. Secondary explosions triggered by the airstrike killed at least 70 civilians and wounded hundreds more. Today, the city of Hawijah is still recovering – not only from long-standing ISIS control of the area, but also the lasting impact on civilian lives of the Dutch airstrike five years ago.

For their new joint report, Seeing through the rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS, Airwars and PAX interviewed Hawijah Mayor Subhan Al Jabouri about the direct, indirect, and ongoing effects of the strike.

The questions were answered via e-mail on September 28th, 2020. The first part of the interview discusses the direct consequences of the Dutch air raid. The second focuses on the indirect effects. In the third section, the Mayor was asked about the impact the Dutch air raid still has on the lives of civilians in Hawijah. Finally, the Mayor examines the overall damage that both the ISIS occupation and the anti-ISIS Coalition have caused in his city.

Subhan Al Jabouri, the Mayor of Hawijah, in his office (Image courtesy of the Mayor)

Interview with Subhan Al Jabouri, Mayor of Hawijah

Part I: Direct harm

1. What is Hawijah Council’s present estimate of civilian deaths and injuries resulting from this Dutch airstrike?

According to preliminary reports, more than 70 civilians were killed and more than 500 others injured.

2. Can the Council please characterise the damage caused to civilian objects such as houses, roads, medical facilities, shops, schools, childcare facilities, pharmacies, factories? Is there a list of damaged properties?

Besides severe damage to civilian properties, factories, workshops and homes in the surrounding area of the explosion, a power station, civil defence centre and a wheat mill were also destroyed.

3. How many schools were damaged in the attack, and are these functional again?

A total of 37 schools were damaged and four schools are out of service and no longer running and these have not yet been rebuilt.

4. How many pharmacies were damaged and are these open again? 

No answer.

5. Is it true that an ice- and brick factory were damaged, and are these operational again?

Yes, it was confirmed that more than one ice production plant and brick factories were destroyed as a result of the airstrike. The factories have not completely reopened, nor have their owners returned to the area.

6. Is it true that the surface water sewage system was damaged, and is that operational again?

No answer.

7. Is there an overall estimate of buildings both damaged and destroyed in the Dutch airstrike?

According to the first assessment of the size of the destruction and the diameter of the impact of the shock wave of the explosion, the size of the damage reached a diameter of more than 2km and 500 buildings were subject to major damage.

8. Can the Council please outline damage to infrastructure, such as electricity, gas pipelines, water pipelines, communication lines, etcetera?

The infrastructure in the area of the explosion and the surrounding neighbourhoods were damaged, which led to the suspension of a large number of facilities, including a power station, main communication lines and water pipes in the area.

Part II: Indirect harm

9. What has been the impact of the damage to civilian objects and infrastructure from the Dutch airstrike such as a decline in access to water, electricity, heating or other essential services such as water and sanitation services, health services, displacement, environmental impact, rubble and waste management

The great damage caused to the infrastructure of the region and the surrounding areas, as well as damage to the power station and water pipelines, led to the displacement of a large number of families from the affected areas and a significant decrease in access to basic services to them.

10. What psychological impact on local communities does the Council believe has occurred?

The horror of this strike had a profound psychological effect on the psyche of the victims, as it led to the death of dozens of families and the injury of hundreds. Some families were completely wiped out, others lost at least three or four family members. The absence of direct health care and the inability of the people to help their families and watch them die under the rubble induced trauma for the people. This is in addition to the loss of their homes, properties and sources of income and their experiences of being displaced.

11. It has been reported that Hawijans remain concerned about possible radiological and other contaminant effects of both the Dutch strike and the broader campaign to remove ISIS. Can the Council please update us on these concerns?

Despite the liberation of the area and the return of locals and their attempts, the industrial zone and surrounding residential areas have not been rebuilt. However, there are still concerns among the residents about the radiological effects and polluting materials as a result of the tremendous force of the explosion, as some believe that radioactive materials are present in the area.

Part III: Long-term effects   12. How are survivors of the Dutch airstrike presently doing?

The Al-Ghad organisation, in cooperation with the local authorities, is ensuring the registration of survivors and those affected by the airstrike through voluntary work. The information currently recorded shows that the survivors are divided between internally displaced persons in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din governorate, and internally displaced persons inside Hawija as a result of the destruction of homes, sources of income and laboratories, and the lack of basic services in the area.

13. Can the local authorities please confirm the estimate that as a result of this attack, that around 2,000 people experienced psycho-social problems?

Yes, and the number of people affected may exceed this number due to the side effects of the strike.

14. Are psychological and physical rehabilitation programs available?

There are no specialized rehabilitation or psychological support programs that specifically target survivors of the Dutch airstrike, but they may be included in public programs that target the Hawija area or Internally Displaced Peoples.

15. Have victims been compensated in any way? Can the Council confirm that there has been only one family that has received compensation? 

No compensation programs were implemented for survivors.

The aftermath of the Dutch strike on Hawijah in 2015 which killed an estimated 70 civilians (via Iraqi Revolution).

16. Have the homes of citizens been repaired? If so, how many? Could the Council please confirm the estimate that 50-60 per cent of the buildings in the area have now been rebuilt?

The houses have not been completely rebuilt, and the percentage of repaired homes does not exceed 40% of the homes. Families returning to the area live in houses damaged by the effects of the strike, as they are unable to repair their homes. It is difficult to confirm this percentage, as there are many buildings that were completely destroyed and the owners of those buildings have not returned.

17. Have people returned or are they still displaced and under which circumstances are they living now?  How many Hawijans remain displaced from the neighbourhood damaged in the Dutch strike?

Living conditions are very difficult due to the lack of basic services, sources of income and the destruction of homes. It is difficult to determine the percentages of returnees in these areas because some displaced persons from outside these areas have returned to live in the affected areas and many of them are still displaced or settled in other areas such as Kirkuk and Salah al-Din.

18. Has infrastructure and or factories/shops/facilities been repaired? What has and has not so far been repaired?

The local government has launched plans to rebuild the infrastructure, but it has not been fully implemented and the region still suffers from a lack of services. Some factories have been rebuilt, such as the wheat mill and a few workshops and shops, but a number of factories are still destroyed along with many car showrooms, workshops and schools.

19. Do people have access to water and electricity again? Did they have access to it before the attack?

A number of transmission lines and water pipes have been repaired, but the main station that was damaged as a result of the bombing has not been operational yet.

20. Have roads been repaired? If so how many?

Yes, only the main road in the area has been repaired. 

21. Has the rubble been cleared? How much?

Some of the debris has been removed but the bigger proportion remains in the area.

22. Is it safe to live in the affected neighbourhoods again? Or is there a risk of unexploded ordnance?

Yes, it is safe, and the Al-Ghad Organisation for Women and Children’s Care is implementing an awareness project about the dangers of war remnants in Hawija now.

23. Do people have access to the same local facilities as before, such as medical facilities, shops, daycares, pharmacies etcetera?

Yes, some facilities were reopened thanks to individual efforts.

24. Can the local authorities confirm the loss of jobs which resulted from this attack (because stores, workshops and factories closed and are still not opened because the area still lacks electricity and has not been rebuilt)?

Hundreds of Hawija residents lost their jobs and sources of income as a result of the destruction of workshops, car showrooms and factories, as well as the destruction of the basic infrastructure of the area. Some people have reopened a small number of workshops and shops, and the mill was rebuilt too, but the lack of services hinders the complete restoration of economic and urban life.

Part IV: General damage ISIS occupation and anti-ISIS Coalition

25. One source mentions that one of two water treatment plants (WTP) in the city were damaged in another airstrike. However another source says the WTP itself wasn’t damaged by an airstrike, but instead a power station was damaged that normally provided the WTP with electricity to pump the water. Was it the WTP itself or the power station and pipelines that were damaged? 

Yes, the water transmission lines, the supplied electricity network and the power station were all damaged.

26. The source also mentions that currently, only one WTP is functioning in Hawijah, through the public grid. However because the grid is not reliable, the functioning of the WTP is limited and it cannot cover the needs of the population.  Can the Council please confirm if this was and remains true?

Yes, it is true and the situation is still as mentioned.

27. A 2018 report noted that two of the three healthcare facilities in Hawijah had been damaged by fighting with only one functioning at that time – meaning people had to travel to Kirkuk for specialized care. However, a separate local source asserts that “No health care center has been damaged because airstrike, only some minor damages in the Directorate of Health building and it already been rehabilitated, Hawija General Hospital and public health center is functioning now – but according to field staff there are huge gaps in sanitation facilities.”

Could the Council please confirm whether two out of three health centres were or were not damaged – and if so, whether they have now been repaired?  

The Health Directorate, known to the government as the ‘second health sector’ was affected by the strike.

28. Can the local authorities please confirm that there are no rehabilitation or psycho-social support programmes for the victims presently available in Hawijah?

Humanitarian organizations generally implement psychological support programs in Hawija, but there are no programs specifically for survivors of the strike.

محافظ الحويجة سبهان الجبوري في مكتبه. الصورة مقدمة من المحافظ.

مقابلة مع محافظ الحويجة: سبهان الجبوري

ليلة الثاني إلى الثالث من حزيران عام 2015، قصفت طائرة حربية هولندية من نوع F-16s معملاً  لداعش متخصصاً في تصنيع القنابل في الحويجة بالعراق. قتلت الانفجارات الثانوية التي سببتها الضربة ما لا يقل عن 70 مدنياً وأدت لجرح مئات آخرين. اليوم، لا تزال مدينة الحويجة تتعافى، ليس من حكم داعش طويل الأمد على المنطقة فقط، بل من التأثير المستمر على حياة المدنيين من الضربة الجوية الهولندية قبل خمس سنوات.

أجرت Airwars و PAX مقابلة مع محافظ الحويجة سبهان الجبوري عن التأثير المباشر وغير المباشر للضربة الهولندية، لتقريرهما المشترك الأخير “الرؤية من خلال الركام: تأثير استخدام الأسلحة المتفجرة في الحرب ضد داعش على المدنيين”.

تمت الإجابة على الأسئلة عبر البريد الإلكتروني يوم الثامن والعشرين من أيلول 2020. يدور القسم الأول من الأسئلة حول التأثيرات المباشرة للغارة الجوية الهولندية، فيما يركز القسم الثاني على الآثار غير المباشرة. في القسم الثالث سئل المحافظ عن التأثيرات المستمرة للضربة على حياة المدنيين في الحويجة حالياً. يبحث المحافظ في القسم الرابع الضرر الإجمالي الذي سببه احتلال داعش والتحالف المضاد لداعش على المدينة.

القسم الأول: الأذى المباشر

1.ما هو تقدير مجلس الحويجة الحالي للقتلى والجرحى المدنيين نتيجة هذه الغارة الجوية الهولندية؟ 

بحسب التقارير الاولية لأعداد القتلى المدنيين فقد بلغت أكثر من 70 قتيلا وأكثر من 500 جريح.

2.هل يمكن للمجلس أن يصف الأضرار التي لحقت بالممتلكات المدنية مثل المنازل والشوارع والمرافق الطبية والمحلات التجارية والمدارس ومرافق رعاية الأطفال والصيدليات والمصانع. هل توجد قائمة بالممتلكات المدمرة أو المتضررة؟

تعرضت الممتلكات المدنية إلى أضرار كبيرة حيث تعرضت المعامل والورش والمحال التجارية والمنازل المحيطة بمنطقة الانفجار الى محو ودمار بالكامل، إضافة إلى تدمير محطة الكهرباء ومركز للدفاع المدني ومطحنة.

3. كم عدد المدارس التي تضررت جراء الهجوم، وهل عادت للعمل مجدداً؟

تعرضت 37 مدرسة للضرر في المجمل،  مع خروج 4 مدارس عن الخدمة، ولم تتم إعادة بنائها.

4. كم عدد الصيدليات التي تضررت وهل تم فتحها مجدداً؟

لا جواب

5. هل صحيح أن معمل ثلج وطوب تضرر نتيجة الضربة وهل عاد للعمل مجدداً؟

نعم، تم تأكيد تدمير أكثر من معمل لإنتاج الثلج وكذلك معامل للطوب نتيجة الضربة الجوية . لم يتم اعادة افتتاح المعامل بشكل كامل او أن أصحابها لم يعودوا للمنطقة.

6. هل صحيح أن نظام الصرف الصحي السطحي تضرر وهل عاد للعمل مجدداً؟

لا جواب

7. هل هناك تقدير إجمالي للمباني المتضررة والمدمرة في هذه الغارة الجوية الهولندية؟

حسب التقييم الأولي لحجم الدمار وقطر تأثير الموجة الارتدادية للانفجار، وصل الدمار الى  دائرة يزيد قطرها عن 2 كيلومتر وتعرض 500 مبنى لدمار بنسبة كبيرة.

·8. هل يمكن للمجلس أن يحدد الأضرار التي لحقت بالبنية التحتية مثل الكهرباء وأنابيب الغاز وأنابيب المياه وخطوط الاتصال وما إلى ذلك؟

نتيجة للأضرار الكبيرة التي لحقت بالبنى التحتية للمنطقة والمناطق المحيطة وتعرض البنى التحتية في منطقة الانفجار والأحياء المحيطة بها إلى أضرار، توقف عدد كبير من المرافق منها محطة كهرباء و خطوط الاتصالات الرئيسية وأنابيب الماء في المنطقة.

القسم الثاني: الأذى غير المباشر

9. ما هو تأثير الأضرار التي لحقت بالممتلكات المدنية والبنية التحتية من الغارة الجوية الهولندية مثل: صعوبة الوصول إلى المياه والكهرباء والتدفئة أو غيرها من الخدمات الأساسية مثل خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي والخدمات الصحية والنزوح والأثر البيئي والأنقاض وإدارة النفايات؟

أدت الأضرار الكبيرة التي لحقت بالبنى التحتية للمنطقة والمناطق المحيطة وتضرر محطة الكهرباء وأنابيب الماء إلى نزوح عدد كبير من العوائل من المناطق المتضررة وتدني نسبة وصول الخدمات الأساسية إليهم .

10. ما هو الأثر النفسي الذي حدث على المجتمعات المحلية؟

كان لهول هذه الضربة أثر نفسي عميق على الضحايا حيث أدت إلى مقتل العشرات من العوائل وإصابة المئات. بعض العوائل محيت بالكامل والبعض الآخر خسر ما لا يقل عن 3-4 أفراد من أفراد الأسرة . تسبب غياب الرعاية الصحية المباشرة وعدم قدرة الأهالي على إسعاف ذويهم ومشاهدتهم يتوفون تحت الركام بصدمة كبيرة لدى الأهالي، إضافة لخسارتهم منازلهم وممتلكاتهم ومصادر الدخل اليوم وتعرضهم للنزوح .

11. أفادت التقارير أن أهالي الحويجة ما زالوا قلقين بشأن الآثار الإشعاعية المحتملة وغيرها من الآثار الملوثة من الضربة الهولندية والحملة ضد داعش. هل يمكن للمجلس إطلاعنا على هذه المخاوف؟

رغم تحرير المنطقة وعودة الأهالي ومحاولاتهم لإعادة بناء المنطقة الصناعية والمناطق السكنية المحيطة إلا أن المخاوف ما زالت مستمرة بين الأهالي من الاثار الإشعاعية والمواد الملوثة نتيجة لقوة الانفجار الهائلة حيث يعتقد بعضهم وجود مواد إشعاعية في المنطقة.

القسم الثالث: الآثار طويلة المدى

12. كيف حال الناجين من الغارة الجوية الهولندية حالياً؟

تقوم منظمة الغد بالتعاون مع السلطات المحلية بعملية تسجيل للناجين والمتضررين من الغارة الجوية بعمل تطوعي، حيث بينت المعلومات المسجلة حالياً أن الناجين منقسمون بين نازحين داخلياً الى محافظة كركوك وصلاح الدين، و نازحين داخل الحويجة نتيجة دمار المنازل ومصادر الدخل والمعامل ونقص الخدمات الأساسية في المنطقة .

13. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد التقديرات أنه نتيجة للهجوم تعرض حوالي 2000 شخص لمشاكل اجتماعية – نفسية؟

نعم ويمكن أن يتجاوز عدد المتضررين هذا العدد بسبب الآثار الجانبية للضربة.

14. هل تتوافر برامج للتأهيل النفسي والجسدي؟ 

لا توجد برامج تأهيل أو دعم نفسي متخصصة تستهدف الناجين من الضربة الجوية الهولندية تحديداً، لكن قد يتم شمولهم بالبرامج العامة التي تستهدف منطقة الحويجة او النازحين.

15. هل تم تعويض الضحايا بأي شكل من الأشكال؟ وهل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد أن احدى العائلات تلقت تعويضاً؟

لم يتم تنفيذ أي برامج تعويضات للناجين.

آثار الضربة الهولندية على الحويجة عام 2015 والتي أدت لمقتل ما يقارب 70 مدنياً (عن صفحة الثورة العراقية)‎.

16. هل تم إصلاح منازل المواطنين التي تضررت؟ في حال تم ذلك، كم عددها؟ هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد أن ما بين 50-60 بالمئة من المباني في المنطقة أعيد بناؤها؟

لم يتم ترميم المنازل بشكل كامل ولا تتجاوز نسبة المنازل المرممة 40% من المنازل رغم عودة العوائل للمنطقة، إلا أنهم يسكنون في منازل متضررة من آثار الضربة لعدم قدرتهم على إصلاح تلك المنازل .

قد يكون من الصعوبة تأكيد هذه النسبة لوجود العديد من المباني التي دمرت بالكامل وعدم عودة أصحاب تلك المباني .

17. ما الظروف التي يعيشها الناس الآن؟ هل عادوا إلى ديارهم أم لا يزالون نازحين؟ كم عدد سكان الحويجة الذين ما زالوا نازحين من المناطق المتضرر من الضربة الهولندية؟

الظروف المعيشية صعبة جداً بسبب نقص الخدمات الأساسية ومصادر الدخل ودمار المنازل. من الصعب تحديد نسبة العائدين في تلك المناطق بسبب عودة بعض النازحين من خارج تلك المناطق للسكن في المناطق المتضررة،  ومازال العديد منهم نازحين او استقروا في مناطق أخرى مثل كركوك وصلاح الدين.

18. هل تم إصلاح البنية التحتية و المصانع و المحلات والمرافق؟ ما الذي تم إصلاحه ولم يتم إصلاحه حتى الآن؟

أطلقت الحكومة المحلية خططاً لإصلاح البنى التحتية إلا أنها لم تنفذ بشكل كامل ومازالت المنطقة تعاني من نقص الخدمات. تم اعادة بناء بعض من المصانع مثل مطحنة الحنطة وعدد قليل من الورش والمحال لكن لا يزال عدد من المصانع مدمراً والكثير من معارض السيارات والورش والمدارس.

19. هل يحصل الناس على الماء والكهرباء من جديد؟ (هل تمكنوا من الوصول إليهما قبل الهجوم)؟

تم إصلاح عدد من الخطوط الناقلة وأنابيب المياه لكن المحطة الرئيسية التي تضررت نتيجة القصف لم تعمل حتى الآن.

20. هل تم إصلاح الطرق؟ إذا كان الأمر كذلك فكم منها تم إصلاحه؟

نعم،  تم إصلاح الطريق الرئيسي للمنطقة فقط.

21. هل تمت إزالة الأنقاض؟ في حال حدث ذلك فكم حجمها؟

تم ازالة جزء من الركام لكن الجزء الاكبر باق في المنطقة.

22. هل الأحياء المتضررة آمنة للعيش فيها مرة أخرى (بالنسبة للألغام و ما إلى ذلك)؟

نعم آمنة وتقوم منظمة الغد لرعاية المرأة والطفل بتنفيذ مشروع التوعية من مخاطر المخلفات الحربية داخل الحويجة حالياً.

 23. هل تتوفر نفس المرافق المحلية لأهالي الحويجة كما كانت من قبل (مثل منشآت طبية، محلات، ومراكز رعاية للأطفال، وصيدليات)؟

نعم،  تم إعادة افتتاح بعض  المرافق بجهود ذاتية بسيطة.

24. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد خسارة وظائف بسبب الهجوم (باعتبار أن محالاً وورش عمل ومصانع أغلقت ولا تزال غير فاعلة لأن المنطقة لا تزال تعاني من انقطاع الكهرباء ولم تتم إعادة بنائها)؟

فقد المئات من أهالي الحويجة وظائفهم ومصادر دخلهم نتيجة لدمار الورش ومعارض السيارات والمصانع وكذلك دمار البنى التحتية الأساسية للمنطقة. أعاد بعض الناس افتتاح عدد قليل من الورش والمحال وكذلك إعادة بناء المطحنة إلا أن نقص الخدمات يعرقل إعادة الحركة العمرانية بالكامل.

القسم الرابع: التأثير العام لاحتلال داعش و للتحالف المضاد لداعش على الحويجة.

25. يذكر أحد المصادر أن إحدى محطتي معالجة المياه (WTP) في المدينة تضررت في غارة جوية أخرى. ومع ذلك ، يقول مصدر آخر إن محطة المعالجة نفسها لم تتضرر من جراء الغارة الجوية  ولكن بدلاً من ذلك تضررت محطة طاقة  كانت تزود محطة معالجة المياه بالكهرباء لضخ المياه. هل تضررت محطة المعالجة نفسها أم محطة الطاقة وخطوط الأنابيب؟

نعم تضررت الخطوط الناقلة والشبكة المجهزة للكهرباء ومحطة الطاقة.

26. ويشير المصدر أيضًا إلى أن محطة معالجة واحدة فقط تعمل حاليًا في الحويجة من خلال الشبكة العامة. ومع ذلك ، نظرًا لأن الشبكة غير موثوقة ، فإن تشغيل محطة المعالجة محدودة ولا يمكنها تغطية احتياجات السكان. هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد ما إذا كان هذا صحيحًا ولا يزال كذلك؟

نعم صحيح ومازال الوضع كما هو مذكور.

 27. أشار تقرير صدر عام 2018 إلى أن اثنتين من مرافق الرعاية الصحية الثلاثة في الحويجة تضررت بسبب القتال وكان هناك مركز واحد فقط يعمل في ذلك الوقت – مما يعني أن الناس اضطروا أن يسافروا إلى كركوك للحصول على رعاية متخصصة. ومع ذلك، أكد مصدر محلي منفصل أنه “لم يتضرر أي مركز رعاية صحية بسبب الغارة الجوية، فقط بعض الأضرار الطفيفة في مبنى مديرية الصحة وتم إعادة تأهيله بالفعل، ومستشفى الحويجة العام ومركز الصحة العامة يعملان الآن – ولكن وفقًا للموظفين الميدانيين هناك فجوات هائلة في مرافق الصرف الصحي”. 

هل يمكن للمجلس أن يؤكد ما إذا كان 2 من أصل 3 مراكز صحية قد تضررت أو لم تتضرر – وإذا كان الأمر كذلك ، فهل تم إعادة إعمارها الآن؟

تضررت مديرية الصحة من أثر الضربة واسمها المعروف لدى الحكومة حالياً القطاع الصحي الثاني.

28. هل يمكن للسلطات المحلية أن تؤكد غياب وجود برامج دعم اجتماعية نفسية للناجين الموجودين حالياً في الحويجة؟

تقوم المنظمات الإنسانية بتنفيذ برامج الدعم النفسي في الحويجة بشكل عام،  لكن لا توجد برامج مخصصة للناجين من الضربة.

Subhan Al Jabouri, de burgemeester van Hawija in zijn kantoor (foto via de burgemeester).

Interview met Subhan al-Jabouri, burgemeester van Hawija

In de nacht van 2 op 3 juni 2015 bombardeerden Nederlandse F-16’s een ISIS Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosives Devices (VBIED) -fabriek in Hawija, Irak. Secundaire explosies veroorzaakt door de luchtaanval hebben minstens 70 burgers gedood en honderden anderen raakten gewond. Vandaag de dag is de stad nog steeds aan het herstellen van niet alleen de langdurige ISIS-controle over het gebied, maar ook van de blijvende impact op het burgerleven van de Nederlandse luchtaanval vijf jaar geleden.

Voor hun recentelijk gepubliceerde gezamenlijke rapport Seeing through the rubble: The civilian impact of the use of explosive weapons in the fight against ISIS, interviewden Airwars en PAX de burgemeester van Hawija Subhan Al Jabouri over de directe en indirecte aanhoudende gevolgen van de aanval.

De vragen zijn op 28 september 2020 via e-mail beantwoord. Het eerste deel van de vragen gaat over de directe gevolgen van de Nederlandse luchtaanval. Het tweede deel focust op de indirecte gevolgen. In het derde deel is de burgemeester gevraagd naar de impact die de Nederlandse luchtaanval vandaag de dag nog altijd heeft op het leven van burgers in Hawija. In het vierde deel gaat de burgemeester in op de algehele schade die de ISIS-bezetting en anti-ISIS Coalitie hebben achtergelaten in zijn stad.

Deel I: Directe gevolgen  1. Wat is uw huidige inschatting van het aantal burgerdoden en gewonden door de Nederlandse luchtaanval op Hawija in de macht van 2 op 3 juni? 

Volgens de eerste rapportages zijn er meer dan 70 burgers gedood, en meer dan 500 gewond geraakt. 

2. Kunt u de schade aan civiele objecten omschrijven; zoals schade aan huizen, wegen, medische voorzieningen, winkels, scholen, kinderopvang, apotheken, fabrieken, enzovoorts? Is er een lijst van beschadigde objecten?

Er zijn behalve zware beschadigingen aan civiele objecten zoals fabrieken, werkplaatsen, winkels en huizen in de directe omgeving van de explosie ook een elektriciteitscentrale, een Civil Defense Center en een molen vernietigd. 

3. Hoeveel scholen zijn beschadigd geraakt, en zijn deze inmiddels weer operationeel?

Er zijn in totaal 37 scholen beschadigd waarvan vier scholen volledig zijn gesloten; deze zijn nog niet opnieuw opgebouwd. 

4. Hoeveel apotheken zijn beschadigd, en zijn deze weer open?

Geen antwoord.

5. Klopt het dat er ook een ijs- en een baksteenfabriek zijn beschadigd, en zijn deze weer operationeel inmiddels? 

Ja, het is bevestigd dat er meer dan een ijsproductiefabriek en steenfabrieken zijn verwoest door de luchtaanval. De fabrieken zijn nog niet volledig heropend, of de eigenaren zijn nog niet teruggekeerd.

6. Klopt het dat het (oppervlakte water) riool is beschadigd; is dit inmiddels weer gerepareerd? 

Geen antwoord.

7. Is er een schatting van de totale schade van gebouwen die beschadigd of vernietigd zijn door de Nederlandse luchtaanval?

Volgens het eerste onderzoek naar de reikwijdte van de schade, en de doorsnee van het gebied dat door de drukgolf van de explosie is geraakt, heeft de vernietiging een diameter van meer dan 2 kilometer, waarbij 500 gebouwen voor een groot deel werden verwoest. 

8. Kunt u de schade aan infrastructuur zoals elektriciteitsvoorzieningen, gasleidingen, waterleidingen, communicatie infrastructuur etcetera beschrijven?

De infrastructuur van zowel het explosiegebied als de omliggende buurten is beschadigd, wat heeft geleid tot gebrek aan veel diensten die deze faciliteiten leverden, zoals een elektriciteitscentrale, communicatielijnen en waterbuizen. 

Deel II: Indirecte gevolgen 

9. Wat is de impact van deze schade aan civiele objecten en infrastructuur ten gevolge van de Nederlandse luchtaanval geweest, zoals verminderde toegang tot water, elektriciteit, verwarming en andere essentiële diensten zoals water en sanitaire voorzieningen, gezondheidszorg, ontheemd raken, de impact op milieu en vuilnis- en puinverwerking? 

De grote schade aan de infrastructuur van de buurt en omliggende buurten, maar ook de schade aan de elektriciteitscentrale en Waterbuizen heeft ervoor gezorgd dat een groot aantal families uit de getroffen gebieden ontheemd is geraakt en heeft geleid tot een significant verminderde toegang tot basisvoorzieningen. 

10. Wat is volgens u de psychosociale impact op de lokale gemeenschap geweest?

De verschrikking van deze aanval heeft een heftige psychologische impact op de zielen van de slachtoffers achtergelaten, aangezien het in tientallen families tot de dood heeft geleid, en honderden gevallen tot verwondingen. Sommige families zijn volledig weggevaagd, andere families verloren minsten drie of vier gezinsleden. De afwezigheid van directe medische zorg en het onvermogen van mensen om hun families te helpen en hen te zien sterven onder het puin veroorzaakten een enorme schok bij inwoners. Tel daarbij op het verlies van hun huizen, bezittingen, inkomstenbronnen en het verworden tot vluchteling. 

11. Er leven naar verluidt onder de mensen in Hawija zorgen over mogelijke radiologische en andere giftige effecten van zowel deze Nederlandse aanval, als ook de bredere militaire campagne om ISIS te verjagen. Kunt u ons over deze zorgen vertellen? 

Ondanks de bevrijding van het gebied en de terugkomst en pogingen van inwoners ten spijt, zijn het bedrijventerrein en de omliggende woonwijken nog niet opnieuw opgebouwd. Er zijn nog steeds zorgen onder de inwoners over stralingseffecten en verontreinigde materialen ten gevolge van de enorme explosie, aangezien sommigen zeggen dat er ook radioactieve materialen in de wijk aanwezig zouden zijn geweest. 

Deel III: Langdurige gevolgen

12. Hoe gaat het met de overlevenden van de Nederlandse luchtaanval?

De organisatie al-Ghad registreert samen met de lokale autoriteiten op vrijwillige basis de ontheemden (Internal Displaced People) en diegenen die schade hebben geleden door de aanval. De tot nu toe verzamelde informatie laat zien dat het ene gedeelte van de ontheemden in Kirkuk en de Salah al-Din provincie leeft, en het andere gedeelte in Hawija, aangezien hun huizen vernietigd zijn, hun bronnen van inkomsten en de fabrieken zijn weggevallen, en het aan basisvoorzieningen ontbreekt in het gebied.

13. Kunt u bevestigen dat als gevolg van de Nederlandse aanval rond de 2000 mensen psychosociale problemen ondervinden? 

Ja en mogelijk nog meer, gezien de neveneffecten van de aanval. 

14. Worden er psychologische en fysieke revalideringstrajecten aangeboden? 

Er zijn geen rehabilitatieprogramma’s of speciale psychologische hulpprogramma’s, specifiek voor de groep ontheemden van de Nederlandse aanval, maar mogelijk doen ze mee in de bredere programma’s die worden aangeboden in het gebied Hawija of aan ontheemden. 

15. Zijn de slachtoffers op welke wijze dan ook gecompenseerd? Kan de burgemeester bevestigen dat er maar een familie is die tot nu toe compensatie heeft ontvangen?

Er is geen compensatie geweest voor ontheemden. 

De ravage na de Nederlandse aanval op Hawija in juni 2015 (via Iraqi Revolution).

16. Zijn de huizen inmiddels weer opgebouwd? Zo ja, hoeveel? Klopt het dat rond de 50 tot 60 procent is herbouwd?

De huizen zijn niet volledig gerestaureerd, en niet meer dan 40 procent van de huizen zijn gerepareerd. Teruggekeerde families wonen in de door de luchtaanval beschadigde huizen omdat ze niet in staat zijn hun huis te repareren. Het is moeilijk het percentage precies te bevestigen, omdat er veel gebouwen volledig zijn verwoest en de eigenaren van deze gebouwen niet zijn teruggekeerd. 

17. Zijn de mensen inmiddels weer teruggekeerd, of zijn ze nog op de vlucht, en wat zijn hun leefomstandigheden? Hoeveel mensen uit Hawija zijn nog steeds dakloos door de door de Nederlandse aanval veroorzaakte schade? 

De leefomstandigheden zijn slecht vanwege het gebrek aan basisvoorzieningen, inkomstenbronnen en verwoeste huizen. Het is lastig een percentage te geven van hoeveel mensen zijn teruggekeerd, omdat sommige vluchtelingen van elders in het gebied zijn gaan wonen. En nog steeds zijn velen van hen ontheemd of hebben zich gevestigd in andere gebieden zoals Kirkuk en Salah al-Din.

18. Is de infrastructuur en zijn fabrieken/winkels/andere faciliteiten inmiddels gerepareerd? Wat is er wel en niet heropgebouwd tot nu toe?

De lokale overheid heeft plannen gelanceerd om de infrastructuur te repareren, maar ze heeft die niet volledig uitgevoerd en het gebied gaat nog steeds gebukt onder een gebrek aan voorzieningen. Sommige fabrieken zijn herbouwd, zoals de tarwemolen, en een paar werkplaatsen en winkels, maar nog steeds is een aantal fabrieken verwoest, net als veel autoshowrooms, werkplaatsen en scholen. 

19. Hebben mensen weer stromend water en elektra? (En hadden ze dit voor de aanval?)

Een aantal transportleidingen en waterbuizen gerepareerd, maar de centrale die verwoest werd door het bombardement is tot nu toe nog niet operationeel. 

20. Zijn er wegen hersteld, en zo ja hoeveel?

Ja, alleen de hoofdweg in het gebied is gerepareerd. 

21. Is het puin geruimd? Hoeveel?

Een deel van het puin is geruimd, maar het grootste gedeelte ligt nog in het gebied. 

22. Is het veilig om weer in de getroffen wijken te wonen? Of liggen er nog explosieve oorlogsresten?

Ja het is veilig, en Al-Ghad Organisation for Women and Children’s Care geeft momenteel voorlichting over de gevaren van oorlogsresten in Hawija. 

23. Hebben mensen weer toegang tot dezelfde voorzieningen als voor de aanval, zoals medische faciliteiten, winkels, kinderopvang, apotheken, etcetera?

Ja, sommigen zijn weer geopend met basale individuele inspanningen.

24. Kunt u bevestigen dat veel mensen als gevolg van deze aanval hun baan hebben verloren, omdat winkels, werkplaatsen en fabrieken zijn gesloten en niet meer open zijn gegaan, en het gebied nog steeds niet herbouwd is en gebrek heeft aan elektriciteit?

Honderden inwoners van Hawija hebben hun banen en hun bron van inkomsten verloren door de verwoesting van de werkplaatsen, autoshowrooms en fabrieken, en ook is de basale infrastructuur van het gebied verwoest. Sommige mensen hebben opnieuw een paar werkplaatsen en winkels geopend, en ook de meelfabriek is herbouwd, maar het gebrek aan voorzieningen hindert de volledige terugkeer van het economische en stadse leven. 

Deel IV: Algemene schade ISIS-bezetting en anti-ISIS Coalitie

25. Een van onze bronnen meldt dat een van de twee waterzuiveringsinstallaties in de stad is beschadigd in een andere luchtaanval, terwijl een andere bron zegt dat niet de waterzuiveringsinstallatie zelf geraakt is, maar de elektriciteitscentrale die de zuiveringsinstallatie normaal voorzag van elektriciteit, en dat deze daarom niet werkt. Was de waterzuiveringsinstallatie zelf beschadigd of de elektriciteitscentrale? 

Zowel de transportleidingen, het elektriciteit netwerk als de elektriciteitscentrale zijn beschadigd. 

26. Diezelfde bron rapporteert ook dat er op dit moment maar een waterzuiveringsinstallatie werkt, die afhankelijk is van het openbare elektriciteitsnetwerk. Maar omdat het elektriciteitsnetwerk niet betrouwbaar is, is de watervoorziening beperkt en dus niet genoeg voor de behoefte van de lokale bevolking. Is dit inderdaad het geval?

Ja, dit is correct en is nog steeds het geval. 

27. Een rapport uit 2018 meldt dat twee van de drie gezondheidscentra in Hawija beschadigd waren door de gevechten, en dat er op dat moment slechts een operationeel was – dit had als gevolg dat mensen naar Kirkuk moesten reizen voor meer specialistische zorg. Een lokale bron meldt echter dat er “geen gezondheidscentrum is beschadigd, maar dat er alleen kleine schade aan het “Directorate of Health”-gebouw was (inmiddels gerepareerd), dat het algemeen ziekenhuis in Hawijah weer open is, maar dat er wel enorme gaten zijn gevallen in de sanitaire voorzieningen in het ziekenhuis.” 

Kunt u bevestigen of er inderdaad twee van de drie gezondheidscentra zijn beschadigd, en zo ja, of deze inmiddels zijn hersteld? 

Het “Health Directorate” gebouw, ook bekend als de “tweede gezondheidssector”, is inderdaad beschadigd geweest.

28. Klopt het dat er geen revalidatie en psychosociale ondersteuning is voor de slachtoffers nu in Hawija?

Er zijn wel humanitaire organisaties die psychologische hulpprogramma’s bieden in Hawija, maar niet specifiek voor de overlevenden en ontheemden van deze aanval. 

Continue reading
▲ Damage in the industrial area of Hawijah, years after the attack in June 2015 (image via NOS).

French MoD for October 21, 2020 – October 27, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 27, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL

Que ce soit sur le terrain, en présentiel, ou bien par vidéo-télé-conférence, le général Tardif, SNR de l’opération Chammal, poursuit ses rencontres dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences.

Après l’ambassadeur d’Allemagne la semaine dernière au QG de la coalition de l’opération Inherent Resolve, le général Tardif s’est de nouveau entretenu avec Paul Jordan représentant de l’EIP en Irak et en Syrie, l’European Institut for Peace.

Il l’avait rencontré il y a quelques semaines à Erbil. En charge du dossier des réfugiés dans les camps IDP (Internal Displaced Persons), le DICE et Paul Jordan, qui revient de Syrie, ont fait le point sur les actions en cours de l’organisation européenne, avec à terme, un programme approfondi d’assistance pour certains des IDP.

Fin de mission pour le MRTT

Au terme de trois semaines intenses, l’A330 Phenix a décollé le 25 octobre de la base aérienne d’Al Udeid au Qatar pour regagner la métropole. Avec près d’une centaine d’heures de vol, 11 sorties pour le compte d’OIR et 47 avions ravitaillés, l’A330 Phenix a parfaitement rempli sa première mission. Les Rafale français et des Typhoon britanniques ont ainsi pu bénéficier de près de 260 tonnes de carburant.

Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 21 au 27 octobre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant, au Quatar et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 16 sorties aériennes dont 2 missions de ravitaillement.

Seeing through the rubble: Airwars and PAX launch joint report

Published

October 2020

Written by

Airwars Staff

Airwars and PAX have published a new joint report, Seeing Through The Rubble, examining the dire and long-lasting effects of explosive weapons on civilian populations in urban areas in recent international military campaigns in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah. The report calls upon States to develop and support an international political declaration to better protect civilians against the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

The report was launched at a virtual event on October 26th. Ambassador Michael Gaffey of Ireland, which is spearheading efforts to create an international consensus on limiting the use of explosive weapons in cities, told participants: “We would not have reached the point of acceptance for the need for a political declaration [on explosive weapons] if it was not because of the work of civil society organisations. Their research and advocacy are vital to the process.”

The new report concludes that ‘precision’ when using explosive weapons in urban areas is not the key determinant of civilian harm. “Rather”, write the authors, “it is the wide area effect of an explosive weapon in relation to the proximity of civilians in populated areas.”

The PAX and Airwars report furthermore concludes that the cases of Mosul, Raqqah and Hawijah show that States acting in accordance with International Humanitarian Law is not enough in itself to prevent immense civilian harm and civilian suffering when explosive weapons are deployed in populated areas.

Co-author of the report Roos Boer, programme leader of the Humanitarian Disarmament programme at Dutch peace organisation PAX, states: “Large aircraft bombs and heavy artillery are intended for open battlefields. When bombing and shelling take place in towns and cities, civilians are killed and suffer life-changing injuries, and vital infrastructure like hospitals and schools are destroyed. We need to see states agree to stronger rules that will stop these urban attacks.”

Explosive weapons in populated areas

According to data monitoring by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 92 per cent of the 19,401 civilian deaths and injuries tracked by the organisation from the worldwide use of explosive weapons in 2019 occurred in urban areas. Furthermore, AOAV concludes that when explosive weapons, such as artillery, grenades, missiles, rockets and aircraft bombs, are used in towns and cities, nine out of ten casualties are civilians.

Explosive weapons are a major driver of forced displacement of civilians – not only because of fear of death and injury and the destruction of homes, but also because of their devastating impact on critical infrastructure services such as health care, education and water and sanitation services.

Cities in rubble

Two nations particularly affected by recent urban fighting are Iraq and Syria. While a variety of actors have caused major civilian harm and widespread destruction in both countries, the report focuses on military operations by the US-led International Coalition against ISIS. Using publicly available sources, the report analyses the short- and long-term effects of the use of explosive weapons in Mosul, Raqqa and Hawijah.

These cases illustrate that the effects of explosive weapons continue long after the bombs have exploded. In Mosul, the costs of the 2016-17 campaign to drive ISIS out of the city were high: at least 9,000 civilians were reportedly killed in the fighting. Around 700,000 Moslawis were displaced; and city officials have stated that 80 per cent of the inner city’s buildings were destroyed.

In June 2019, the UN International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported that entire neighbourhoods of Mosul had yet to be rebuilt and that a lack of essential services and poor sanitation were still threatening public health. Additionally, unexploded bombs, missiles, rockets and shells prevented civilians from returning to the city.

A federal Iraqi recovery team removes a body from the ruins of west Mosul, May 2018. (Image courtesy of Mosul Eye).

New details on Hawijah disaster

Seeing Through The Rubble also adds fresh information on the current situation in Hawijah. Six different sources, including Hawijah’s mayor, were interviewed for the report on the recent state of the city after a devastating 2015 Dutch airstrike on an ISIS IED factory, leading to the deaths of at least 70 civilians and hundreds more injured.

The report estimates that the secondary explosions triggered by the Dutch airstrike damaged between 400 and 500 buildings in the area, including many shops, homes and schools. Sources also reported that the airstrike caused major damage to crucial infrastructure, including roads and water pipelines.

According to the Mayor of Hawijah, Subhan Al Jabouri, less than 40 per cent of the buildings have been rebuilt and much rubble remains. The industrial area in Hawijah still suffers from a shortage of water and electricity.

Chris Woods, director of Airwars and a co-author of the report along with Laurie Treffers and Roos Boer, notes: “In highlighting the negative consequences for civilians of recent Western military interventions at Mosul, Hawijah and Raqqa, our new report demonstrates why militaries can’t rely simply upon compliance with the laws of war when trying to reduce civilian casualties during urban fighting. Large scale civilian harm during city battles is a terrible reality – and greater international safeguards are urgently needed.”

International political declaration 

Since 2019, Ireland has been leading a series of consultations in Geneva, aimed at drawing up an international political declaration to ban the use of explosive weapons in urban areas. The International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), a network of NGOs, urges states to take immediate action to prevent human suffering from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. “These case studies show once again the unacceptably high levels of civilian casualties and destruction as a result of bombing and shelling in cities and other populated areas,” says Laura Boillot, coordinator of INEW, responding to the new report.

“Every year we see tens of thousands of civilians killed and injured, that suffer psychological trauma, and are forced to flee for safety. Cities are being torn apart – housing, hospitals, schools and vital infrastructure is destroyed which has disastrous consequences for the survival and wellbeing of the people that live there”, continues Boillot.

“This pattern of civilian harm should not be considered an inevitable consequence of war. Using heavy explosive weapons such as heavy artillery, multi-barrel rocket launchers and large bombs and missiles in populated areas – even against military targets – is not acceptable and must stop.”

Continue reading
▲ An airstrike targets a civilian neighbourhood in Mosul in March 2017 operations to drive out so called Islamic State (Reuters/ Alaa Al-Marjani)

French MoD for October 14, 2020 – October 20, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 20, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative de niveau opératif (SNR-O) CHAMMAL

Dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate (DICE – directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences), le général Tardif, SNR-O de l’opération Chammal, poursuit ses rencontres sur le théâtre irakien.

Après avoir rencontré plusieurs délégués des différentes missions de l’ONU en Irak, dont madame Hamida Lasseko de l’UNICEF, il s’entretient cette semaine avec l’ambassadeur d’Allemagne en Irak pour évoquer la contribution de l’Allemagne à la stabilisation de l’Irak ainsi que le programme allemand vers la jeunesse irakienne de prévention de la radicalisation.

Sorties air hebdomadaire (bilan du 14 au 20 octobre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 19 sorties aériennes dont 5 missions de ravitaillement.

French MoD for October 7, 2020 – October 13, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 13, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Le Phénix déployé dans le cadre de CHAMMAL

Depuis le 5 octobre 2020, et pour trois semaines environ, un A330 Phénix, nouvel avion ravitailleur de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace, est déployé en opération extérieure sur la base aérienne d’Al Udeid, au Qatar, au profit de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE.

Dès le 6 octobre 2020, le Phénix a procédé à sa première mission de ravitaillement au profit de la coalition et des Rafale de la base aérienne projetée au Levant.

Outre la capacité à déployer cet aéronef, cette mission démontre l’engagement de la France dans la lutte contre Daesh et sa capacité à intégrer ce type de moyens dans un environnement complexe.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 07 au 13 octobre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 23 sorties aériennes dont 5 missions de ravitaillement.

French MoD for September 30, 2020 – October 6, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 6, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Nouvelles rencontres à Bagdad pour le Senior national representative (SNR) de niveau opératif
Le général Tardif, SNR opératif de l’opération CHAMMAL, de retour à Bagdad après quelques jours à Erbil, continue son programme de rencontres dans le cadre de ses activités de directeur du Directorate of interagency and civil environment (DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences). Cette semaine, il a ainsi rencontré madame Irena Solano, l’adjointe de Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, chef de l’United nations assistance mission in Irak (UNAMI – mission d’assistance de l’ONU pour l’Irak). Puis, toujours dans un cadre onusien, le général Tardif a rencontré Sheri Ritsema-Anderson de l’Office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs (OCHA – Office de coordination des affaires humanitaires). Enfin, pour le compte de l’Union européenne, le général Tardif a rencontré Simone Karlstetter et Matteo Salvatori, représentants en Irak de l’European union advisory Mission in Iraq, la mission de conseil de L’UE auprès du ministère intérieur irakien.

 

Le Phénix déployé dans le cadre de CHAMMAL

Depuis le 5 octobre 2020, le nouvel avion ravitailleur de l’armée de l’Air et de l’Espace, l’A330Phénix est déployé en opération extérieure.

Après avoir effectué des missions opérationnelles depuis la métropole au profit des opérations BARKHANE et CHAMMAL et une liaison sur la base aérienne projetée au Levant, il est déployé et stationné sur la base aérienne de Al Udeid au Qatar. Pendant quelques semaines, il opérera au profit de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR).

Dès le 6 octobre 2020, le Phénix a procédé à sa première mission de ravitaillement au profit de la coalition et des Rafale de la base aérienne projetée au Levant.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 30 septembre au 06 octobre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 14 sorties aériennes.

UK MoD for October 6, 2020 – October 6, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

October 6, 2020

Summary

Tuesday 6 October – an RAF Reaper killed terrorists who had attacked Iraqi security forces in the Anbar desert.

Detail

UK Armed Forces continue to provide a significant contribution to the global coalition ensuring the Daesh terrorist group does not become resurgent in Syria and Iraq, with Royal Air Force aircraft flying daily armed reconnaissance patrols. On Tuesday 6 October, a small group of Daesh extremists attacked Iraqi security forces in the desert of Anbar province, west of Baghdad. A coalition air strike provided immediate support to the Iraqi troops, and succeeded in destroying half the attacking Daesh group. An RAF Reaper was then tasked to deal with the remaining terrorists. The crew of the Reaper successfully located them, and at an appropriate moment, with no sign of a strike posing any risks to friendly forces or any civilians, conducted a carefully planned attack with a GBU-12 guided bomb. The Iraqi forces subsequently reported that the threat had been eliminated.

Previous update

As part of the UK’s contribution to the Global Coalition in the fight against Daesh, the Royal Air Force continues to fly daily missions against the terrorist movement in Syria and Iraq. Our aircraft conduct strikes on terrorist targets when required.

Intelligence analysis confirmed that a Daesh leadership group had established a cave network 85 miles west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. An RAF Reaper kept a close watch on the location during the early hours of Thursday 20 August. When terrorists were identified at the cave entrance, the Reaper’s crew conducted an attack with a single Hellfire missile, having first swept the area for any signs of civilians who might be placed at risk. The missile struck the target accurately, and the blast was observed to emerge from another part of the cave network, indicating that weapon’s effect had reached deep inside the caves.

In addition to this, an RAF Reaper maintained surveillance on another set of caves in the area on Wednesday 26 August, which confirmed the presence of a number of Daesh extremists at the site. When terrorists were observed at the mouth of one of the caves, the Reaper’s crew engaged successfully with a Hellfire missile, then provided surveillance support to a follow-up attack by two coalition fast jets which struck the rest of the Daesh position.

For more information see Daesh: UK government response page on GOV.UK

Report Date

October 6, 2020

Report Summary

  • 1 total strikes
  • 1 in Iraq

Confirmed Actions

UK
On Tuesday 6 October, a small group of Daesh extremists attacked Iraqi security forces in the desert of Anbar province, west of Baghdad. A coalition air strike provided immediate support to the Iraqi troops, and succeeded in destroying half the attacking Daesh group. An RAF Reaper was then tasked to deal with the remaining terrorists. The crew of the Reaper successfully located them, and at an appropriate moment, with no sign of a strike posing any risks to friendly forces or any civilians, conducted a carefully planned attack with a GBU-12 guided bomb. The Iraqi forces subsequently reported that the threat had been eliminated.

Belgian airstrikes and the myth of zero civilian casualties

Published

October 2, 2020

Written by

Laurie Treffers

As Belgium's F-16s return to the skies of Iraq and Syria, significant accountability improvements for civilian harm are needed.

On October 1st, Belgium once again sent its F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve, fighting ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Yet the Belgian, Iraqi and Syrian publics are still kept in the dark when it comes to civilian harm during previous deployments. The Belgian military to this day refuses to take responsibility for civilians its actions might have killed or injured.

Also this week, an open letter to defence minister Philippe Goffin from eleven civil society organisations including Airwars – calling for greater transparency and accountability for reported civilian harm – has been widely covered by the Belgian media.

Until the end of 2017, Belgium was one of the more active Coalition allies, alternating with the Dutch military. During some 991 declared missions, the Belgians fired nearly one thousand bombs and missiles. A total of 95 Belgian military personnel and a team of four Red Card Holders will now be deployed again until September 2021. According to the parliamentary resolution approving this latest weapon deployment, any possible action in Syria “covers only a buffer zone on the border with Iraq and is much more restricted than in 2017”. The stated aim of the mission is to protect troops on the ground, and to carry out planned or ad-hoc targeted attacks on ISIS.

In August, the Belgian news organisation HLN reported that the Belgian military had updated its weapons to ‘precision bombs’. F-16s will be armed with bombs of the type GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb. According to a Belgian military technician, the munition was chosen because of its “surgical precision”.

According to Alma Al Osta, Arms Advocacy Manager with Humanity And Inclusion, this change of munition is not enough: “There is much more to protecting civilians than just choosing a precise weapon. Belgium has indeed chosen GBU-39/B bombs, which are known for their precision, but these bombs weigh around 115kg and are capable of penetrating one meter of steel-reinforced concrete. If this weapon is used on open battlefields without the presence of civilians, then the risk would be smaller. But wars nowadays are fought in towns and cities where people live, children go to school, and civilians gather on markets.”

Besides the direct impact of explosive weapons in urban areas, Al Osta is worried about their secondary effects: “We have no information on how Belgium will prevent civilian harm and mitigate the so-called domino effects of airstrikes, such as trauma, damage to civilian objects, displacement, lack of access to education, health care and agricultural land, contamination with unexploded ordnances, damage to the environment and further instability,” she notes.

The zero civilian casualty myth

In March 2020, Commander of the Belgian Air Component Frederik Vansina refused to answer any questions on Belgian involvement in specific civilian harm incidents and told De Morgen: “Countries within the Coalition show solidarity and neither confirm nor deny [involvement]. Let’s talk about how the Syrian regime and Russia operate there. That’s a different story. Just look at the images of Homs and Aleppo.”

Back in 2017, a senior Belgian official had told Airwars that the government was planning to admit two civilian harm incidents – one at Al Qaim on February 27th 2017 and the second incident on March 21st of that year in the vicinity of Mosul. According to the US-led Coalition itself, the strikes had killed at least two civilians and injured four others. However, the Belgian government then publicly failed to take responsibility for these incidents, and even asserted that its actions had killed zero civilians.

In March 2020, a joint investigation by Airwars, RTL Netherlands, BBC, De Morgen and Liberation revealed that Belgium consistently refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions, even where the US-led Coalition has conceded particular Belgian strikes to have killed and injured non combatants. In response to this investigation, the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces (BAF) were “certainly not involved in all events.”

Previous comments by Colonel J. Poesen, head of operations at the Belgian Air Force, indicated that only incidents in which international humanitarian law was possibly violated were being investigated. However, the acknowledged civilian harm events recognised by the Coalition show that civilians are nevertheless killed in military actions, even where they might comply with international humanitarian law.

Lack of parliamentary overview

A major bottleneck to greater transparency and accountability for Belgian military actions abroad is a lack of effective parliamentary oversight. According to a 2018 report by Pax Christi Vlaanderen and Vredesactie, “there is no binding parliamentary approval for foreign missions, nor mandatory evaluations during and after the operation. Moreover, there is no formal and transparent framework under which the government periodically informs parliament about the specific objectives, content and consequences of military operations.”

In the special parliamentary commission Follow-up of Foreign Missions, established in the early 2000s, MPs are confidentially briefed about military interventions. Yf Reykers, Assistant Professor in International Relations at Maastricht University notes: “This commission is special in the sense that there are not many countries having such a commission in which high-level classified information is shared. However, that information cannot be used by MPs who are part of that commission because they are bound to strict confidentiality. They are also unable to verify this information independently with other sources.”

Belgium about to send four #F16s to #Iraq and #Syria as part of #InherentResolve.For the #warpowers community: parliamentary approval by a remarkable coalition of minority government parties with @de_NVA and far-right @vlbelang. https://t.co/lVAIsQFRzP via @demorgen

— Yf Reykers (@YfReykers) June 26, 2020

The Parliamentary resolution approving the upcoming weapon deployment does include several amendments that call on the government to improve its transparency and accountability practices. For example, Parliament requests the federal government “to communicate publicly, after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations, about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations.”

Reykers is generally positive about the amendments: “It is progress that Parliament is even considering transparency and accountability practices. That is really a change compared to a few years ago. We see that Belgium is learning from its neighbouring countries, such as the Netherlands, especially after the Hawijah scandal.”

However, Reykers also sees possibilities for the Government to manoeuvre itself through the amendments with minimum levels of transparency and accountability: “The question is if these amendments will bring about structural change. One of the things that is really needed is systematic evaluations [of civilian harm claims] before, during and after a mission, ideally publicly available.”

While the new parliamentary resolution urges the federal Government to improve its transparency and accountability during the upcoming deployment, it is yet to be seen whether Belgium will structurally change its practices – and whether the civilian victims of its previous airstrikes will receive answers.

    An opinion piece by Laurie Treffers for Airwars, related to Belgium’s recent redeployment to Iraq and Syria, was also published in the Belgian daily De Standaard on September 24th 2020.
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▲ Library image: A pair of Belgian F-16s over the Baltic region in early 2020 (Picture via Belgian Defence)

On eve of Belgium’s return to war on ISIS, groups call for improved civilian harm accountability

Published

September 30, 2020

Written by

Airwars Staff

Open letter from 11 Belgian and international organisations calls on the Defence Minister to increase transparency and accountability for civilian harm.

On October 1st 2020, Belgium will send four F-16s to Iraq and Northeast Syria for a period of 12 months, to once again participate in Operation Inherent Resolve – the international campaign against so-called Islamic State.

Yet Belgium has been one of the least transparent countries in the Coalition, refusing publicly to concede any civilian harm from its own actions and with no additional accountability mechanisms being put in place during the new deployment. despite the urgings of the Belgian parliament.. 

Airwars, together with our Belgian and international partners, is today publishing a joint open letter recently sent to Minister of Defence Philippe Goffin, which urges the Belgian government to take concrete steps to improve its transparency and accountability for civilian harm resulting from its own military actions. The full text is reprinted below. 

 

Dear Mr Goffin,

On October 1st, 2020, Belgium will send four F-16s to participate in Operation Inherent Resolve. As a collective of civil society organisations, we have concerns about the limited levels of transparency and accountability of this military deployment. Belgium’s past participation in Operation Inherent Resolve still remains highly secretive. As a result, Belgian members of Parliament cannot thoroughly exercise democratic oversight, while the Belgian, Syrian and Iraqi public are kept in the dark about possible cases of civilian harm as the result of previous Belgian airstrikes or other activities in support of airstrikes in the fight against the so-called Islamic State.

Previous comparative research by Airwars has highlighted that Belgium remains one of the least transparent countries in the US-led International Coalition. As a joint investigation by Airwars, BBC, De Morgen and Liberation revealed in March 2020, Belgium refuses to acknowledge civilian casualties from its actions, even where the US-led Coalition has conceded these same cases as credible. In response to this investigation, the Belgian Ministry of Defence stated only that the Belgium Armed Forces (BAF) were “certainly not involved in all events”, without providing any more details or proof for such a bold claim.

Belgium’s focus thus far in the debate on civilian harm and accountability has been on the legality of airstrikes. As long as the Belgian Ministry of Defence does not consider civilian harm incidents to have breached international humanitarian law, it refrains from engaging in exercises or lessons learnt, or in evaluations that are publicly available.

We believe that this position is not sustainable. As we have seen in the Netherlands, where media uncovered in October 2019 that the Netherlands had been responsible for a 2015 airstrike on Hawijah, Iraq, in which at least 70 civilians died, once the truth about civilian harm incidents inevitably comes to light, it can lead to major national blowback and severely harm the trust of both Parliament and the public in its government.

Call for greater transparency 

So far, the Belgium Ministry of Defence has given few signs that it is committed to improving its transparency and accountability practices during the coming deployment of four F-16s, even while there has been a clear message from Parliament that more transparency is required. We, therefore, urge the Ministry of Defence to fully comply with a parliamentary resolution of June 25th, 2020. Specifically, Amendment number 4, 6 and 17 of this motion request the federal government to do the following (unofficial translation):

4. To demonstrate militarily responsible maximum transparency vis-à-vis the Chamber of Representatives, with regard to the prevention, monitoring and reporting of possible civilian casualties as a result of our military efforts, in particular through strengthening parliamentary scrutiny of the actions of the national Red Card Holder.

6. To actively consult with the Dutch government in order to take note of all the lessons learned from the Hawija tragedy, to understand them and to subsequently report to the Chamber of Representatives on how these lessons will be used during the Belgian military deployment, in order to avoid civilian casualties as much as possible.

17. To communicate publicly, after investigation and taking into account military and security considerations, about possible civilian casualties as a result of Belgian military operations and to ensure active cooperation and exchange with external monitoring groups and human rights organizations (emphasis added).

Currently, consultative processes are ongoing [with militaries] in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to improve transparency and accountability for civilian harm and to implement policies to better protect civilians in armed conflict. These processes are taking place in consultation with various civil society organisations, including academics and NGOs, such as Airwars, CIVIC, Amnesty International and local civil society organisations.

We believe that it is crucial that Belgium commits itself to improve its poor transparency and accountability track record. We hereby wish to inform you that we, as a collective of civil society organisations, stand ready to actively work together and share our expertise and knowledge with the Ministry of Defence in order to make concrete progress towards improved transparency and accountability of Belgium’s upcoming military deployment in Iraq and Syria.

Recommendations

The undersigned organisations call upon the Belgian government to, at the minimum:

    Publish the exact date and near location of all Belgian air raids carried out in the fight against ISIS; Publish the results of all investigations into civilian casualties – including the data, location, targets and number of civilian casualties of military action – even if the Ministry of Defence’s own investigation concludes that there has been no violation of international humanitarian law; Draft guidelines for proactively publishing this information (in the future) as open data in a machine-readable overview that enables control by independent parties; To work together with external parties, including NGOs, by drawing up standards for the minimum criteria that external claims for civilian victims must meet in order for the Ministry of Defence to be able to assess them; Provide capacity at the Ministry of Defence so that officials can focus on monitoring and actively publishing data on airstrikes and civilian casualties in armed conflict, including in future military interventions so that the consequences of military intervention are systematically monitored and published; Introduce or support a mechanism where potential victims of Coalition bombardments can come forward and report issues of concern; Adopt a political declaration on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas with a clear commitment to data collection and transparent reporting.

While the Belgian military has decided to use precise small diameter bombs during the coming deployment period, we believe that it is crucial to emphasise that protecting the lives of civilians and civilian infrastructure, in particular in urban areas, requires more than using precision weapons.

The undersigned organisations are preparing to publicly communicate on this matter and share a copy of this letter with the Belgian press by the end of September, as we believe this discussion concerns the Belgian public. We hope that you will respond positively to our call for cooperation and exchange on this important matter, and we are happy to enter into dialogue with the Ministry of Defence for further discussion of our recommendations.

Signed,

11.11.11

Agir pour la Paix

Airwars

Amnesty Belgium

CNAPD

GRIP

Humanity & Inclusion

Oxfam Belgium

Pax Christi Flanders

Vredesactie

Vrede vzw

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▲ Library image: The F-16s of the Belgian military have been deployed to Iraq and Syria several times since 2014. Picture via Belgian Ministry of Defence.

CJTF–OIR for September 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 30, 2020

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

October 29, 2020

Release No. 20201029-01

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, September 2020

SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.

CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers (42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer live under Daesh oppression.  CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.

Strike Summary

Between September 1 and September 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 15 strikes consisting of 28 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 16 engagements. This resulted in 18 enemy killed, six cache sites destroyed, and four tunnels destroyed.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted eight strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 12 engagements. This resulted in seven terrain denial operations.

This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter, attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.

A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use. Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.

CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.

#DefeatDaesh

-30-

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Report Date

September 30, 2020

Report Summary

  • 15 total strikes
  • 7 in Iraq
  • 8 in Syria

Confirmed Actions

US
Between September 1 and September 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 15 strikes consisting of 28 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted seven strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 16 engagements. This resulted in 18 enemy killed, six cache sites destroyed, and four tunnels destroyed.
September 1, 2020 – September 30, 2020
Syria: 8 strikes
Between September 1 and September 30, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 15 strikes consisting of 28 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted eight strikes against Daesh targets consisting of 12 engagements. This resulted in seven terrain denial operations.   

French MoD for September 23, 2020 – September 29, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 29, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Le Senior national representative (SNR) en déplacement à Erbil
Dans le cadre de sa mission de directeur du DICE – Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences, le général Tardif, SNR-Opératif de l’opération CHAMMAL poursuit ses rencontres avec les différentes autorités en Irak. Après quelques jours à Bagdad, il s’est rendu dans la capitale du Kurdistan irakien. Profitant d’une réunion de l’état-major de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE avec les autorités kurdes, le général Tardif a également rencontré monsieur Patrice Leroy, consul de France adjoint à Erbil et Paul Jordan, délégué de l’European Institute of Peace, en charge du rapatriement des réfugiés européens dans les camps de personnes déplacées.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 29 [23] au 29 septembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 21 sorties aériennes.

A statement from organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, calling on the United States to immediately end sanctions against members of the International Criminal Court

Published

September 22, 2020

Written by

Airwars Staff

Airwars adds voice to partners calling on the US government to end its targeting of the ICC

The United States Government recently applied sanctions to senior officers of the International Criminal Court – a court of last resort established by treaty, and endorsed by a majority of countries including most of the US’s closest allies. In partnership with a number of organisations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, Airwars is calling upon the US Government to end its targeting of ICC officials. The public statement also calls on both Presidential campaigns to publicly commit to rescinding an Executive Order passed by President Trump in June, which formed the basis of the ICC sanctions.

We the undersigned, representing human rights and humanitarian non-governmental organizations working on the protection of civilians in conflict, write in opposition to United States sanctions against named senior personnel within the International Criminal Court (ICC).

We call on President Trump to revoke these harmful sanctions immediately and to rescind Executive Order 13928 on “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated with the International Criminal Court.” We also call on the Presidential campaigns of both major parties to publicly commit to reversing this harmful Executive Order. The United States should support the rule of law rather than punish those seeking to provide redress to victims of harm.

The ICC exists as a court of last resort to hold government officials and other powerful actors accountable when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute the most serious international crimes. The Court has secured successful prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The primary beneficiaries are the many civilian victims who can secure no justice elsewhere and the communities subject to cycles of violence fuelled by impunity. They include many victims and survivors of violence for whom the United States has been a strong, vocal advocate for justice and accountability.

We understand that the United States takes issue with some of the ICC’s jurisprudence and assertions of jurisdiction. However, we believe that concerted diplomatic efforts and engagement with the ICC will enhance its effectiveness more than punishing individuals who have dedicated their careers to delivering justice to victims of egregious crimes.

As condemnatory statements from close U.S. allies make clear, the United States has lost significant international standing through these sanctions, which have undermined the international rule of law and provided succour to war criminals seeking to evade justice. 

The United States should recommit to an independent and credible domestic process of investigating and holding to account U.S. citizens for alleged abuses, free from executive interference and consistent with U.S. and international law. That is the best way to ensure that U.S. service members are afforded due process of law in a domestic forum for any alleged wrongdoing and that the U.S. is recognized as a leader in the pursuit of global justice and accountability.

Signed,

Action on Armed Violence

Airwars

Amnesty International USA

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC)

Human Rights First

Oxfam America

Oxford Research Group

Saferworld

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▲ A recent appeal hearing at the International Criminal Court (Image via ICC)

French MoD for September 16, 2020 – September 22, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 22, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN-ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE
L’opération CHAMMAL se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE
Destruction d’une position de Daech

Le 19 septembre 2020, soit une semaine après leur dernière frappe, des Rafale déployés sur la Base aérienne projetée (BAP) au Levant, ont agi en soutien des troupes de la coalition. Opérant au nord de l’Irak, la patrouille de Rafale a frappé une position occupée par des combattants de Daech, neutralisant ces derniers et détruisant plusieurs entrées de grottes.

Le SNR-O CHAMMAL se rend à Bagdad
Afin de poursuivre au plus près du terrain son action de directeur du DICE (Directorat de l’environnement civil et inter agences), le général de brigade aérienne Tardif est actuellement dans la capitale irakienne. Il se rendra notamment au quartier général de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE et près du Joint Operations Center Irak (JOC-I), le centre des opérations interarmées des forces irakiennes.

En outre, il rencontrera de nouveau quelques directeurs d’agences gouvernementales et non gouvernementales pour coordonner leurs actions.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 16 au 22 septembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération CHAMMAL ont réalisé 15 sorties aériennes et une frappe.

Report Date

September 22, 2020

Confirmed Actions

France
Weekly air outlets (results from September 16 to 22 included)

French aircraft based in the Levant and the United Arab Emirates are continuing their actions against Daesh, within the Coalition. This week, the planes engaged in Operation CHAMMAL carried out 15 aerial sorties and one strike.

French MoD for September 9, 2020 – September 15, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 15, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Destruction d’une position de Daech
Le 12 septembre 2020, une patrouille de Rafale provenant de la Base aérienne projetée (BAP) au Levant et opérant au nord de l’Irak a été engagée pour conduire une frappe contre une position occupée par Daech. En lien avec les troupes de la coalition, les Rafale ont tiré plusieurs bombes, détruisant des caches d’armes et neutralisant plusieurs terroristes.

Cette frappe est la première frappe opérationnelle pour des Rafale mis au standard F3-R. Pour mémoire, ce standard d’aéronefs est déployé au Levant depuis le 30 août dernier.

Le JOCAT de Bagdad monte en puissance
C’est au sein du Joint Operations Command Advisory Team (JOCAT), nouvelle entité de l’opération INHERENT RESOLVE, que la France délivre désormais son expertise de commandement auprès des forces irakiennes.

Commandé par un officier français, le colonel Laurent, le JOCAT qui comptera un peu moins de trente personnes d’une dizaine de nationalités différentes a vu son effectif se compléter. Outre le colonel Laurent, quatre officiers français spécialisés dans les domaines du renseignement et des opérations aériennes ont intégré cette structure. Très prochainement, le JOCAT sera pleinement opérationnel pour assister et conseiller les officiers irakiens du Joint Operations Center Irak (JOC-I), centre de commandement des opérations de l’état-major irakien.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 9 au 15 septembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 19 sorties aériennes et une frappe.

Report Date

September 15, 2020

Confirmed Actions

France
Weekly air outlets (results from September 9 to 15 included)

French aircraft based in the Levant and the United Arab Emirates are continuing their actions against Daesh, within the Coalition. This week, the planes engaged in Operation Chammal carried out 19 air sorties and one strike.

French MoD for September 2, 2020 – September 8, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 8, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit toujours ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Changement de chef à la tête de la coalition internationale luttant contre Daech
Après un an à la tête de l’opération Inherent Resolve (OIR) qui rassemble 80 pays et organisations, dont la France, le lieutenant general Pat White a cédé sa place au lieutenant general Paul Calvert. Alors que l’opération est entrée dans sa phase dite de « normalisation », il aura pour tâche principale de poursuivre l’évolution du format des forces déployées et de leurs missions. En effet, les opérations de lutte contre Daech se poursuivent, le moment est venu de consolider les capacités des hautes autorités militaires irakiennes à planifier et conduire des opérations.

L’opération CHAMMAL qui représente le volet français de cette opération internationale accompagne cette adaptation. En effet, un colonel français dirige le Joint Operations Advisory Team (JOCAT), équipe d’une trentaine de conseillers pour le commandement interarmées des opérations irakien.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 02 au 08 septembre inclus)
Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.

Incident date

August 30, 2020

Incident Code

TI050

LOCATION

زاب, Zab area, Duhok, Iraq

A woman was killed in an alleged Turkish airstrike on Zab area, on August 30th, 2020. While some sources reported that the victim, Hiam Noah Haji, was a political leader of the Kurdish Labour Party, other sources wrote she was the leader of a PKK militia. Khabour reported that “Kurdistan Labour Party leader Hiam Noah

Summary

First published
September 7, 2020
Last updated
January 18, 2022
Strike status
Likely strike
Strike type
Airstrike
Civilian harm reported
Yes
Civilians reported killed
0 – 1
(0–1 women)
Cause of injury / death
Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
Airwars civilian harm grading
Contested
Competing claims of responsibility e.g. multiple belligerents, or casualties also attributed to ground forces.
Suspected belligerent
Turkish Military
Suspected target
Unknown
Named victims
1 named
Belligerents reported killed
0–1
View Incident →

French MoD for August 26, 2020 – September 1, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

September 1, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Ø Relèves d’aéronefs sur la BAP au Levant : arrivée du Rafale F3-R
Au-delà de la visite de la ministre des Armées au Levant et d’une activité aérienne en soutien de l’opération Inherent Resolve, l’actualité aura été marquée par l’arrivée sur le théâtre du Rafale au standard rénové F3-R.

Le 30 août dernier, quatre Rafale au standard F3-R de la 30e escadre de chasse, dernière évolution de ce chasseur, sont arrivés sur la base aérienne projetée au Levant. Ils remplacent nombre pour nombre les quatre Rafale biplaces de la 4e escadre. Pilotes, navigateurs et aéronefs rentrent en France ce jeudi 3 septembre après avoir réalisé plus de 250 sorties aériennes, soit près de 1300 heures de vol.

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 26 août au 01 septembre inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 18 sorties aériennes.

CJTF–OIR for August 1, 2020 – August 31, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

August 31, 2020

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

September 14, 2020
Release No. 20200914-02
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CJTF-OIR Strike Summary Report, August 2020

SOUTHWEST ASIA – Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve and
its partners continue to target and pursue the enduring defeat of Daesh.

CJTF-OIR and partner forces have liberated nearly 110,000 square kilometers
(42,471 square miles) from Daesh. As a result, 7.7 million people no longer
live under Daesh oppression.  CJTF-OIR remains committed to the enduring
defeat of Daesh to improve conditions for peace and stability in the region
and to protect all our homelands from the Daesh terrorist threat.

Strike Summary
Between August 1 and August 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 17
strikes consisting of 42 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted 11 strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
36 engagements. This resulted in nine enemy killed, eight caves denied,
eight tunnels neutralized, and four successful terrain denial operations.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted six strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
six engagements. This resulted in six terrain denial operations.

This CJTF-OIR strike release contains all strikes conducted by fighter,
attack, bomber, rotary-wing, or remotely piloted aircraft, rocket propelled
artillery and ground-based tactical artillery.

A strike, as defined in the CJTF-OIR release, refers to one or more kinetic
engagements that occur in roughly the same geographic location to produce a
single, sometimes cumulative effect in that location. For example, a single
aircraft delivering a single weapon against a lone Daesh vehicle is one
strike, but so is multiple aircraft delivering dozens of weapons against a
group of Daesh-held buildings and weapon systems in a compound, having the
cumulative effect of making that facility harder or impossible to use.
Strike assessments are based on initial reports and may be refined.

CJTF-OIR does not report the number or type of aircraft employed in a
strike, the number of munitions dropped in each strike, or the number of
individual munition impact points against a target. The information used to
compile the daily strike releases is based on ‘Z’ or Greenwich Mean Time.

#DefeatDaesh

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CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

Report Date

August 31, 2020

Report Summary

  • 17 total strikes
  • 11 in Iraq
  • 6 in Syria

Confirmed Actions

US
Between August 1 and August 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 17
strikes consisting of 42 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, CJTF-OIR conducted 11 strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
36 engagements. This resulted in nine enemy killed, eight caves denied,
eight tunnels neutralized, and four successful terrain denial operations.
August 1, 2020 – August 31, 2020
Syria: 6 strikes
Between August 1 and August 31, 2020, CJTF-OIR conducted a total of 17
strikes consisting of 42 engagements in Iraq and Syria.

In Syria, CJTF-OIR conducted six strikes against Daesh targets consisting of
six engagements. This resulted in six terrain denial operations.   

UK MoD for August 20, 2020 – August 26, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

August 26, 2020

Summary

Thursday 20 August – an RAF Reaper struck a Daesh command post in a cave in northern Iraq.

Wednesday 26 August – an RAF Reaper attacked a second Daesh position and provided surveillance support to a coalition air strike in northern Iraq.

Detail
As part of the UK’s contribution to the Global Coalition in the fight against Daesh, the Royal Air Force continues to fly daily missions against the terrorist movement in Syria and Iraq. Our aircraft conduct strikes on terrorist targets when required.

Intelligence analysis confirmed that a Daesh leadership group had established a cave network 85 miles west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. An RAF Reaper kept a close watch on the location during the early hours of Thursday 20 August. When terrorists were identified at the cave entrance, the Reaper’s crew conducted an attack with a single Hellfire missile, having first swept the area for any signs of civilians who might be placed at risk. The missile struck the target accurately, and the blast was observed to emerge from another part of the cave network, indicating that weapon’s effect had reached deep inside the caves.

In addition to this, an RAF Reaper maintained surveillance on another set of caves in the area on Wednesday 26 August, which confirmed the presence of a number of Daesh extremists at the site. When terrorists were observed at the mouth of one of the caves, the Reaper’s crew engaged successfully with a Hellfire missile, then provided surveillance support to a follow-up attack by two coalition fast jets which struck the rest of the Daesh position.

Previous update
As part of the UK Armed Forces’ contribution to the global coalition against Daesh, our aircraft have continued to fly armed reconnaissance patrols in support of the Iraqi security forces, striking terrorist targets as necessary.

A Royal Air Force remotely piloted Reaper investigated on Sunday 31 May a location in northern Iraq, some seventeen miles west of Tuz Khurmatu, where a Daesh group had been identified as having established themselves at a bunker situated in the mountains. The Reaper’s crew conducted a thorough check of the area, finding no signs of any civilians nearby, but confirming the presence of several terrorists close to the bunker itself, who were attempting to conceal themselves in heavy foliage. The Reaper therefore conducted two attacks in succession, destroying the bunker with a GBU-12 guided bomb, then hitting those terrorists who were outside the bunker with a Hellfire missile.

On Wednesday 3 June, a pair of Typhoon FGR4s, supported by a Voyager air refuelling tanker, joined other coalition aircraft in an operation against Daesh positions which had been identified on a mountainous ridge some thirty-five miles north-west of Kirkuk. Having confirmed that there were no signs of civilians in the area, the Typhoons provided surveillance support to a strike by coalition jets, and were then allocated a cave, occupied by Daesh, as their own target. This position was struck with a single Paveway IV guided bomb, and Iraqi ground forces subsequently confirmed the attack to have been a success.

A further group of caves, situated thirty miles north-west of Tikrit, were confirmed as being used by Daesh both as accommodation and storage for improvised explosive devices. Two Typhoons were accordingly tasked to attack the terrorist position on Monday 22 June. Having checked the area for any civilians who might be at risk, four Paveway IVs were successfully used to strike four carefully selected targets within the cave network.

Intensive coalition surveillance efforts were able to confirm that another group of Daesh terrorists had established themselves in a cave network in the Makhmur mountains of northern Iraq. RAF Typhoons were therefore tasked with the destruction of this terrorist base on Wednesday 24 June. After the usual precautionary check of the area for civilians, our aircraft attacked with four Paveway IVs, all of which struck their targets successfully.

For more information see Daesh: UK government response page on GOV.UK

Report Date

August 26, 2020

Report Summary

  • 2 total strikes
  • 2 in Iraq

Confirmed Actions

UK
Intelligence analysis confirmed that a Daesh leadership group had established a cave network 85 miles west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq. An RAF Reaper kept a close watch on the location during the early hours of Thursday 20 August. When terrorists were identified at the cave entrance, the Reaper’s crew conducted an attack with a single Hellfire missile, having first swept the area for any signs of civilians who might be placed at risk. The missile struck the target accurately, and the blast was observed to emerge from another part of the cave network, indicating that weapon’s effect had reached deep inside the caves.
August 26, 2020
Iraq: 1 strikes
In addition to this, an RAF Reaper maintained surveillance on another set of caves in the area on Wednesday 26 August, which confirmed the presence of a number of Daesh extremists at the site. When terrorists were observed at the mouth of one of the caves, the Reaper’s crew engaged successfully with a Hellfire missile, then provided surveillance support to a follow-up attack by two coalition fast jets which struck the rest of the Daesh position.

Incident date

August 25, 2020

Incident Code

TI049

LOCATION

Bahrava, Nineveh, Iraq

Two civilians were reported killed in Sinjar, Iraq when Turkish drones allegedly struck two vehicles in the evening of August 25th, 2020. The exact location was identified by local sources as Bhrava, Khansur located in the northern Nineveh province. Iraqi Security Media reported that Turkish drones targeted a double-wheeled pickup truck in the village of

Summary

First published
August 25, 2020
Last updated
January 18, 2022
Strike status
Likely strike
Strike type
Airstrike, Drone Strike
Civilian harm reported
Yes
Civilians reported killed
0 – 2
Airwars civilian harm grading
Contested
Competing claims of responsibility e.g. multiple belligerents, or casualties also attributed to ground forces.
Suspected belligerent
Turkish Military
Suspected target
Other
View Incident →

French MoD for August 19, 2020 – August 25, 2020
Original
Annotated

Report Date

August 25, 2020

PROCHE MOYEN ORIENT – CHAMMAL

SITUATION MILITAIRE DU THÉÂTRE

L’opération Chammal se poursuit, et les Armées restent résolument engagées dans leur lutte contre l’organisation terroriste Daech, qui tente de reconstituer son réseau et poursuit ses actions violentes à bas niveau.

ACTIVITÉ DE LA FORCE

Ø Relève des postes de commandement
Cet été a vu la relève des postes de direction de l’opération Chammal.

Outre les relèves du commandant de la base aérienne projetée (BAP) au Levant et du commandement des éléments français en poste à Al Udeid au Qatar au sein du Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC), on notera celle du senior national représentative opératif (SNR-O).

En effet, le 14 juillet, le général de brigade aérienne Dominique Tardif a succédé au général Stéphane Dupont comme représentant national opératif de théâtre et chef du Directorate of Interagency and Civil Environment (DICE).

Ø L’opération Inherent Resolve s’adapte

La défaite de Daesh et l’autonomie acquise par les forces de sécurité irakiennes, notamment grâce au travail de formation et de conseil, réalisé par la coalition, dont la France, avec les Task Forces Narvik et Monsabert, imposent une adaptation et une réorganisation de certaines de l’opération Inherent Resolve (OIR).

Ce sont tout d’abord les actions civilo-militaires qui ont été repensées, avec la création du Directorate of Interagency and Civil Environment (DICE). Ce service, dirigé par le général Tardif, SNR-O de l’opération Chammal, se trouve au cœur des relations entre le gouvernement irakien, les acteurs militaires et les organisations internationales et non gouvernementales qui ont des représentants en Irak. Il a pour objectif de coordonner les activités de ces différentes entités dans les domaines de l’assistance humanitaire, du déminage, de l’aide d’urgence et de l’assistance à l’établissement des conditions de stabilisation de la zone.

C’est ensuite la « fonction formation » qui est complètement refondue. Une entité globale, le Military Advisory Group (MAG), est en charge de la politique de conseil qui sera désormais prodiguée aux hautes autorités militaires irakiennes, en particulier au sein du joint operation center – Irak (JOC-I), le centre de commandement des opérations de l’état-major irakien.

Cette mission est confiée à un nouvelle organe : le Joint Operations Advisory Team (JOCAT) qui est une équipe de conseil pour le commandement interarmées des opérations. Ce JOCAT, basé à Bagdad, sera dirigé par un colonel français et intègrera une trentaine de personnes. Quatre officiers français supplémentaires seront positionnés au sein de cette nouvelle structure

Sorties air hebdomadaires (bilan du 19 au 25 août inclus)

Les aéronefs français basés au Levant et aux Émirats arabes unis poursuivent leurs actions contre Daech, au sein de la Coalition. Cette semaine, les avions engagés dans l’opération Chammal ont réalisé 14 sorties aériennes.

Incident date

August 19, 2020

Incident Code

TI048

LOCATION

كانى ماز, Kani Masi, Duhok, Iraq

One civilian was allegedly killed by a Turkish airstrike on Kani Masi. Rudaw reported: “Khalid Abdulrahman, 60, was killed while trying to rescue his grazing livestock after several Turkish airstrike hit the village of Kani Mazin, according to Kani Masi Mayor Sarbast Akrey. ‘At 1:45pm a drone came and fired two rockets and then a

Summary

First published
August 19, 2020
Last updated
January 18, 2022
Strike status
Likely strike
Strike type
Airstrike
Civilian harm reported
Yes
Civilians reported killed
1
(1 man)
Cause of injury / death
Heavy weapons and explosive munitions
Airwars civilian harm grading
Fair
Reported by two or more credible sources, with likely or confirmed near actions by a belligerent.
Suspected belligerent
Turkish Military
Suspected target
Unknown
Named victims
1 named
View Incident →